Critical Threats Today - March 9, 2017

Egyptian military authorities invited Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar to attend an emergency meeting in Cairo, along with Russian and Emirati officials. The meeting will cover the LNA’s strategy to retake the Ras Lanuf and al Sidra oil ports from the Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB). The BDB, a militia coalition with hardline Islamist elements and ties to al Qaeda, likely has backing from Turkey and Qatar. Each party involved will promote a military solution in order to advance its own interests in Libya and the region, making a political reconciliation in Libya even less likely. (Related reading: Ignoring History: America’s Losing Strategy in Libya)

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/North (SPLM-N), a Sudanese rebel group, announced it detained three Boko Haram fighters on March 6. Boko Haram traditionally maintained a smuggling network in Sudan to facilitate car smuggling and human trafficking. It is unclear which faction of Boko Haram currently controls the smuggling network in Sudan.      

Al Shabaab militants seized El Baraf town in Middle Shabelle region, located 150 kilometers north of Mogadishu. Al Shabaab seized Barire and parts of Afgoi in Lower Shabelle region in January and February 2017. Al Shabaab has also targeted SNA and AMISOM forces along the main roads exiting Mogadishu. This campaign is likely intended to prevent the movement of SNA and AMISOM reinforcements between the capital and interior regions while setting conditions for al Shabaab’s eventual advance toward Mogadishu. (Related reading: US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?)

 An Emirati-backed al Hizam brigade, the primary force tasked with counterterrorism in Abyan, Aden, and Lahij governorates, is reportedly reducing its deployed forces by half. The reduction of deployed al Hizam forces will create a more permissive environment for AQAP and leave much of the anti-AQAP campaign in the region to local tribesmen. These tribesmen are more likely to side with AQAP than fight them when presented with the alternative of losing a ground campaign to the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. The absence of an effective ground force to coordinate with U.S. counterterrorism strikes increases the likelihood that AQAP will quickly reconstitute itself. The Hadi government is also failing to develop support in the areas it claims to govern. Security forces organized demonstrations over the Hadi government’s failure to pay salaries. AQAP will continue to benefit from the Hadi government’s inability to establish governance or security. (Recommended reading: Targeting AQAP: U.S. Airstrikes in Yemen)

Rezaei stated that President Donald Trump may see Rouhani’s behavior towards the U.S. as “weakness” and an opportunity to exploit Iran, and called on Rouhani to adopt a more direct stance. Rezaei’s comments should be viewed in light of a possible run in the May presidential elections. Rezaei ran and lost to Rouhani in the 2013 elections, and was named recently to the shortlist of possible candidates to represent the Popular Front of the Islamic Revolution Forces, the coalition of conservative groups challenging President Rouhani. Rezaei’s comments regarding Trump nonetheless represent a marked departure from other regime officials’ statements, which have urged caution in judging the U.S. president.