These are the major events from March 14 for Iran and for al Qaeda operations in Yemen and Africa. Please see the Iran News Roundup, the Gulf of Aden Security Review, and the weekly Threat Update for more details.
Iran
Prominent hardliner cleric Ayatollah Mezbah Yazdi’s refusal to support any political coalition in the forthcoming elections underscores the continuing division amongst Iran’s hardliners.Yemen
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) resumed attacks against al Houthi-Saleh forces in central Yemen.Prominent hardliner cleric Ayatollah Mezbah Yazdi’s refusal to support any political coalition in the forthcoming elections underscores the continuing division amongst Iran’s hardliners.
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, the spiritual leader of the hardline Steadfastness Front, stated that he does “not accept any coalition” and “will not promise to support” any particular candidate in the May presidential elections during a meeting with members of the principlist Islamic Coalition Party (ICP). Mesbah Yazdi has purportedly distanced himself previously from the Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces, the coalition of principlist groups dedicated to introducing a single conservative candidate to challenge President Hassan Rouhani. Yazdi’s distance is at least in part due to the unusual voting mechanism by which the Popular Front intends to select a candidate. The Popular Front has reached out to Mesbah Yazdi recently, however.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) resumed attacks against al Houthi-Saleh forces in central Yemen.
These attacks are the first claimed by AQAP in central Yemen since the U.S. conducted a barrage of airstrikes targeting the group between March 2 and 6. U.S. airstrikes will only temporarily disrupt AQAP’s operations while Yemeni factions prioritize fighting the civil war over counterterrorism operations. The Yemeni civil war perpetuates the conditions that allow AQAP to expand its support base. (Recommended reading: How the U.S. Should Re-Engage in Yemen)
Boko Haram emir Abu Bakr Shekau is trying to build his brand as a global Salafi-jihadi leader in order to win back support from ISIS leadership.
Boko Haram-Shekau released a video showing the execution of three alleged Nigerian spies on March 14. Shekau pledged allegiance to ISIS in March 2015, gaining recognition as the governor of ISIS’s Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah (West Africa Province). ISIS leadership later replaced Shekau with Abu Musab al Barnawi after Shekau failed to follow ISIS’s guidance. The video features branding specific to Shekau and pre-2015 Boko Haram juxtaposed over ISIS logos. Shekau is trying to show strength at a time when all factions of Boko Haram are struggling to conduct operations due to famine. ISIS leadership is very unlikely to reverse its position on Shekau, who has continued to violate ISIS’s guidance by using child female suicide bombers and indiscriminately targeting civilians.
Ansar al Islam, an AQIM associate based in Burkina Faso, receives support from rogue elements of the Burkinabe military.
Burkinabe intelligence confirmed evidence of correspondence between Ansar al Islam leader Mahama Ibrahim Dicko and Boubacar Sawadogo, a former commander of the now-disbanded Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP). Burkinabe security services arrested Sawadogo for trying to form a Burkinabe division of AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din in May 2016. The RSP was the personal guard of longtime Burkinabe president Blaise Compaore, who was deposed in 2015. The Burkinabe government disbanded the RSP after Compaore’s overthrow and incorporated its soldiers into the regular Burkinabe army. Connections to the RSP, if confirmed, would be a key source of strength for Ansar al Islam.
The Libyan National Army (LNA) recaptured key oil terminals in eastern Libya, but conflict will likely continue and spread.
The LNA seized the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals from the Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB), an Islamist militia coalition with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia that had seized the terminals on March 3. The LNA will likely advance toward Sirte and Jufra, where the BDB is based, in order to diminish the BDB’s capabilities and prevent future attacks on LNA positions. This advance would cause backlash from powerful factions, including moderate Islamist groups, which oppose any LNA incursion into central or western Libya. (Recommended reading: Ignoring History: America's Losing Strategy in Libya)