Africa File: Al Qaeda’s East Africa affiliate will gain from US withdrawal, regional instability

Africa File: Al Qaeda’s East Africa affiliate will gain from US withdrawal, regional instability

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Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s East African affiliate, will benefit from the expected withdrawal of US troops from Somalia and growing instability in Somalia and neighboring Ethiopia. Al Shabaab is the most determined among al Qaeda’s African affiliates to conduct external terror attacks and has been developing increasingly lethal capabilities. Recent US actions have targeted al Shabaab’s bomb-making capability, including terrorist designations and a November raid in which an American CIA officer was killed. The withdrawal of US forces would derail the US-trained Somali special forces that have pressured al Shabaab’s leadership and reduced its most brazen and destructive terror attacks inside Somalia.

A US withdrawal now will contribute to instability in Somalia, as the country prepares for a fraught election cycle. Al Shabaab will attempt to disrupt the elections and their aftermath and may benefit from rising tensions between Somalia and Kenya. The group will likely benefit from the withdrawal of thousands of Ethiopian forces amid a security crisis in northern Ethiopia. Al Shabaab may also seek to expand into Ethiopia directly if the current conflict leads to fragmentation and more widespread violence.

In this Africa File:

• Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government’s claimed victory in Tigray region will not end the current conflict.
• Somalia. A political crisis in Somalia is raising tensions between Somalia and Kenya and will likely disrupt Somalia’s national elections.
• Mozambique. The Islamic State–linked insurgency in Mozambique is destabilizing the Mozambican-Tanzanian border region.
• Sahel. Salafi-jihadi groups are increasing their attack capability against security forces in northern Mali and escalating attacks in northern Burkina Faso.
• Lake Chad. Boko Haram escalated attacks on civilians in northeastern Nigeria.

Latest publications:

• Ethiopia. CTP is publishing frequent updates on the Ethiopia crisis. Sign up to receive the latest updates by email here. Read Jessica Kocan’s latest update here and Emily Estelle’s background on the conflict here.
• West Africa. Large-scale prisoner releases and escapes will invigorate the global Salafi-jihadi movement at a time when it has ample opportunity to expand. Recent prisoner exchanges, escapes, and mass releases are returning thousands of insurgents to battlefields in West Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia and will accelerate the growth of several insurgencies. Read more from Rahma Bayrakdar and the Institute for the Study of War’s Eva Kahan here.

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East Africa

West Africa

Figure 1. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Africa: October 2020

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Source: Emily Estelle.

At a Glance: The Salafi-jihadi threat in Africa

Updated November 10, 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic will hasten the reduction of global counterterrorism efforts, which had already been rapidly receding as the US shifted its strategic focus to competition with China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. This reduction will almost certainly include Africa. The US Department of Defense is considering a significant drawdown of US forces engaged in counterterrorism missions on the continent. The ongoing shift away from US engagement in the Middle East and Africa will likely continue after the change in presidential administrations in early 2021.

This drawdown is happening as the Salafi-jihadi movement, including al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates and allies, continues to make gains in Africa, including in areas where previous counterterrorism efforts had significantly reduced Salafi-jihadi groups’ capabilities. The movement was already positioned to take advantage of the expected general reduction in counterterrorism pressure before the pandemic hit. Now, an increasingly likely wave of instability and government legitimacy crises will create more opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups to establish new support zones, consolidate old ones, increase attack capabilities, and expand to new areas of operations.

The Salafi-jihadi movement is on the offensive in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali, where al Qaeda–linked militants are insinuating themselves into local governance while the Malian government is preoccupied with the aftermath of a coup. An Islamic State–linked insurgency has also developed rapidly in northern Mozambique and is spilling over into Tanzania. Ethiopia’s civil war, ignited in November 2020, will lift pressure from al Shabaab in Somalia and will likely create new opportunities for the Salafi-jihadi movement, particularly if the Ethiopian crisis becomes a prolonged regional conflict. Salafi-jihadi insurgencies are also stalemated in Nigeria and persisting amid the war in Libya. Current conditions—including mass anti-government protests in Nigeria and a fragile cease-fire in Libya—will likely evolve in the Salafi-jihadi movement’s favor in the coming year.

Counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and Mali rest on the continued efforts of international coalitions, support for which is eroding in both host and troop-contributing countries and on local partners that have demonstrated their inability to govern effectively or establish legitimacy in their people’s eyes. Mali’s coup and its aftermath will also disrupt international and regional counterterrorism efforts and coordination. Libya’s civil war, which has been subsumed by overlapping regional conflicts, will likely remain a simmering conflict that will fuel the conditions of a Salafi-jihadi comeback.

Amid these conditions, US Africa Command is shifting its prioritization from the counterterrorism mission to great-power competition, a move that coincides with efforts to reduce risk after a 2017 attack killed four servicemen in Niger. US and European powers aim to turn over counterterrorism responsibilities to regional forces of limited effectiveness—such as the G5 Sahel, which is plagued by funding issues, and the African Union Mission in Somalia, which is beginning a scheduled drawdown.

The Salafi-jihadi movement has several main centers of activity in Africa: Mali and its environs, the Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, Libya, and now, northern Mozambique. These epicenters are networked, allowing recruits, funding, and expertise to flow among them. The rise of the Salafi-jihadi movement in these and any other places is tied to the circumstances of Sunni Muslim populations. The movement takes root when Salafi-jihadi groups can forge ties to vulnerable populations facing existential crises such as civil war, communal violence, or state neglect or abuse (all now likely to be exacerbated by the pandemic). Local crises are incubators for the Salafi-jihadi movement and can become the basis for future attacks against the US and its allies.

East Africa