Africa File: Ethiopia crisis spreads beyond Tigray

Africa File: Ethiopia crisis spreads beyond Tigray

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The civil war in northern Ethiopia is spreading and poses a serious risk to the stability of the entire country. Tigrayan forces crossed from Tigray into neighboring Afar region, weeks after recapturing Tigray’s regional capital from Ethiopian federal forces. Tigrayan forces could severely disrupt the Ethiopian economy if they gain control of key road and rail lines in Afar that connect Ethiopia to the sea through neighboring Djibouti. The conflict is already fueling a dire humanitarian crisis in northern Ethiopia.

Widespread and persistent conflict in Ethiopia—home to Africa’s second-largest population—would create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including Somalia’s al Shabaab, which has tried and largely failed to gain a foothold in Ethiopia in the past. The Ethiopia crisis comes as al Shabaab wages offensives in Somalia and seeks to capitalize on that country’s ongoing political dysfunction.

In this Africa File:

• Ethiopia. Tigrayan forces advanced into a neighboring region and may soon threaten critical transit routes between landlocked Ethiopia and coastal Djibouti.
• Somalia. The US military conducted the first drone strike in Somalia under the Joe Biden administration to support Somali forces countering al Shabaab advances in north-central Somalia.
• Sahel. France’s president announced a plan to end the French counterterrorism mission in Mali. Rising Salafi-jihadi violence in Burkina Faso caused mass protests.
• Lake Chad. The Islamic State’s branch in Nigeria is strengthening following the death of Boko Haram’s leader.

Latest publications:

• Africa. Salafi-jihadi insurgencies are costing Africa billions of dollars that should be fueling economic growth and better governance. Read Emily Estelle’s analysis in AEIdeas here.
• Mozambique. Emily Estelle traces the development of the Islamic State in Mozambique for Foreign Policy, arguing that “getting policies right in Mozambique could set a new and better precedent for the fight against Salafi-jihadi insurgencies in Africa in general.” Read the piece here.
• Mozambique. Emily Estelle and Jessica Trisko Darden updated the analysis from their February 2021 report on the Islamic State in Mozambique for Orbis. Read the article here.

Read Further On:

East Africa

West Africa

Figure 1. The Salafi-jihadi movement in Africa: July 2021

View full image here.

Source: Authors.

Overview: The Salafi-jihadi threat in Africa

Updated July 1, 2021

The Salafi-jihadi movement, which includes al Qaeda and the Islamic State, is active across Northern, Eastern, and Western Africa and is expanding and deepening its presence on the continent (Figure 1). This movement, like any insurgency, draws strength from access to vulnerable and aggrieved populations. Converging trends, including failing states and regional instability, are creating favorable conditions for the Salafi-jihadi movement’s expansion. Meanwhile, counterterrorism efforts rely on the continued efforts of international coalitions, support for which is eroding, and on states and local authorities that have demonstrated an inability to govern effectively.

West Africa. The Salafi-jihadi movement has spread rapidly in West Africa by exploiting ethnic grievances and state weaknesses that include human rights abuses, corruption, and ineffectiveness. An al Qaeda affiliate co-opted the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and has continued to expand southward through the Sahel region into central Mali and the peripheries of Burkina Faso. An Islamic State–linked group is active in the same area, particularly western Niger and parts of Burkina Faso.

Sahel groups have not yet plotted attacks outside West Africa but have sought to drive Western security and economic presence out of the region while building lucrative smuggling and kidnapping-for-ransom enterprises. An al Qaeda–linked group in Mali is infiltrating governance structures, advancing an overarching Salafi-jihadi objective, and expanding into Gulf of Guinea countries. West Africa has become an area of focus for transnational Salafi-jihadi organizations, with rival jihadists now fighting for dominance in the Sahel. Meanwhile, political instability, particularly in Mali, threatens local and international counterterrorism efforts.

The Islamic State’s largest African affiliate is based in northwest Nigeria—Africa’s most populous country—and conducts frequent attacks into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Boko Haram and an al Qaeda–linked splinter group are also active in this region. The death of Boko Haram’s longtime leader in May 2021 may lead to short-term intra-jihadist turmoil but will likely benefit the Islamic State’s Nigerian branch in time.

New instability in Chad, whose longtime president was killed in April 2021, may lift pressure from Salafi-jihadi groups in both Mali and the Lake Chad Basin, where Chadian forces participate in regional counterterrorism efforts.

East Africa. Al Shabaab, an al Qaeda affiliate and the dominant Salafi-jihadi group in East Africa, is vocal about its intent to attack US interests and has begun to plot international terror attacks. The group enjoys de facto control over broad swathes of southern Somalia and can project power in the Somali federal capital Mogadishu and regional capitals, where it regularly attacks senior officials. It seeks to delegitimize and replace the weak Somali Federal Government—a task made easier by endemic political dysfunction, corruption, and an ongoing constitutional crisis. Al Shabaab’s governance ambitions extend to ethnic Somali populations in Kenya and Ethiopia, and the group conducts regular attacks in eastern Kenya.

Al Shabaab is positioned to benefit from eroding security conditions in East Africa. Ethiopia’s destabilization is already having regional effects, including weakening counter–al Shabaab efforts in Somalia. The drawing down of the US and African Union counterterrorism missions in Somalia will also reduce pressure on al Shabaab.

The Islamic State has also penetrated the region. Islamic State branches are now active in northern Somalia, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and northern Mozambique, bordering Tanzania. The insurgency caused French company Total to shutter a multibillion-dollar natural gas project in northern Mozambique that was the continent’s largest private investment. The Islamic State foothold in Mozambique also marks the Salafi-jihadi movement’s expansion into southern Africa.

North Africa. Salafi-jihadi groups in North Africa are at a low point, but the fragility and grievances that led to their rise remain. The Arab Spring uprisings and subsequent security vacuums allowed Salafi-jihadi groups to organize and forge ties with desperate and coerced populations. The Islamic State’s rise brought a peak in Salafi-jihadi activity in North Africa, particularly from its branches in Libya and Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Counterterrorism pressure has weakened Salafi-jihadi groups across North Africa in the past five years.

The insurgencies in Libya and the Sinai are active but contained, and terrorist attacks across the region have decreased. Libya’s political and security crisis will continue to create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, and severe instability or collapse in any North African state would likely bring the Salafi-jihadi threat back to the surface.

East Africa

Ethiopia