A Violent Summer in the North Caucasus: Analysis of the Ingushetia Bombing

The suicide bomb attack in Nazran, Ingushetia on Monday, August 17 was hardly surprising, given the rising turmoil in the North Caucasus over the past year. It was but one incident in a long list of violence and terrorism (though it caused the most casualties, by far) that has wracked the North Caucasus this summer. It seems it was not even a surprise to the Ingushetian police, who had been informed about a “planned terrorist attack using a yellow GAZel [the vehicle involved]” on Saturday, August 15.[1] Officials estimate that 25 people died (mostly police officers) and around 280 people were wounded in the attack, which occurred early Monday morning when a suicide bomber drove a car full of explosives into the gates of the police headquarters in Nazran, Ingushetia’s largest city.[2] As the blast set off ammunition within the police headquarters, surrounding buildings and cars were severely damaged. Riyadus Salikhin, a Chechen separatist martyr brigade founded by the notorious terrorist Shamil Basayev in 2002and revived earlier this year, claimed responsibility on August 21 for not only the Nazran attack, but also the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric dam disaster in Siberia that occurred the same day.[3] This southern Siberian dam suffered a large explosion (triggered by an anti-tank grenade, according to Riyadus Salikhin) that flooded the plant, killing 17 workers (with another 58 missing and presumed dead) and causing serious energy shortages in the region.[4] In a letter posted on a Chechen separatist website, Riyadus Salikhin announced that the Chechen separatist leadership decided to “make active economic war against Russia in its territory,” and trumpeted their success in the “destruction of the occupying and puppet bandit groups ROVD and GOVD.”[5] While most analysts consider the Sayano-Shushenskaya claim to be opportunistic propaganda (Russian investigators have found no evidence of a bomb and blame the deteriorated infrastructure[6]), it is no stretch to believe that Riyadus Salikhin carried out the Nazran bombings, probably with the help of Ingushetian rebels.

While Russian President Dmitry Medvedev quickly denounced the Nazran bombing as a terrorist act, he also harshly chastised the Ingushetian police for their poor performance and fired the Interior Minister of Ingushetia, declaring, “This act of terrorism could have been prevented.”[7] Ingushetian President Yanus-Bek Yevkurov, himself recently the victim of a car-bomb assassination attempt, identified a different culprit, “I am far from the thought that the Arabs stand up for all this business. There are other powers, much more serious. …The States and Great Britain. Including Israel. It is quite true.”[8] Both Medvedev and Yevkurov failed to identify the real problems behind the recent bombing, which is just one of many terrorist and violent acts to take place in the North Caucasus this summer.

Contrary to Medvedev’s statement, it is not police ineptitude that has turned Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia into a hotbed of violence, nor is Yevkurov correct in blaming the West (or the Arabs). Rather than address the serious issues of repression, poverty, corruption and massive human rights abuses in these republics, the Kremlin has chosen to install authoritarian regimes that offer favorable election turnout in return for huge quantities of aid—aid that further feeds the widespread corruption and abuse in the region. It is thus Moscow’s (and by extension, the local governments’) own policies that are to blame for the surge in violence and terrorism in the North Caucasus.

The list of terrorist and other violent acts in the North Caucasus over the past 3 months is quite extensive[9]:

Some of these attacks can be attributed to the annual upswing in violence in the summer in the North Caucasus, but this summer the region has seen more attacks than usual, including the deadliest attacks in both Ingushetia and Dagestan in recent years.[10] These attacks are in stark contrast to the optimistic proclamations of the Russian and republic governments. On April 16 2009, Russia announced the end of formal counterterror operations in Chechnya. Just aweek later, on April 24, the Kremlin was forced to expand its counterterror operations in three main districts of Chechnya because of militant plans to commit terrorist acts.[11] The militants called the end of counterterror operations propaganda and announced their continued plans to fight.[12] While militant violence and activity has fallen in the republic since Ramzan Kadyrov came to power (first as prime minister in March 2006 and then as president in February 2007), stability in the republic is an illusion. Kadyrov’s militias, known as the Kadyrovtsy, use violence, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings and other human rights abuses to control the population through fear (and enrich themselves), while the Chechen republic relies heavily on Kremlin handouts for reconstruction and basic needs. Despite Kadyrov’s repeated claims that the remaining militants in Chechnya are foreign interlopers, the combined social and security policies of the Russian troops and Kadyrovtsy continue to drive more young Chechens “into the woods” to join the militants. Punitive measures such as disappearances, beatings, house burnings, rapes, killings and fines are all used against anyone suspected of being connected to the militants or related to a militant, with the goal of forcing militants to come out of the woods. Instead, they often backfire and lead more young men (and sometimes women) to join the militants in search of revenge.

Another popular theory is that all violence elsewhere in the North Caucasus, primarily Ingushetia and Dagestan, is the result of fighters fleeing Kadyrov’s crackdown and trying to spread the rebellion.[13] Certainly, the 2007 proclamation of the North Caucasus Emirate by Chechen separatist government leader Dokku Umarov (who proclaimed himself Emir of the North Caucasus at the same time) subsequent declarations of the need to unite it under Shariat law lend themselves to this argument.[14] However, while fleeing fighters and the region-wide aspirations of the Chechen separatist leadership have contributed to the violence in other republics, the root cause lies within the republics and Kremlin policy.

All over the North Caucasus, unemployment is high (estimated at 50 percent for the region) and, in the absence of a strong alternative, the clan system continues to control society.[15] The local economy is far from strong, and the region relies heavily on the roughly $3 billion in yearly aid that regional governments receive from Moscow.[16] In exchange for this money and a relatively free hand to govern, local authorities proffer their loyalty and support to the Kremlin and serve as an extension of its control. The Kremlin ignores crackdowns on the population at large for dissent or protest, particularly when the crackdowns go hand-in-hand with counterterror operations of the Chechen variety (punitive measures and human rights abuses meant to scare the populace into cooperation with officials). However, this policy has proven less reliable in recent years, leading Moscow to consider, and implement, leadership change. In Dagestan, President Mukhu Aliev’s first term is nearly up and rumors are swirling that Moscow intends to replace him. However, while Moscow’s motives might be to increase, stability, these rumors are instead fueling a power struggle in the already turbulent political environment of ethnic and clan factions.[17] Add this to recent social unrest resulting from electricity cutoffs in major cities across Dagestan (as the city governments cannot pay the electric companies), and the domestic scene in Dagestan is far from stable.[18] Meanwhile, militant activity continues to increase as the security forces’ ruthless counterterrorism campaigns push more young men “into the woods.” Shariat Jamaat, a militant Islamic group founded in 2002 that joined with the Chechen separatists in 2005 and now reports to Dokku Umarov, engages in shootouts and attacks on Dagestani security forces almost daily, and claimed responsibility for the assassination of Dagestan’s Interior Minister, Adilgerei Magomedtagirov, on June 9, 2009.[19] Despite Dagestani officials’ recent success against the group in the capital, Makhachkala, Shariat Jamaat has increased its activity in other parts of Dagestan, proving it is still a strong threat to the republic.[20] 

Replacing an unpopular leader does not necessarily bring much more stability or success, as the Kremlin found with Ingushetia. A loyal former KGB and FSB member, Murat Zyazikov, served as the republic’s president from May 2002 until forced to resign in October 2008 under growing public pressure. Though he maintained tight control over the republic in his early years, the last few were increasingly marred by significant civil unrest, violence, and a strong, civil opposition. His rule was marked by corruption and further impoverishment of the republic, as well as serious civil and human rights violations by police and local authorities. Ingushetia surpassed both Chechnya and Dagestan as the most unstable and violent North Caucasian republic, with attacks on police and security occurring daily. After the rigged elections in March 2008, Ingushetia’s clans responded by choosing delegates for a shadow National Assembly.[21] When prominent opposition journalist Magomed Yevloyev was found shot after being taken into police custody (an accident that occurred when he grabbed for a policeman’s gun, Zyazikov assured the public), the situation turned to chaos.[22] Zyazikov’s inability to handle the mass protests and increase in violence and social disturbances that followed proved to be the last straw for the Kremlin, and on October 31, 2008, Medvedev accepted Zyazikov’s voluntary resignation and appointed Yanus-Bek Yevkurov in his place. Yevkurov, a career military intelligence officer, was welcomed with cautious hope for his lack of ties to Zyazikov’s corrupt government, and his willingness to meet with the Ingush opposition. There was a brief lull in violence, but though his efforts to combat corruption and work with the opposition calmed the social and civil unrest, he did not effectively address the police brutality that provoked so many attacks and inspired young men to turn to the militants. Though Yevkurov also planned to decrease the republic’s reliance on federal aid (which amounts to roughly 80 percent of the republic’s budget), he has been unable to do so and complained in March 2009 of the problems the republic faced because Moscow was slow in giving it the 29 billion rubles (approximately $909 million) Medvedev promised him in January.[23] Without the funding or political will to back his attempted reforms, the situation in Ingushetia has only worsened.

In this context, it is no wonder that the summer of 2009 has been particularly violent in the North Caucasus. The economic crisis is hitting the already heavily impoverished North Caucasus republics hard as Moscow struggles to deliver the billions of aid they rely on. Meanwhile, social discontent and unrest increase, while harsh crackdowns on large parts of the population and large scale human rights abuses drive more and more people to sympathize with and join the militants. In turn, republic and federal security forces crackdown even harder on militants and the population alike, leading to more violence and more new recruits for the militants. Even Ingushetia’s Yevkurov, who once offered amnesty to most militants, seems to have turned into a hardliner as a result of the attempt on his life. Upon returning to Ingushetia on August 22, he declared that “the fight [against terrorism] will continue without mercy.”[24] Until Moscow seriously considers changing its policies, it (and the North Caucasus) will continue to be trapped in the current morass of worsening violence.