Africa File, April 10, 2025: The RSF’s Northern Sudan Campaign

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have highly publicized a drone and ground campaign against the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in northern Sudan. The RSF has increased drone attacks on SAF military and power infrastructure in northern Sudan since November 2024. The RSF conducted 50 drone attacks targeting major infrastructure sites in Northern state and River Nile state in northern Sudan between October 2024 and March 2025, compared to the 10 drone attacks in the same region between April 2024 and September 2024.[1] Roughly half of these attacks targeted the SAF-controlled Merowe Dam, Dongola Airport, and Atbara Airport.[2]

Figure 1. RSF Drone Attacks in Northern State and River Nile State, 2024–2025

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The RSF has also advanced in North Darfur state toward Northern state since late March. The RSF captured al Mahla—an operationally significant town located on a road to Northern state and approximately 110 miles (185 kilometers) north of the North Darfur capital, al Fasher—on March 20.[3] The RSF also took control over al Rahid--a mining town on the border of North Darfur and Northern state--and al Atrun, which is 55 miles northwest of al Rahid, in early April.[4]

Figure 2. Control of Terrain in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

RSF threats against SAF-controlled areas in northern Sudan likely aim to boost RSF morale after RSF losses in Khartoum. The SAF recaptured Khartoum from the RSF in late March and has advanced against the RSF in Khartoum’s twin city Omdurman in recent weeks as part of an offensive that began in October 2024.[5] The SAF capture of Khartoum on March 26 marked a major military and political victory for the SAF.[6] SAF control over Khartoum bolsters the SAF political claim to be the only legitimate ruler in Sudan. The SAF recapture of the capital is also a military victory that gives the SAF control of the eastern bank of the Nile River, which the SAF can use to prepare for future offensives against the RSF center of gravity in western Sudan. Control over the eastern bank cuts RSF supply lines to the eastern side of the Nile River. The defeat is a strategic setback to the RSF and its efforts to control the capital in order to present itself as a legitimate national power and more than its historical background as a western Sudan– and Darfur-based rebel movement.   

Figure 3. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

RSF leader Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, has attempted to rally RSF fighters despite the RSF’s loss of Khartoum. Hemedti gave a speech on March 15 and threatened to “invade” Port Sudan despite the RSF not being present any territory within 430 miles of the SAF administrative capital on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.[7] Hemedti wore a traditional head covering associated with his traditional base of fighters in Darfur—the notorious and genocidal Janjaweed—during the speech, likely as a rallying cry to the RSF support base in western Sudan.[8] Hemedti on March 30 called the RSF loss of Khartoum a “tactical retreat” and said that the RSF would return to the capital city “more powerful.”[9] Hemedti’s speeches are at odds with videos of SAF units repeatedly ambushing RSF fighters as the RSF fled Khartoum and the disorderly retreat of hundreds of RSF fighters across the last remaining RSF exit from the city, however.[10] Hemedti has made similarly lofty statements about expelling the SAF from “northern regions” and Northern state in late March as part of this rhetorical campaign.[11]

The RSF’s military campaign has limited strategic value and is likely linked to the failed RSF campaign to hold Khartoum and the separate RSF campaign to protect its core territory in western Sudan. Further RSF gains in Northern state would likely be costly with limited strategic benefit for the RSF. The RSF would face challenges in achieving strategic objectives to expand the area it governs in Sudan by consolidating control over large population centers in Northern state.[12] The closest RSF fighters to the Northern state capital, Dongola, are currently located more than 230 miles west of the city. The flat, desert terrain also makes RSF forces there vulnerable to SAF airstrikes.  The SAF has drones with ranges between 60 and 2,500 miles and could strike RSF positions in Northern state from several SAF-controlled areas in Sudan.[13] Egypt also views a significant RSF incursion into Northern state and closer to the Egyptian border as a potential security risk that would presumably warrant greater Egyptian support for the SAF. SAF leader Abdel Fattah al Burhan assured the Egyptian intelligence chief that the SAF would maintain security in Northern state despite RSF attacks, according to Sudanese media on April 9.[14]

The RSF attacks on SAF infrastructure in northern Sudan likely aimed to degrade SAF governance and military capabilities in Khartoum as part of the RSF’s failed campaign to hold the capital. Merowe Dam generates 40–60 percent of Sudan’s electricity and is the largest hydroelectric dam in the country.[15] RSF attacks on the dam have caused widespread blackouts in SAF-controlled areas, including Khartoum and Omdurman.[16] The blackouts undermine the SAF’s ability to provide public services to civilians and risk reducing SAF morale more broadly.[17] The Atbara and Dongola airports sit on key SAF supply lines that connect Khartoum, Northern state, and Port Sudan, which is the current seat of the SAF-aligned government.[18] The SAF additionally uses Atbara Airport as a base to conduct drone strikes against RSF positions in Khartoum.[19]

SAF ground gains in North Darfur and toward Northern state likely aim to create a buffer zone for the group’s core territory in western Sudan. The SAF-aligned Darfur Joint Forces in this area of North Darfur and Northern state pressure RSF supply lines and threaten to reinforce the SAF base in al Fasher, which is the capital of North Darfur that the RSF has besieged since April 2024.[20] The Darfur Joint Forces heightened the threat to the RSF when they reinforced al Mahla and recruited new fighters from areas west of al Mahla along the Chad-Sudan border in early March 2025.[21]

Figure 4. External Support in Sudan's Civil War

Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.

[1] Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) database, available at www.acleddata.com

[2] Armed Conflict Location and Event (ACLED) database, available at www.acleddata.com

[3] https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-captures-strategic-desert-city

[4] https://t.me/RSFSudan/7549; https://t.me/RSFSudan/7578

[5] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudans-army-shells-omdurman-push-oust-rsf-capital-region-2025-03-27/; https://acleddata.com/2024/10/14/turning-the-tide-the-safs-strategic-offensive-in-khartoum-and-the-rsfs-setbacks-sudan-october-2024/; https://x.com/Mustafa_sdm1/status/1908127538972385489; https://sudantribune.com/article299431/; https://sudantribune.com/article299492/ 

[6] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-27-2025-saf-liberates-khartoum-burundi-and-rwanda-tensions#Sudan

[7] https://sudantribune.com/article298628/

[8] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1901262173277401311

[9] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/30/sudans-rsf-confirms-retreat-from-khartoum-eyes-stronger-return

[10] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1904864713961242983; https://x.com/SudaneseAF/status/1901256269438067136; https://x.com/Droo3sd/status/1901245196400029834 

[11] https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/03/02/sudanese-army-joint-forces-rsf-deploy-new-forces-in-north-darfur; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/02/27/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B9; https://t.me/GeneralDagalo/604

[12] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-27-2025-saf-liberates-khartoum-burundi-and-rwanda-tensions

[13] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/drones-over-sudan-foreign-powers-in-sudans-civil-war

[14] https://sudantribune.net/article299501/

[15] https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/protest-in-sudan-capital-by-merowe-dam-affected; https://sudantribune.com/article295881/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/blackouts-hit-wide-swathes-army-controlled-sudan-after-drone-attacks-2025-01-18/ 

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/blackouts-hit-wide-swathes-army-controlled-sudan-after-drone-attacks-2025-01-18/; https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/04/05/attack-on-hydroelectric-dam-causes-power-blackouts-in-khartoum-and-northern-sudan/; https://sudantribune.com/article299398/  

[17] https://observers.france24.com/en/africa/20250228-saving-lives-in-whatever-way-we-can-amid-power-crisis-sudan-s-hospitals-strive-to-keep-running; https://x.com/osamahatim/status/1909271563859345573; https://x.com/yasseralfadol/status/1904893011609174193;  https://x.com/SUNA_AGENCY/status/1909321092923093309; https://x.com/hash_sudan/status/1887553091307811281; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-march-27-2025-saf-liberates-khartoum-burundi-and-rwanda-tensions#Sudan 

[18] https://sudantribune.net/article293477/; https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-and-world/2025/04/07/%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%81-%D9%85%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%82%D9%84%D8%A7-%D8%A8%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9

[19] https://x.com/Dinlas3/status/1896034232675549526

[20] https://x.com/ArkoMinawi/status/1895438545663218112; https://x.com/MmfNazar79432/status/1895348504522039742; https://sudantribune.com/article279446/; https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-army-repels-new-rsf-attack-on-famine-stricken-north-darfur-camp; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b198-halting-catastrophic-battle-sudans-el-fasher

[21] https://www.darfur24 dot com/en/2025/03/02/sudanese-army-joint-forces-rsf-deploy-new-forces-in-north-darfur; https://www.darfur24 dot com/2025/02/27/%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B9