Africa File, April 24, 2025: JNIM’s Growing Pressure on Benin; Turkey to Somalia; Salafi-Jihadi Cells Continue to Grow Across Nigeria

Contributor: Kathryn Tyson

CTP will cover recent developments regarding peace talks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a special edition of the Congo War Security Review this week.

Data Cutoff: April 24, 2025, at 10 a.m.

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The Critical Threats Project’s Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Benin. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in the Sahel carried out its deadliest-ever attack in Benin as it continues to increase the lethality of its operations in Benin throughout 2025. The latest attacks are significantly more lethal despite no increase in frequency. Benin is a key US security partner in West Africa. Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen’s (JNIM’s) growing strength in Benin undermines US efforts to contain the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in the Sahel and to demonstrate to African states that the West is a more effective and reliable security partner than Russia.

Somalia. Turkey has deployed 400 troops to Somalia, as it develops its partnership with the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and its position around the Red Sea. Turkey reportedly plans to send up to 2,500 troops to help implement deals with the SFG, ranging from oil and gas exploration to naval support. Turkey may be responding partly to the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and possible cuts in Western defense support to Somalia.

Nigeria. Salafi-jihadi factions are strengthening in Nigeria outside the typical hotspots in the northeastern parts of the country. These factions in north-central and northwestern Nigeria have ties to Boko Haram and the al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates in West Africa. These factions could facilitate these groups’ activities around the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel.

Assessments:

Benin

Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has intensified its attacks in Benin, including a recent attack that is the group’s deadliest-ever operation in Benin. “Dozens” of militants from Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) simultaneously attacked Beninese positions at Koudou Falls and Point Triple and a patrol on the road to Point Triple in the Park W complex along the Benin–Burkina Faso border on April 17.[1] JNIM claimed on April 20 that the attacks killed at least 70 soldiers and published videos showing dozens of dead bodies and extensive loot from the attack.[2] Beninese officials confirmed on April 24 that the attack killed at least 54 soldiers.[3] This makes the attack the most deadly JNIM attack against Beninese forces, surpassing another JNIM attack on Point Triple in January 2025 that killed at least 28 Beninese soldiers.[4]

Figure 1. JNIM’s Area of Operations in Northeastern Benin

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The recent attack is the latest indicator of the growing threat of the JNIM subgroup in this area—Katiba Hanifa—in Benin in 2025. Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED)—supplemented with the latest casualty figures from the Park W attack—shows that JNIM attacks in Benin have caused more fatalities so far in 2025 (157) than they did in the entirety of 2024 (103) and are on pace to more than quintuple this figure before the end of 2025.[5] JNIM has not increased the rate of its attacks, however, and is on pace to conduct 25 percent fewer attacks in 2025 than it did in 2024.[6] These figures are approximate—as ACLED uses independently verified or official figures over insurgent claims—and include JNIM fatalities incurred in JNIM-initiated attacks.[7] These numbers highlight the increased scale of JNIM attacks in Benin broadly, however. Analyst Charlie Werb calculated that Benin’s losses in 2025 are equal to 80 percent of the Beninese forces killed in action over the previous three years.[8]

Figure 2. JNIM Intensifies Attacks in Benin

Note: Fatalities include civilian, militant, and soldier fatalities from JNIM-initiated engagements (attacks).

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data; Critical Threats Project.

JNIM attacks may subside in the coming months with the onset of the local rainy season. CTP assessed in October 2024 that JNIM would likely increase the scale of its attacks in Benin and Togo between November and April, during the local dry season.[9] The drier conditions enable JNIM fighters to more easily move through their support zones in the park complexes that straddle the borders of the littoral countries and the Sahel countries.[10] Seasonal rains often reduce access to and from JNIM’s support zones in the park networks along the borders of Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Togo.[11] JNIM significantly increased its rate of attacks in Benin during the last dry season, when the group averaged over 14 attacks per month, compared with fewer than four attacks per month during the 2024 rainy season.[12]

JNIM likely aims to strengthen its rear support zones in Benin. JNIM initially escalated activity against Benin and Togo in 2022 in response to heightened counterinsurgency activity from both countries that threatened its rear support zones.[13] Attacks in Benin have grown more deadly each year since 2021.[14] Most JNIM attacks on Benin and its neighbor, Togo—especially its deadliest attacks—have targeted security forces along the border with Burkina Faso.[15] This pattern further indicates that the group is trying to degrade border security to strengthen its cross-border rear support zones.

Katiba Hanifa may have increased attacks in Benin to strengthen rear support zones in response to increased counterterrorism pressure on its forward support zones on the Burkinabe and Nigerien side of the border. Burkinabe and Nigerien forces have each already conducted more operations in these areas in 2025 than they did in the entirety of 2024 and are both on pace to more than quintuple their 2024 rate of activity.[16] This pressure may have forced Katiba Hanifa fighters to seek refuge in Benin.

Katiba Hanifa additionally looted critical equipment—drones, machine guns, and mortars—that will boost its capabilities.[17] Katiba Hanifa has increased the frequency of mortar attacks in Burkina Faso in 2025 since it seized mortar equipment from Beninese forces in the January attack on Point Triple.[18] Katiba Hanifa will likely use the drones that it acquired in the recent attack to coordinate attacks and drop explosives, as JNIM subgroups have done in other parts of the Sahel.[19] Katiba Hanifa has looted drones in attacks in Burkina Faso and conducted its first attack using a drone to drop explosives in Burkina Faso in March and possibly a second attack in Togo in April.[20]

A lack of counterterrorism coordination between Benin and its Burkinabe and Nigerien neighbors has likely created security gaps and facilitated JNIM’s offensive. Cross-border military cooperation has decreased since the coups in Burkina Faso and Niger in 2022 and 2023, respectively.[21] Burkina Faso and Niger have additionally withdrawn from several regional coordinating bodies in recent years.[22] UN officials have warned repeatedly that decreased coordination is creating gaps for insurgents to exploit.[23]

The United Nations reported in July 2024 that JNIM cells based in Burkina Faso conduct most of the group’s attacks in the littoral countries to establish support zones over resources and logistic corridors that are essential for expansion.[24] JNIM attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger have separately expanded the group’s weapon stockpiles that it uses in attacks in Benin.[25] Increased Beninese intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts have failed to sufficiently replace multilateral counterterrorism coordination and cannot deny JNIM the space to organize attacks.[26]

JNIM’s growing strength in Benin challenges US efforts in the Gulf of Guinea to contain the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency and show that the West is a more effective and reliable defense partner than Russia. The United States named Benin a key partner in bolstering resilience to security threats in West Africa and is heavily engaged with Benin via programs such as the US Global Fragility Act and the US-German Coastal States Stability Mechanism.[27] Both initiatives aim to enhance security through political, humanitarian, and military efforts that increase community resilience and address the root political causes of instability, such as a lack of social cohesion and effective governance.[28]

Benin has emerged as one of the primary US defense partners in West Africa since the United States withdrew from Niger in September 2024, after the Nigerien coup in July 2023.[29] The Wall Street Journal reported in September 2024 that the United States spent $4 million to refurbish an airfield in Parakou, Benin.[30] US Africa Command has stationed helicopters and medics in Parakou to evacuate Beninese soldiers who are wounded in clashes with insurgents in northern Benin and a special forces team stationed in Cotonou to advise Beninese troops.[31] Beninese military leaders have praised the partnership with the United States and said that the United States remains Benin’s preferred security partner.[32]

The US partnership also helps counter Russia’s efforts to usurp the United States and other Western countries as primary defense partners in Africa. French-led and Western-backed counterterrorism efforts in the central Sahel failed to defeat or permanently degrade the Sahelian Salafi-jihadi insurgency in the decade that Western and UN forces were present in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.[33] This failure contributed to governance collapse and the rise of military juntas in all three central Sahelian countries.[34] Russia exploited this shift to partner with the juntas, who rejected the Western approach, and entrench itself in the region.[35] US and other Western officials have framed their efforts in the littoral states as a way to apply lessons learned from the Sahel to contain the insurgency and show that the West is a more effective partner than Russia.[36] Beninese military leaders have used this framing and implied that the United States–Benin partnership would serve as a referendum on US credibility as a defense partner in Africa.[37]

Somalia

Turkey deployed at least 400 troops to the TURKSOM base in Mogadishu on April 21 as part of its growing strategic partnership with the Somali Federal Government (SFG). The troops are reportedly part of a larger force of around 2,500 soldiers.^[38] Unspecified sources told Somali media that additional troops will arrive in the coming weeks and months.^[39] Multiple sources reported that the force is related to Turkish parliament’s approval of a two-year deployment to Somalia in July 2024.[40] Turkey plans to use the troops to help implement and provide security for several agreements that it reached with the SFG in 2024.[41] Somali media said that Turkish forces will help build a rocket launch test site, support oil exploration projects, secure Turkish facilities, and provide air support and training to Somali forces.^[42] The deployment followed meetings between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara in late March and occurred as top Turkish and Somali defense officials met in Turkey.^[43] Erdoğan and Mohamud agreed to increase bilateral defense and economic cooperation, particularly on counterterrorism and trade.^[44]

Turkey has been a major actor in Somalia since the early 2010s and has continued to expand its economic and military leverage around the Red Sea through its partnership with the SFG.[45] Turkey established its first African military base in Mogadishu in 2017 and deployed military trainers to Somalia to help develop the Haramcad and Gorgor special operations forces.[46] Turkish naval forces have operated off Somalia’s coast as part of international efforts to combat piracy since 2009.[47] Turkey will expand its influence in these critical waterways thanks to a naval deal that it signed with Somalia in 2024 to protect Somalia’s coastline while training the defunct Somali navy.[48] Turkey manages the Port of Mogadishu, and recent deals with the SFG will give Turkey a significant share of the revenue from the six billion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves and the potential 30 billion barrels of oil in Somalia’s offshore exclusive economic zone.[49]

Turkey may be responding partly to the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and potential Western cuts in defense support to Somalia. Al Shabaab has waged an offensive across Somalia in recent months that has made significant gains and increased pressure on Mogadishu. The group recaptured critical areas in central Somalia, which enables it to relink its support zones in central and southern Somalia and threaten the main roads linking Mogadishu to central Somalia for the first time since 2022.[50] Al Shabaab captured villages south of Mogadishu in March that are crucial for Somali forces to defend the capital from al Shabaab vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.[51] CTP continues to assess that al Shabaab is highly unlikely to launch an offensive on Mogadishu to seize power in the short term, but its gains in central and southern Somalia will allow the group to increase economic and military pressure on Mogadishu and thus destabilize the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy.[52]

Figure 3. Al Shabaab Regains Territory in Central Somalia

Note: Control and support zones are not added for at least one month after initial support indicators.

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The United States—a major counterterrorism partner of the SFG—has discussed cutting support for bilateral and multilateral defense efforts in Somalia. The New York Times reported on April 10 that the Trump administration is divided between officials who want to reduce the US presence in Somalia and others who wish to increase support for counterterrorism operations in response to al Shabaab’s offensive.[53] Somali officials claimed in March that the United States reduced funding for the Danab special operations forces—the elite US-trained Somali partner force that has been the cornerstone to the US “partner-led, US-enabled” security approach.[54] US President Donald Trump redeployed US forces from Somalia to Djibouti and Kenya in his first term, but US forces “commuted” to Somalia to continue training the Danab forces.[55] The United States has additionally signaled that it will not support the proposed funding model for the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia in an upcoming UN Security Council vote in May.[56] Analysts agree that this funding obstacle is unlikely to end the peacekeeping mission, but prolonged negotiations could cause funding gaps.[57]

Conflicting reports claim that Turkey is sending troops, and possibly mercenaries, to stabilize the increasingly embattled SFG. Rashid Abdi, the research director at Sahan Global—a think tank specializing in the Horn of Africa, said that Turkey’s deployment aimed to help “boost the city’s defenses” and “protect key installations.”[58] Guled Ahmed, a scholar at the Washington, DC-based Middle East Institute, has reported several times since late March that Turkey plans to deploy thousands of mercenaries from the SADAT International Defense Consultancy to strengthen security in Mogadishu.[59] SADAT is a Turkish private military company run by a former intelligence officer with close ties to Erdoğan.[60] SADAT and journalists have denied that SADAT is part of the recent Turkish deployment.[61] French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that Turkey is considering deploying troops as part of a “security guarantee” to the SFG, given reduced Western aid and recent al Shabaab gains.[62]

Nigeria

Darul Salam—a Boko Haram–linked faction in north-central Nigeria—is strengthening. Nigerian media reported on April 18 that a new Salafi-jihadi group known as “Mahmuda” attacked communities around Kainji Lake in north-central Nigeria.[63] The attackers killed at least 15 local militiamen and villagers in Kaiama and Burtein districts in Kwara state. Locals said that the group controls territory in this area and enforces taxes, forced labor, roadblocks, and aspects of shari’a law.[64]

The militants are likely part of Darul Salam, a Boko Haram–linked splinter group that has been active for decades and in this area of Nigeria for several years. James Barnett and Bulama Bukarti—two leading researchers on militant groups in Nigeria—said that Mahmuda is a faction or rebrand of Darul Salam.[65] Darul Salam has gone through various iterations since its original founding as a reclusive Islamist sect in Nigeria’s Niger state in the 1990s. The group’s more hardline members joined the Boko Haram insurgency after Nigerian authorities expelled the group from its camps in 2009, while others relocated to Nasarawa state.[66] Barnett and Murtala Rufa’i wrote about two other Darul Salam–linked factions in Niger state in the mid-2010s and Nasarawa state in 2020.[67] The Dutch research institute Clingendael reported in June 2024 that Salafi-jihadi militants who had been based in the Kainji area since 2021 were behind an increase in bandit-related incidents along the Beninese-Niger border.[68] Clingendael said that this pattern signaled potential ties to Darul Salam, given the faction’s ties to bandit groups.[69] The links and continuity between these various cells and direct links to Boko Haram are unclear.

Darul Salam likely has links with al Qaeda– and IS-linked groups in West Africa and could support jihadist activities in northeastern Nigeria and the Sahel. Multiple researchers have noted that Francophone militants have crossed into the Kainji area and other parts of north-central and northwestern Nigeria from Benin. The characteristics of these militants suggest ties to al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), which is the dominant group in Benin.[70] These suspected JNIM-linked militants could use northwestern Nigeria as a rear support zone or participate in bandit-like activity to raise funds for activities in Benin.[71]

IS has conducted several attacks near areas with a Darul Salam presence, although it is unclear whether Darul Salam supported these attacks. IS in 2022 claimed an attack on the Kuje prison near Abuja in the Federal Capital Territory, which borders Nasarawa state.[72] Nigerian security officials believe that IS West Africa Province (ISWAP) was behind another attack on the Wawa cantonment, which is in the Kainji area, in late 2022.[73] Researchers believe that militants with links to Ansaru—a small al Qaeda–linked Boko Haram offshoot that has been publicly dormant since 2022—and non-jihadist bandit factions played various roles in both attacks.[74]

Figure 4. Salafi-Jihadi Militants Infiltrate Northwestern Nigeria

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

An IS Sahel Province–linked faction known as “Lakurawa” is simultaneously strengthening in northwestern Nigeria near the border with Niger. Nigerian military officials warned in early November that Lakurawa had infiltrated northwestern Nigeria’s Kebbi and Sokoto states from neighboring Niger and Mali.[75] Nigerian media reported that the insurgents controlled some communities across five districts in Sokoto state, which borders Niger, and imposed shari’a and taxation measures.[76] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data recorded that IS Sahel militants—presumably Lakurawa based on the areas of activity—have carried out at least 13 attacks in Nigeria and eight attacks in Niger in 2025 after conducting none in 2024.[77] This uptick in recorded attacks is at least partially attributable to increased media coverage of Lakurawa activity since Nigerian officials’ warning in November, however, but is still likely indicative of the group’s growing presence. The Lakurawa faction—like Darul Salam—is a new iteration of an old issue. The faction had tried to embed itself in Sokoto state in 2018 but alienated the local population, and a joint Nigerian-Nigerien military operation pushed the militants back across the border by early 2019.[78]

The Lakurawa faction could help better connect ISSP and IS West Africa Province, which would better integrate ISSP into the global IS network. IS disseminates guidance and resources and coordinates external activity through its General Directorate of Provinces. The General Directorate of Provinces has regional offices that help coordinate this activity on the regional level.[79] ISWAP hosts the West Africa office, Maktab al Furqan, which oversees ISSP and ISWAP.[80] A UN report in June 2024 stated that ISWAP established cell and facilitation networks in northwestern Nigeria with the express aim of supporting ISSP operations at the behest of IS core leadership.[81] The UN report said that these networks help move supplies and fighters to ISSP and that cells in Sokoto state play a particularly pivotal role.[82] Local researchers have cast doubt on the report and believe that such well-developed networks would be a new phenomenon, given that the existence of such deep support networks has not come up in interviews with defectors.[83]