Africa File, April 25, 2024: IS Somalia Expansion Benefits IS Global Network; Togo Constitutional Changes

Contributor: Josie Von Fischer

Data Cutoff: April 25, 2024, at 9 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Somalia. The Islamic State claimed that its Somali affiliate has expanded control over mountainous areas of northern Somalia at the expense of al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab, which would strengthen the regional IS office’s ability to support global Islamic State activity, including funding external attack plots in Asia and the West through the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Growing havens in northern Somalia would also likely attract foreign fighters from neighboring countries and Europe, which would increase the risk that the group develops external attack aims. The IS affiliate could face increased pressure from al Shabaab as al Shabaab recovers from unrelated setbacks in central Somalia in 2022 and 2023.
• Togo. Togo’s ruling party approved constitutional changes that allow the longtime Togolese president to stay in office beyond a previously constitutionally limited fifth term. The change adds to a growing list of antidemocratic developments that could raise domestic or bilateral tensions with the US, which risks hampering US stabilization assistance. Russia has been slowly growing ties with Togo since 2022, and increased cooperation with Russia has accelerated breakdowns in relationships between authoritarian African countries and Western partners elsewhere in West Africa.

Assessments:

Somalia

Author: Liam Karr

Contributor: Josie Von Fischer

The Islamic State has claimed that its Somali affiliate has expanded its control over a mountain range in northern Somalia, signaling the group’s growing strength over the past year. IS central media claimed in its weekly newsletter on February 2 that IS Somalia Province (ISS) had regained control over most of the ‘Al Miskaad Mountains throughout 2023 and killed hundreds of al Qaeda–affiliated al Shabaab militants in the area.[1] The group followed this initial publication with a second update on April 18, saying it had established control over the entire mountain range and killed a further 50 al Shabaab militants in the first quarter of 2024.[2]

Al Shabaab and ISS are the main competitors for control of the various mountainous ranges in northern Somalia, although both groups face sporadic pressure from local and international forces.[3] This competition has led to regular clashes in the past, but the ISS claims mark the first concerted fighting between the two groups since 2019.[4]

Figure 1. Al Shabaab and Islamic State Somalia Province Battle for Supremacy in Northern Somalia

Source: Liam Karr; Josie Von Fischer.

Growing ISS sanctuaries in northern Somalia would likely strengthen the IS regional office’s ability to support global Islamic State activity, including external attack plots in Asia and the West through the ISKP. ISS hosts the regional East Africa IS office, al Karrar, which oversees financing, directives, and other support between the group’s personnel in East and South Africa and the global IS network. The US Treasury Department reported in February 2024 that the regional office had already “largely recovered” since US Special Forces killed a senior financier in the group in January 2023.[5] The United States and UN have reported that the group generates hundreds of thousands of dollars per month for regional IS financing efforts through extortion rackets in the nearby regional port capital, Bossaso, despite the pressure it faces from al Shabaab.[6]

The group has used operatives in South Africa to transfer money to ISKP.[7] ISKP has become the vanguard of IS’s external attack network and is the most active IS branch in terms of plotting and conducting external operations.[8] The group has primarily focused on central Asia, where large-scale attacks have killed hundreds of civilians in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia.[9] However, European security forces have thwarted several ISKP attack networks, and analysts and security officials have warned in 2024 that there is a heightened risk of further ISKP plots targeting the West, including inside the United States.[10] 

The al Karrar office also supports the Islamic State Central Africa Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and IS Mozambique Province. It has coordinated sending trainers and funds to both groups, which has likely contributed to the growing capabilities of the DRC-based group in recent years.[11] The US Treasury Department reported in February 2024 that the regional office had recently sent money to the IS branches in central Africa.[12] CTP assessed that this funding has likely contributed to the IS Mozambique Province’s resurgence in 2024.[13]

Growing havens in northern Somalia would likely attract foreign fighters from neighboring countries and Europe, which would increase the group’s external attack risk. The al Karrar office plays a leading role in receiving and coordinating foreign fighters in East Africa.[14] Swedish police reported in March 2024 that they have seen a larger number of citizens attempting to join IS affiliates in Africa.[15] Swedish police did not disclose the ethnicity of the prospective foreign fighters, but Sweden has a large Somali diaspora population that has previously cultivated links between Swedish-Somali citizens and Salafi-jihadist groups in Somalia.[16] Local Somali security sources estimate that ISS has between 200 and 300 fighters, most of whom are Ethiopian nationals.[17] IS and its supporters have amplified media productions and translations since 2022 in prominent languages spoken in Ethiopia, such as Amharic and Oromo.[18]

An influx of foreign fighters would increase the risk that the group develops external attack aims. The presence of foreign fighters has historically led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots.[19] Foreign fighters are more hardened ideologues that ascribe to transnational Salafi-jihadism and are not as interested in the local aims or grievances that motivate local militants. Many foreign fighters have also demonstrated interest in returning to their countries of origin to organize attack plots after being further radicalized in an active conflict theater.[20] In the only ISS-linked external plot to date, Italian police arrested a Somali citizen who was planning a bombing attack in 2018.[21] The prospective attacker had direct contact with the group, but police could not establish whether ISS had directed the plot.[22]

ISS lacks the capacity to deny al Shabaab access to Bossaso and could face increased pressure from al Shabaab as al Shabaab recovers from unrelated setbacks it faced in central Somalia in 2022 and 2023. Al Shabaab and ISS networks have both been able to facilitate their extortion activities in Bossaso for years, despite having no physical control over the town and clashing with each other in nearby rural areas.[23] ISS’s small size and basing in more remote areas will continue to prevent it from exerting the level of physical control necessary to uproot al Shabaab’s financial networks.

ISS began its offensive against al Shabaab at the beginning of 2023 as al Shabaab was launching its first major counterattack against Somali Federal Government (SFG) forces in central Somalia after being on the back foot for most of 2022.[24] Al Shabaab continued to repel SFG efforts to eliminate the group’s remaining havens in central Somalia throughout the first three quarters of 2023.[25] Al Shabaab began to retake territory in March 2024 for the first time as the SFG’s focus on the offensive waned.[26] CTP has assessed that SFG’s preoccupation with domestic and regional political crises will alleviate pressure on al Shabaab in central Somalia, which creates more bandwidth to give priority to countering ISS in northern Somalia in the coming months.[27]

Togo

Authors: Liam Karr and Matthew Gianitsos

Togo’s ruling party approved constitutional changes that allow the longtime Togolese president to stay in office beyond a previously constitutionally limited fifth term. Togo’s National Assembly gave final approval to constitutional changes on April 19 that will transition the government from a presidential system to a parliamentary system. The changes will transfer the head-of-state powers from the president to a prime minister–like position called “President of the Council of Ministers.”^[28] The new office will serve as the party or coalition leader of parliament with the authority to manage government affairs and represent Togo abroad and have a six-year term that the National Assembly can renew indefinitely.^[29] The changes also give the Togolese parliament the authority to elect a figurehead president for up to two four-year terms in place of holding public presidential elections, without accounting for time already spent in office.^[30]

Civil society and opposition politicians have called the changes a constitutional coup that aims to keep Togolese President Faure Gnassingbe in power.[31] Gnassingbe has been in power since the military installed him in 2005 to succeed his father, who came to power via coup in 1967.[32] Gnassingbe’s party controls the vast majority of parliament due to opposition boycotts of the most recent legislative elections and crackdowns on opposition protests in 2018.[33] This control enabled the party to push the constitutional changes through parliament on March 25.[34] Opposition groups say the changes would enable Gnassingbe to extend his influence over Togolese politics in the presidency for an additional fifth and sixth term or have his party elect him to the prime minister–like position.^[35] Gnassingbe briefly postponed regional and legislative elections, which are now scheduled for April 29, to review the changes and appease opposition protests.^[36]

The change adds to a growing list of antidemocratic developments that could raise domestic or bilateral tensions with the US, which risks hampering US stabilization assistance. Togolese security forces violently suppressed opposition party protestors weeks before the 2018 parliamentary elections, killing at least two people.^[37] Opposition party members accused Gnassingbe of widespread election fraud during the 2020 presidential elections.^[38] The government prohibited domestic civil society groups and US-based organizations from deploying observers during the elections, although a small number of permitted African Union and regional observers did not highlight any irregularities.[39] Togolese security forces have also harassed journalists in northern Togo since 2022 to limit coverage of the ongoing Salafi-jihadi insurgency.^[40] Security forces have more recently arrested opposition politicians campaigning against the constitutional changes in early April and have banned demonstrations against the changes.^[41]

The US Bureau of African Affairs condemned the Togolese government’s handling of the recent constitutional changes without explicitly condemning the changes. The bureau tweeted that it was “deeply concerned” that the National Assembly approved constitutional changes without publicly releasing the text and urged the government to allow open debate, ensure inclusivity and transparency, and respect the right to peaceful assembly.[42] The United States has placed various legal restrictions on providing some forms of assistance to countries based on such democratic and human rights concerns.^[43] However, it has never done so in Togo despite raising similar concerns about civil and political rights violations in the past.[44] The US government most often enforces these punitive measures in the case of sudden events, like military coups, instead of the gradual or legally manipulated erosion of civil and political rights.[45]

Heightened domestic or bilateral tensions risk degrading US-Togolese coordination on US stability support programs that are part of the Global Fragility Act (GFA). Togo is currently one of five coastal West African countries that receive support from the GFA, which supports long-term plans to increase community resilience and address the root political causes of instability.^[46] The US Departments of State and Defense and the US Agency for International Development implement targeted development, political, and security assistance to recipient countries through the GFA.^[47] Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate uses Togo as a buffer zone and transit route for activities in Benin and Burkina Faso, which has limited it to a low-level, cross-border threat in Togo.^[48]

Russia has expanded military cooperation with Togo in 2024, building on cooperation that has been growing since 2022. Russia has expanded military cooperation with Togo in 2024, building on cooperation that has been growing since 2022. French-based investigative news site Africa Intelligence reported on February 19 that a contingent of 30 Russian military advisers that recently arrived in Togo is helping Togolese troops build a new military camp on the border with Burkina Faso.[49] Russia delivered three Mi-35 combat helicopters and two Mi-17 transport helicopters to Togo in late 2022.[50] This deal established Russia over France and the United States as the leading provider of military hardware to Togo from 2012 to 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s trend-indicator value index.[51] It also made Togo the leading recipient of Russian military hardware among the Francophile West African littoral states over the same period.[52] The trend-indicator value measures the volume of military capability transfers rather than the financial value of arms transfers.[53]

The Kremlin may have also offered Gnassingbe other forms of regime support that it has offered to other authoritarian African regimes to form partnerships. The National Resistance Center of Ukraine, which is a Ukrainian Special Forces–run information operation and partisan support organization, claimed on February 24 that the Russian armed forces planned to deploy a newly formed “African Expeditionary Force” to Togo in March 2024 to support the incumbent president in the now significantly altered 2025 elections.[54] CTP has not been able to verify any such arrival, but the rumored plan is like other types of Russian engagement in Africa where the Kremlin has offered information campaign support in exchange for partnerships.[55] The Ukrainian National Resistance Center claimed that Russia aims to secure naval basing in Togo, which would strengthen a logistics corridor connecting Russian mercenary bases from Libya, through Burkina Faso and Mali, to the Gulf of Guinea via Togo.[56]

Increased cooperation with Russia has accelerated breakdowns in relationships between authoritarian African countries and Western partners elsewhere in West Africa. Security partnerships have worsened some African states’ democratic and human rights records and brought in Western-sanctioned actors involved in the Wagner Group and its successor, the Africa Corps.[57] These developments have previously led the West to distance itself from African partners, leading those countries to increasingly rely on Russia and bringing them into the Kremlin’s orbit. Russia also leverages regime security support through military assistance, information operations, and political support to further increase its influence over target governments and isolate them from the West.[58]