Africa File, April 3, 2025: Russia-Sahel Summit; Sahelian Juntas Target Chinese Mining; M23 Loses Walikale but Uganda Leaves Vacuum

Contributor: Nick Markiewicz

Data Cutoff: April 3, 2025, at 10 a.m.

To receive the Africa File via email, please subscribe here. Follow CTP on Twitter, LinkedIn, and BlueSky.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Russia. The Kremlin is strengthening its strategic relationships with Sahelian juntas to entrench Russian influence in the region and secure its interests in Africa at the expense of the West. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—enables the Kremlin to advance its goals of supplanting Western influence in Africa, asserting itself as a revitalized great power, and creating opportunities to threaten the southern NATO flank.

Sahel. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas targeted China in their pro-sovereignty pressure campaign on international mining, marking an expansion of the campaign beyond just Western companies. The juntas’ actions indicate that they seek better terms in all mining contracts, not just those with the West. The AES efforts come as other African countries have sought to renegotiate lopsided mining deals with China in recent years.

Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Congolese army (FARDC) and allied militias recaptured the district capital Walikale town in western North Kivu, which—if it holds—will be a blow to M23’s leverage entering Qatari-mediated negotiations with the Congolese government scheduled for April 9. The setback is M23’s first retreat from a significant population center since its major offensive in January 2025 and may indicate that M23 is facing capacity and supply challenges. M23 may have opportunities to advance along another axis in northern North Kivu, however, as the Ugandan army (UPDF) is considering redeploying its forces in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo from North Kivu province further north to Ituri province. Uganda’s potential redeployment to Ituri likely is calculated at least partially to support ongoing UPDF operations against another rebel group—Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO)—that operates in northeast Ituri.

Assessments:

Russia

Russia is consolidating its strategic relationships with the Sahelian juntas to entrench itself in the region. The foreign ministers from the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov on April 3 and 4 as part of the first sessions of “AES-Russia consultations.”[1] A joint AES statement announced that the meeting aims to establish strategic relations in areas of common interest.[2]

Russia has increased its military footprint in Mali and Niger in 2025, as it expands the Russian Defense Ministry–controlled Africa Corps. Large convoys of Russian-sourced military supplies have entered Mali via Guinea in 2025.[3] This buildup is likely part of the Kremlin’s effort to consolidate control of the Russian military presence in Mali under the Africa Corps.[4] Russian Deputy Defense Minister and de facto Africa Corps head Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Malian junta leader Assimi Goita and Malian Defense Minister Sadio Camara during a visit to Mali in March 2025.[5] A Russian Air Force Tupolev Tu-154M that has previously transported mercenaries flew from Libya to Agadez airbase, northern Niger, on March 25.[6] The flight was likely transporting a combination of Russian Africa Corps and Syrian soldiers from the deposed Bashar al Assad regime. Local researchers claimed that 37 Russians and nearly 200 Syrian soldiers arrived at the uranium mining town Arlit, over 125 miles north, on March 27.[7] Hundreds of US service members were previously stationed at Agadez as part of a $110 million drone base before they withdrew from Niger at the request of the Nigerien junta in 2024.[8]

The AES is a strategic project for Russia that advances its goals to supplant Western influence in Africa and assert itself as a revitalized great power. The juntas announced the alliance shortly after meeting with Yevkurov in September 2023, presumably securing the Kremlin’s blessing from its inception.[9] The joint visit marks another step in the bloc’s efforts to form a true multi-sectoral confederation that aims to coordinate diplomatic, economic, and military policies. The three regimes had already broadly coordinated their diplomatic activity in line with their anti-Western outlooks and emphasized the need to speak with “one voice,” but the April Moscow visit is the bloc’s highest-ever level of joint diplomatic engagement with an external partner.[10] The AES states have coordinated other major efforts to integrate in the last year, such as a united passport, joint tariffs, and a joint force to address the Salafi-jihadi insurgency that has spread across all three countries.[11] Russia has conducted information operations and provided troops to bolster regime security and ensure the survival of all three juntas.[12]

Russia has supplanted the West in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and formed a pro-Russian economic, military, and political bloc in the AES. The AES juntas have pressured Western mining companies across the Sahel while laying the groundwork for greater cooperation with Russia, which seeks access to gold, uranium, and other valuable natural resources in the region.[13] Russia has been the primary security partner for the AES since all three countries cut ties with Western forces. This shift effectively resulted in the withdrawal of at least 4,300 French, 1,000 American, and 10,000 UN troops and the arrival of roughly 2,500 Russian personnel across the three countries between 2022 and 2024.[14] The three countries serve as a pro-Russian bloc in international institutions like the United Nations, where they reliably vote with Russia on resolutions.

The AES serves as a conduit for Russia’s efforts to supplant the West elsewhere on the continent. The AES has withdrawn from and undermined several neutral or Western-aligned regional political and security institutions.[15] The AES withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)--a West African political and economic bloc.[16] The AES branded their withdrawal as a direct challenge to the bloc, and the three countries’ departure threatens ECOWAS’s legitimacy by hampering regional economic and security integration.[17] The AES countries also left security alliances, such as the Sahel G5 and Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin, which are two African Union–, UN-, and Western-backed military missions meant to combat Salafi-jihadi terrorism.[18]

Figure 1. CES and ECOWAS Countries in West Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

The AES helps attract additional states in West Africa and the Sahel deeper into the Russian orbit. Malian officials claimed in April 2024 that Chad was interested in joining the bloc.[19] The Togolese foreign minister said in 2025 that Togo was “considering joining the AES” to strengthen regional cooperation and offer sea access to the landlocked Sahel countries.[20] Chad and Togo conducted combined military drills with the AES in 2024.[21] Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leaders visited Mali and Niger in June 2024.[22]

Chad, Sudan, and Togo all grew closer to Russia as they grew closer to the AES. French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that 30 Russian military advisers arrived in Togo in early 2024.[23] A small number of Russian military personnel are rumored to be in Togo, with Russia possibly interested in using Togo to complete a logistics corridor from Libya to the Atlantic via the Sahel.[24] CTP noted in April 2024 that Chad’s growing relationship with the AES and Russia provided Chad with a regime security alternative to France and the West and Russia with an opportunity to oust France from its last hub in the Sahel.[25] Chad annulled its defense agreements with France in November, and French troops withdrew by the end of January 2025.[26] Sudan and Russia agreed in principle in February 2025 to implement a stalled 2017 deal for a Russian naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast after Russia promised “unrestricted military aid” to the SAF in April 2024.[27]

Russia’s entrenched presence in the Sahel creates opportunities for the Kremlin to directly and indirectly threaten NATO’s southern flank. Russia’s presence in the Sahel is an opportunity for the Kremlin to bolster its campaign to manufacture migration crises to destabilize Europe. Russia has weaponized migrant crises in Europe repeatedly and systematically, and the EU border patrol agency and numerous European officials have warned that Russia is trying to foment refugee flows from Africa to Europe as part of this campaign.[28] Kremlin-linked assets have highlighted Libya—where Russia has a strong partnership with Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar, who controls eastern Libya—as an opportunity to control migration flows to Europe.[29] Russia’s growing footprint in the Sahel has positioned it along key nodes on trans-Saharan migration routes that flow into Libya.[30] The Italian foreign minister has said that Russian personnel in Africa are in contact with traffickers in Africa, and Russia’s replacement of the West in the Sahel has fomented migration drivers and contributed to the AES countries annulling migration deals with the EU.[31] Russia lacks the capacity to control these sprawling and decentralized networks but is still well-positioned to noticeably influence migration flows to pressure Europe at key moments, such as elections or negotiations.[32]

Figure 2. Growing Russian Presence on Trans-Saharan Migration Routes in West Africa

Source: Liam Karr; West Africa Maps; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime; Norwegian Center for Global Analyses; Clingendael Institute.

There is no evidence that Russia plans to base drones in the Sahel, but doing so would be an opportunity to threaten NATO in the Mediterranean directly. Russian forces in the Sahel have relied on host countries’ use of Turkish drones, and no drones have been reported among the newer shipments of Russian military hardware to the Sahel. Russia has increased production of Iranian Shahed-style drones in recent years, however.[33] Shahed-style drones based near Agadez would be within range of key US and NATO installations and parts of the Mediterranean Sea. The Shahed 136, known as Geranium in Russia, has a maximum range of 1,553 miles (2,500 kilometers).[34] Agadez is 1,523 miles from Sicily, Italy, and the southern tip of the Italian mainland; 1,555 miles from Gibraltar, which the UK’s overseas territory on the Iberian Peninsula; and roughly 1,600 miles from the US-Spanish air and naval bases in southern Spain. Libya continues to pose a more viable option for Russian drone and missile systems to threaten the Mediterranean and mainland Europe directly, but Haftar is under more pressure to at least nominally keep balanced ties with the West than the Sahelian regimes.[35]

Figure 3. Prospective Range of Iranian-Made Shahed-136 Drones from Agadez, Northern Niger

Note: US forces were still stationed at Agadez Air Base at the time the image was originally published in April 2024 but since withdrew in September 2024.

Source: Liam Karr.

Sahel

The Sahelian Alliance of Sahel States (AES) juntas have expanded their pro-sovereignty pressure campaign beyond Western mining companies and attacked China. Niger’s military junta expelled three Chinese oil executives on March 15, reportedly due to disputes over wage disparities for local Nigerien staff and delays in Chinese-led oil projects.^[36] The Nigerien Ministry of Tourism revoked the license of a Chinese-operated hotel in Niamey over alleged discriminatory practices.[37] Beijing has been a major player in Niger’s oil sector since it signed a joint petroleum production agreement with Niger in 2008 and has significant stakes in Niger’s largest oil field, sole refinery, and the Niger-Benin oil pipeline completed in 2023.^[38]

Malian Prime Minister General Abdoulaye Maiga summoned Chinese Ambassador Chen Zhihong on March 25 to address illegal Chinese mining operations and their environmental and social consequences. Maiga told Zhizhong that Mali would halt illegal mining activities involving Chinese nationals and suspend all artisanal mining permits held by foreigners.^[39] The two leaders discussed establishing a coordination mechanism to address the dispute.^[40] China maintains stakes in the Goulamina and Bougouni commercial lithium mines, both located in southern Mali.^[41]

China has been a stable partner for the Sahelian juntas, especially Niger. China has been a leading economic partner for the AES states due to China’s willingness to work with the juntas to continue expanding its preexisting investments in Mali and Niger in particular.^[42] Chinese state-owned companies have invested in crude oil, uranium, and solar power projects across the AES.^[43] This relationship has provided the Nigerien junta with sorely needed funds.^[44] Niger signed a deal with the China National Petroleum Corporation in April 2024 to receive $400 million of future oil sales in advance to repay regional debts.^[45]

The juntas’ actions indicate that the Sahelian juntas seek to enforce and secure better terms in all its mining contracts, not just contracts with Western companies. The Malian junta forced Canadian mining company Barrick Gold to temporarily suspend operations in January 2025 after the junta arrested multiple Barrick employees and seized over $200 million in gold stockpiles.^[46] Barrick and the junta in February 2025 reached a tentative agreement to resume operations, which required the company to pay $438 million.^[47] Australian-based Resolute Mining faced a similar dispute and agreed to pay $160 million after Malian authorities detained its CEO and two employees.^[48] The Nigerien junta forced French uranium mining companies to suspend operations at several mines in 2024.[49]

Other African countries have criticized lopsided mining agreements with China and sought to renegotiate terms in recent years. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) renegotiated a 2008 minerals-for-infrastructure deal with a Chinese consortium in January 2024 after President Félix Tshisekedi denounced the original agreement as deeply unfair to the DRC. The revised terms increased the Congolese stake in the joint venture and secured up to $7 billion in pledged infrastructure investment from Chinese firms.^[50] Central African Republic (CAR) authorities revoked the license of the Chinese gold and diamond mining company Daqing SARL in June 2024 over alleged ties to local militias, illegal mining practices, and tax evasion.^[51] There is no indication that the Chinese mining company resumed operations in CAR following the suspension.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Congolese army (FARDC) and allied militias recaptured Walikale town in western North Kivu. The development—if it holds—would mark M23’s first retreat from a population center since its major offensive in January 2025 and likely indicates that M23 is facing capacity and supply challenges. FARDC and allied Wazalendo militias recaptured Walikale town on April 3 but had been setting conditions to retake the district capital by isolating M23 forces shortly after M23 initially captured the town on March 19.[52] The pro-Congolese government campaign to retake Walikale exploited supply line vulnerabilities that M23 faces the further away it gets from its center of gravity in the eastern Kivus and its rear supply base in Rwanda. Wazalendo militias penetrated M23’s overexposed flank and recaptured much of the RP529 road between Walikale and Masisi towns, which is the route that M23 initially used to advance to Walikale town. ^[53] FARDC’s bombing raids degraded M23’s ability to fly in reinforcements to the nearby Kigoma airfield.^[54] FARDC’s air campaign also likely prevented M23 from flying in Rwandan military equipment that has given it “superior combat strength,” according to the United Nations.^[55]

Figure 4. M23 Advances Westward Toward the DRC Interior

Source: Liam Karr and Yale Ford.

M23’s front lines have been porous in multiple areas of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), signaling that the group is likely overstretched. M23 had been unable to maintain a solid defensive perimeter around Masisi town since capturing the district capital in January and advancing further westward toward Walikale. FARDC and Wazalendo militias had flanked M23 to isolate Walikale town, cut ground lines of communication between Masisi and Walikale, and continued to carry out attacks around Masisi town.^[56] M23 forces retreated from Walikale back toward Masisi, signaling an effort to consolidate this overextended axis. M23 has also been unable to create a strong defensive perimeter around Bukavu since capturing the South Kivu provincial capital in February.[57] Wazalendo militias have regularly attacked towns within 15 miles of Bukavu and even Bukavu directly on March 3.^[58] FARDC and Wazalendo also reportedly recaptured Nyangezi village on April 1, which effectively severed M23’s ground lines of communication between Bukavu and Kamanyola, the southernmost town along the Rwandan border, on the Congolese side of the border.^[59]

Figure 5. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Liam Karr and Yale Ford.

M23 may have also withdrawn from Walikale town as a sign of goodwill for upcoming Qatari-mediated negotiations with the DRC government scheduled for April 9. This consideration was likely not the primary deciding factor, however, given that the loss of Walikale undermines the group’s bargaining leverage. M23 initially captured Walikale to align with when the group was first scheduled to negotiate with the DRC government in Angola on March 18.[60] These negotiations never happened after M23 withdrew from the talks in retaliation for EU sanctions on M23 and Rwandan leaders, and DRC President Félix Tshisekedi traveled to Doha for the first set of Qatari-mediated talks with Rwandan President Paul Kagame.[61] M23 said that it would withdraw from Walikale on March 22 to support ongoing peace initiatives.[62] The group had remained in the town, however, and accused the FARDC of failing to respect the ceasefire terms.[63] The group only retreated after its military position became more tenuous due to strong FARDC and Wazalendo resistance.

Controlling Walikale would be a key bargaining chip for M23 because it enables the group to threaten the more economically and politically sensitive areas in the interior of the DRC. Walikale town has roughly 60,000 inhabitants and is the gateway between North Kivu province and the interior of the DRC along the RN3 road.[64] Lubutu town and its nearby airport are 125 miles west of Walikale town, and Kisangani—the DRC’s fourth largest city—over 250 miles northwest of Walikale town.[65] FARDC relocated at least two of its Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets to Kisangani after M23 advanced toward Bukavu in early February, and M23 commander Sultani Makenga has warned that the group will take Kisangani if FARDC continues to launch air attacks on M23 positions from the city.[66] Walikale district also has extensive gold, tantalum, and tin ore deposits that the group would benefit from.[67]

M23 may have opportunities along an axis, however, as the Ugandan army is unrelatedly considering redeploying troops from the Lubero district capital in northern North Kivu to Ituri province as part of a years-long campaign against IS-affiliated Ugandan rebels. Ugandan army (UPDF) spokesperson Chris Magezi made the announcement on social media on March 30 and said that the UPDF would make the final call “in the coming days.”^[68] Low-level Congolese and Ugandan military officials in Butembo—a major commercial and military hub 25 miles north of Lubero town—reportedly denied that the UPDF would withdraw from the Lubero and Butembo areas on April 1.^[69]

Magezi said that the UPDF would withdraw from Lubero town because joint UPDF and FARDC operations against an IS-affiliated Ugandan rebel group had successfully flushed the group out of northern North Kivu.^[70] Uganda and the DRC launched Operation Shujaa in late 2021 to target IS Central Africa Province—known locally as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—after the ADF launched a bombing campaign in Kampala, Uganda’s capital, in November 2021.^[71] The UPDF and FARDC agreed to expand joint Operation Shujaa to Lubero district in July 2024.^[72] Magezi claimed on March 30 that ADF has “taken flight” from Lubero district to Ituri province and that UPDF’s “operational focus could switch to those regions” to prevent the ADF from regrouping.^[73] The United Nations reported in December 2024 that Operation Shujaa’s expansion into northern North Kivu had pushed the largest cell of ADF fighters further northward into Ituri province to flee Operation Shujaa’s area of operations.^[74] Armed Conflict Location and Event Data further showed that ADF engagements with security forces and civilians in North Kivu decreased by nearly 70 percent across February and March compared to December 2024 and January.^[75] FARDC officials had claimed that they “dismantled” an ADF network in northern North Kivu after arresting several ADF rebels who were attempting to move north into Ituri due to Shujaa operations in early March.^[76]

Uganda’s potential redeployment to Ituri province also likely aims to support UPDF’s ongoing operations against another rebel group that operates in northeast Ituri province. Coopérative pour le développement du Congo (CODECO) is a coalition of ethnic Lendu militias that operate primarily in Djugu district.^[77] The UPDF has escalated operations against CODECO since mid-March in response to a CODECO attack that killed more than 80 civilians in Djugu district in early February.^[78] Uganda had already deployed an unspecified number of additional troops from Uganda to Bunia—the provincial capital of Ituri—and several districts in Ituri, including Djugu and Mahagi, since early February.^[79] UPDF and FARDC formally agreed in late March to expand Operation Shujaa to northeast Ituri to include military operations against “all armed groups in the area.”^[80] Magezi said in his March 30 announcement that UPDF could redeploy troops to Ituri province and that the “huge operational area” of Bunia and Mahagi and Djugu districts “will require additional [UPDF] forces to be dominated effectively.”^[81]

Figure 6. Uganda Deploys to Eastern DRC to Counter CODECO

Source: Liam Karr and Yale Ford.

UPDF’s withdrawal from Lubero town will likely create opportunities for M23 to relaunch its offensive in northern North Kivu. M23 began advancing in northern Lubero district toward the Lubero district capital in spurts in late 2024 and February 2025 but stalled in late February due to significant resistance from FARDC and pro-Congolese government militia fighters.^[82] M23 has attempted to flank FARDC positions in Lubero town and on the RN2 road since February in a possible attempt to reach Butembo, a garrison town with a population of at least 150,000.^[83] The UPDF deployment is unrelated to M23.^[84] Congolese media reported on multiple occasions, however, that the presence of Ugandan troops in Lubero town and surrounding villages has blocked M23’s flanking maneuvers and likely deterred a direct assault on Lubero town.^[85]

Figure 7. M23 Advances Northward Toward Lubero

Source: Liam Karr and Yale Ford.