Africa File, June 27, 2024: Niger Reallocates Uranium Mine; IS Strengthens in the Sahel; AU Future in Somalia

Data Cutoff: June 27, 2024, at 10 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Niger. Niger revoked the operating permit of a French state-owned mining company for a uranium mine in northern Niger. Russia seeks to take over the uranium mine. The Kremlin has a continent-wide strategy to dominate the nuclear energy market to boost the Russian economy and increase leverage over countries that aim to cut Russian energy purchases. The Nigerien junta is likely seeking to gain military support or near-term access to revenue to bolster its counterinsurgency efforts and economy, strengthening its regime security.
• Central Sahel. The Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) claimed its first suicide vehicle–borne improvised explosive device attack in Mali since 2020 as it continues to strengthen. ISSP has also consolidated its territorial control in Mali over the past two years and improved its military and governance efforts across the border in Niger since the July 2023 coup in Niger. ISSP has historically used SVBIEDs in large-scale attacks that overrun hardened security force bases near crucial towns, highlighting the risk to Menaka, a Malian regional capital besieged by ISSP. ISSP’s growing strength and territorial control have attracted foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe since early 2023, which increases the group’s transnational threat risk.
• Somalia. The African Union (AU) endorsed plans to establish a new AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia after the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) concludes at the end of 2024. The AU’s justification for the mission echoed numerous warnings about al Shabaab’s growing strength in 2024. The upcoming mission’s initial goals are similar to ATMIS, but the AU has de-emphasized language about capacity- and state-building and framed itself as an equal partner to the Somali Federal Government. The shifting priorities of Somalia’s regional and international partners make it uncertain which countries will contribute troops and fund the mission.

Assessments:

Niger

Niger revoked the operating permit of a French state-owned mining company for a uranium mine in northern Niger. The Nigerien junta issued the decision on June 19, following through on a series of ultimatums to the French firm, Orano, to resume production at the Imouraren site in northern Niger’s Agadez region.^[1] The Nigerien junta gave Orano and several other international mining companies ultimatums in March to resume production within three months lose their permits.[2]

The junta effectively blocked Orano from resuming production so it could revoke its permit. France-based Jeune Afrique reported that Orano attempted to send employees to restart work on the site multiple times, but Nigerien forces responsible for security at the mines prevented them from entering.[3] Jeune Afrique said Orano also tried to use intermediaries to negotiate access with the Nigerien prime minister and publicly announced its plans to resume production on June 12 to increase public pressure on the junta.[4] The junta said Orano’s plans did not meet its expectations and reiterated its June 19 deadline.[5]

Niger is the seventh-largest uranium producer in the world and has one active major uranium mine.[6] The mine provided about 2,020 tons of uranium in 2022, which is about 5 percent of the world’s mining output.[7] France has relied on Niger for nearly 20 percent of the uranium it has imported to power its nuclear energy facilities over the past decade, and the United States banned imports of uranium fuel directly from Russia on April 30.[8]

Russia seeks to take over the uranium mine. The Kremlin has a continent-wide strategy to dominate the nuclear energy market to boost the Russian economy and increase leverage over countries that aim to cut Russian energy purchases. Bloomberg reported on June 2 that Russian state-owned nuclear energy company Rosatom seeks to take over Orano’s uranium assets in Niger and was in initial talks with the Nigerien junta.[9] Russian deputy defense minister Yunus Bek Yevkurov headed a delegation that visited Niger on June 2.[10] Unspecified energy investors were part of the delegation, which could refer to Rosatom representatives given Rosatom’s prominence in Russia’s energy policy in Africa.[11] Yevkurov signed a “multi-sectoral cooperation” agreement with Nigerien officials during the visit.[12]

The Kremlin pursues various aspects of nuclear energy cooperation across Africa to secure additional revenue streams and export markets, which helps it mitigate the economic impact of tensions with the West. Russia has positioned itself as a global leader in the nuclear energy market, including Africa.[13] Russia has secured numerous deals on peaceful nuclear technological cooperation and nuclear power plant construction on the continent.[14] These deals create multiple revenue and export market opportunities for Russia—such as exporting nuclear energy technology, constructing power plants, and dominating the uranium fuel market that power plants need to operate.

Figure 1. Russian Nuclear Cooperation in Africa

Source: Liam Karr; European Parliament.

The Nigerien junta is likely seeking military support or near-term access to revenue to bolster its counterinsurgency efforts and economy, strengthening its regime security. The Nigerien junta disagreed with Orano’s timeline and targets for the mine, which diminished the immediacy and total value of returns for the junta. Orano intended to use an operating method that would have delayed the beginning of full-scale production until 2028. It also planned to target a more easily reachable but smaller deposit than what the junta wanted.[15]

The junta is still facing significant economic shortfalls after the regional West African economic bloc lifted sanctions in February.[16] The sanctions severely harmed the already-weak Nigerien economy by closing nearly all borders and trade with Niger, suspending the government’s financial transactions, and freezing the country’s assets in external banks.[17] The fallout led the junta to slash its 2023 budget by 40 percent and default on four debt payments totaling $519 million since taking power, in July 2023.[18] The World Bank projected Niger’s economic growth in 2024 to be 45 percent less than pre-coup estimates.[19] These issues have inflated food prices and contributed to at least 1.1 million Nigeriens falling below the extreme poverty threshold since the coup, bringing the total number to 14.1 million people—roughly 54 percent of the entire population.[20]

Military and diplomatic challenges are compounding the junta’s economic struggles by threatening oil revenue. Anti-junta rebels have attacked and disabled some segments of an oil pipeline that exports Niger’s oil to shippers in the Gulf of Guinea.[21] A diplomatic dispute with Benin, which the pipeline runs through, is also preventing exports.[22]

The junta also faces growing security threats from Salafi-jihadi insurgents and a new grouping of anti-junta rebels. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate has intensified its activity along the Burkinabe-Nigerien border since May, creating opportunities for the group to strengthen the foothold in southwestern Niger it established in 2023.[23] ISSP has also significantly increased the lethality of its attacks and civilian taxation efforts in Niger since the July 2023 coup.[24] Various anti-junta rebel groups have also carried out various attacks on the oil pipeline and Nigerien officials under demands for a return to democratic rule.[25] These challengers foment insecurity and undermine the junta’s legitimacy by showing the ineffectiveness of the junta and security forces.

The junta has sought to exchange Nigerien natural resources for loans and weapons to help address these challenges. The junta signed an agreement in March with a Chinese state-owned company to receive a $400 million advance on its share of future oil sales through the newly built Chinese-built pipeline in Niger.[26] The junta reportedly plans to use the money to repay part of its regional debt.[27] French media reports in May claimed that the junta has engaged in direct uranium-for-arms talks with Iran since the end of 2023.[28] A March Wall Street Journal report supports these claims and notes that US officials warned Niger against selling Iran uranium.[29]

Central Sahel

ISSP claimed its first suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack in Mali since 2020 as it continues to develop various capabilities and strengthen in the Sahel. ISSP launched a complex ambush on June 13 that involved an SVBIED targeting a joint Africa Corps–Malian army convoy along the R20 road linking Menaka and Ansongo towns in northeastern Mali.[30] ISSP claimed to have attacked the convoy multiple times, killing and wounding 30 soldiers.[31] The attack is the first ISSP SVBIED attack since at least 2022, when the Malian army claimed ISSP used an SVBIED in an attack on a Malian army base southeast of Ansongo.[32]

ISSP has also strengthened its territorial control in Mali over the past two years, facilitating its growing military capabilities. The UN observed that the territory under ISSP control doubled between 2022 and the first half of 2023, including swaths of northeastern Mali that its al Qaeda–linked rivals and communal militias previously controlled.[33] ISSP achieved this growth through a military onslaught in 2022 and 2023 after the French withdrawal that targeted JNIM and ethnic groups that had historically supported French and JNIM forces against ISSP.[34] The group massacred hundreds of civilians in retaliatory killings against suspected French and JNIM collaborators.[35]

ISSP has since instituted various governance measures in rural areas under its control and besieged a regional capital, Menaka, since April 2023.[36] The group repatriated locals who had fled from several villages now under its control and rebuilt damaged houses and water towers.[37] It also began regulating water tower usage, reopening weekly markets, financing health services, and providing security patrols around towns and for traders traveling to nearby markets.[38] The siege on Menaka has enabled it to tax local economic activity into and out of the town.[39] The group has also carried out numerous shari’a punishments across the Gao and Menaka regions since June 2023.[40]

ISSP has simultaneously strengthened its military and governance efforts across the border in Niger since the July 2023 coup. The group has significantly increased the lethality of its attacks, averaging nearly five times as many fatalities per month since July 2023.[41] In October 2023, the group conducted an ambush similar to the June 13 attack; this one reportedly involved multiple SVBIEDs and killed dozens of Nigerien soldiers.[42] ISSP has simultaneously expanded the geographic scope and rate of its taxation activities in northern Niger.[43]

Figure 2. Islamic State Sahel Province Expands Control in the Central Sahel

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database Project.

Figure 3. ISSP Intensifies Attacks in Post-Coup Niger, 2023–24

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Database Project.

Security forces have previously reduced pressure on ISSP after deadly and demoralizing large-scale attacks, which allows the group to strengthen and expand its support zones. Some Nigerien soldiers stationed near the Malian border subsequently halted patrols and remained in their bases after the attack in Niger.[44] The recurring use of SVBIEDs in ambushes indicates the group is trying to deny security forces access to targeted areas. IS West Africa Province uses similar tactics to repel security force patrols.[45] The lack of Western intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support since French forces left Mali, in 2021, and the Niger coup, in 2023, has contributed to ISSP’s ability to stage these large-scale attacks in both countries.[46]

ISSP has historically used SVBIEDs in large-scale attacks that overrun hardened security force bases near crucial towns, highlighting the risk to Menaka. ISSP most recently overran Malian forces in Tessit, Gao region, in August 2022 in a complex attack that involved ground forces, mortars, surveillance drones, and an SVBIED.[47] Militants then intimidated locals before withdrawing.[48] ISSP established control over the surrounding area and isolated Malian forces in the following months, and it claimed to carry out a shari’a punishment in the town in August 2023.[49] ISSP’s recent SVBIED and governance activity indicate that it has developed the military and governance capabilities it needs to implement this strategy in Menaka.

ISSP’s growing strength and territorial control have attracted foreign fighters from North Africa and Europe since early 2023, which increases the group’s transnational threat risk. The UN Security Council reported in August 2023 that IS recruiters and facilitators had established transit corridors between southern Europe and the Sahel.[50] Moroccan security forces have since disrupted three IS cells facilitating foreign fighters’ travel to ISSP in Mali, in October 2023 and January–February 2024.[51] The presence of foreign fighters previously led to an increase in Salafi-jihadi groups’ external attack plots.[52] Foreign fighters are more hardened ideologues that ascribe to transnational Salafi-jihadism and are not as interested in the local aims or grievances that motivate local militants. Many foreign fighters have also demonstrated an interest in returning to their countries of origin to organize attack plots after being further radicalized in an active conflict theater.[53] The IS network in northwest Africa has also already shown an interest in organizing external activity, given that the UN Security Council reported that it had organized a now-disrupted attack cell operating out of Morocco and Spain.[54]

Somalia

The African Union endorsed plans to establish a new AU-led peacekeeping mission in Somalia after the African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia concludes at the end of 2024. The AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) endorsed the plans on June 20 in a statement that noted “concern” that ongoing counterinsurgency offensives and a simultaneous withdrawal of international forces at the end of 2024 would leave gaps that al Shabaab could exploit.[55] The AUPSC also reiterated the “importance” of force generation, regeneration, integration, and capacity building as key benchmarks for Somalia fully assuming security responsibility.[56]

The AU’s justification for the mission echoed numerous warnings about al Shabaab’s growing strength in 2024. Anonymous US defense officials told Voice of America in June that in 2024 al Shabaab had “reversed all” the gains the Somali Federal Government (SFG) had made in central Somalia since its 2022 offensive stalled.[57] The Somali national security adviser strongly rejected this claim. CTP has warned about notable al Shabaab gains in crucial areas of central Somalia throughout 2024.[58]

The SFG and independent observers had also indicated that a complete withdrawal of AU military presence at the end of 2024 would be premature. The AU and SFG published a joint assessment in March that recommended adjusting the withdrawal timeline “based on the actual readiness and capabilities” of Somali forces and that a “hasty drawdown of ATMIS personnel will contribute to a security vacuum.”[59] The SFG requested in May that the AU slow down and adjust the scheduled withdrawal of the current ATMIS mission.[60] The director of the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, Paul D. Williams, published a net assessment of the Somali National Army (SNA) versus al Shabaab in the May edition of the West Point Combatting Terrorism Center Sentinel that found al Shabaab would currently be slightly militarily stronger than the SNA in the event of a total AU withdrawal “because of its significant advantages across the non-material dimensions related to force employment, cohesion, and psychological operations, as well as the sustainability of its forces.”[61]

The new mission’s initial goals are similar to ATMIS, but the AU has de-emphasized language about capacity- and state-building and framed itself as an equal partner to the SFG. The early information about the future AU-led mission does not indicate any significant military change from ATMIS. Many of the new mission’s security goals carry over directly from the ATMIS mandate, such as degrading al Shabaab, providing security to civilians, and supporting stabilization efforts.[62]

The June 20 statement implied that the mission would de-emphasize leading capacity- and state-building and instead focus on stabilization activity in cooperation with the SFG. The AUPSC emphasized the need to establish clear lines of communication, centralized joint planning processes, command structures, and information-sharing mechanisms with the SFG.[63] The AU also framed stabilization efforts as a way to “enable” state-building priorities and the transfer of security responsibilities.[64] This differs from the ATMIS and African Union Mission in Somalia frameworks, which directly mandated the mission to develop security and government capacity.[65]

This framing suggests that the AU aims to reduce the mission’s responsibilities and appease pro-sovereigntist sentiment in Somalia. International donors are seeking to scale down the mission due to a lack of funding, and the current SFG administration had repeatedly said it would assume responsibility for its security off the back of counterterrorism successes in 2022 and 2023 before the recent setbacks in 2024.[66] These trends make all stakeholders interested in scaling down the scope and aims of any new mission. The SFG has also aggravated pro-sovereigntist and specifically anti-Ethiopian sentiment through aggressive rhetoric against Ethiopia in 2024 due to a diplomatic dispute.[67] Al Shabaab has historically played on this sentiment to criticize the AU mission as an “occupying” force supporting an “illegitimate” government, creating a potential backlash against a continued AU mission.[68]

The shifting priorities of Somalia’s regional and international partners make it uncertain which countries will contribute troops and fund the mission. Ethiopia’s role in the new mission remains unclear and controversial due to its ongoing diplomatic dispute with the SFG. Somali National Security Adviser Hussein Sheikh Ali said Somalia will expel Ethiopian forces when the ATMIS mandate expires, at the end of 2024, unless Ethiopia repeals the port deal it signed with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region.[69] Ali signaled that the SFG would invite the four other ATMIS states to remain in the country in a post-ATMIS framework.[70]

CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia will almost certainly maintain its presence in Somalia because it uses its forces to create a buffer zone against al Shabaab that it views as essential to its national security. Ethiopia currently maintains more than 4,000 troops in Somalia as part of ATMIS, and thousands more soldiers in the country on a bilateral basis.[71] Ethiopia signaled it would remain in Somalia when it sent thousands of additional troops across the border into Somalia on June 22 and warned local leaders and military personnel that they would return if al Shabaab militants were found in the area.[72] Partner countries and the SFG would almost certainly be unable to replace a force gap of 10,000 or more soldiers if Ethiopia withdrew and would also lack the connections in the region that Ethiopian troops have cultivated.

Western partners are also disputing funding for the new mission. The European Union and the United States, the top funders of the AU missions since they began in 2007, have sought to reduce the peacekeeping operation due to worries about long-term financing and sustainability.[73] Western officials specifically have concerns with “unnecessary costs” and loose regulations for generating troops.[74] The EU wants the new mission to be financed through the UN.[75] The AUPSC acknowledged in its June statement the particularly “unwavering support” of the EU but noted that the AU commission would need to continue developing additional financing options for the new mission.[76]