Africa File, March 13, 2025: Looming Civil Wars in Ethiopia, South Sudan Threaten to Plunge Horn into Crisis; Renewed Peace Talks in DRC as M23 Advances

Contributors: John Reece and Nick Markiewicz

Data Cutoff: March 13, 2025, at 10 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Ethiopia. A violent power struggle in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia, which could, in turn, expand quickly to include Eritrea. Renewed conflict in Tigray or between Ethiopia and Eritrea would generate an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis that would have reverberations across Africa and even into Europe. External powers, such as Iran and Russia, have demonstrated interest in exploiting conflict in the region to consolidate their own influence around the Red Sea. Salafi-jihadi groups would benefit from such crises as well, given that it would produce a wall of instability across Africa, stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa. A war would exacerbate the refugee crisis in the region and increase migration flows to Europe and the Gulf states.

Sudan. The SAF and RSF could seek to capitalize on the resumption of civil war in South Sudan The SAF could use its historic ties with militias in northern South Sudan to counter RSF efforts to use South Sudan as a rear support base, as the SAF tries to contain the RSF west of the Nile River. An expansion of fighting toward the Sudan–South Sudan border would exacerbate the humanitarian crisis there and could pressure civilians to flee from South Sudan to Sudan. The RSF is trying to counter SAF advances toward western Sudan by attacking an SAF-controlled state capital on a major highway into Darfur.

Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains unlikely to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist negotiating demands despite nominally conceding to Angolan-mediated direct talks with M23. The DRC, M23, and Rwanda may be open to short-term ceasefires as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. M23 has continued to advance in several areas of eastern DRC since the beginning of March.

Assessments:

Ethiopia

The following text is from the Africa File Special Edition “Renewed War in Ethiopia Threatens to Draw in Eritrea and Plunge the Horn of Africa into Crisis.” | “Tigray Threatens to Spark the Next Eritrean-Ethiopian War and Plunge the Horn of Africa into Crisis.”

Tigrayan forces aligned with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) leader attacked the Tigray Interim Administration (TIA) on March 11, which risks sparking another civil war in Ethiopia. Tigrayan forces aligned with TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael dismantled local offices of the federally backed TIA, opened fire on civilians, and detained TIA cabinet members in at least three areas in Tigray on March 11.[1] Eritrean and Ethiopian media released conflicting reports on whether the anti-TIA forces attacked the TIA in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray.[2] The TPLF posted on March 13 that they had “entered offices” and “started services” in Mekelle and the Eastern zone of Tigray.[3] The TIA had suspended high-ranking officers and ordered Tigrayan forces to all military movement in the days before the attacks after warning that some Tigrayan forces were preparing “an outright coup.” [4] The TIA on March 12 called on the international community and the Ethiopian federal government to “exert all necessary pressure” on the anti-TIA forces.[5] Several European governments have since warned against travel to Ethiopia and encouraged their citizens to either leave or stock up on supplies in case the situation deteriorates.[6]

Figure 1. Attacks against Tigray Interim Administration

Source: Liam Karr.

The TPLF is an ethno-nationalist paramilitary group and political party based in the northern Tigray region in Ethiopia and fought the Ethiopian government in a civil war from 2020 until the Pretoria peace treaty in 2022.[7] Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appointed the TIA as a temporary government in May 2023 as part of the Pretoria agreement and selected Getachew Reda—the former deputy head of the TPLF—as its leader.[8] The appointment of Reda split the TPLF into two factions. TIA critics have accused the TIA of acting in the interests of the federal government, while the TIA has accused the TPLF of trying to regain control over Tigray.[9] Many aspects of the Pretoria agreement, including the complete disarmament of the Tigray Defense Forces, have not been implemented. These failures have driven tensions between the TIA, TPLF, and Ethiopian federal government.[10]

The battle for legitimacy between the TPLF and TIA began in October 2023 and culminated in the violent power grabs in March 2025. The TIA dismissed several members of the TPLF in October 2023 for trying to attend a TPLF meeting without the approval of the TIA.[11] Tensions worsened when Ethiopia’s election board denied the TPLF’s request to be fully reinstated as a political party in August 2024.[12]  The TPLF and TIA exchanged accusations of corruption, and the TIA accused the TPLF of “plotting a coup” in September 2024.[13] Over 200 officers aligned with the TPLF called for the dissolution of the TIA in January 2025.[14]

Figure 2. Tigray Conflict: 2022–2025 Timeline

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

A reignited civil war in Tigray may escalate rapidly into a proxy or a regional war between longtime rivals Ethiopia and Eritrea, as Eritrea seeks to weaken and fragment Ethiopia and Ethiopia seeks Red Sea access. Recent developments indicate that a wider war between Eritrea and Ethiopia is imminent. The TIA leader accused “external forces” of supporting the armed seizures of government offices in Tigray.[15] The attacks against the TIA occurred days after Lieutenant General Tsadkan Gebretensae, the TIA Vice President and former ENDF chief of staff, warned on March 10 that Eritrea and Ethiopia are in the “final stages” of preparations for war and that a conflict between the two sides—likely in Tigray—“seems” inevitable.[16] Eritrea also implemented a nationwide military mobilization in February, and Ethiopia deployed troops toward the Eritrean border in March.[17] The former US deputy special envoy for the Horn of Africa and the EU special representative for the Horn of Africa warned again on March 12 that “the speed and scale of mobilization and deployment on all sides” indicates an imminent conflict.[18]

Eritrea and Ethiopia have been fierce rivals since the mid-1990s—shortly after Eritrea officially gained independence with Ethiopian consent in 1993. Economic tensions and border disputes led to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in May 1998, and the two continued to militarize their shared border and support opposition groups to destabilize the other in the decades following a peace agreement in 2000.[19]

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s rise to power in 2018 seemed to reset Eritrean-Ethiopian relations and led to Eritrean-Ethiopian cooperation during the Tigray war, but this alliance of convenience has not lasted. Abiy sought to curb the influence of the TPLF, which had dominated Ethiopia since it overthrew the previous government alongside Eritrean forces in 1991, upon taking power.[20] This blossoming relationship and Eritrea’s historic distrust of the TPLF led Eritrea to quickly back the Ethiopian government when the TPLF rebelled against Abiy in November 2020.[21] The 2022 Pretoria agreement excluded Eritrea as a signatory and left Eritrean security objectives unaddressed by leaving the TPLF intact, however.[22]  Some reports even said that Eritrea believed that the Pretoria agreement heightened the threat from Ethiopia because the deal increased alignment between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government.[23] 

Eritrea and Ethiopia have returned to their old rivalry since the end of the Tigray war in nearly all aspects.[24] Abiy has made inflammatory statements since 2023 that Ethiopian Red Sea access, which it lost when Eritrea became independent in 1993, was an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight to acquire if not through diplomacy.[25] Eritrea increased cooperation with Egypt, which is one of Ethiopia’s main geopolitical rivals due in large part to Egypt’s staunch opposition to Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project on the Nile River, as part of a de facto anti-Ethiopian axis throughout 2024.[26] Ethiopia began hosting prominent Eritrean opposition groups in Addis Ababa in 2025, while Eritrea has preexisting ties with Amhara rebels and met with TPLF leadership in March 2024.[27]

Eritrea will likely use its ties with the anti-TIA TPLF faction to weaken and fragment the TPLF and Ethiopia. Ethiopian officials have accused Eritrea and the TPLF of establishing an alliance against Ethiopia, but Eritrean and TPLF officials have denied the accusations.[28] Anonymous Western diplomatic sources told French media that there has been a noticeable rapprochement between TPLF factions and Eritrea that involves “at least some communication” and may include a series of meetings in early 2025.[29] Africa Intelligence reported that these meetings included a summit in Asmara in January that involved Eritrean President Isais Afwerki.[30]

Figure 3. Eritrea-Ethiopia Tensions Timeline

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

A renewed war in Tigray or a regional war between Eritrea and Ethiopia would be an economic, humanitarian, and security crisis in the Horn of Africa that would have ripple effects across the continent and Europe. The Netherlands-based Clingendael Institute published an alert on March 6 warning that a conflict would likely lead to “immense” death and destruction given Eritrea’s and Ethiopia’s large militaries.[31] The Eritrean-Ethiopian war killed at least 70,000 people with the highest estimates going up to 300,000.[32] The most recent war in Tigray killed between 300,000 and 800,000 civilians alone.[33] The war could spread across Ethiopia and lead to ethnically motivated violence given the myriad ethnic-based armed groups in Ethiopia. The most prominent group is a loose collection of Amhara militias known as Fano. Fano militias have rebelled against the Ethiopian government since 2023 after fighting alongside the government in the Tigray war and are embroiled in a long-standing territorial dispute with Tigray.[34]

External powers, including Iran and Russia, have shown an interest in capitalizing on regional conflicts to advance their objectives around the Red Sea. Iran and Russia have sought separately to partner with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Sudan to secure their own Red Sea naval bases.[35] CTP has previously assessed that these bases would support Iran’s and its Axis of Resistance’s attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea and Russia’s power projection into the Mediterranean Sea.[36] Russian and Sudanese officials said in February 2025 that they had finalized a deal for a Russian naval base in Sudan, but Sudan’s foreign minister has repeatedly insisted that Sudanese parliament, which has been vacant since 2019 following failed elections in 2022 and the beginning of the civil war in 2023, must ratify the deal before it enters effect.[37] The deal is actually a realization of a 2017 deal signed with the former Sudanese regime for a Russian ”service center” that can host four ships and up to 300 personnel.[38]

Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are all competing for the rights to mining deposits and Red Sea port access in Sudan. The UAE has supported the opposing Rapid Support Forces to secure its investments in Sudan’s gold mining and port infrastructure.[39] Turkey sent at least $120 million of weapons, including TB2 Bayraktar drones, to the SAF in 2024 in exchange for considerations to copper, gold, and silver mines.[40] The UAE owned the development rights to the Abu Amama port near SAF-controlled Port Sudan before civil war began, but The Washington Post reported in March 2025 that SAF has since offered to Turkey and will grant to Russia if Turkey declines.[41]

Figure 4. Competition in the Greater Red Sea Area

Source: Liam Karr.

International parties, such as China, Turkey, and the Gulf states, could seek to stabilize the situation due to their significant ties and investments in Eritrea and Ethiopia. China has invested billions of US dollars in Ethiopia, is Ethiopia’s top trading partner, and has a defense agreement with Ethiopia for joint training and technology transfers.[42] Turkey is the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia behind China, provided drones to Ethiopia during the Tigray war, and demonstrated its strong ties with the Abiy regime when it brokered a port access agreement between Ethiopia on Somalia in 2024.[43] The UAE has been a staunch supporter of Abiy since 2018, established an air bridge to support Ethiopia in the Tigray war, and has sponsored Ethiopian efforts to gain Red Sea access to secure more Emirati client ports on the Red Sea.[44] The UAE also established a military base in Eritrea at the peak of Emirati involvement in the Yemeni civil war, but has since withdrawn from Eritrea.[45] The UAE and Saudi Arabia both helped mediate the 2018 peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia, although the two Gulf allies have a more rivalrous relationship in 2025.[46] Russia has a strong relationship with Eritrea and even discussed securing a port on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast as recently as 2023 but engages with Ethiopia regularly in forums such as the Russia-Africa summit and BRICs.[47]

A war between Eritrea and Ethiopia—and the potential regionalization of the conflict—would further destabilize the Red Sea region, which could impose a global economic toll. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea since the start of the Israel-Hamas conflict in 2023 have raised shipping costs due to heightened insurance rates and logistic challenges posed by alternative routes around Africa.[48] These costs have yet to return to their pre-October 2023 levels, even though the Houthis have conducted no attacks since November 2024.[49] The Houthis announced in March that they would resume attacks on international shipping.[50] A regional conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea increases the risk of added disruptions in the Red Sea. European and US analysis of the shipping crisis note that Red Sea disruptions caused short-term inflation and constrained economic growth but said that the long-term impact was manageable.[51] A wider conflict in the Red Sea would alter this calculus.

Figure 5. Average Global Price to Ship a 40-Foot Container: September 2023–March 2025

Source: Katherine Wells; Institute for the Study of War.

A war in Ethiopia would create opportunities for malignant nonstate terrorist actors by expanding the wall of instability stretching across Africa from the jihadist-afflicted Sahelian countries in West Africa to the numerous conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Sudan has been in a civil war since 2023, and rapidly escalating tensions in South Sudan have caused concerns that it could descend back into open civil war for the first time since 2018.[52] Somalia continues to be heavily fragmented between the internationally backed federal government and al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab in the latest chapter of its decades-long civil war.[53] The Islamic State (IS) has capitalized on Somalia’s instability to establish northern Somalia as its main leadership hub and a key financial node in its global network.[54] The Iranian-backed Yemeni Houthis have reached out to al Shabaab to support its efforts to destabilize the Red Sea.[55] Al Qaeda and IS have also encouraged their followers to capitalize on the Sudanese civil war to establish havens in Sudan and would likely do the same in Ethiopia, especially given IS’s recruitment efforts among ethnic groups in Ethiopia.[56]

Figure 6. Conflict Across Africa

Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data; Critical Threats Project.

War in Ethiopia would exacerbate the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa and increase migration flows that would impact Europe and the Gulf States. Clingendael’s March 2025 report noted that Ethiopia has twice the population of Sudan, where the Sudanese civil war already has increased refugee flows to North Africa and southern Europe.[57] Ethiopia also already hosts over one million refugees from the various conflicts in neighboring states.[58] The EU has highlighted migration as a critical issue since the Syrian refugee crisis of the 2010s destabilized the continent by overwhelming the EU asylum system.[59] Saudi Arabia is a leading destination for refugees from the Horn of Africa.[60]

Sudan

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) could seek to capitalize on the resumption of civil war in South Sudan. South Sudanese President Salva Kiir (Mayardit) and South Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar have been at odds for over a decade.[61] Warring factions allied with Kiir and Machar fought each other in the South Sudanese civil war from 2013 and 2018.[62] The civil war had strong ethnic undertones, with Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups backing Kiir and Machar, respectively.[63] A 2018 peace agreement and 2020 unity government between Kiir and Machar prevented a return to full-scale war but have been tenuous.[64] Tensions escalated on March 4, 2025, when a Nuer militia with ties to Machar attacked an army base in Nasir along the Ethiopia–South Sudan border and accused Kiir’s forces of launching attacks on Machar’s forces in late February.[65] Kiir responded by arresting several of Machar’s political allies.[66] The United States ordered nonemergency US government personnel to depart the country on March 8.[67] Ugandan forces began arriving in Juba, the South Sudanese capital, to support Kiir on March 9.[68]

Figure 7. Nuer White Army Militia Attacks South Sudanese Army Base

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

An expansion of fighting toward the Sudan–South Sudan border would exacerbate the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the area and could pressure civilians to flee from South Sudan to Sudan. The International Crisis Group on March 7 cited unspecified sources in Juba who said that Nuer militias aligned with Machar may try to capture Malakal in Upper Nile, approximately 115 miles (185 kilometers) northwest of Nasir.[69] Fighting in Malakal could force civilians to flee north toward the border with Sudan, which is 20 miles (32 kilometers) north of Malakal. The government in Sudan’s White Nile State, which borders South Sudan, began on March 11 establishing a plan to monitor a potential influx of refugees from South Sudan.[70] South Sudanese civilians could choose to remain in South Sudan given a recent pattern of attacks against South Sudanese refugees in Sudan.[71]  The fighting would also displace at least some of the over half a million Sudanese refugees that are in South Sudan.[72]

The SAF could leverage its historic ties with militias in northern South Sudan to counter the efforts of the RSF to use South Sudan as a rear support base as the SAF tries to contain the RSF west of the Nile River. The Sudanese government historically armed Nuer militias in the 1990s under former Sudanese dictator Omar al Bashir.[73] The International Crisis Group reported that the Sudanese army may have reactivated its ties to Nuer militias in Upper Nile and sent military supplies to South Sudan, according to unspecified diplomats in South Sudan and the surrounding region.[74]

RSF ties to Kiir-aligned militias on the Sudan–South Sudan border have created a potential supply line from RSF-controlled western Sudan to RSF-aligned enclaves in SAF-dominated southeastern Sudan. The RSF and a Kiir-aligned militia made a political pact in early 2025 and opened joint training camps in a militia-controlled enclave in southeastern Sudan, which fueled SAF fears of the RSF establishing a supply corridor from western Sudan to the SAF’s flank in southeastern Sudan via South Sudan.[75]  The RSF-aligned militias have an enclave on the Sudanese border with South Sudan and Ethiopia and on the Sudan–South Sudan border in South Kordofan state.

Figure 8. Control of Terrain in Sudan's Civil War

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.

The SAF is attacking these RSF-aligned enclaves to secure the South Sudan border and contain the RSF west of the Nile River. The SAF made marginal advances in South Kordofan state, which borders South Sudan, in late February, possibly as part of its efforts to secure the Sudan–South Sudan border in West Kordofan and South Kordofan States.[76] The SAF forced the RSF west of the Nile River in central Sudan when it took the last RSF strongholds in Sennar State on March 5—except for the RSF-aligned enclave in southeastern Sudan.[77]

The SAF has surrounded the RSF in central Khartoum, as the SAF seeks to push the RSF west of the Nile River and create a one-front war against the RSF in western Sudan. The SAF captured the East Nile district, east of Khartoum, on March 8, and has surrounded the remaining RSF forces in central Khartoum.[78] SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to consolidate control over the eastern bank of the Nile River and support SAF offensives into western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to recross the Nile River given SAF control of key bridges on the river and because the RSF has one remaining link to the city at the Jebel Awliya Bridge.[79] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are better positioned to support future offensives in western Sudan than the SAF’s current command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles northeast of Khartoum on Sudan’s Red Sea coast.

The RSF is trying to counter SAF advances toward western Sudan by attacking an SAF-controlled state capital on a major highway into Darfur. The SAF has advanced west toward RSF strongholds in Darfur since January 2025.[80] The SAF on February 20 captured el Obeid—a state capital in south-central Sudan located on a major east-west highway that leads toward Darfur and a north-south highway that links Khartoum and southwestern Sudan.[81] CTP previously assessed that these SAF advances create conditions for an offensive against the RSF center of gravity in Darfur.[82] The RSF has shelled el Obeid for seven consecutive days between March 6 and March 12.[83] The RSF also rolled back SAF advances west of el Obeid and recaptured el Khawai--a small town located on the major highway between el Obeid the Darfur region--on March 9.[84] The SAF captured the town in late February 2025.[85] Weather conditions will slow the pace of SAF and RSF operations, as the rainy season in Sudan typically occurs between March and October, with the greatest concentration between June and September.[86]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Angola announced that it would mediate direct peace talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels. Angolan President João Lourenço announced after a meeting with DRC President Félix Tshisekedi on March 11 that he would mediate the talks in the Angolan capital, Luanda, on March 18.[87] DRC spokesperson Tina Salama said that the DRC had “received an invitation” but would “wait to see” the details of Angola’s approach before confirming its participation.^[88] Congolese officials told French media that the DRC was “surprised” by Angola’s statement and considered it a “unilateral announcement that was not coordinated with Kinshasa.”^[89] Congolese officials also reiterated DRC demands for Rwanda to cease all support for the DRC and the Congolese government’s preference to negotiate with M23 through the Kenyan-mediated Nairobi process—an inter-Congolese dialogue between the DRC government and armed groups in the eastern DRC.[90] An M23 spokesperson told Reuters that the group plans to attend the talks.[91]

Direct DRC-M23 negotiations represent a major concession from the DRC, but the DRC is unlikely to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s maximalist demands. The prospect of direct DRC-M23 negotiations has been an insurmountable obstacle to previous peace talks. The Angolan-mediated Luanda process between the DRC and Rwanda broke down in December 2024 when Rwanda insisted that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23” for talks to continue.[92] The DRC has long ruled out direct negotiations with M23, which it brands as “terrorists” and a Rwandan proxy.[93] Talks between the DRC and M23 within the Nairobi process have stalled since 2022 after the DRC lost faith in the process and allied with anti-Rwandan militias following continued M23 advances.[94] Member states from the East African Community and the Southern African Development Community recommended merging the two processes in early February, but the DRC government's spokesperson said that the DRC supported an “alignment” between the two processes rather than the creation of an entirely new process on March 6.[95]

M23 almost certainly aims to legitimize control over the areas that it has captured in North and South Kivu, including in Goma and Bukavu, and possibly expand its influence in the DRC as a legitimate political party as part of any long-term agreement with the DRC government. M23 has demanded that the DRC implement the 2013 Nairobi peace deal, which stipulated that M23 would demilitarize and become a political party and that the Congolese government would facilitate the return of refugees, among other provisions.[96] Corneille Nangaa—the  head of M23’s political branch Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)—said that the AFC-M23 is “here to stay” and “open to dialogue” with the DRC after the rebel coalition captured Goma.[97] The group’s systematic effort to establish “state-like” administrative systems in the parts of eastern DRC under its control indicates that the group intends to control these areas in the long-term.[98] A deal that legitimizes M23’s control over eastern DRC would advance Rwanda’s objectives to establish a sphere of influence in the eastern DRC given that Rwanda “de facto control” of M23, according to the UN.[99]

Tshisekedi is unlikely to follow through on a deal that legitimizes M23’s control of eastern DRC because it would severely undermine his legitimacy and power base in Kinshasa.[100] Tshisekedi heavily leaned into anti-Rwandan rhetoric and promised to declare war on Rwanda during his successful campaign to be reelected in January 2024.[101] Congolese government officials have sought to mobilize the population against Rwanda and contributed to sometimes violent anti-Rwandan and anti-Western protests, including attacks on several embassies in Kinshasa in late January.[102] The previous Congolese president initially agreed to the 2013 Nairobi peace deal but never implemented it. This previous move shows that Congolese politicians are willing to agree in principle to negotiations with M23 but are ultimately unwilling to accede to M23’s and Rwanda’s demands due to domestic political constraints.

The escalation of the M23 rebellion since December has heightened internal pressure on Tshisekedi. Numerous opposition politicians in Kinshasa have criticized Tshisekedi for failing to contain M23’s rapid expansion, and rumors of a palace coup have circulated in the DRC’s national capital—Kinshasa—since mid-February.[103] Tshisekedi released several of his political opponents from jail, reorganized his inner circle, and restructured the DRC government and his political party's leadership in February and March in response to this growing pressure.[104] Tshisekedi has tried to absorb various opposition members into a unity government to ease tensions, but some politicians have declined Tshisekedi’s overture and said that their disagreements with Tshisekedi are “insurmountable.”[105] M23 leader Bertrand Bisimwa boasted on social media that the group’s recent advances in the eastern DRC pressured the DRC into direct dialogue.^[106]

The DRC, M23, and Rwanda may be open to short-term ceasefires as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. Both M23 and the Congolese army (FARDC) have used previous pauses in fighting to reconstitute their forces and launch new offensives. M23 continued to seize territory and relocate troops after a regionally brokered ceasefire in December 2022.[107] The group’s activities during the brief ceasefire period helped it then capture the operationally significant town of Kitchanga in February 2023.[108] The UN reported that FARDC and M23 exploited a lull in fighting to “reinforce troops and replenish weaponry” following a July 2024 ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda.[109] FARDC has used pauses in fighting to consolidate its forces and mount counteroffensives, including in October 2022, October 2023, and January 2025.[110] These FARDC counteroffensives have collapsed quickly or failed to regain any operationally significant areas, however.[111]

Figure 9. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

Source: Liam Karr.

M23 made significant advances toward Uvira, the second-largest city in South Kivu, in March. The rebels captured several villages in the Kaziba chiefdom of Walungu district from pro-Congolese government forces and allied Burundian troops on March 10 and bypassed Burundian and Congolese positions on the RN5 to advance within 20 miles of Uvira through forested paths on March 12.[112] CTP previously assessed that Burundi and Rwanda likely agreed to deconflict around Uvira after M23 voluntarily withdrew from key positions along the road between Uvira and the Rwandan border in late February, and Burundian troops and allied Congolese militias assumed control over the road.[113] Congolese media outlets reported that M23’s control of the Kaziba area would allow M23 to link its support zones with the Rwandan-backed and M23-aligned militias about 30 miles south near Minembwe town in southern South Kivu.[114] M23 has condemned FARDC’s activity near Minembwe town and said that it would act if FARDC persisted.[115] The Kaziba area also provides a buffer around Bukavu 33 miles to the north and a route to M23’s ongoing advance on the RN2 road toward the gold mining town of Kamituga 32 miles to the west.

Figure 11. M23 and Allies Activity in South Kivu

Source: Liam Karr.

M23 has also made gains in western North Kivu as it seeks to consolidate control over Masisi district and advance toward the mineral-rich Walikale district. FARDC and pro-Congolese government militia had attacked villages near Masisi town since March 6 in an attempt to retake the district capital and block M23’s westward advance along the RP529 road.[116] M23 launched a counterattack that broke through pro-Congolese government positions near Masisi’s district capital and ended in the capture of Nyabiondo town and several nearby villages on March 9.[117] M23 advanced 5 miles west from a village near Nyabiondo and captured Kashebere and Kibati towns along the RP529 on March 12.^[118] M23’s control of Nyabiondo and the RP529 denies pro-Congolese government forces road access to Masisi town and sets conditions for M23 to advance into Walikale district and on to Kisangani, the fourth largest city in the DRC and the most important point in the central DRC.[119]

Figure 12. M23 Advances Westward Toward DRC Interior

Source: Liam Karr.

Several armed militia groups in North Kivu reportedly defected from the FARDC to join M23’s broader coalition, which will likely boost M23’s ongoing offensive in northern North Kivu. Congolese media initially reported that fighters from three armed groups created a new coalition and joined the AFC on March 9.[120] Some leadership figures and a small number of elements from two of the groups immediately denounced defections from their groups and denied their involvement with M23, however.[121] The UN has assessed that AFC’s strategy to recruit and build a wider coalition of armed groups is “key” to M23’s “successful territorial expansion” within its broader effort to “reshape the political and military landscape” of the eastern DRC.[122] M23 has advanced in northern Lubero district toward the Lubero district capital since late February but has faced significant resistance from FARDC and Wazalendo fighters.[123] M23 has attempted to flank Lubero town, but pro-Congolese government forces blocked the group’s advance, leading M23 to divert northwest toward the gold-mining town of Bunyatenge.[124]

The Force des Patriotes pour la Paix/Armée du Peuple (FPP-AP) in particular could help M23’s efforts to flank FARDC positions west of Lubero town. The UN estimated in 2021 that the group had 200-300 fighters, but Congolese media said the group has more than 2,000 fighters in March 2025.[125] Congolese media described FPP-AP’s defection as a “major blow” to the FARDC because the militia is “one of the best structured and influential armed groups in North Kivu” and had deployed “hundreds of fighters” to “dozens of villages” in the Lubero district to block M23’s advance.[126] Congolese media and a researcher on social media reported that the defected fighters moved northward to reinforce M23 positions near Lubero town and allowed M23 to seize Bunyatenge.[127] The Congolese media outlet Actualite.cd quoted a local researcher who said that M23 would now be able to advance unimpeded in FPP-AP areas of operation to Manguredjipa—another gold mining town 73 miles northwest of Lubero town near the border with Tshopo province—via Bunyatenge.[128] Congolese media also said that FPP-AP’s presence in northern Beni district in North Kivu and the southern parts of Ituri province could potentially facilitate [129]

M23’s advances would threaten Lubero town and Butembo—a major commercial and military city—along the RN2 road. M23’s strengthened positions to the west of Lubero would allow the group to mount an offensive on the town, which is FARDC’s last defensive position before Butembo.[130] Congolese media has said that M23’s flanking maneuvers around Lubero town may intend to bypass Lubero and reach Butembo. Butembo is a commercial and military hub in North Kivu with a population of at least 150,000.[131] M23’s control of Butembo would allow the group to solidify administrative and political control over Lubero district and set conditions for the group to expand further north by strengthening its supply lines and reappropriating FARDC military infrastructure.

[1] https://addisstandard.com/tigray-interim-admin-urges-federal-govt-for-necessary-assistance-warns-of-looming-danger/; https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1899501893509955655; https://borkena.com/2025/03/11/tigray-ethiopia-debretsion-faction-launches-attacks-multiple-casualties-in-mekelle/; https://x.com/breaking_bre/status/1899472486728654919; https://x.com/Wolde_Yabele/status/1899499344690110645; https://x.com/WegahtaFacts/status/1899572738450493725; https://x.com/sajid_nadeem78/status/1899531712717353298; https://www.bbc.com/tigrinya/articles/ckg8z77278wo

[2] https://borkena.com/2025/03/12/ethiopia-pro-debretsion-military-commanders-reportedly-in-control-of-airport-in-mekelle/; https://x.com/WegahtaFacts/status/1899765914939072998

[3] https://www.facebook.com/tplf.officia/posts/1253193412836604; https://www.facebook.com/tplf.officia/posts/1253226699499942

[4] https://addisstandard.com/tigray-interim-admin-urges-federal-govt-for-necessary-assistance-warns-of-looming-danger/

[5] https://addisstandard.com/tigray-interim-admin-urges-federal-govt-for-necessary-assistance-warns-of-looming-danger/; https://web.facebook.com/TigrayCAO/posts/pfbid0ye29TTAjsuSp2Axrwh658uxR7uSFrazvz2aDCayMKtPeYGSG1be7wWsn954KBmRql; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopias-tigray-region-urges-federal-intervention-after-town-seized-2025-03-12/ 

[6] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/03/12/tigray-escalation-worries-western-embassies,110386426-gra

[7] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-says-tigray-interim-administration-set-up-part-peace-plan-2023-03-23/

[9] https://theafricainsight.substack.com/p/the-sub-saharan-security-review-a72

[10] https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1612928216192192514; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/11/ethiopias-tigray-rebels-start-handing-over-heavy-weapons;  https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/03/19/epo-monthly-update-february-2024-clashes-in-tigrays-disputed-territories-threaten-peace-deal/; https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-eritrean-troops-abducting-farmers-livestock-bd11f55a42b4705a2da5c01afbd7cc74

[11] https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/11/01/epo-weekly-21-27-october-2023/; https://www.facebook.com/addismaleda/posts/pfbid02VRLJsbRbEm9bM16Z8L9EH39kS34ddJXaZBTJgbvw2ZqzY9pdnH3aTgKDiVen4LAml 

[12] https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/08/15/ethiopia-weekly-update-13-august-2024/

[13] https://addisstandard.com/news-getachew-redas-faction-accuses-debretsion-led-group-of-coup-plot-against-tigray-interim-admin/; https://umdmedia.com/2024/12/tplf-central-committee-faction-accuses-getachew-reda-of-national-treason-amid-deepening-divisions-after-meeting-with-abiy-ahmed/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/africa-file-october-17-2024-egypt-eritrea-somalia-summit-challenges-tigray-peace

[14] https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/43483/; https://addisstandard.com/senior-leaders-of-tigray-forces-call-for-dissolution-of-interim-admin-alleging-weaknesses-and-external-influence/

[15] http://borkena dot com/2025/03/11/tigray-ethiopia-debretsion-faction-launches-attacks-multiple-casualties-in-mekelle; https://x.com/reda_getachew/status/1899501893509955655

[16] https://www.theafricareport.com/378644/tigray-cannot-be-the-battleground-for-ethiopia-and-eritrea

[17] https://borkena dot com/2025/02/21/eritrea-mobilizes-military-reserves-imposes-travel-restrictions-amid-rising-tensions-with-ethiopia; https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-orders-nationwide-military-mobilization-raising-fears-of-renewed-conflict; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-eritrea-path-war-tigray-officials-warn-2025-03-13

[18] https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/12/ethiopia-eritrea-tigray-abiy-isaias-tdf-tplf-war-red-sea

[19] https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/The%20Eritrea%E2%80%93Ethiopia%20Armed%20Conflict.pdf; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/ethiopia-and-eritrea-stopping-slide-war; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia;

[20] https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2022/the-remaking-of-the-ethiopian-state; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44376298; https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2019/summary

[21] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/09/navigating-regionalization-ethiopias-tigray-conflict/03-key-regional-players-and-their; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/eritrea-ethiopia/eritreas-long-bitter-feud-ethiopias-tigray

[22] https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf; https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/taking-ethiopia-eritrea-tensions-seriously

[23] https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf; https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/taking-ethiopia-eritrea-tensions-seriously

[24] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b194-ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara; https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf

[25] https://www.theafricareport.com/327485/ethiopia-abiy-stirs-up-region-in-his-quest-for-a-port; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port

[26] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-october-17-2024-egypt-eritrea-somalia-summit-challenges-with-tigray-peace-process#Somalia; https://www.aljazeera dot com/economy/2020/6/30/egypt-warns-of-existential-threat-from-ethiopia-dam; https://www.sis.gov dot eg/Story/189557/Ethiopia%E2%80%99s-unilateral-GERD-operation-an-%E2%80%98existential-threat%E2%80%99-to-all-Egyptians-Irrigation-ministers

[27] https://borkena dot com/2025/01/29/eritrean-opposition-organizing-in-ethiopia-aims-to-topple-eritrean-govt; https://www.voanews.com/a/tigray-leader-reports-talks-with-archrival-eritrea/7779628.html; ﷟HYPERLINK "https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/07/eritrean-diaspora-s-brigade-nhamedu-set-to-open-addis-ababa-branch,110372794-bre"https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/07/eritrean-diaspora-s-brigade-nhamedu-set-to-open-addis-ababa-branch,110372794-bre; ; https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/12/who-fano-inside-ethiopia-amhara-rebellionhttps://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/b194-ethiopias-ominous-new-war-amhara; https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2024/11/12/who-fano-inside-ethiopia-amhara-rebellion

[28] https://www.theafricareport.com/377503/ex-ethiopian-president-mulatu-teshome-accuses-eritrea-of-plotting-war-as-tensions-flare; https://www.aljazeeradot com/opinions/2025/2/17/to-avoid-another-conflict-in-the-horn-of-africa-now-is-the-time-to-act; https://x.com/hawelti/status/1891837074325508563; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95a1DP2hN5o&lc=Ugw2iDNjBnBN3ExSzWR4AaABAg

[29] https://www.theafricareport.com/377503/ex-ethiopian-president-mulatu-teshome-accuses-eritrea-of-plotting-war-as-tensions-flare; https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/24/tigray-leaders-dangerously-torn-between-addis-ababa-and-asmara,110378687-eve; https://x.com/hawelti/status/1891837074325508563; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95a1DP2hN5o&lc=Ugw2iDNjBnBN3ExSzWR4AaABAg

[30] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2025/02/24/tigray-leaders-dangerously-torn-between-addis-ababa-and-asmara,110378687-eve

[31] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia

[32] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia; http://journal-of-conflictology.uoc.edu/joc/ca/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/download/vol5iss2-bezabih/1919-8683-1-PB.pdf; https://journals.openedition.org/cea/pdf/384

[33] https://epo.acleddata.com/2023/02/08/

[34] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-26-2024-fano-offensive-in-ethiopias-amhara-egypt-arms-somalia-rebel-drones-in-mali-burkina-thwarts-another-coup#Ethiopia; https://epo.acleddata.com/amhara-conflict-fano-insurgency; https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/02/21/epo-weekly-update-20-february-2024; https://epo.acleddata.com/2024/04/24/epo-weekly-update-23-april-2024

[35] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan

[36] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-20-2025-m23-advance-continues-unchallenged-saf-grows-partnerships-with-iran-and-russia-rsf-creates-parallel-government-in-sudan#SudanInt 

[37] https://www.memri.org/tv/sudan-fm-ali-youssef-buy-weapons-iran-ukraine-russia-naval-base; https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-sudan-agree-red-sea-naval-base-sudanese-foreign-minister-says-2025-02-12; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c30del8dz51o

[38] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2020/11/13/russia-plans-naval-base-in-sudan; https://www.memri.org/tv/sudan-fm-ali-youssef-buy-weapons-iran-ukraine-russia-naval-base

[39] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Sudan

[40] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/07/sudan-war-turkey-baykar-rsf-saf

[41] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/07/sudan-war-turkey-baykar-rsf-saf

[42] https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/01/despite-high-stakes-ethiopia-china-sits-sidelines-peace-efforts

[43] https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike; https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa

[44] https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1KT1RS; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366; https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-january-11; https://www.newarab.com/analysis/how-israel-egypt-and-uae-view-ethiopias-red-sea-deal

[45] https://thearabweekly dot com/uae-dismantles-eritrea-base-it-continues-pull-back-yemen-war

[46] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia

[47] https://www.hudson.org/foreign-policy/eritreas-growing-ties-china-russia-highlight-americas-inadequate-approach-east-joshua-meservey; https://www.theeastafrican.co dot ke/tea/news/rest-of-africa/afwerki-to-putin-remake-world-order-to-end-us-dominance-4255960; https://jamestown.org/program/russia-in-the-red-sea-port-options-in-eritrea-part-two; https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-ethiopia-rethink; https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/13/russia-is-building-military-influence-in-africa-challenging-us-france.html; https://www.voanews.com/a/russian-fm-lavrov-heads-to-ethiopia-seeking-closer-ties/6674221.html; https://apnews.com/article/russia-africa-putin-ukraine-grain-food-be35ba24397aaac84d36764a5ce7db95; https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-russia-ethiopia-rethink; https://tass dot com/politics/1741207

[48] https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-economic-consequences-attacks-red-sea-shipping-lanes

[49] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82bel; https://www.drewry.co.uk/supply-chain-advisors/supply-chain-expertise/world-container-index-assessed-by-drewry

[50] http://x.com/army21ye/status/1899563866599678368; https://x.com/TvAlmasirah/status/1899883401034842138

[51] https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-economic-consequences-attacks-red-sea-shipping-lanes; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/the-long-shadow-of-the-red-sea-shipping-disruption; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12657; https://www.freightos.com/freight-blog/red-sea-crisis-impact/#-mitigating-the-impact-of-the-

[52] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-precipice-renewed-full-blown-war; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59035053

[53]

[54] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-june-13-2024-houthi-shabaab-weapons-deal-sfg-boost-in-central-somalia#Aden; https://editorials.voa.gov/a/al-shabaab-still-a-threat-in-somalia/8005499.html

[55] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-islamic-states-global-long-game-and-resurgence-in-syria-poses-an-evolved-threat-to-the-west;

[56] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-islamic-state-somalia-propaganda-coalitions-regional-language-push; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/islamic-state-somalia-a-growing-global-terror-concern

[57] https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia; https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/QMMU-2024-Q4-North-Africa.pdf;

[58] https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-refugees-and-asylum-seekers-31-january-2025

[59] https://www.politico.eu/article/climate-refugee-crisis-europe-policy; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53925209; https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2018/04/europes-great-challenge-integrating-syrian-refugees.html; https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-the-far-right-has-reshaped-the-refugee-debate-in-europe

[60] https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl701/files/documents/2024-09/ec-july-2024_0.pdf; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dangerous-frenemy-averting-showdown-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia

[61] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-precipice-renewed-full-blown-war

[62] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-precipice-renewed-full-blown-war

[63] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan

[64] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/civil-war-south-sudan

[65] https://apnews.com/article/south-sudan-un-chopper-fighting-nasir-db1ec0bdea98864b48a61b17f0092ee6; https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-precipice-renewed-full-blown-war

[66] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/south-sudans-peacebuilding-minister-arrested-vice-presidency-says-2025-03-06/

[67] https://ss.usembassy.gov/travel-advisory-update-ordered-departure-of-non-emergency-u-s-government-personnel/

[68] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/uganda-says-special-forces-deploy-south-sudan-capital-amid-tensions-2025-03-11/

[69] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-precipice-renewed-full-blown-war

[70] https://sudantribune.com/article298424/

[71] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudanese-suffer-retaliatory-attacks-south-sudan

[72] https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/10/1155636

[73] https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudan1103/8.htm; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/04/riek-machar-south-sudan-ambitions 

[74] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/south-sudan/south-sudan-precipice-renewed-full-blown-war

[75] https://sudantribune.com/article298039; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20250223-sudan-s-rsf-allies-sign-charter-for-rival-government-sources

[76] https://sudantribune.com/article297869/

[77] https://x.com/SudanTribune_EN/status/1897394716351848781

[78] https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1168622614922856&id=100053253862082

[79] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-13-2025-saf-announces-government-plan-and-russian-naval-base-drc-concedes-to-direct-talks-with-m23-turkeys-growing-defense-partnerships-in-africa; https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1886835869698679029  

[80] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-27-2025-saf-advances-west-toward-darfur-m23-and-drc-reset-as-pressure-grows-rwanda-issp-transnational-threat-al-shabaab-central-somalia-offensive#Sudan

[81] https://sudantribune.com/article297800/

[82] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-february-27-2025-saf-advances-west-toward-darfur-m23-and-drc-reset-as-pressure-grows-rwanda-issp-transnational-threat-al-shabaab-central-somalia-offensive#Sudan

[83] https://x.com/sudan_war/status/1899051285493490131; https://x.com/sudan_war/status/1898662855827759149; https://x.com/BSonblast/status/1899851531178123312

[84] https://sudantribune.com/article298366/; https://t.me/RSFSudan/7492; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=625212366890486

[85] https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1894375866697732347

[86] https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/sudan/climate-data-historical

[87] https://x.com/SMwanamilongo1/status/1899525571744297298; https://x.com/StanysBujakera/status/1899890107831763302  

[88] https://x.com/TinaSalama2/status/1899561256572645467; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-m23-rebels-begin-direct-peace-talks-march-18-angola-says-2025-03-12

[89] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250312-l-angola-annonce-de-possibles-n%C3%A9gociations-entre-rdc-et-afc-m23-l-entourage-de-tshisekedi-reste-prudent

[90] https://x.com/TinaSalama2/status/1899561256572645467; https://www.mediacongo dot net/article-actualite-148377_muyaya_sur_les_negociations_directes_entre_kinshasa_et_m23_il_faut_attendre_des_precisions_sur_l_initiative_angolaise.html; https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/ruto-mismanaged-nairobi-peace-process-tshisekedi-says-4704180; https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/373/37/pdf/n2437337.pdf; https://issafrica.org/iss-today/eastern-drc-peace-processes-miss-the-mark  

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