Africa File, March 20, 2025: Qatari-Mediated Ceasefire in DRC; SAF Closes in on Khartoum; RSF Attacks Spread to South Sudan; Al Shabaab Ramadan Offensive; Tigray Simmers as Amhara Escalates; Russia’s Red Sea Efforts; Burkinabe Massacres

Contributors: John Reece and Nick Markiewicz

Data Cutoff: March 20, 2025, at 10 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda agreed to a Qatari-mediated ceasefire, but fundamental disagreements remain an obstacle to long-term peace efforts. African-led peace efforts continue to face challenges from regional rivalries and mutual distrust between the belligerents and mediators in the eastern DRC conflict. The Qatari-mediated agreement comes after Rwandan-backed M23 rebels captured a key district capital in the eastern DRC from Congolese forces, despite both sides nominally agreeing to multiple ceasefires. The DRC, Rwanda, and M23 will likely remain open to short-term ceasefires as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives.

Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have made several operationally significant advances against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in central Khartoum in recent days and are poised to retake the last key RSF-controlled areas in the capital in the coming weeks. SAF control over Khartoum would help the SAF control the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives that aim to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The recapture of Khartoum would also mark a significant milestone in the SAF effort to establish itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. 

South Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are likely backing opposing sides in South Sudan, which risks fueling a possible civil war in South Sudan. The RSF attacked a major South Sudanese Nuer opposition militia near the Sudan-South Sudan border after the militia reportedly tried to reach an SAF weapons cache. The SAF is likely leveraging its ties with militias in northern South Sudan to counter any RSF efforts to use South Sudan as a rear support base as the SAF tries to contain the RSF west of the Nile River. South Sudan faces a high risk of civil war as violence and political tensions continue to worsen.

Somalia. Al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate al Shabaab is attempting to overwhelm Somali forces around Mogadishu and in central Somalia. The group has escalated attacks around Mogadishu, including an attempt to assassinate the Somali president, and increasingly infiltrated the capital since the beginning of Ramadan at the end of February. Al Shabaab has maintained an offensive northeast of Mogadishu across central Somalia since January 2025 that seeks to encircle the capital and overturn landmark, United States-backed, Somali counterterrorism gains from 2022. Al Shabaab likely aims to exploit gaps left by overstretched Somali forces, but it is unclear whether moving into Mogadishu or central Somalia is its primary objective.

Ethiopia. Opposing factions in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region are reportedly negotiating to deescalate tensions, but an offensive by ethno-nationalist Amhara militias threatens to destabilize Ethiopia further. A new offensive by Amhara Fano militants will further strain Ethiopian forces and could complicate the situation in Tigray, given Fano’s long-standing territorial dispute with Tigray. The conflicts in Amhara and Tigray may escalate into a proxy or a regional war between longtime rivals Ethiopia and Eritrea, which have both mobilized for war in recent months.

Russia. The Kremlin reached a deal to train the Ethiopian navy as it seeks to increase its influence in the Red Sea and supplant the West in Africa. The Kremlin has pursued naval deals with Eritrea in recent years and may view Ethiopia as another potential avenue for gaining influence in the Red Sea. Russia also nominally reached an agreement with the SAF for a Russian naval base in Sudan.

Burkina Faso. Burkinabe security forces and auxiliary militia conducted another major massacre against civilians. The attack continues a pattern of heightened violence against civilians since the current junta took power in 2022. These abuses exacerbate the ethnic grievances that Salafi-jihadi groups use to recruit.

Assessments:

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda agreed to a Qatari-mediated ceasefire. DRC President Félix Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame met in Doha, Qatar, for a trilateral meeting with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani on March 18.^[1] The parties released a joint communiqué after the meeting announcing an “immediate and unconditional” ceasefire as outlined by East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders in early February.^[2] Foreign ministers from the EAC-SADC had met the day before the trilateral meeting in Qatar to discuss a “roadmap” to implement the ceasefire.^[3] Angola tried and failed to broker a separate ceasefire between pro-Congolese government forces and the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels on March 16.^[4]

The joint communiqué from the trilateral meeting stated that the DRC and Rwanda committed to continue informal, Qatari-mediated negotiations and reaffirmed their commitments to the Luanda and Nairobi peace process.^[5] The Luanda process is an SADC-backed, Angolan-mediated initiative that aims to broker a peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, while the Nairobi process is an EAC-backed, Kenyan-mediated, inter-Congolese dialogue between the DRC government and armed groups in the eastern DRC, including M23. French media reported that France and Qatar have tried separately to mediate talks between the DRC and Rwanda since 2023.^[6] Qatar has close economic and diplomatic ties to the DRC and Rwanda, and French media reported that the DRC and Rwanda likely view Qatar as “a mediator with no hidden agenda.”[7]

The DRC and Rwanda released separate readouts after the Doha meeting that highlight that fundamental disagreements remain unresolved. The DRC reiterated its demands for all parties to observe a UN resolution from February that demanded the immediate withdrawal of all Rwandan troops on Congolese soil.^[8] Kagame claimed in an interview with CNN in late January that “he doesn’t know” if Rwandan troops are deployed in the eastern DRC.^[9] The United Nations has reported that Rwanda has deployed at least 4,000 soldiers to the eastern DRC, while Reuters has reported that Rwandan troop numbers may have surged to 12,000 personnel amid the latest M23 offensives.^[10] Rwanda released a statement after the meeting in Doha that reiterated its security concerns over the presence of anti-Tutsi armed groups in the eastern DRC—a pretext Rwanda has used to justify past military interventions in the DRC.^[11] Rwanda previously agreed in 2024 to withdraw its troops from the eastern DRC in exchange for the DRC dismantling anti-Tutsi armed groups as part of Luanda process negotiations.^[12] This proposed compromise collapsed in December 2024 after Rwanda insisted that the DRC “hold a direct dialogue with the M23” for talks to continue.^[13] The specific details of the March 18 Doha ceasefire agreement remain undisclosed.

The DRC-Rwanda talks in Qatar came after M23 unilaterally withdrew from Angolan-mediated negotiations with the DRC in retaliation for EU sanctions against Rwandan and M23 officials.^[14] The European Union sanctioned five Rwandan officials, four M23 leaders, and a gold refinery in Kigali, Rwanda’s capital, on March 17.^[15] M23 accused the European Union of “obstructing the much-anticipated talks” in Angola and claimed that “successive sanctions” from Western countries “severely undermined direct dialogue and made any progress impossible.”^[16] Rwanda on the same day severed diplomatic ties with Belgium, which has been one of Rwanda’s biggest critics and a leading voice for strong EU action against Rwanda for supporting M23.^[17]

The DRC, Rwanda, and M23 will likely remain open to short-term ceasefires, as they seek to reset and set conditions for future offensives. Both the Congolese army (FARDC) and M23 have used previous pauses in fighting to reset militarily and launch new offensives. The United Nations reported that FARDC and M23 exploited a lull in fighting to “reinforce troops and replenish weaponry” following a July 2024 ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda.^[18] FARDC has used military stalemates to consolidate its forces and mount counteroffensives, including in October 2022, October 2023, and January 2025.^[19] M23 continued to seize territory and relocate troops after it relinquished control of Kibumba town in North Kivu as part of an EAC-brokered ceasefire in December 2022.^[20] The group’s activities during the brief ceasefire helped it then capture the operationally significant town of Kitchanga in February 2023.^[21] M23 continued to advance toward the South Kivu provincial capital of Bukavu in early February 2025 after declaring a unilateral ceasefire.^[22] Corneille Nangaa--head of M23’s political branch--told Reuters that the Qatari-brokered ceasefire “doesn’t concern us” on March 20.[23]

African-led peace efforts continue to suffer from regional rivalries and mutual distrust between the belligerents and mediators in the eastern DRC conflict. A diplomatic source told Reuters that the Qatari-mediated discussions were “informal” and “not meant to replace” the existing Luanda and Nairobi peace processes.^[24] The EAC-SADC bloc presented plans in March to merge the two processes after it named three former African heads of state to facilitate the merger.^[25] The Qatari foreign ministry stated that the DRC and Rwanda committed to finding a longer-term peace solution through the “now merged and/or aligned” Luanda and Nairobi processes after the Doha meeting.^[26] It remains unclear, however, whether the DRC will negotiate with Rwanda or M23 first, what role the facilitators will play, and how the two peace frameworks will be combined.[27]

The DRC, Rwanda, and M23 have shown mixed positions toward merged peace talks and have accused the regional bodies of bias in the past. Rwanda and M23 previously condemned the SADC’s military involvement in the eastern DRC.^[28] Rwanda expressed its support for the merged peace processes, however, and for direct dialogue between M23 and the Congolese government after the Doha meeting.^[29] The DRC has criticized the EAC for its perceived favorability toward Rwanda and accused Kenya of “mismanaging” the Nairobi process.^[30] Talks between the DRC and M23 within the Nairobi process stalled in 2022 after the DRC lost faith in the process and allied with anti-Rwandan militias amid continued M23 advances.^[31] The DRC has stated that it supports an “alignment” between the Luanda and Nairobi processes rather than the creation of an entirely new process.^[32] French media reported that the EAC-SADC did not consult the DRC about the selection of the new facilitators for a merged peace process and that the DRC proposed alternative mediators.^[33]

M23 captured a key district capital in the eastern DRC from Congolese forces, despite both sides nominally agreeing to multiple ceasefires. M23 advanced roughly 85 miles westward from the Masisi district (officially called territories) to capture Walikale’s district capital in western North Kivu between March 9 and 19.^[34] Angolan President João Lourenço had tried to broker a ceasefire, as M23 advanced toward Walikale, but both sides accused the other of violating the ceasefire and claimed to fight in self-defense.^[35] M23’s capture of Walikale marks its furthest westward advance in North Kivu since the M23’s emergence in 2012, and the group now controls three of the six district capitals in North Kivu province as well as the provincial capital Goma.[36]

Figure 1. M23 Advances Westward Toward DRC Interior

Source: Liam Karr and Yale Ford.

M23 capturing Walikale enables the group to advance deeper into the DRC and benefit from the extensive mineral resources in Walikale district. Walikale town has roughly 60,000 inhabitants and is the gateway between North Kivu province and the interior of the DRC along the RN3 road.[37] Lubutu town and its nearby airport are 125 west of Walikale town, and Kisangani—the DRC’s fourth largest city—s over 250 miles northwest of Walikale town.^[38] The Congolese army relocated at least two of its Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets to Kisangani after M23 advanced toward Bukavu in early February, and M23 commander Sultani Makenga has warned that the group will take Kisangani if FARDC continues to launch air attacks on M23 positions from the city.[39] Walikale district has extensive gold, tantalum, and tin ore deposits.^[40] Canadian mining company Alphamin Resources suspended operations on March 13 at the Bisie mining site, which is 53 miles west of Walikale town and is the DRC‘s largest tin mine.^[41] The mine produces seven percent of the world’s mined tin and is the third largest tin mine in the world.^[42] M23 has previously established “state-like” administrations in other mineral-rich areas that the group controls to generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue.[43]

Sudan

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have made several operationally significant advances against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in central Khartoum since March 16 and are poised to retake the last key RSF–held areas in the capital in the coming weeks. The SAF Armored Corps linked up with other SAF units at the General Command Headquarters, effectively encircling the RSF-controlled Presidential Palace.[44] The SAF seeks to link up its forces from the west, north, and south of Khartoum and push the RSF across Jebel Awliya Dam Bridge in southwestern Khartoum, which is the last RSF-controlled route into and out the city. The commander of the SAF Armored Corps said in an interview on March 14 that the SAF is in the final stage of its “third phase” of military operations in Khartoum.[45]

SAF control over Khartoum would allow the SAF to control the eastern bank of the Nile River and prepare for future offensives to defeat the RSF in its strongholds in western Sudan. The RSF would struggle to re-cross the Nile River, as the SAF controls key bridges there.[46] Khartoum also has airports and military infrastructure that are more centrally located than the current SAF command and logistics hub in Port Sudan, which is over 400 miles from Khartoum on the Red Sea coast. The SAF and RSF have contested control over manufacturing facilities and military bases since the civil war erupted in April 2023.[47] Sudanese engineers are rebuilding the damaged al Jili oil refinery, which is the largest refinery in Sudan, which would significantly boost the SAF fuel supply.[48]

Figure 2. Area of SAF and RSF Operations in Khartoum

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The recapture of Khartoum supports the SAF’s effort to establish itself as the only legitimate power in Sudan. SAF leader Abdel Fatteh al Burhan on February 8 outlined plans for a new SAF-led government to take charge after the SAF captures Khartoum, and Egyptian media reported that the SAF-backed Sudanese Transitional Council is considering three candidates to appoint as prime minister to this new government.[49] Burhan conducted several high-profile meetings with the leaders of Egypt, Qatar, South Sudan, and Turkey in 2023 in a bid to boost SAF legitimacy in the international community.[50] Burhan conducted a regional tour of West Africa in January 2025 for the first time since the civil war began in 2023.[51] 

South Sudan

The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are likely backing opposing sides in South Sudan, which risks fueling a possible civil war in South Sudan. The RSF attacked South Sudan’s main Nuer opposition rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO), between March 15 and 16 near the Sudan-South Sudan border.[52] The RSF soldiers had recently fled west across the border into South Sudan after the SAF advanced in two areas in Sennar State, which borders South Sudan.[53] An RSF field commander said in a video after the fighting that the RSF is “protecting” the “sovereignty” of South Sudan.[54] The RSF ambushed the SPLM-IO fighters as they were moving from Nasir to Bout to collect weapons from the SAF, according to multiple South Sudanese sources cited by Sudan War Monitor—an investigative outlet that has reported on the war in Sudan since 2023.[55]

Figure 3. RSF Attacks South Sudanese Opposition Group in South Sudan

Source: Kathryn Tyson; Thomas van Linge.

The RSF attack inserts Sudan’s warring factions into the simmering civil war in South Sudan. South Sudanese President Salva Kiir (Mayardit) and South Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar have been at odds for over a decade.[56] Factions allied with Kiir and Machar fought each other in the South Sudanese civil war from 2013 and 2018.[57] The civil war had strong ethnic undertones, with Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups backing Kiir and Machar, respectively.[58] A 2018 peace agreement and 2020 unity government between Kiir and Machar prevented a return to full-scale war but have been tenuous.[59] Tensions escalated on March 4, 2025, when the Nuer White Army—a Nuer militia group with ties to Machar—overran an army base in Nasir town along the Ethiopia–South Sudan border.[60] Kiir responded by detaining several of Machar’s political allies.[61]

The SAF may have started to back South Sudanese rebels after Kiir and the RSF grew closer over the past year.[62] Relations between Sudan and South Sudan have been relatively stable for the last decade, and the SAF retained positive ties with Kiir through the beginning of the civil war in 2023.[63] The SAF publicly expressed support for Kiir amid the current conflict, and Burhan and Kiir held a phone call on March 9 and discussed efforts to increase bilateral relations and the security situation in South Sudan.[64] The SAF has become alarmed privately, however, about the growing relationship between Kiir and the RSF as well as the RSF’s primary patron—the United Arab Emirates.[65] A newly formed political alliance between the RSF and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLN-North)—a Kiir-aligned Sudanese rebel group active in southern Sudan—also worsened the SAF-Kiir relationship.[66] The International Crisis Group reported in March that the SAF may have reactivated its ties to Nuer militias that date back to the 1990s and recently sent military supplies to South Sudan.[67]

The SAF could leverage its ties with militias in northern South Sudan to counter RSF efforts to use South Sudan as a rear support base as the SAF tries to contain the RSF west of the Nile River. RSF ties to Kiir-aligned militias on the Sudan–South Sudan border have created a potential supply line from RSF-controlled western Sudan to RSF-aligned enclaves in SAF-dominated southeastern Sudan. The RSF-aligned militias have an enclave on the Sudanese border with South Sudan and Ethiopia and on the Sudan–South Sudan border in South Kordofan state.[68] The RSF and a Kiir-aligned militia made a political pact in early 2025 and opened joint training camps in a militia-controlled enclave in southeastern Sudan.[69] These moves further fueled SAF fears that the RSF would establish a supply corridor from western Sudan to the SAF’s flank in southeastern Sudan via South Sudan.[70]

The SAF is attacking these RSF-aligned enclaves to secure the South Sudan border and contain the RSF west of the Nile River. The SAF made marginal advances in South Kordofan state, which borders South Sudan, in late February, possibly as part of its efforts to secure the Sudan–South Sudan border in West Kordofan and South Kordofan states.[71] The SAF forced the RSF west of the Nile River in central Sudan when it took the last RSF strongholds in Sennar state on March 5—except for the RSF-aligned enclave in southeastern Sudan.

South Sudan faces a high risk of civil war as violence and political tensions continue to escalate, leading to international calls for calm. The South Sudanese army (SSPDF) conducted an airstrike that killed at least 19 civilians in Nasir on March 17.[72] The SSPDF reportedly targeted the rebel-controlled town’s airstrip and surrounding areas.[73] The South Sudanese interior minister ordered the evacuation of civilians from Nasir on March 17 and said that the SSPDF would continue strikes and take “decisive military action” against the White Nile Army unless the group withdraws from Nasir.[74] South Sudanese media reported that Ugandan military convoys carrying heavy military weapons entered South Sudan from Nimule on the South Sudan-Uganda border on March 17 following an initial deployment of Ugandan forces to Juba to support the SSPDF on March 9.[75]

Political ties between factions aligned with Kiir and Machar are deteriorating. The SPLM-IO, which Machar founded and allied with the White Army from 2013 to 2018, suspended its participation in key security and peace mechanisms from the 2018 agreement.[76] The SPLM-IO cited the presence of Ugandan forces and the detention of SPLM-IO officials as the cause of its suspension in the security arrangements.[77] The United Nations, regional bodies, and international diplomatic missions in South Sudan, including as the United States and European Union, have called on the South Sudanese leaders to deescalate the conflict and resolve disputes through direct dialogue.[78]

The conflict has displaced tens of thousands of civilians and threatens to exacerbate the pre-existing refugee crisis stemming from the Sudanese civil war. The fighting has displaced 50,000 civilians in Nasir, mainly to western Ethiopia, since February 2025.[79] The International Crisis Group on March 7 cited unspecified sources in Juba who said that Nuer militias aligned with Machar may try to capture Malakal in Upper Nile, approximately 115 miles (185 kilometers) northwest of Nasir.[80] Fighting in Malakal could force civilians to flee north toward the border with Sudan, which is 20 miles (32 kilometers) north of Malakal. The fighting would displace at least some of the over half a million Sudanese refugees that are in South Sudan.[81]

Somalia

Al Shabaab has infiltrated parts of Mogadishu and the capital’s southern outskirts and conducted several prominent attacks, including an attempt to assassinate the Somali president, since the beginning of Ramadan at the end of February. The group launched two coordinated attacks on March 15 against Somali positions in Awdhiigle and Hawo Adbi, roughly 27 and three miles, respectively, from the Mogadishu administrative limits.[82] Somali officials claimed to repel the attacks, while al Shabaab claimed to overrun Somali positions and kill at least 30 Somali soldiers.[83] Somali media reported that al Shabaab militants peacefully entered several districts in the Mogadishu administrative outskirts and patrolled the areas for two consecutive nights on March 15 and 16.[84] Al Shabaab then attempted to assassinate Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for the first time since 2014 with a large improvised explosive device (IED) that was possibly a house-borne IED, as his convoy passed the area on the way to the Mogadishu airport.[85] The explosion killed at least four people but did not injure Mohamud.[86] The group has not escalated the rate or severity of its attacks in Mogadishu or its southern outskirts, but the brazenness of al Shabaab activity highlights the group’s infiltration around Mogadishu.

Figure 4. Al Shabaab Offensive in Central Somalia and Around Mogadishu

Source: Liam Karr

Al Shabaab has maintained an offensive northeast of Mogadishu across central Somalia since January 2025 that seeks to exploit security gaps to encircle the capital and overturn landmark, US-backed Somali counterterrorism gains from 2022. Al Shabaab has increased the rate and severity of its activity dramatically in central Somalia since January 2025. The group has conducted 50 percent more attacks per month in 2025 in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions than its 2024 average, according to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).[87] Middle Shabelle region is immediately northeast of Mogadishu, and the Hiraan region extends further north to the Ethiopian border. Al Shabaab has seized more towns in each of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle in 2025 than it did in the entirety of 2024 thanks to the offensive.[88]

Figures 5 and 6. Al Shabaab Central Somalia Offenisve 2025: Activity in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle Regions

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The offensive has included large-scale complex attacks on politically significant government-controlled towns. The group launched a complex siege attack on March 11 that involved suicide bombers and targeted a group of prominent elders gathered at a hotel in the Hiraan regional capital, Beledweyne.[89] It was the group’s first major attack in Beledweyne since 2022.[90] Al Shabaab in late February temporarily overran security forces and freed captured al Shabaab militants in Bal’ad—a district capital in Middle Shabelle that lies only 15 miles northeast of the Mogadishu administrative limits.[91] The attacks were the first major al Shabaab attacks in Bal’ad since last Ramadan in April 2024.[92]

Figures 7 and 8. Al Shabaab Central Somalia Offenisve 2025: Major Events in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle Regions

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The group is waging a two-front war to link its support zones in central and southern Somalia. Al Shabaab militants based in both support zones in central and southern Somalia have conducted attacks during the offensive to squeeze the Somali forces between the two fronts. Militants from southern Somalia initially escalated attacks in January 2025 to establish positions on the east bank of the Shabelle River that runs through Hiraan and Middle Shabelle.[93] These forces then tried to overwhelm Somali forces in Bal’ad, Bulo Burde, and Jowhar districts in February.[94] All three districts have roadways that run through areas that Somali forces cleared in 2022 and into al Shabaab’s remaining support zones in north-central Somalia. The resumption of al Shabaab village seizures in the ‘Adale district in 2025 for the first time in more than a year indicates that al Shabaab has re-infiltrated these previously cleared areas.[95] The al Shabaab grouping on the other front in north-central Somalia has escalated attacks in Adan Yabal district—the northeasternmost district of Middle Shabelle—and are threatening to retake Adan Yabal town, which was al Shabaab’s administrative headquarters in central Somalia for over a decade.[96]

Al Shabaab has made multiple attempts to overturn its 2022 losses in order to strengthen its isolated support zones in central Somalia and encircle Mogadishu.[97] Somali forces liberated dozens of villages and several prominent al Shabaab–controlled district capitals in central Somalia during the first-ever successful, Somali-led, anti-al Shabaab offensive in 2022. The offensive originated as an uprising of local clan militias that the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and international partners quickly supported.[98] Somali forces cleared the highway that linked Mogadishu to Ethiopia via central Somalia during the offensive.[99] These gains alleviated pressure on Mogadishu and degrading lines of communication between the remaining al Shabaab enclave in central Somalia and the group’s center of gravity in southern Somalia.[100] The highway is also a major revenue generation opportunity for al Shabaab, clan militias, and the local and federal Somali government given the numerous taxation checkpoints on the road that affect local trade and trucks traveling between the port of Mogadishu and Ethiopia.[101]

Al Shabaab is likely benefiting from the haphazard implementation of the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia and the withdrawal of Burundian forces in central Somalia from the mission. Burundian forces have been deployed in Somalia since 2007 and were based in Middle Shabelle under the former AU mission.[102] Burundi stated its intention to withdraw from the new AU mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) days before the mission officially began on January 1, 2025, after the SFG allocated Burundi 1,000 soldiers to the mission—a figure that Burundian officials said was half of what was necessary to ensure adequate force protection.[103] An unclear number Burundian forces remained in Somalia and were directly involved in efforts to repel the al Shabaab incursions into central Somalia in early 2025, however, while the two countries tried to negotiate a solution.[104] Burundi and the SFG confirmed on February 25 that Burundian forces will not be part of the new mission, but the SFG has not given a timetable for the withdrawal of Burundian forces or indicated how it aims to replace Burundian troops.[105] Somali media reported on March 17 that Ethiopia, who has forces in Hiraan, ruled out sending additional forces to Middle Shabelle.[106]

Somali forces and international partners have increased activity—primarily defensive drone strikes—in response to the al Shabaab offensive. Somali and partner forces have nearly quadrupled their average monthly rate of operations across Hiraan and Middle Shabelle in 2025 compared to 2024.[107] President Mohamud traveled to Adan Yabal to rally local clan militia support on March 18.[108] Mohamud visited central Somalia several times in 2022 and even based himself in central Somalia for a period in 2023 to help maintain cohesion among the anti-al Shabaab coalition of government forces and local clan militias.

Figure 9. Somali Counterterrorism Activity in Central Somalia 2025

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The uptick in counterterrorism operations is partially driven by the SFG and international partners already more than doubling the number of drone strikes against al Shabaab in 2025 than the entirety of 2024.[109] These drone strikes have helped to prevent al Shabaab from holding many of the locations that the group has overrun temporarily. The strikes have not prevented the group from massing large-scale attacks and inflicting unsustainable losses on Somali forces, however. Al Shabaab attacks in 2025 have caused more than five times the number of fatalities, including both Somali forces and al Shabaab, than the entirety of 2024.[110] Attacks in Middle Shabelle in 2025 have nearly doubled the total number of fatalities in 2024.[111]

Al Shabaab likely aims to capitalize on overstretched Somali forces, but it is unclear whether moving into Mogadishu or central Somalia is its primary objective. Al Shabaab released a propaganda video on March 10 that could signal the group intends to topple Mogadishu. The al Shabaab emir called for the group’s followers to “prepare for the new stage in the war” in the video.[112] The video also included a speech from the group’s former emir that said “The enemy is going through the most difficult stages and is drawing his last breath. Therefore, we must all rise up to finish him off.” Al Shabaab propaganda typically focuses on the group’s governance or military activity.

Somalia’s partners have not taken procedures that would indicate an imminent al Shabaab offensive on Mogadishu, however. The United States denied reports that it had evacuated embassy personnel on March 16 despite issuing a security warning on March 8 about an increased risk of attacks in sensitive areas of Mogadishu.[113] CTP has not recorded that Somalia’s regional security partners, such as Egypt, Ethiopia, or Uganda, have sent additional troops to Mogadishu to defend against an imminent al Shabaab threat to seize the capital.[114] The Ethiopian prime minister and Emirati minister of foreign affairs followed through on previously scheduled visits to Mogadishu on February 27 and March 19, respectively.[115]

Ethiopia

Opposing factions in northern Ethiopia’s Tigray region are reportedly negotiating to deescalate tensions, which may decrease the risk of an imminent conflict in Tigray. French media cited unspecified sources that Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is speaking with the rival factions from the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to reach a compromise on the composition of the federally backed Tigray Interim Administration (TIA).[116] The TIA, TPLF, and Ethiopian federal government have not confirmed that negotiations occurred.

The negotiations come after Tigrayan forces aligned with TPLF head Debretsion Gebremichael launched a de-facto coup against TIA leader Getachew Reda. Anti-TIA forces dismantled local TIA offices, opened fire on civilians, and detained TIA cabinet members in at least four areas in Tigray on March 11, including in the Tigray capital Mekelle.[117] The TIA had suspended high-ranking officers and ordered Tigrayan forces to suspend all military movement in the days before the attacks after warning that some Tigrayan forces were preparing “an outright coup.”[118] The TIA on March 12 called on the international community and the Ethiopian federal government to “exert all necessary pressure” on the anti-TIA forces.[119]

Figure 10. Attacks against Tigray Interim Administration

Source: Liam Karr.

Sporadic clashes continued in Tigray despite the reported negotiations. Clashes between TPLF-aligned forces and a militia affiliated with the TIA clashed on March 15 in Mekoni, southern Tigray, killing two fighters.[120] The TPLF took over a local administrative building in the Southeast Zone in Tigray on March 18.[121]

The negotiations have not addressed the root issues at the core of the TPLF schism over the Pretoria agreement and the role of the federal government. The TPLF is an ethno-nationalist paramilitary group and political party based in the northern Tigray region in Ethiopia that fought the Ethiopian government in a civil war from 2020 until the Pretoria peace treaty in 2022.[122] Abiy appointed the TIA as a temporary government in May 2023 as part of the Pretoria agreement and selected Reda—the former deputy head of the TPLF—as its leader.[123] The appointment of Reda split the TPLF into two factions. TIA critics have accused the TIA of acting in the interests of the federal government, while the TIA has accused the TPLF of trying to regain control over Tigray.[124] Many aspects of the Pretoria agreement, such as the complete disarmament of the Tigray Defense Forces, have not been implemented. These failures have driven tensions between the TIA, TPLF, and Ethiopian federal government.[125]

Amhara Ethno-nationalist rebels in the neighboring Amhara region launched a new offensive against Ethiopian federal forces that threatens to further destabilize Ethiopia. Amhara Fano rebels seized several towns and cities across the Amhara region, according to Egyptian media citing local sources and Fano leadership on March 18.[126] Clashes between Fano and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) in three towns between March 10 and March 13 killed at least eight civilians.[127] Ethiopian media reported that ENDF troops were responding to Fano fighters who attempted to seize various buildings in the region.[128] Pro-Fano sources reported that Fano has captured at least six towns in Amhara since March 12.[129]

Fano is a group of loosely aligned Amhara militias that are mostly small and operate autonomously.[130] Fano and the ENDF have been in direct conflict since April 2023, when the Ethiopian government attempted to dissolve regional special forces.[131] Fano and Amhara ethno-nationalists said that this government effort was an attempt to leave Amhara defenseless against threats from rival ethno-nationalist militias.[132] Fano has waged a mostly low-level insurgency in northern Ethiopia’s Amhara region since an ENDF counteroffensive against the group following Fano attacks on major cities in Amhara in August 2023.[133] Fano expanded control over several key roadways and attacked Ethiopia’s second-largest city in the group’s last major offensive in September 2024 before an ENDF counteroffensive in the last quarter of 2024.[134]

Fano could contribute to ongoing tensions and violence in Tigray, given the group’s long-standing territorial dispute with Tigray.[135] Fano militants initially fought alongside the federal government during the Tigray war from 2020 to 2022 and captured several disputed territories.[136] Fano accused the federal government and TIA of “beating a war drum” after the TIA and federal government reached an agreement in May 2024 to return thousands of displaced Tigrayans to the disputed areas, disarm combatants in the area, and create new local administrations.[137]

Figure 11. Ethno-Nationalist Militias Area of Operations in Northern Ethiopia

Source: Liam Karr; ACLED.

The conflicts in Amhara and Tigray may escalate into a proxy or a regional war between longtime rivals Ethiopia and Eritrea. Developments in early March indicate that Eritrea and Ethiopia have mobilized for an imminent war. Prominent Ethiopian and Western officials warned in early March that the “speed and scale” of preparations by both countries indicated that a conflict was imminent and possibly unavoidable.[138] Eritrea implemented a nationwide military mobilization in February, and Ethiopia deployed troops toward the Eritrean border in March.[139]

Figure 12. Tigray Conflict: 2022–25 Timeline

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

Eritrea and Ethiopia have been rivals for decades despite a brief détente at the beginning of Abiy’s tenure that lasted through the end of the Tigray war. Abiy partnered with Eritrea upon taking power in 2018 as he sought to curb the influence of the TPLF, which had dominated Ethiopia since it overthrew the previous government alongside Eritrean forces in 1991.[140] This rapprochement eventually led Eritrea and Ethiopia to cooperate in the Tigray war, but the end of the war ended this alliance of convenience. Abiy has made inflammatory statements since 2023 that Ethiopian Red Sea access, which Ethiopia lost when Eritrea became independent in 1993, was a “natural right.”[141] Eritrea increased cooperation with Egypt—one of Ethiopia’s main geopolitical rivals—as part of a de-facto anti-Ethiopian axis throughout 2024.[142]

Eritrea has ties with both the TPLF and Fano that could escalate the domestic conflicts into a wider regional conflict. Ethiopian officials have accused Eritrea and the TPLF—longtime enemies dating back to when the TPLF dominated Ethiopia—of establishing an alliance against Ethiopia.[143] Anonymous Western diplomatic sources told French media that there has been a noticeable rapprochement between TPLF factions and Eritrea that involves “at least some communication” and may include a series of meetings in early 2025.[144] French investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported that these meetings included a summit in Asmara in January that involved Eritrean President Isais Afwerki.[145] Eritrea also has ties with Fano dating back to the Tigray war, when it trained Fano militants to degrade the TPLF in the disputed areas of western Tigray that border Eritrea.[146] Eritrea has denied ties to both groups repeatedly, but Eritrean support for rebellions against the Ethiopian government would fit Eritrea’s strategy over the past several decades to support opposition groups to weaken and fragment Ethiopia.[147]

Russia

The Kremlin strengthened its unrealized efforts to increase its influence in the Red Sea and supplant the West in Africa by reaching a deal to train the Ethiopian navy. A Russian delegation led by Russian Navy Deputy Commander Vladimir Aurobiv agreed to provide training and capacity building to the Ethiopian Navy during a meeting with an Ethiopian naval delegation on March 14.[148]

The deal has helped Russia hedge its bets in the event of any regional war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Russia has pursued naval deals with Eritrea previously.[149] An Eritrean delegation led by Eritrean President Isais Afwerki discussed “prospects of Russian support to regional efforts” in the Red Sea in April 2024 with Russian Deputy Navy Chief Vice Adm. Vladimir Kasatonov in Eritrea.[150] Afwerki also toured the Russian Pacific Fleet frigate, Marshal Shaposhnikov, and conducted joint drills with Eritrean forces.[151] The Kremlin views Eritrea as an option to secure a Red Sea port and may view Ethiopia as another potential avenue for gaining direct Red Sea access.[152]

Russia’s outreach to Ethiopia challenges French influence in Ethiopia and supports the Kremlin’s goal to supplant Western influence in Africa. Russia has replaced France’s military presence across West Africa in recent years in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and is interested in developing a military footprint in Chad and Senegal following the French withdrawals from both countries in 2025.[153] Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[154] French President Emmanuel Macron expressed support for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea but did not publicly discuss plans for France to rebuild the Ethiopian navy during a meeting with Abiy in Ethiopia in December 2024.[155]

Russia’s activity in Eritrea and Ethiopia is part of a broader—but still unrealized—effort to increase the Kremlin’s power projection in the Red Sea region that includes an agreement for a naval base in Sudan. Russian and Sudanese officials said in February 2025 that they had finalized a deal for a Russian naval “facility” in Sudan.[156] Sudan’s foreign minister has insisted that the Sudanese parliament, which has been vacant since 2019 after failed elections in 2022 and the beginning of the civil war in 2023, must ratify the deal before it enters effect, however.[157] The deal is a reactivation of a 2017 agreement signed with the former Sudanese regime for a Russian “service center” that can host four ships and up to 300 personnel.[158] The Washington Post reported in March that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have also considered offering Russia the development rights to the Abu Amama port near SAF-controlled Port Sudan if Turkey declines the SAF’s offer for the port.[159] It is unclear if Abu Amama would be the location of the Russian naval base or is part of a separate deal.

Figure 13. Competition in the Greater Red Sea Area

Source: Liam Karr.

Burkina Faso

Burkinabe security forces and auxiliary militias executed dozens of Fulani civilians in western Burkina Faso. State forces and auxiliary civilian militia known as Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (Volontaires pour la défense de la patrie, VDP) detained and killed unarmed civilians in Solenzo, Boucle du Mouhoun province on March 10 as part of a counterterrorism operation.[160] Human Rights Watch reported that state forces and auxiliary civilian militias killed at least 58 civilians, including unarmed children and women, in the attack.[161] 

The attack is the latest abuse in a pattern of increased violence against civilians by security forces and auxiliary militias since the junta took power in 2022. CTP previously noted in May 2024 that state forces and auxiliary militias had increasingly targeted civilians since junta leader Captain Ibrahim Traoré took power on September 30, 2022.[162] The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded that security forces attacked civilians 65 percent more frequently in the first 18 months of Traoré’s reign than in the previous 18 months.[163] The severity of the abuses against civilians was even more stark. ACLED recorded that Burkinabe state forces in the first 18 months of the Traoré era killed over 1,000 civilians, which is more than three times the same amount of time in the immediate pre-Traoré period.[164] ACLED shows that the rate of state-sanctioned violence against civilians has remained consistent since, with state forces and VDP militias killing 669 civilians from March 2024 to March 2025.[165]

Figure 14 and 15. Burkinabe State Forces and VDP Attacks on Civilians 2021–2024

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The increase in civilian casualties disproportionately affects the Fulani ethnic group and other marginalized communities suspected of cooperating with al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) and IS Sahel Province. The Burkinabe state has treated Fulani communities with suspicion historically and accused them of cooperating with insurgents.[166] The uptick in civilian casualties owes mostly to large-scale retaliatory massacres against civilians believed to be collaborating with the insurgents.[167] Such massacres include the Solenzo attack, the Burkinabe army executing at least 156 civilians in April 2023, and another Burkinabe massacre that killed nearly another 100 people in November 2023.[168]

The Burkinabe junta’s use of civilian auxiliary militias has further spread ethnically motivated violence against marginalized communities. VDP units have reinforced long-standing ethnic divisions because they draw from pre-existing self-defense militias and exclude most Fulani recruits.[169] These auxiliaries report to security forces and provide local intelligence, but their minimal training and loyalty to Traoré have turned the VDP into primary perpetrators of ethnically driven violence.[170] The VDP has increasing abuses against civilians since expanding expanded offensive operations when Traoré assumed power in October 2022.[171]

State-backed violence against civilians exacerbates the ethnic grievances that JNIM uses to recruit. Ethnically motivated violence fuels grievances that JNIM exploits to recruit and undermine the legitimacy of state forces in affected areas. Army massacres lead civilians to either flee the area for government-held cities or cooperate with insurgents for protection. The insurgents benefit either way because both outcomes degrade security forces’ local intelligence about the area.[172] JNIM has publicized previous security force abuses in its propaganda and already vowed to retaliate for the Solenzo attacks.[173]