Africa File, May 9, 2024: America and Russia’s Shifting Roles in West Africa; IS Africa Media; Russia’s Morphing Stance in Sudan

Data Cutoff: May 9, 2024, at 10 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• West Africa. The United States is strengthening counterterrorism and defense cooperation with littoral West African countries as it plans its withdrawal from Niger. Russian forces have already begun backfilling US forces as US forces plan to withdraw, which presents short-term risks for limited and low-level US-Russian clashes in Niger. Russia’s footprint in Niger will likely remain small in the coming months due to capacity limitations, but having a presence will still enable the Kremlin to close logistics gaps in its current network and grow its influence in Niger. Greater Russian influence and military presence in Niger will create several long-term opportunities for the Kremlin to strategically threaten Europe with energy blackmail, migration influxes, and conventional military threats.
• IS Media. Islamic State central media has increasingly highlighted the governance activities of its African affiliates throughout 2024. The current media push is similar to a 2022 campaign that focused on IS governance in Africa, but the new campaign has put a greater focus on IS Sahel Province (ISSP), highlighting its growing strength and importance for IS in Africa.
• Sudan. Russia may be increasingly favoring the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Sudan’s civil war in pursuit of a Red Sea naval base, which would create opportunities for greater Iranian-Russian cooperation in Sudan and the broader Red Sea area. Russia has pursued a Red Sea port since 2008 to protect its economic interests in the area and improve its military posture by increasing its ability to challenge the West in the broader region, including in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. Russia backing the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Iranian and Russian policy and strategy in the region, which would advance Iran’s aims of securing a Red Sea base in Sudan. The Kremlin is additionally pursuing secondary objectives, including sidelining Ukrainian and US influence in Sudan, through its outreach to the SAF.

Assessments:

West Africa

The United States is strengthening counterterrorism and defense cooperation with littoral West African countries as it plans its withdrawal from Niger. US Africa Command Commander Gen. Michael Langley met with top civilian and military leaders, including the presidents and defense chiefs, in Côte d’Ivoire and Benin between April 28 and May 3.[1] Langley discussed shared objectives, such as regional stability and security coordination, including on non-terrorism threats such as illegal fishing.[2] The United States also delivered nearly $3 million of nonlethal military equipment to the Beninese government for border security on April 30.[3] The Wall Street Journal reported in January 2024 that the United States had already begun preliminary discussions to base drones in both countries as well as Ghana as it explored alternatives to its bases in Niger.[4] The United States is planning to withdraw at least 600 troops from Niger after the junta annulled bilateral defense agreements in March.[5]

The United States had already been increasing aid and cooperation with littoral West Africa through the Global Fragility Act (GFA) to contain the Salafi-jihadi insurgency’s spread before the July 2023 Niger coup. The GFA aims to build community resilience and address the root causes of instability in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.[6] The program is a whole-of-government effort involving the US Departments of State and Defense and the US Agency for International Development to implement targeted development, political, and security assistance to recipient countries.[7] The United States and partner countries view security assistance, including the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support that drone bases would offer, as crucial to improving border security to let the community-focused programs take root.[8]

These alternative locations still have some practical range drawbacks compared to the current US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in Niger. American forces in Niger use MQ9 Reaper drones, which have a 1,150-mile range.[9] The locations of the prospective US bases in the Gulf of Guinea would not enable US forces to surveil Salafi-jihadi cells and networks in Libya and most of Algeria with the drones. Depending on where US forces are based, drones in Côte d’Ivoire could also be too far west to surveil the Lake Chad Basin in northeastern Nigeria, where the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) and regional administrative node is based.

Figure 1. Current and Prospective Range of United States Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance Capabilities in Northwestern Africa

Note: CTP calculated the alternative ranges using the 1,150-mile range of the MQ9 Reaper drones that US forces use in Niger. CTP centered the range rings on airfields in Benin and Ghana that the Wall Street Journal reported on January 3, 2024, that US officials proposed as potential bases and on the northernmost military-use airport in Côte d’Ivoire.

Source: Liam Karr.

As US forces plan to withdraw, Russian forces have already begun backfilling them, which presents short-term risks for limited and low-level US-Russian clashes in Niger. Russian soldiers from the Ministry of Defense–affiliated Africa Corps arrived in Niamey on April 12.[10] US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin confirmed on May 3 that these Africa Corps personnel are stationed near the withdrawing US forces at the same airbase in Niamey.[11] US officials told Politico on May 3 that although the Russians pose no immediate threat, they are “increasingly worried” that rogue Russian soldiers would antagonize US troops in a way that would lead the US forces to respond and could escalate to an exchange of fire.[12]

CTP continues to assess that Russian forces will also likely occupy the US drone base in northern Niger as US forces withdraw.[13] The Africa Corps troops said they wanted to take over the US base in Agadez, which is in northern Niger, minutes after landing in Niamey. This indicates that they seek to replace the United States.[14] Russian forces in Mali backfilled vacated French and UN bases across the country, establishing a precedent of backfilling Western positions.[15]

Russia’s footprint in Niger will likely remain small in the coming months due to capacity limitations, but having a presence will still enable the Kremlin to close logistics gaps in its current network and grow its influence in Niger to create more significant long-term opportunities. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger said on April 12—the day that Russian forces arrived in Niger—that the Russian Ministry of Defense had already delayed Africa Corps’s initial deployment to Niger due to recruiting issues.[16] The Kremlin halved its initial recruiting goal of 40,000 Africa Corps soldiers in the immediate aftermath of subsuming Wagner Group operations in August 2023 to just 20,000 by the end of 2023, but it still failed to meet the adjusted goal.[17]

Africa Corps deployed a similarly sized 100-soldier contingent to neighboring Burkina Faso in January 2024 and said the group’s size would eventually grow to 300 soldiers.[18] However, there have been no reports of more troops arriving since then. This gap highlights that the process of scaling up these smaller deployments will take months, if not years. Russian insider sources reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense is redeploying unspecified Africa Corps units to the Ukrainian border days after new units deployed to Niger. This underscores that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not yet stopped Africa Corps’s 2024 expansion but risks undermining it in the future if redeployments come from these new theaters.[19]

Africa Corps personnel in Niger will grow relationships between Nigerien soldiers and the Nigerien junta, likely enabling Russia to pursue one of its goals of securing access to natural resources. Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti said the Africa Corps deployed to “build relationships and jointly form and train the Nigerien army.”[20] Russia previously lacked strong interpersonal ties with the Nigerien junta, as most Nigerien officers trained with the French or US armies.[21] Russia’s mercenary deployments have repeatedly sought to build these kinds of interpersonal relationships in other countries to grow Russian influence over authoritarian regimes and gain access to natural resource concessions.[22]

An Africa Corps base in Niger will also strengthen Russia’s logistical network in Africa by bridging the gap between its North African and sub-Saharan positions. Africa Corps taking over the US base in Agadez would put a Russian base 1,100 miles or less from the Russian-controlled air bases in Libya to the north and just over 1,100 miles from major Russian bases in the Malian capital to the west and the Central African Republic capital to the southeast.[23]

Figure 2. Russian Mercenary Facilities in Northwest Africa

Source: Liam Karr; Grey Dynamics; Jules Duhamel; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

Greater Russian influence and military presence in Niger will create several long-term opportunities for the Kremlin to strategically threaten Europe with energy blackmail, migration influxes, and conventional military threats. Russian access to the large uranium deposits in northern Niger in exchange for Russian military support would grow Russia’s share of the nuclear energy market, increasing its leverage with countries seeking to cut Russian energy purchases.[24] Niger is the seventh-largest uranium producer in the world and has one active major uranium mine.[25] The mine provided about 2,020 tons of uranium in 2022, which is equal to about 5 percent of the world’s mining output.[26] France has relied on Niger for nearly 20 percent of the uranium it has imported to power its nuclear energy facilities over the past decade, and the United States banned imports of uranium fuel directly from Russia on April 30.^[27] 

The junta has already shown its willingness to engage in resource sales to boost its budget, even at the risk of sanctions. France-based investigative outlet Africa Intelligence reported on April 30 that the Nigerien junta has been exploring a uranium-for-arms deal with Iran since late 2023.[28] The junta also signed an agreement with a Chinese state-owned company to receive a $400 million advance on its share of oil sales that it plans to export through a Chinese-constructed pipeline to Benin.[29] The junta has not indicated whether it intends to usurp the French-owned company currently running its active major mine but threatened to revoke the license of a Canadian-owned company exploring a second mine if it did not begin production by July 3, setting conditions for it to change ownership.[30]

Russia would also likely use positions in northern Niger to exploit trans-Saharan migrant-smuggling routes to increase irregular migration flows to Europe and enrich its mercenaries. The EU border patrol agency and numerous European officials have warned in 2024 that Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to foment greater refugee flows from Africa to destabilize Europe, influence elections, and undermine support for Ukraine.[31] Russia has repeatedly and systematically weaponized migrant crises in Europe. The Russian and Belarussian governments have flooded the borders of Finland, Lithuania, and Poland with refugees since 2021.[32] Their tactics have included luring refugees from the Middle East and Africa on flights to Europe based on false promises before dropping them at the border.[33] The Kremlin also foments prolonged instability in theaters where it is active, such as Syria, Ukraine, and now the Sahel, which creates long-term refugee crises.[34]

Russia now has a military presence along many of the trans-Saharan migrant routes, increasing its opportunities to facilitate mass migration. Russian mercenaries in the Sahel have contributed to a massive spike in human rights abuses since 2021, helping fuel record-high levels of trans-Saharan migration to Europe.[35] The EU border patrol agency noted that 380,000 migrants attempted to cross into Europe from Libya in 2023, the highest number of irregular crossings since 2016.[36] Russia’s partners in the Nigerien junta annulled an EU-backed migration law that aimed to stem these flows in December 2023, benefiting both allies but directly increasing migrant flows to North Africa and Europe.[37] Russia’s growing footprint in sub-Saharan Africa also increases opportunities for Russian personnel to directly lure more migrants to Europe to drop at NATO’s borders.

Figure 3. Growing Russian Presence on Trans-Saharan Migration Routes in West Africa

Source: Liam Karr; Clingendael Institute; Norwegian Center for Global Analyses.

Russian forces in Niger can insert themselves into the local migrant-smuggling economy to further increase profits and migrant flows. Facilitating migration to North Africa is a major local economy in Agadez, where migrant smugglers and locals stage migration convoys to cross the desert to the Libyan coast.[38] Nigerien security forces are already involved in this economy by charging migrant smugglers at security checkpoints and escorting migrant convoys.[39] Russian forces have shown adept at inserting themselves into other informal African economies by cultivating ties with civilian and military power brokers; they will do the same in Niger.[40] This would allow them to both profit off migration and directly facilitate migration by helping convoys reach the Mediterranean.

Russia is unlikely to base drones with its mercenaries in Niger in the immediate term. However, the presence of Russian mercenary bases in northern Niger would create an opportunity for the Kremlin to deploy drones in the area to threaten NATO’s southern flank in the future. Russian mercenaries in Mali have not deployed or indicated they plan to deploy Russian drones in Africa. Wagner auxiliaries in Mali have relied on Malian forces’ use of Turkish TB2 drones.[41] Niger also has its own TB2 drones.[42] Russia has supported its Wagner mercenaries in Libya with conventional Russian aircraft but no drones.[43] The rapid increase in Iranian and Russian production of Shahed-style drones for Russia’s war in Ukraine increases the risk that the Kremlin leverages some of this production capacity to equip mercenaries in Africa with drones in the future.[44]

Shahed-136 drones based near Agadez would be within range of key US and NATO installations and parts of the Mediterranean Sea. The Shahed-136, also known as Geranium in Russia, has a maximum range of 1,553 miles (2,500 kilometers).[45] Agadez is 1,523 miles from Sicily, Italy, and the southern tip of the Italian mainland; 1,555 miles from Gibraltar, the UK’s overseas territory on the Iberian Peninsula; and roughly 1,600 miles from the US-Spanish air and naval bases in southern Spain.

Figure 4. Prospective Range of Iranian-Made Shahed-136 Drones from Agadez, Northern Niger

Source: Liam Karr.

IS Media

IS Media

Islamic State central media has increasingly highlighted the governance activities of its African affiliates throughout 2024. IS published claims and media showing ISWAP in the Lake Chad Basin and ISSP implementing IS’s harsh interpretation of shari’a law in numerous editions of its weekly newsletters in April and May.[46] This media blitz builds on growing publications of ISSP implementing shari’a in new areas under its control since July 2023.[47] IS also highlighted the preaching campaigns of ISSP and Mozambique Province (ISMP) in versions of its weekly newsletter and stand-alone publications throughout 2024.[48]

The current media push is similar to a 2022 campaign that focused on IS governance in Africa. The 2022 campaign predominantly focused on ISWAP but also included references to ISMP, ISSP, and IS Central Africa Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[49] Media publications also highlighted the hisbah bureau’s (religious authorities) activity, zakat (charity) distribution, and preaching.[50]

However, the new campaign has put a greater focus on ISSP, highlighting its growing strength and importance for IS in Africa. ISSP has been ascendant since France withdrew from Mali in 2022, doubling the area under its control between 2022 and July 2023, according to the United Nations.[51] The group then shifted its focus to implementing governance measures in these areas, creating more content for IS to highlight.[52] ISSP is also competing with al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) for dominance in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.[53] The propaganda helps ISSP advertise itself and boost its legitimacy vis-à-vis JNIM, which it has explicitly ridiculed in statements covering ISSP governance activity.[54] ISWAP has also suffered several setbacks due to infighting with its Boko Haram rivals, limiting its media capacity and appeal.[55]

The current campaign has been more siloed than the 2022 campaign, which called for hijra (migration) to Africa and included videos of IS fighters in the Middle East praising the African affiliates.[56] IS branded Africa as a new front for hijra and global jihad during the 2022 media blitz to encourage foreign fighters to join the African affiliates in 2022.[57] However, ISSP’s greater territorial control and media coverage have already contributed to growing numbers of foreign fighters attempting to join the group over the past year, despite no recent calls for hijra.[58]

Sudan

The following section is adapted from the Russian Offensive Campaign Update, May 6, 2024

Russia may be increasingly favoring the SAF in Sudan’s civil war in pursuit of a Red Sea naval base, which would create opportunities for greater Iranian-Russian cooperation in Sudan and the broader Red Sea area. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and Special Representative for the Russian President in Africa and the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov met with SAF head Abdel Fattah al Burhan and several other Sudanese officials during a two-day visit to Sudan on April 28 and 29.^[59] Bogdanov stated that his visit could lead to increased cooperation and expressed support for “the existing legitimacy in the country represented by the [SAF-backed] Sovereign Council.”^[60] France-based Sudanese news outlet Sudan Tribune reported that Russia offered “unrestricted qualitative military aid” during the meetings and also inquired about its long-standing but unimplemented agreement to establish a naval base in Port Sudan.^[61]

Russia has had long-standing ties with SAF elements but was primarily supporting the opposing Rapid Support Forces (RSF) via the Wagner Group to protect Russian interests in Sudanese gold that it has used to help fund its war in Ukraine and mitigate the impact of Western sanctions. The RSF and its leader Gen. Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, have controlled the bulk of the country’s gold mines since 2017, which cultivated preexisting relationships with Russian entities, including the Wagner Group.[62] US officials and an independent report from nonprofit groups claimed that Wagner smuggled out an estimated 32.7 tons of gold worth $1.9 billion during the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.^[63]

Bogdanov’s discussions indicate that the Kremlin is willing to risk the gold it had been getting from supporting the RSF, which is fighting a civil war against the SAF, to advance its long-standing Red Sea basing ambitions. The Wagner Group had been arming and training the RSF since the outbreak of the civil war in April 2023.^[64] However, it is unclear if this support has continued to the same extent after the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin in August 2023.^[65]

There has been little reporting on Wagner Group or Africa Corps activity in Sudan since Prigozhin’s death, indicating a potential policy freeze and reevaluation period as the Kremlin balances state policy aims against Wagner’s previously more narrow business aims. The Kremlin has pivoted away from Prigozhin-era Wagner policies in Chad, where the Kremlin reset its policy in favor of another army and military strongman.[66] The civil war has also halted some Wagner-linked gold operations, decreasing Russia’s incentives to partner with the RSF for business purposes.[67]

Russia has pursued a Red Sea port since 2008 to protect its economic interests in the area and improve its military posture by increasing its ability to challenge the West in the broader region, including in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.^[68] Russian President Putin had previously made an agreement with Sudan’s longtime dictator Omar al Bashir in 2017 for a Red Sea base capable of stationing 300 Russian service members and four ships in exchange for various kinds of military and regime security support.^[69] The Kremlin subsequently supported both the RSF and SAF after Bashir’s ouster in 2019 to pursue implementation of the deal.^[70] Hemedti led these negotiations after the RSF and SAF overthrew Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government in 2021, but the civil war that broke out between the RSF and the SAF once again put the deal on hold.^[71] The SAF controls Sudan’s coast, making it the key gatekeeper for any naval base.^[72]

Russia backing the SAF would greatly benefit Iran by aligning Iranian and Russian policy and strategy in the region, which would advance Iran’s aims of securing a Red Sea base in Sudan. Iran strengthened its bilateral relations with the SAF throughout 2023 and started sending drones to the SAF in late 2023 and early 2024.^[73] The Wall Street Journal reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully attempted to use these ties and promises of a helicopter-carrier ship to secure a permanent naval base in Port Sudan.^[74] Iran seeks a Red Sea naval base for reasons similar to Russia’s—to project power farther westward. Iran would use a Red Sea base to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping. This power projection includes threatening Red Sea shipping traffic and creating opportunities to launch attacks into Israel with systems fired from surface combatants.

The Kremlin may also align its Sudan policy with Iran to lighten its own military commitments. Russian insider sources reported in mid-April that the Russian Ministry of Defense was redeploying Russian soldiers from unspecified Ministry of Defense–affiliated Africa Corps units to the Ukrainian border.^[75] These demands from the Ukraine war compound ongoing capacity issues stemming from the Africa Corps’s recruitment struggles.^[76] Russia aligning with Iran would enable the Kremlin to coordinate aid with Iran and potentially free the resources and soldiers it had devoted to supporting the RSF.^[77] Bogdanov met with Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Ali Bagheri Kani two days before leaving for Sudan, when they discussed “the importance of bilateral ties and regional issues,” indicating they are already coordinating on the issue.^[78]

The Kremlin is additionally pursuing secondary objectives, including sidelining Ukrainian and US influence in Sudan, through its outreach to the SAF. The Sudan Tribune reported that Bogdanov inquired about Sudanese military cooperation with Ukraine during his visit.^[79] Ukraine has provided military support to the SAF as one of its many initiatives to boost support in Africa, as many African countries have been ambivalent about or supportive of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.^[80] The Wall Street Journal reported that Ukraine sent nearly 100 Ukrainian special forces soldiers to Sudan at Burhan’s request in August 2023 that have supported the SAF through occasional combat, drone support, training, and supplies provision.^[81] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate claimed on April 17 that the Kremlin planned to launch an information operation accusing Ukrainian forces of illegally using Western weapons in Sudan to discredit Ukraine and undermine its Western support.^[82]

Russia’s backing of the SAF also risks undermining impending US-backed peace talks.^[83] The US has been urging a resumption of peace talks after US-Saudi efforts failed throughout 2023.^[84] Other foreign interventions contributed to these failures by emboldening actors to take hard-line negotiating stances.^[85]