November 21, 2024

Africa File, November 21, 2024: Russian Mining in the Sahel; Sudan Ceasefire Still Unlikely; AU Mission in Somalia Uncertainty; IS Postelection Offensive in Mozambique

Kathryn Tyson, Yale Ford, Margaret Herr and Liam Karr

CTP will be pausing the Africa File for the Thanksgiving holiday in the United States the week of November 28. The next Africa File will publish as usual the week of December 5.

Data Cutoff: November 21, 2024, at 10 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

Sahel. Sahelian juntas are pressuring Western mining companies out of the region and partnering with Russia to fill the void. Niger recently invited Russia to explore its natural resources and confirmed communication with multiple Russian mining companies. Mali has also increased collaboration with Russia on exploiting oil, gas, uranium, and lithium in 2024 and is taking an aggressive approach to Western mining companies through new tax laws and by arresting Western mining company employees. Increased Russian mining access in the Sahel will boost Russia’s economy and mitigate Western efforts to economically isolate Russia. The Kremlin’s pursuit of uranium also aims to increase its grip on the nuclear energy market to improve its leverage with countries seeking to cut Russian energy purchases.
Sudan. The RSF said it is open to ceasefire negotiations with the SAF, but a ceasefire remains unlikely due to both sides’ maximalist demands and continued external meddling. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are calling for a ceasefire in an attempt to gain domestic and international legitimacy while delegitimizing the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The RSF and SAF have reiterated their maximalist demands for a ceasefire in recent months, both of which are nonstarters. Foreign sponsors, including Iran, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates continue to fuel the fighting in pursuit of their own interests and hinder the UN’s ability to pressure both sides to end the fighting.
Somalia. The impending transition from the current African Union Mission in Somalia to a new African Union mission may lead to conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia and give al Shabaab opportunities to strengthen. Many aspects of the new mission remain unclear, and Ethiopia has indicated that it will remain in Somalia to protect its national security interests through the African Union transition despite the Somali Federal Government’s explicit calls for Ethiopia to withdraw. Ethiopian forces have made several efforts to entrench themselves in Somalia in recent months, and internal Somali political tensions are also benefiting Ethiopia’s efforts. Ethiopian forces’ continued presence in Somalia past the African Union Mission in Somalia mandate increases the risk of a direct conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia with Egyptian involvement or a proxy conflict with local actors. Al Shabaab will benefit from a contested transition and any resulting violence.
Mozambique. ISMP is likely taking advantage of the unrest following Mozambique’s general elections to increase its rate of attacks in northern Mozambique. Islamic State Mozambique Prorvince’s (ISMP’s) increase in attacks and the growing dangers related to Mozambique’s security situation and financial stability risk stalling the rollout of important Western-funded natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado and exacerbating the lack of socioeconomic opportunity.

Assessments:

Sahel

Sahelian juntas are pressuring Western mining companies out of the region and partnering with Russia to fill the void. Nigerien Mining Minister Ousmane Abarchi released a statement on November 8 that invited Russian companies to explore Niger’s natural resources and confirmed communication with multiple Russian mining companies on exploitation of uranium and other natural resources.[1] The statement comes after the French mining company Orano announced that it had suspended operations on its only remaining active mine in Niger in October 2024. Orano ascribed its decision to the closure of the Benin-Niger border, which was the main export corridor for uranium production, after Niger’s military coup in 2023.[2] The blocked uranium has reached a value of nearly $318 million since the border closed.[3] Niger had already revoked the mining license from the Imouraren mine, one of Orano’s three subsidiary mines in the country, in June 2024.[4] Bloomberg reported the Russian company Rosatom’s intention to take over French-controlled Nigerien uranium supplies in June 2024.[5]

Mali has also taken an aggressive approach to Western mining companies while tightening cooperation with Russia. Mali nationalized its first mine in 2024 and adopted a new tax code to boost state interests in August 2023.[6] Negotiations to nationalize the mine began before the Malian military coup in 2020.[7] The new mining code aims to eliminate tax breaks to international companies and boost domestic revenue.[8] The code does this by increasing the maximum stakes the government can hold in a mine to 35 percent with an included 5 percent stake for local investors, whereas the maximum government stake had previously been only 20 percent.[9]

Mali has taken an increasingly hostile approach to Western mining companies to enforce these new measures, likely increasing Western anxiety and aversion to continuing business in Mali. Mali arrested four senior-level Malian employees from the Canadian mining company Barrick Gold in September 2024.[10] The government detained the Barrick employees for alleged financial crimes.[11] Mali released the detained employees in late September.[12] The government arrested the British CEO and two executives of Resolute, an Australian mining company, on November 9 following a meeting in Bamako to discuss tax and mining practices.[13]

The government’s assertive approach is causing increased financial difficulties for Western mining companies. Resolute’s stock shares fell by 32 percent after the news of the executive’s arrest was released to the public on November 10, the company’s worst trading day in over 15 years.[14] Resolute announced on November 18 that it would pay $160 million to the junta to resolve the dispute and secure the release of its employees.[15] Mali and Barrick are negotiating a settlement to resolve their dispute and are expected to reach an agreement by 2025.[16]

Mali and Russia have been increasing cooperation on natural resource exploitation since March 2024.[17] Malian and Russian officials developed a geological map for better resource exploration on March 21. The two countries later signed a series of agreements for the exploitation of oil, uranium, and gas in northern Mali on March 31.[18] Malian officials signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia’s Uranium One Group in July 2024.[19] Both countries discussed a joint lithium project at an event in Moscow in late September.[20] Uranium One Group is a subsidiary of Russia’s nuclear company Rosatom and is expected to begin lithium exploitation in southern Mali over the next 24 months.[21] Malian media reported in October 2024 that Russia was expected to begin lithium, oil, and gas exploitation in Mali that month.[22] Mali has also directly used tax revenue from Western gold mining to finance its contract for Russian Wagner Group and Africa Corps soldiers, underscoring how this revenue boost helps fund the junta’s defense budget.[23]

Figure 1. Opportunities for Mali and Russia to Cooperate on Mineral Extraction

Source: Liam Karr; Global Initiative on Transitional Organized Crime; US Department of the Interior; International Atomic Energy Agency; Jules Duhammel.

Increased Russian access to mining in the Sahel will boost the Russian economy and mitigate Western efforts to economically isolate Russia. Russia has repeatedly sought to gain access to such resources—primarily gold—from its partnerships with African countries to mitigate the effect of Western sanctions.[24] Russia does not produce raw lithium materials, which are crucial for green energy due to its use in rechargeable batteries for mobile phones, laptops, and electric vehicles.[25] The United States lists lithium as a critical mineral, meaning that it is important to national and economic security and that global demand outpaces supply.[26] The People’s Republic of China dominates the global lithium market, but Russia is trying to enter the market through mining deals in Bolivia and may have opportunities to exploit lithium deposits in eastern Ukraine.[27] Russia’s shift in lithium sourcing comes after supplies from Chile and Argentina stopped exporting lithium to Russia in 2022 due to Western sanctions.[28]

The Kremlin’s pursuit of uranium also aims to increase its grip on the nuclear energy market to improve its leverage with countries seeking to cut Russian gas purchases.[29] Niger is the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer, is the second-largest producer on the African continent, and has the highest-grade uranium ores on the African continent.[30] France could be particularly vulnerable as it relies on nuclear energy for 68 percent of its electricity and has relied on Niger for nearly 20 percent of the uranium it imports to power its nuclear energy facilities over the past decade, although France has tried to diversify its suppliers in recent years.[31]

Sudan

The RSF said it is open to ceasefire negotiations with the SAF, but a ceasefire is unlikely as the RSF has reaffirmed its maximalist demands and external sponsors—such as Russia—continue to fuel the fighting. During a press conference in Nairobi on November 18, Rapid Support Forces (RSF) representative Brigadier General Osama Hamdan said that the RSF is open to a peace agreement.[32] Hamdan blamed the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for undermining peace talks and starting the civil war. Hamdan also denied that the RSF attacked civilians in Gezira state, central Sudan, in October after aid groups and international organizations reported ethnically based RSF attacks in the region.[33] Hamdan said that the RSF has “tried” RSF fighters for other abuses in Khartoum, Gezira state, and Darfur.[34]

The RSF’s statements come as the US and UN have made a renewed push for a ceasefire deal between the RSF and SAF. US Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello traveled to Sudan for the first time on November 18 to meet with SAF Chief Abdel Fattah al Burhan as well as humanitarian, government, and tribal leaders in Port Sudan.[35] Burhan and Perriello discussed mechanisms to end the fighting and increase the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sudan, according to Sudan’s state media outlet.[36] The Saudi Arabia–based outlet Asharq al Awsat reported that Perriello and Burhan planned to discuss the future of the RSF and “security and military reform.”[37] Perriello previously traveled to the region on October 30 to meet with Sudanese civil society leaders, Sudanese government officials, and international leaders in Egypt, Kenya, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia.[38]

The RSF is calling for a ceasefire in an attempt to gain domestic and international legitimacy while delegitimizing the SAF. The RSF has long sought to legitimize its political and military status in Sudan by securing a preeminent role in national military institutions, a desire that was a major driver in the outbreak of the war in 2023. A key dispute in negotiations before the civil war was how the RSF would be integrated into the military and who would have ultimate control over its fighters and weapons.[39] The RSF has sought to gain domestic support during the war by establishing civil administrations to empower loyalists and deprive the SAF of local support.[40] The RSF has repeatedly accused the SAF of corruption and committing civilian abuses to undermine the SAF.[41] The RSF has attempted to achieve international legitimacy by meeting with international stakeholders in the region. RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo met with government leaders in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda in late December 2023 and January 2024.[42]

The SAF’s recent offensive is likely not a major factor in the RSF’s calculus given the RSF’s previous calls for ceasefires. The SAF recently launched offensives against the RSF in Khartoum, Gezira state, and Sennar state, making several operationally significant gains that are setting conditions to take strategically significant population centers in those states.[43] The RSF indicated that it would continue fighting while claiming that it is open to peace talks. Hamdan said on November 18 that the SAF does “not listen to any language but that of the rifle, and so we will continue to talk to them in the language they understand.”[44] The RSF has also expressed openness to a ceasefire when it holds the military advantage. The RSF said that it supported an immediate ceasefire with the SAF in January 2024 after military successes in Darfur and Gezira state.[45]

Figure 2. SAF Attempts to Relieve Besieged SAF Forces in Khartoum and Eastern States

Panel A. SAF Seizes Bridges in a Surprise Attack

Panel B. SAF Captures Halfaya Bridge, Breaking Kadroo Siege

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

Figure 3. Sudan Army Advances in Eastern States

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

A peace agreement between the RSF and SAF remains unlikely in the coming months due to both sides’ maximalist demands and continued external meddling. The RSF has reiterated its maximalist demands for a ceasefire in recent months, saying the RSF will not withdraw from Sudanese government buildings before a political deal has been secured.[46] The RSF proposed a political deal in January 2024 in which “the June 30 regime” (i.e., former Sudanese autocrat Omar al Bashir’s regime) is dismantled.[47] The RSF regularly refers to the SAF as remnants of Bashir’s government, implying that the only acceptable political deal is the dissolution of the SAF and its leadership.[48] The SAF has similar maximalist objectives of destroying the RSF as a military organization.[49] The SAF has less incentive to compromise on that objective because it holds the military advantage with its recent offensive.[50] The SAF had already reiterated in August before its offensive that it will not reconcile with the RSF and was absent from peace talks in Geneva that month.[51] SAF Chief Abdel Fattah al Burhan said in a speech on November 20 that the SAF would not negotiate with the RSF “unless it is preceded by a complete withdrawal of the [RSF] from all the areas they have occupied.”[52]

Figure 4. Sudan’s Civil War and Peace Process: 2023–2024 Timeline

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

The RSF has made several conflicting statements on its openness to negotiations, signaling that the group does not have a cohesive negotiating position. In a recorded message to the UN on September 26, Hemedti said the RSF was committed to implementing a ceasefire.[53] An RSF representative said on September 29 that it would not negotiate with the SAF and would pursue a military solution instead.[54]

Foreign sponsors continue to fuel the fighting in pursuit of their own interests and hinder the UN’s ability to pressure both sides to end the fighting. Russia abstained from a UN Security Council vote in June 2024 calling for a cessation of hostilities and vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for an end to the fighting in November 2024.[55] Russia has sent multiple weapons shipments to the SAF after agreeing to send “unrestricted qualitative military aid” to the SAF in April 2024 in exchange for the SAF moving forward on a 2017 deal to give Russia a naval base in Port Sudan.[56]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Iran have denied repeated allegations that they have provided weapons to the RSF and SAF, respectively, despite UN calls for foreign actors to cease involvement in the war.[57] Both countries are also seeking port deals with their Sudanese partners. The UAE is stoking the conflict by threatening to cut off aid if the RSF does not capture key areas. An unspecified official “close to the Chadian presidency” told Sudanese media that the UAE threatened to cut off support to the RSF if the RSF does not capture the last SAF stronghold in Darfur, al Fasher, which the RSF has been besieging since May 2024.[58]

Chad has allowed the UAE to funnel weapons and ammunition to the RSF through Chadian territory in exchange for financial aid.[59] The UAE has used an airport in eastern Chad as a logistics hub for its weapons shipments and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for the RSF in its fight against the SAF.[60] Chad has denied this assistance amid growing domestic and international pushback.[61]

Figure 5. External Support in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr.

Somalia

The transition from ATMIS to a new AU mission may be a flashpoint for conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia with Egyptian involvement. The current African Union Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) handed over the final military base from African Union (AU) forces to the Somali National Army on November 14.[62] Nine thousand ATMIS forces have departed Somalia and handed over control of several military bases to Somali security forces as of November 2024.[63]

The AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) is expected to succeed the outgoing ATMIS mission on January 1, 2025, but several aspects of the new mission remain unresolved.[64] The AU adopted a strategic concept of operations for AUSSOM in early August and forwarded the concept to the UN Security Council for approval in mid-August.[65] A joint UN-AU mission traveled to Somalia in early October to continue still-unresolved discussions on the mission’s composition and funding with key local, regional, and international stakeholders.[66] The mission’s force structure is unclear, with most external sponsors supporting Ethiopia’s continued presence in the new mission, while Egypt and the SFG are pushing to replace Ethiopian forces with Egyptian forces.[67]

Ethiopia has indicated that it will remain in Somalia through the AUSSOM transition despite the Somali Federal Government’s explicit calls for Ethiopia to withdraw. Ethiopia and Somalia have been at odds since Ethiopia signed a naval port deal with Somaliland in January 2024, which would grant Ethiopia land in Somaliland for a major port in return for recognizing Somaliland as an independent state.[68] Somalia has repeatedly said Ethiopia would not be included in AUSSOM since June 2024, called for the expulsion of Ethiopian forces from Somalia, and signed deals with Egypt in August for Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian troops in the AU mission and on a bilateral basis.[69] Ethiopia has said it will maintain forces in Somalia as part of the AUSSOM mission.[70] Ethiopia has about 10,000 soldiers in Somalia as part of ATMIS and on a bilateral basis to protect Ethiopia’s border from al Shabaab.[71] Ethiopian forces operate primarily in Somalia’s South West State, Hirshabelle state, and Jubbaland.[72]

Figure 5. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr.

Ethiopian forces have made several efforts to entrench themselves in Somalia in recent months, and internal Somali political tensions are also benefiting Ethiopia. CTP has recorded that the Ethiopian military has handed over only two bases to the Somali army over the past year as part of the ATMIS drawdown out of the at least 21 total bases handed over.[73] Somali media reported that Ethiopia established a new military base in South West state, which borders Ethiopia, in September 2024.[74] Officials from South West state and Jubbaland have voiced opposition to the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the region as well as to Somalia’s agreement with Egypt to deploy Egyptian forces to the country, signaling that Ethiopian forces would have local support if they remained in the country after the ATMIS mandate ends.[75]

Ethiopia continues to try to build local support for a sustained Ethiopian military presence in Somalia. Somali media reported that Ethiopian military officials met with local elders in South West state and Jubbaland in September 2024 to garner local support for the Ethiopian presence.[76] Both states had stated their preference for Ethiopian troops to remain in Somalia. Jubbaland in particular has become a potential proxy for Ethiopia given a separate dispute between the Jubbaland state government and the SFG over election reform in Somalia. Jubbaland is pressing ahead with its own elections and formally cut ties with the Somali Federal Government (SFG), which CTP has previously assessed could lead to political violence.[77] Ethiopian forces reportedly detained six Somali National Army soldiers in Gedo, Jubbaland, on November 19 due to the election dispute.[78] The UN and international partners are attempting to quell the tensions and called on both sides to resume negotiations on November 20.[79]

Ethiopia has stated that al Shabaab’s and Egypt’s growing presence in Somalia pose serious national security threats. Al Shabaab conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022, demonstrating al Shabaab’s strength near the Ethiopian border and underscoring the group’s regional ambitions.[80] Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent future cross-border incursions. Through its anti-Ethiopian propaganda, al Shabaab has repeatedly expressed an intent to attack Ethiopian troops as ATMIS forces have drawn down over the past year.[81] Al Shabaab seeks to recruit new members using perceptions that Ethiopia has ambitions to “occupy” Somalia.[82]

Foreign diplomats and security experts have expressed concern that the Ethiopian forces’ withdrawal could provide opportunities for al Shabaab to strengthen in Somalia.[83] The AU Peace and Security Council endorsed plans for AUSSOM in June 2024 while highlighting the need for Somali force to address military capacity gaps during the drawdown that al Shabaab could exploit.[84] The possible replacement of Ethiopian forces by Egyptian troops could complicate counterterrorism efforts. Ethiopian armed forces have built up local networks for over a decade and have equipped and trained local militias against al Shabaab.[85] Egyptian forces would struggle to develop similar networks because of the opposition to Egypt’s presence in the region, giving al Shabaab opportunities to take advantage of a security vacuum near the Ethiopia border.[86]

Egypt and Ethiopia have been in dispute over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam since 2011, which Egypt has repeatedly labeled an existential threat that will degrade its Nile water supply.[87] The Nile is vital for Egypt’s economy and general population because Egypt gets 90 percent of all its water from the Nile, which it uses for electric production, agriculture, and drinking water.[88] Ethiopia has framed the project as key to its economic development, energy independence, and national unity.[89] Egypt sees Somalia as an ally in undermining Ethiopian influence and has developed relations with Somalia since Somali-Ethiopian relations soured in January 2024.

Ethiopian forces’ continued presence in Somalia past the formal ATMIS expiration at the end of 2024 increases the risk of a direct conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia or a proxy armed conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia. Egypt has sent weapons and deployed troops to Somalia since signing its defense deals with the SFG in August 2024 and has said that it would contribute troops to the new AUSSOM mission.[90] Egyptian-Somali military cooperation is meant to combat al Shabaab while threatening Ethiopia. CTP has previously noted that some of the arms Egypt has sent, particularly heavy weaponry such as anti-tank and antiaircraft artillery, is meant for use against Ethiopia, as al Shabaab lacks the capabilities to warrant such weaponry.[91] Somalia’s foreign minister threatened in September to establish contact with insurgents in Ethiopia if Ethiopia followed through on its port deal with Somaliland.[92]

Ethiopia may also be arming actors more favorable to Ethiopia’s presence in Somalia to buffer against the Egyptian deployments.[93] Somali officials reported that Ethiopia shipped weapons to Baidoa, the de facto political capital of South West state, without specifying the time frame of the shipment.[94] The Somali government accused Ethiopia of sending two lorries carrying weapons to the semiautonomous Puntland region in Somalia in late September.[95]

Mozambique

ISMP is likely taking advantage of the unrest following Mozambican general elections to increase its rate of attacks in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province. Islamic State Mozambique Province (IMSP) insurgents carried out 12 out of the 16 attacks in October between October 23 and October 29, two weeks after Mozambique held elections.[96] ISMP militants have sustained a heightened rate of attack through November and have already carried out 19 attacks in November.[97] This surge represents more than a 50 percent increase in attacks from the previous four months. ISMP launched six attacks in March before increasing its rate of attacks in April and May with 22 and 29 incidents of violence, respectively.[98] The group averaged fewer than 12 attacks per month between June and September.[99]

Figure 6. ISMP Surges Attacks Following Mozambican Elections

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

This offensive is the group’s first since the Rwanda Security Forces offensive earlier in 2024. Rwandan and Southern African Development Community (SADC) counterinsurgency operations significantly weakened the group in 2022 and reduced the number of ISMP fighters from 2,500 to just 280 by the beginning of 2023.[100] ISMP resurged in early 2024 as it began operating across a geographic scope in Cabo Delgado unseen since at least 2022.[101] Rwanda Security Forces initiated a large-scale offensive in July 2024 that aimed to push ISMP insurgents out of forested areas and population centers on the coast.[102]

ISMP is likely aiming to reestablish a presence in several areas where it has been largely dormant for at least the second half of 2024, including the interior of Cabo Delgado and southern Cabo Delgado. Militants have carried out 12 attacks southwest of the N380 road in the Messalo River valley since October, which is four times the number of activities recorded in this area in the rest of 2024. ISMP had been more active in this area in 2023 after the counterinsurgency offensives had cleared its coastal havens and pushed it into the interior.[103] ISMP insurgents conducted two separate attacks in the Ancuabe district on November 16 that it claimed killed 18 pro-government militants, marking the group’s southernmost and most violent attack in the Cabo Delgado province since mid-June.[104] ISMP launched an attack campaign into southern Cabo Delgado in the first quarter of 2024, where the group had previously not been active since 2022.[105] ISMP also carried out its first attacks along the coast of Quiterajo locality since 2023.[106] ISMP has long maintained support zones around this area, such as Mucojo town.

Figure 7. ISMP Capitalizes on Election Unrest in Mozambique

Source: Liam Karr; Yale Ford; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.

The ISMP uptick comes as political violence has rocked Mozambique in the wake of the October 9 elections, violence that has preoccupied the Mozambican government and security forces and likely created gaps for ISMP to exploit. Mozambique held presidential and legislative elections on October 9. The Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS) candidate Venâncio Mondlane declared victory on October 10 over Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) candidate Daniel Chapo before most ballots were counted.[107] Electoral authorities certified FRELIMO’s legislative dominance and Daniel Chapo’s presidential victory with 71 percent of the national vote on October 24.[108]

Tensions across the country have mounted as PODEMOS supporters have protested electoral results they claim are fraudulent.[109] Election observers from the EU noted irregularities in voting and said the results were fabricated.[110] Protests across Mozambique erupted on October 18 when rioters assassinated two PODEMOS figures close to Mondlane in the streets of Maputo.[111] Mondlane claimed that Mozambican security forces were responsible for the killings and has thus far called for five phases of strikes in response to the election results.[112] Mozambican police have killed at least 30 protestors since late October and arrested thousands of demonstrators across the country.[113]

Societal unrest in Mozambique has accentuated an economic crisis as demonstrations continue to target the country’s logistics networks and economic pressure points, including important roadways, ports, and provincial capitals.[114] The protests have caused nearly $390 million in economic losses to the national economy—roughly 2 percent of Mozambique’s gross domestic product.[115] Violent protests near the Mozambican–South African border forced border authorities to shut vital intra-regional corridors for the movement of goods and people, resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars per day.[116] The postelection crisis has also caused food shortages and price increases.[117] An official from Cabo Delgado expressed his dismay to the press that the protests have limited residents’ access to basic services in the province.[118]

The Maputo-based research institute Center for Public Integrity claimed that ISMP insurgents have exploited security gaps in Cabo Delgado after Mozambican troops redeployed from the north to the capital city of Maputo to quell the protests.[119] Rumors also swirled online that Rwandan troops based in Cabo Delgado were redeployed to Maputo, but the EU and Rwandan government denied the allegations and said Rwandan troops are “deployed strictly in Cabo Delgado province.”[120] The Center for Public Integrity claimed based on these developments that the uptick in ISMP attacks can be directly attributed to the October 9 elections and the ensuing unrest.[121]

CTP is unable to verify the claim that Mozambican or Rwandan forces stationed in Cabo Delgado were transported to Maputo to contain the demonstrations. The number of government-initiated armed clashes with ISMP insurgents in Cabo Delgado has remained steady since July, which suggests that counterinsurgency operations in northern Mozambique have not been deprioritized.[122] The Mozambican government has deployed military units in Maputo to police the demonstrations, however.[123] The Mozambican defense minister threatened to redeploy the country’s military to Maputo in order to halt the postelection protests he claimed were aimed at toppling the government.[124]

ISMP’s increase in attacks in the context of nationwide instability risks stalling the rollout of natural gas projects and exacerbating the lack of socioeconomic opportunity in Cabo Delgado. The US-based ExxonMobil and French hydrocarbon giant TotalEnergies are both financing liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in the Rovuma deepwater basin that ISMP has affected. The ISMP insurgency previously forced TotalEnergies to declare force majeure on its $20 billion project in April 2021.[125] Total agreed in principle to restart work on the project in late 2023 and secured most of the requisite financing by early October 2024.[126]

Growing risks related to the precarious financial and security situation of Mozambique threaten further delays to the LNG facilities. ExxonMobil announced in late September that it expects to finalize the technical design of its LNG project within the next year before making a final investment decision by 2026.[127] Total’s decision to resume work on its natural gas site by the end of 2024 and aim for production by 2029 is conditional on the security environment in Cabo Delgado.[128] The Maputo-based outlet Zitamar News reported in early October that TotalEnergies sought Rwandan security guarantees to move forward with the restart.[129] The Mozambican president stated his belief in late September that the French company was hedging itself against risk by “waiting for the outcome” of the October 9 elections before resuming the project.[130] The Mozambican courts are not expected to adjudicate the final results of the October 9 elections until December, and opposition protests designed to create a “war-like atmosphere” and pressure electoral authorities to overturn the interim results will likely continue.[131]

Natural gas projects in Cabo Delgado will bring important economic benefits to the local economy as Mozambique seeks to address underlying socioeconomic drivers of conflict. Cabo Delgado remains one of the poorest provinces in Mozambique—a driving factor in the initial ISMP insurgency—despite the discovery of an abundance of natural resources.[132] A national business association official warned that the recent political instability in Mozambique has caused a “direct and worrying impact on the economy” in Cabo Delgado.[133] Improving the security environment in Cabo Delgado for the purpose of restarting the projects and appropriating their benefits for local populations was a key plank in the leading parties’ platforms.[134] TotalEnergies estimates that its project would employ 15,000 people and provide job creation programs that would foster substantial local economic growth.[135]

The natural gas projects will also help the global gas market as countries seek to diversify their purchases of natural gas away from Russia. The LNG facilities would produce significant quantities of natural gas—up to a combined total of 61 million metric tons annually—that would alleviate the global gas squeeze that the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Europe’s efforts to shift away from Russian supply have exacerbated.[136]

[1] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20241113-niger-embraces-russia-for-uranium-production-leaving-france-out-in-the-cold

[2] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/frances-orano-warns-financial-problems-niger-uranium-plant-somair-2024-11-15/

[3] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20241024-orano-halts-uranium-output-at-niger-s-arlit-mine-amid-financial-strain

[4] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20240621-france-s-orano-loses-operating-licence-at-major-uranium-mine-in-niger

[5] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-03/russia-said-to-seek-takeover-of-france-s-uranium-assets-in-niger

[6] https://www.barrons.com/news/mali-concludes-gold-mine-nationalisation-deal-d387390d

[7] https://www.barrons.com/news/mali-concludes-gold-mine-nationalisation-deal-d387390d

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-adopts-new-mining-code-boost-sectors-contribution-gdp-mines-ministry-2023-08-08/

[9] www.ecofinagency dot com/mining/0509-45849-mali-new-mining-code-to-apply-to-allied-gold-s-sadiola-gold-mine

[10] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-09-28/mali-junta-arrests-four-barrick-gold-employees-reuters-says

[11] www.mining dot com/web/mali-junta-arrests-four-employees-of-barrick-gold/; hr.economictimes.indiatimes dot com/news/industry/mali-releases-four-canadian-mining-firm-employees-source/113843020

[12] www.mining dot com/web/mali-junta-arrests-four-employees-of-barrick-gold/; https://www.barrons.com/news/mali-releases-four-canadian-mining-firm-employees-source-9519574d

[13] https://www.voanews.com/a/australian-gold-company-confirms-arrest-of-ceo-2-executives-in-mali/7859017.html; https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/australian-mine-company-pay-160-million-mali-junta-115968564; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyg6319d1eo

[14] https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/australias-resolute-mining-slumps-after-mali-detains-ceo-two-other-employees-2024-11-11/

[15] https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/australian-mine-company-pay-160-million-mali-junta-115968564

[16] https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/barrick-sees-deal-with-mali-over-new-mining-code-before-year-end-2024-11-07/

[17] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-april-4-2024-mali-and-russia-explore-malis-mineral-wealth-niger-plays-the-field-the-kremlins-red-sea-ambitions-in-eritrea#Mali

[18] https://x.com/fabsenbln/status/1770895655445450830?s=46&t=3jADKce4MtZBKDyf5P9itQ; https://x.com/AESinfos/status/1774454160919847047; https://x.com/sputnik_afrique/status/1774730443373314543

[19] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-mali-discuss-joint-lithium-solar-projects-2024-09-26/

[20] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-mali-discuss-joint-lithium-solar-projects-2024-09-26/

[21] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-mali-discuss-joint-lithium-solar-projects-2024-09-26/

[22] news.abamako dot com/h/295962.html

[23] https://bloodgoldreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The-Blood-Gold-Report-2023-December.pdf; https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68322230; https://twitter.com/AESinfos/status/1774454160919847047

[24] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-blinken-visits-west-africa-as-former-sahelian-counterterrorism-partners-continue-to-slide-into-russia-and-irans-orbit

[25] https://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/3/lithium; resourceworld dot com/russia-ready-to-resume-domestic-lithium-mining-as-sanctions-bite/

[26] https://www.wri.org/insights/critical-minerals-us-climate-goals ; https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/us-geological-survey-releases-2022-list-critical-minerals ; https://netl.doe.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/Li-Bridge%20-%20Building%20a%20Robust%20and%20Resilient%20U.S.%20Lithium%20Battery%20Supply%20Chain.pdf

[27] https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-spends-billions-on-risky-bets-to-lock-down-worlds-lithium-39e174e8; https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/bolivia-seals-14-bln-lithium-deals-with-russias-rosatom-chinas-guoan-2023-06-29; https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/news-insights/lithium-the-link-between-the-ukraine-war-and-the-clean-energy-transition

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[29] https://cepa.org/article/russias-civil-nuclear-threat-must-be-crushed; https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Unconventional-Weapons-final-web.pdf

[30] https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20240621-france-s-orano-loses-operating-licence-at-major-uranium-mine-in-niger; https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/uranium-mines-niger-worlds-7th-biggest-producer-2023-07-28/; https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/uranium-production-by-country

[31] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=55259; https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2023/08/04/how-dependent-is-france-on-niger-s-uranium_6080772_8.html; https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/energy-and-economy-program-eep/french-connection-macrons-nuclear-deals-in-central-asia; https://www.rfi.fr/en/france/20231101-macron-is-shopping-for-uranium-in-kazakhstan-after-the-loss-of-niger

[32] https://www.dabangasudan dot org/en/all-news/article/sudans-rsf-ready-for-a-ceasefire-says-top-negotiator#google_vignette

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[35] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-sudan-envoy-meets-army-chief-burhan-first-visit-2024-11-18/; https://www.state.gov/u-s-special-envoy-for-sudan-perriellos-travel-to-sudan-djibouti-and-italy/; https://x.com/Maha_eltelb/status/1858434066950819882; https://x.com/TSC_SUDAN/status/1858557150441639976; https://www.suna-sd dot net/posts/ryys-mgls-alsyad-alantkaly-alkayd-alaaam-llkoat-almslh-yltky-almbaaoth-alamryky-llsodan

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[38] https://www.state.gov/special-envoy-for-sudan-perriello-travels-to-kenya-uganda-saudi-arabia-and-egypt/

[39] https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/power-struggle-sudan; https://apnews.com/article/sudan-clashes-military-rapid-support-forces-444d37ec93ccc813b2ba4abba24aca5c

[40] https://www.radiotamazuj dot org/en/news/article/new-government-under-rsf-formed-in-south-darfur; https://sudanwarmonitor.com/p/rsf-establish-civil-administration

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[46] https://www.dabangasudan dot org/en/all-news/article/rsf-will-not-withdraw-from-sudan-gov-buildings-before-a-comprehensive-political-deal-says-advisor

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[108] https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-daniel-chapo-wins-presidential-election-with-70-67-cne-269526; https://www.voaportugues.com/a/cne-confirma-vit%C3%B3ria-de-daniel-chapo-por-70-por-cento-em-mo%C3%A7ambique/7837569.html; https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20241024-mozambique-le-candidat-du-parti-au-pouvoir-daniel-chapo-d%C3%A9clar%C3%A9-vainqueur-de-la-pr%C3%A9sidentielle

https://cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/17927-eleicoes-2024-cne-chancela-vitoria-de-chapo-com-70-67; https://integritymagazine dot co.mz/arquivos/33745; https://www.zitamar.com/frelimo-to-be-given-best-ever-result-in-parliamentary-elections; https://aimnews.org/2024/10/25/frelimo-conquista-mais-de-dois-tercos-na-assembleia-da-republica

[109] https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-elections-daniel-chapo-and-frelimo-win-in-nampula-province-watch-268662; https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/14/frelimos-candidate-wins-in-maputo-amid-ongoing-vote-count; https://integritymagazine dot co.mz/arquivos/33278; https://opais.co.mz/gaza-podemos-e-mdm-contestam-vitoria-de-chapo-e-frelimo; https://moztimes.com/en/blog/podemos-points-to-mathematical-discrepancies; https://cartamz.com/index.php/politica/item/17941-eleicoes-2024-resultados-da-cne-mostram-170-mil-votos-falsos-para-frelimo-e-chapo

[110] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39l931zyg8o; https://apnews.com/article/mozambique-election-irregularities-results-protest-killings-50ea2d587e563dece5454253547897d4; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EU%20EOM%20Mozambique%20PRELIMINARY%20STATEMENT%20EN.pdf

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[112] https://www.voaportugues.com/a/ven%C3%A2ncio-mondlane-acusa-for%C3%A7as-de-defesa-e-seguran%C3%A7a-de-cometer-o-crime/7828745.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/10/23/au-mozambique-le-principal-opposant-accuse-le-pouvoir-d-avoir-tue-son-avocat_6358659_3212.html; https://www.voaportugues.com/a/mo%C3%A7ambique-pol%C3%ADcia-reprime-protestos-convocados-por-ven%C3%A2ncio-mondlane-/7830039.html; https://www.voaafrique.com/a/mozambique-manifestation-post-%C3%A9lectorale-sous-tension-%C3%A0-maputo/7830041.html; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/11/02/mozambique-nouveaux-affrontements-apres-une-presidentielle-contestee_6372722_3212.html; https://www.zitamar.com/maputo-prepares-for-further-unrest-as-mass-demonstration-looms; https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/11/11/au-mozambique-l-opposition-appelle-a-trois-nouvelles-journees-de-manifestations_6388839_3212.html

https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-mondlane-wants-demonstrations-in-provincial-capitals-aim-report-270539; https://360mozambique.com/development/venancio-mondlane-declares-national-mourning-and-calls-for-three-more-days-of-peaceful-protests

[113] https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2024/11/mozambique-post-election-violence-and-repression-must-stop-say-un-experts; https://clubofmozambique.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Hanlon-MozElec-Firoz-Lalji-12Nov24-updated-14Nov24-1.pdf; https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-lawyers-free-2700-people-detained-at-political-protests-270159; https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-police-claim-371-arrests-during-unrest-aim-report-269617

[114] https://integritymagazine dot co.mz/arquivos/34672; https://cartamz.com/index.php/economia-e-negocios/item/17975-eleicoes-2024-governo-diz-estar-a-somar-prejuizos-com-a-paralisacao-geral-das-actividades-economicas; https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-maputo-port-lost-384-million-meticais-due-to-demonstrations-270832; https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mocambique-mondlane-wants-three-day-national-mourning-for-dead-protesters-traffic-halt-watch-270874; https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-mondlane-wants-demonstrations-in-provincial-capitals-aim-report-270539; https://lusa dot pt/lusanews/article/2024-11-20/43943565/mozambique-traffic-stops-in-maputo-to-protest-against-election-results; https://www.barrons.com/news/mozambique-opposition-calls-for-crippling-protests-over-poll-results-0ac810b7; https://clubofmozambique.com/news/sp-sees-mozambique-unrest-pushing-nation-closer-to-debt-default-270879; https://integritymagazine dot co.mz/arquivos/34791; https://www.zitamar.com/zitamar-week-in-review-11-17-november-2024