Africa File, November 7, 2024: Niamey Threatened; Boko Haram Fallout in Chad; M23 Marches on Eastern DRC; Somalia-Jubbaland Tensions

Contributor: Halkano Boru

Data Cutoff: November 7, 2024, at 10 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• Niger. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate JNIM attacked a military checkpoint in the Niamey suburbs, signaling its ability to attack the Nigerien capital roughly one month after it launched its first attack on the Malian capital in a decade. A major attack on Niamey would likely undermine the Nigerien junta’s legitimacy and support base, which could cause the junta to turn to external backers like Iran and Russia for additional military assistance. However, Russia faces internal constraints on increasing support due to its invasion of Ukraine, and Niger has thus far shown a limited interest in greater Iranian or Russian support.
• Chad. Chad is threatening to pull out of the Lake Chad Multinational Joint Task Force in reaction to Boko Haram’s deadliest attack in Chad since March 2020. Chad’s strong public response to the Boko Haram attack is distracting from internal and external tensions over its role in supporting the United Arab Emirates to fuel the Sudanese civil war.
• Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels are rapidly advancing toward a local hub and gateway town in North Kivu, threatening to end the ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda. The March 23 Movement (M23) launched a separate, limited offensive to the northeast, where it targeted villages on Lake Edward that serve as a regional hub for economic activity. M23’s offensive also augments the rebel group’s leverage to influence ongoing Angolan-mediated peace negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda.
• Somalia.  The Somali Federal Government and the state governments in Somalia are in political disputes over the format of upcoming elections, which could lead to political violence.

Assessments:

Niger

JNIM attacked a military checkpoint in the Niamey suburbs, signaling its ability to attack the Nigerien capital roughly one month after it launched its first attack on the Malian capital in a decade. Al Qaeda’s Sahelian affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a military checkpoint in the Niamey suburb district of Seno on October 26.[1] JNIM claimed that the attack killed one soldier.[2] Nigerien authorities have not acknowledged the attack. The Seno attack is JNIM’s first-ever recorded attack within the Niamey administrative limits.

The Seno attack is the latest indicator that JNIM is likely capable of attacking inside Niamey. JNIM had already carried out three attacks within five miles of the Niamey administrative limits in 2024.[3] Seno lies between the N7 and N26 roads, which connect Niamey to the district capitals of Torodi and Say to the southwest. CTP has assessed that JNIM had been building support zones in the Ouro Gueladjo area, 25 miles southwest of Niamey between these same two roads, since around the July 2023 Niger coup.[4]

Figure 1. JNIM Encroaches on Niamey

Source: Liam Karr.

JNIM activity around Niamey mirrors the group’s pattern of activity around the Malian capital in the year before the September attack. JNIM had waged an attack campaign around Bamako since early 2023 but had not given priority to attacking the capital.[5] The group had also consolidated support zones roughly 75 to 200 miles north of the Malian capital that CTP assessed JNIM used to support these attacks and eventually the cell in Bamako.[6]

Figure 2. JNIM Strengthens in Southern Mali

Source: Liam Karr; Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.

A major attack on Niamey would likely undermine the Nigerien junta’s legitimacy and support base, which could cause the junta to turn to external backers like Iran and Russia for additional military assistance. JNIM’s attack on Mali specifically targeted government and military targets, unlike al Qaeda–affiliated militants’ high-visibility attacks on capitals in the 2010s.[7] JNIM would presumably attack similar targets in Niamey if it carried out an attack on the city itself. The bulk of the Nigerien armed forces supported the July 2023 coup only because of the coup leaders’ messaging about correcting the democratic government’s counterinsurgency strategy and reasserting its sovereignty.[8] More frequent JNIM attacks in and around the capital undermine this key legitimacy pillar. Local reporters partnering with Dutch and African media outlets reported in July and August that the junta’s widespread popularity in the capital is showing some—albeit isolated—cracks after more than one year of junta rule.[9] Anecdotal local reports claim that Nigerien soldiers are suffering from low morale and discontent with the junta.[10]

Niger’s junta has limited options to respond to the deteriorating security situation outside of its Russian partners. Niger cut defense ties with its two major external counterterrorism partners, France and the United States, in 2023 and 2024, respectively, leading to the departure of over 2,000 partner forces.[11] Niger simultaneously turned to Russia and its neighboring anti-Western juntas in the Alliance of Sahel States to replace the Western support.[12] Russia deployed roughly 100 troops for primarily regime security purposes and an antiaircraft system in April 2024 but has not provided any additional military assistance since.[13]

Figure 3. Niger Diversifies Its Military Partners

Note: CTP based the trajectory assessments on the rate and depth of reported discussions and agreements.

Source: Liam Karr.

Russia faces internal constraints on increasing support to Niger due to its invasion of Ukraine, and Niger has thus far shown limited interest in greater Iranian or Russian support. Russia has not signaled that it plans to increase its support and is facing capacity challenges due to its war in Ukraine and recruiting shortfalls. CTP has previously assessed that Russian manpower shortages are inhibiting it from scaling up its presence in the central Sahelian countries.[14] Neither Iran nor Russia has signaled plans to increase defense assistance to Niger in recent months, and Nigerien officials have not discussed defense cooperation with their counterparts since June. Niger signed a deal on November 1 with Russian satellite company Glavcosmos, a subsidiary of Russian space agency Roscosmos, to purchase three satellites that will improve remote sensing and radar for defense purposes.[15] However, the deal will not address the short-term threats the Nigerien junta faces because the satellites will not be online until 2028.[16]

Iran and Russia have significantly scaled up their drone-making capacity, but Niger continues to prefer purchasing Turkish drones. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in September that Russia is on pace to increase its drone production tenfold, to 1.4 million drones, in 2024.[17] Iran increased outreach to Niger in early 2024, and French media reported that Iran offered to provide drones and surface-to-air missiles in exchange for uranium.[18] However, these talks have seemingly not progressed, and the Nigerien junta has increased its arsenal of Turkish drones instead of diversifying its drone-providing partners.[19]

Chad

Chad is threatening to pull out of the Lake Chad Multinational Joint Task Force in reaction to Boko Haram launching its deadliest attack in Chad since March 2020. Local media reported that 300 Boko Haram fighters overran a Chadian military garrison housing 200 soldiers on an island in Lake Chad on October 27.[20] The attackers killed at least 40 soldiers and civilians, looted weapons, and burned Chadian military vehicles before retreating.[21] It was Boko Haram’s first attack in Chad since November 2020 and its deadliest attack in Chad since March 2020, when it killed 100 Chadian soldiers in a raid on a peninsula on Lake Chad.[22]

A recent lull in Boko Haram activity may have freed resources for the recent attack in Chad. Boko Haram has decreased its rate of attacks since late August. The group carried out only five attacks in September, which is half of its monthly average from January to August. Boko Haram has not fought with its inter-jihadi rivals in the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) since late August after averaging three clashes per month over the first two-thirds of the year. The group’s last major fight with ISWAP ended with Boko Haram killing over 90 ISWAP fighters in an attack on an ISWAP headquarters on a Nigerian island in Lake Chad on August 1.[23]

Chadian President Mahamat Idress Déby threatened to withdraw from the Lake Chad Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on November 4, citing the mission’s failure to prevent the attack.[24] The MNJTF is a counterterrorism alliance that operates in the Lake Chad basin and consists of forces from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Déby specifically said that a lack of “mutualization” among the MNJTF enabled the October 27 attack.[25] The MNJTF has suffered from coordination issues since the July 2023 Niger coup, which caused Niger to suspend its participation in the MNJTF in November 2023 due to tensions with neighboring Nigeria. Niger reentered the MNJTF in August 2024 because of improved relations with Nigeria, but Nigerian and Nigerien forces still have not conducted joint operations since the coup after having conducted six such major operations between May 2022 and July 2023.[26] Nigeria also accused Chad of mistaking fishermen for Boko Haram fighters in an airstrike that killed dozens of civilians on November 1, highlighting coordination issues with the other MNJTF members as well.[27]

The MNJTF has been relatively successful in containing the Salafi-jihadi threat in the Lake Chad basin, and Chad’s withdrawal may lead to an increase in jihadist activity in the region. The MNJTF has been unable to defeat the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in the Lake Chad basin due to weak structural commands, short-lived operations, and an underfunded civilian oversight committee that cannot exert authority.[28] However, the force has successfully carried out regular “mowing the grass” offensives that have helped contain the insurgency, decrease the total number of insurgent attacks, and return refugees and local business to some parts of the Lake Chad basin.[29] The MNJTF conducted one of these “mowing the grass” offensives in early 2024, called “Lake Sanity,” in which 140 Boko Haram militants were killed, 57 suspected militants were arrested, and 176 militants surrendered.[30] These successes have led the European Peace Fund and the African Union to continue funding the MNJTF.[31]

Chad’s withdrawal would strengthen Boko Haram’s ongoing resurgence. The group began strengthening in late 2022 after consolidating under a new leader following the death of founder Abu Bakar al Shekau in 2021.[32] The group then launched an offensive in 2023 and 2024 and retook many key islands in Lake Chad that it had previously lost to ISWAP.[33] The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project recorded that Boko Haram and ISWAP clashed at least 20 times from January to August 24, 2024.[34] The group has simultaneously continued carrying out a high rate of smaller attacks against civilians, security forces, and ISWAP throughout the other countries in the Lake Chad basin.[35] The group conducted a suicide attack on June 29 in Nigeria, which was its first suicide attack since 2020.[36]

Figure 4. Boko Haram Resurgent in Northeastern Nigeria

Source: Liam Karr.

Déby’s strong public response to the Boko Haram attack is distracting from internal and external tensions over its role in supporting the United Arab Emirates to fuel the Sudanese civil war. Déby has taken a highly visible role in the aftermath of the Boko Haram attack by addressing the country from the site of the attack and announcing on October 28 that he would personally lead a counteroffensive, named “Operation Haskanite.”[37] The French outlet Le Monde reported that Chad sent reinforcements to the region to support the offensive.[38]

Déby’s “rally around the flag” campaign distracts from the growing internal pressure Déby faces over his decision to allow the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to use Chad to support the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in the Sudanese civil war in exchange for financial aid. The UAE has used an airport in eastern Chad as a logistic hub for its weapons shipments and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support for the RSF in its fight against the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militias.[39] Déby faces growing pressure from Chad’s military and political elite, as they are predominantly drawn from the area and view the RSF as a threat due to a history of cross-border ethnic tensions and violence involving militia groups that now compose the RSF.[40] Sudanese media reported on October 31 that Chad had reinforced its border with Sudan due to increased fighting and instability on the Sudanese side of the border that threatens to escalate these cross-border tensions.[41] American experts on African politics have warned that the internal regime disputes increase the risk of an elite coup.[42]

Figure 5. External Support in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr.

Déby called on the international community for increased support to combat Boko Haram, distracting from international calls on external actors to stop fueling the Sudanese civil war.[43] United States diplomats and lawmakers, as well as allies, have repeatedly condemned foreign interference in the Sudanese civil war.[44] Chad and the UAE have denied their roles in fueling the conflict and avoided consequences for their actions.[45] Déby has also sought to maintain Chad’s position as an indispensable partner in the conflict-ridden Sahel to avoid blowback for its role in the Sudan civil war.[46] This strategy has been successful and drawn continued engagement from the West, Russia, Hungary, and other middle powers.[47] His latest call for international support against Boko Haram aligns with this broader narrative pushing Chad as vital partner against instability and terrorism.

Democratic Republic of the Congo 

The Rwandan-backed M23 rebels are rapidly advancing toward a local hub and gateway town in North Kivu after seizing multiple villages in an offensive. The March 23 Movement (M23) is a Rwandan-backed armed rebellion that emerged in late 2021 and has since captured large sections of territory in the southern areas of North Kivu.[48] The rebel group launched a new offensive in the Masisi territory against armed militia groups backed by the Congolese army (FARDC) known as “Wazalendo” on October 20. M23’s first major gain was the strategic town of Kalembe on October 23—a village of an estimated 40,000 inhabitants with access to gold and tin mining zones in the Walikale territory.[49] The offensive violates a ceasefire between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda that came into effect on August 4 under the Angola-mediated Luanda Process.[50]

M23 has since conquered at least a dozen towns and is operating an estimated six miles away from Pinga, the administrative center of northwest Masisi territory and an entry point into several neighboring areas. M23 fighters initially progressed along the RP1030 Road—the primary supply route and transit corridor in the Masisi territory that leads northwest to Pinga.[51] Fighting between the M23 and Wazalendo militants along the RP1030 Road has centered on the villages of Kahira, Katobi, Minjenji, and Mpeti.[52] The Kinshasa-based outlet Actualite.CD reported on October 28 that M23 relocated troops to Masisi from a support zone in Rutshuru territory to reinforce its positions in the area.[53] Thousands of civilians who reside in villages along the route have fled toward Pinga due to the M23 advance.[54] M23 attacked the village of Burayi on October 29 with the objective of overrunning what a national radio station called Wazalendo fighters’ “last resistance position” before reaching Pinga.[55]

Pinga is a key town due to its vital infrastructure and location as a potential staging ground for M23 expansion. Pinga hosts an airstrip, an army base, and a hospital.[56] The capture of the town would provide M23 with a staging area to launch attacks in Walikale territory—a region rich in high-value minerals and the only territory out of five in North Kivu yet to be significantly affected by protracted clashes between M23 and the Wazalendo.[57] Pinga is also an entry point to the Maniema, South Kivu, and Tshopo provinces.[58] Holding Pinga would mark a notable expansion in M23’s areas of control given the town’s history as a contested stronghold.[59]

Figure 6. M23 Offensive Approaches Pinga

Source: Liam Karr.

M23 rebels launched a separate, limited offensive on another front 50 miles northeast, where it added to its attack zones in the Lubero territory by targeting villages situated on Lake Edward that serve as a regional hub for economic activity. M23 briefly took control of two localities on the shores of Lake Edward in southern Lubero territory on November 3. The rebel group first attacked the town of Kirumba—an economic center and the largest town in southern Lubero territory, with an estimated 120,000 residents—before advancing 12 miles to seize control of the Kamandi Gîte and Vitshumbi localities.[60] A local civil society member told a French media outlet after the rebel group consolidated its presence in the area that the fighters were heavily armed and numbered in the hundreds.[61] M23 withdrew from Kamandi Gîte on November 5, however, and the Congolese National Police reoccupied the area.[62]

The group has conducted significant military operations near the shores of Lake Edward since March.[63] M23 previously held Vitshumbi in March after intense fighting with FARDC and its affiliated militia groups.[64] The group seized control of two towns 15 miles away from Kamandi Gîte in late June, including Kirumba and Kanyabayonga.[65]

A sustained M23 presence around Kamandi Gîte would create opportunities for the group to benefit from local economic activity, as well as control the intra-regional movement of goods and people. Kamandi Gîte is a prominent fishing locality that serves as an access point to the lake for several villages.[66] Vitshumbi lies near several trade and transportation routes on Lake Edward that link North Kivu with the broader Great Lakes region, including Uganda to the north and the rest of North Kivu to the south. A national radio station reported that M23 influence over these areas would provide opportunities for the group to tax tens of thousands of fishermen and control boat traffic on Lake Edward.[67]

M23’s advance toward Pinga and the joining of its support zones near Lake Edward threatens to end the ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda and augments the rebel group’s leverage in the Luanda Process negotiations. Foreign ministers from the DRC, Rwanda, and Angola met for the latest round of talks under the Angola-mediated Luanda Process in early October to reaffirm their commitment to observe a ceasefire that came into effect on August 4 and approve a “harmonized plan” that would see the DRC attack an anti-Rwandan government Hutu rebel group in exchange for Rwanda reducing its military presence in the eastern DRC.[68] The UN claims that Rwanda’s military presence in the DRC has been decisive to M23’s “superior combat strength” since its resurgence in 2021 through Rwanda’s provision of an estimated 4,000 troops, training, and military equipment.[69]

The August 4 ceasefire has been a point of contention during the Luanda Process. Officials from all sides agreed on October 12 to establish a regional verification mechanism to enforce the terms of the ceasefire and mediate disputes between the DRC and Rwanda, which went into effect on November 5.[70] However, the DRC and Rwanda have both accused each other of failing to abide by the spirit of the agreement, and the M23 offensive will inflame these tensions.[71] The Angola Ministry of Foreign Affairs said after M23 attacked Kalembe on October 20 that the group’s offensive constituted a “flagrant violation” of the August 4 ceasefire.[72] The UN Security Council and France also condemned M23 for violating the agreement.[73] The M23 claims that its exclusion from the Luanda negotiations makes the discussions “incomplete,” interpreting the ceasefire agreement as strictly between the DRC and Rwanda.[74] Affiliates of M23 said after Kalembe fell on October 23 that the rebel group “did not consider themselves bound by the [ceasefire] agreement, which they did not sign.”[75]

An M23 attack on Pinga would likely draw the FARDC back into the fighting. Clashes between M23 and the FARDC have significantly decreased since the beginning of the ceasefire in August.[76] Wazalendo fighters claim the M23 uses ceasefire agreements as cover to seize territory after the Congolese government orders the retreat of the FARDC and pro-government militias.[77] The North Kivu military governor said the Congolese army was still “loyally respecting” the ceasefire but that government forces in the region “await orders” from Kinshasa to mount a defense against M23 and “stop the enemy’s advance.”[78] The DRC’s defense minister said the country’s “valiant soldiers” are making a concerted effort to thwart M23’s capture of Pinga.[79] It remains unclear, however, whether this claim refers to Wazalendo fighters who still regularly clash with M23 or to FARDC soldiers who have largely disengaged with M23 following the August 4 ceasefire.[80]

M23 is installing its own local officials as it advances, bolstering its claimed legitimacy in the territory and strengthening its bargaining power in negotiations.[81] CTP previously assessed that the Rwandan-backed M23 rebels likely launched the October 20 offensive on the Walikale-Masisi-Rutshuru axis to pressure the DRC in the Luanda Process discussions.[82] The France-based magazine Jeune Afrique quoted a Congolese army official who claimed the M23 rebels are “taking advantage” of the ceasefire before the Luanda Process verification mechanism is installed.[83] Former DRC presidential candidate and leader of an opposition party Martin Fayulu questioned DRC President Félix Tshisekedi’s urgency in counteracting M23’s recent advances and called on Kinshasa to take the necessary military measures to recover lost villages.[84]

Somalia

The Somali Federal Government and the state governments in Somalia are in political disputes over the format of upcoming elections, which could lead to political violence. Somalia’s government and three of the five federal member states agreed on a one-person, one-vote election system in October after monthlong talks under the National Consultative Council (NCC). The current electoral system is an indirect model in which state legislatures and clan delegates pick lawmakers for the national parliament, who then choose the president.[85] The agreement scheduled the first one-person, one-vote municipal elections in June 2025, followed by parliamentary and state presidential elections in September 2025.

Jubbaland and Puntland states both protested the decision and said they would hold their own elections.[86] Jubbaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam, also known as Madobe, withdrew from the October NCC meetings, said the new system would undermine Jubbaland’s regional autonomy, and accused Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of attempting to extend his term.[87] Madobe plans to run for a third term as the Jubbaland president after the Jubbaland parliament abolished term limits for the upcoming elections.[88] Jubbaland was already at odds with the Somali Federal Government (SFG) because it supported the continued presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia despite the SFG planning to expel Ethiopian forces at the end of 2024.[89] Puntland never attended the latest NCC after announcing in March 2024 that it was withdrawing from the countries’ federal system and would govern itself independently due to disagreements over revising the constitution, including the path to one-person, one-vote elections.[90]

Somalia’s elections in 2025 could be a flashpoint for violence between Jubbaland and SFG security forces, with backing from external partners such as Ethiopia. Troops loyal to the SFG and Jubbaland clashed in early 2020 after a disputed election in 2019, displacing over 56,000 civilians.[91] The Jubbaland government released a statement on November 5 calling for Jubbaland security forces to be on “full alert” and said that the Jubbaland forces are legally responsible for providing security to Jubbaland officials participating in elections.[92] Kenyan and Ethiopian forces remain in Jubbaland and neighboring areas as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission and to protect their respective borders from al Shabaab. Both countries provide military and political support to their favored political actors, which complicated the response to the 2019 crisis.[93] The SFG has already accused Ethiopia of sending weapons to Puntland and South West states in 2024, which Ethiopia has denied.[94]

The Jubbaland government and SFG may resolve the dispute through negotiations. A Kenyan delegation reportedly met with Madobe on November 4 to ease tensions between Jubbaland and the SFG.[95] Somali President Mohamud said that he is willing to meet with the presidents of Jubbaland and Puntland states to solve the disputes, but there are no public plans for such meeting.[96]