Africa File, October 31, 2024: Africa and BRICS; Sudan Fighting Fuels Humanitarian Disaster

Data Cutoff: October 31, 2024, at 10 a.m.

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The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaways:

• BRICS. African engagement in the 2024 BRICS+ summit highlights that many African countries are primarily interested in the bloc’s economic benefits and that BRICS remains divided over fundamental geopolitical disagreements and the wider geopolitical role the bloc should play. China and Russia have attempted to frame the bloc as an anti-Western geopolitical body. Member and partner states have fundamental disagreements on regional and international issues, however, including relations with the West and Chinese influence. Given its largely economic focus and its recent pattern of expansion, BRICS will likely prioritize increasing its engagement with countries that are suited to expand the group’s global economic leverage in certain comparative advantage sectors, which could help it pursue goals such as decreasing the influence of the US dollar.
• Sudan. A ceasefire agreement in Sudan remains unlikely as the latest round of fighting continues to worsen the humanitarian situation in the country in the near term. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) launched offensives in Gezira, Khartoum, North Darfur, and Sennar states in late September and early October to relieve besieged troops and take back territory held by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF has carried out retaliatory, ethnically based violence in Gezira, central Sudan, which risks further high-level communal violence in the country. The recent RSF attacks in Gezira state following the SAF offensive there will worsen the already poor humanitarian situation in Sudan. Foreign military support to the opposing sides has also prolonged the war and hindered the progress of peace talks.

Assessments:

BRICS

African engagement in the 2024 BRICS+ summit highlights that many African countries are primarily interested in the bloc’s economic benefits and that BRICS remains divided over fundamental geopolitical disagreements and the wider geopolitical role the bloc should play. Russia hosted the 16th BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, on October 22–24. The summit was the first meeting of BRICS+, which includes the original BRICS members—Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and South Africa—and four new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa touted new economic cooperation opportunities across their various meetings at the summit. South African President Cyril Ramaphosa held several bilateral meetings with other heads of state during the summit that focused on “strengthening political and economic relations.”[1] Ramaphosa highlighted several economic initiatives during the BRICS+ session that aim to “unlock opportunities for trade and investment for local and global businesses.”[2] Ramaphosa also signed bilateral agreements with China on energy generation and nuclear power and a local currency credit deal with China and Russia.[3] Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi highlighted Russia’s nuclear energy assistance following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, while Putin praised bilateral trade ties with Egypt for accounting for “about a third of all trade turnover between Russia and Africa.”[4] Putin notably highlighted the potential for “economic, health, and scientific cooperation” with Ethiopia after meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and Abiy noted that the two states would expand economic cooperation.[5]

BRICS elevated its partnership with Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda, and 10 non-African countries without giving them full membership status, suggesting that their inclusion is focused on economic cooperation. The newly added “partner countries” do not have voting rights in the bloc or full participation in summits and meetings and are not expected to fully commit to decisions the bloc makes.[6] Partner countries will presumably be less committed to geopolitical efforts, therefore, and will focus on economic cooperation with BRICS members. Algeria, Nigeria, and Uganda had all focused on economic advantages when framing their interest in joining the bloc.[7] Many other African countries are interested in joining BRICS for economic and symbolic reasons.

China and Russia have attempted to frame the bloc as an anti-Western geopolitical body. Member and partner states have fundamental disagreements on regional and international issues, however, including relations with the West and Chinese influence. China and Russia both seek to use BRICS to advance their respective narratives and efforts to revise the current international order.[8] The two have different views on how BRICS and similar institutions should be used, however. Putin has framed Russia as a leader of the “world majority” and views BRICS as a key piece in creating a new global order in which the West cannot enforce the rules of the current system.[9] Xi Jinping has postured China as the leader of the “Global South” and emphasized the importance of BRICS as an alternative institution to give developing countries a greater voice in multilateral institutions and push for a more multipolar and less Western-dominated system.[10] Pro-Chinese and pro-Russian information operations pushed these messages across West African media during the BRICS summit.[11]

Member countries have divergent goals on geopolitical matters, and some are already wary of China’s outsize influence over the bloc, limiting BRICS’s geopolitical cohesion and impact.[12] BRICS is already heavily economically dependent on China, with China accounting for over 60 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).[13] China has sought to advance this position by putting itself at the center of BRICS efforts to reduce dependence on the US dollar and pushing its own renminbi as a universal currency, which would replace dependence on the United States with dependence on China.[14] India is particularly concerned about outsize Chinese and Russian influence, especially given India’s regional rivalry and ongoing territorial dispute with China. India has pushed against expanding BRICS partially due to fears of adding more China- or Russia-aligned voting countries.[15] These worries contributed to the creation of the partner country category to avoid giving the 13 countries voting rights in the bloc, narrowing the scope of potential cooperation.[16] Brazilians and Indians view the PRC unfavorably according to polls, further influencing their governments’ approaches to the bloc and China.[17] China and Russia also oppose any expansion of permanent United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seats, while the other BRICS members are competing with each other for permanent seats.[18]

African BRICS affiliates are competing with each other, straining the bloc’s cohesion as a united geopolitical entity on the continent. New members Egypt and Ethiopia are fierce regional rivals in the Horn of Africa and are on opposing sides of a multilayered regional crisis that risks devolving into a direct or proxy war.[19] Egypt and Ethiopia are simultaneously competing with South Africa, and new partner country Nigeria, for leadership on the continent and the right to be the African representative in multilateral institutions. Egypt and Ethiopia refused to sign on to a statement supporting Brazil, India, and South Africa for permanent seats on the UNSC during a meeting of BRICS foreign ministers in September due to fears that giving South Africa a highly sought-after UNSC seat would come at their expense.[20] Nigeria has also strongly lobbied to represent Africa on the UNSC if the continent receives a permanent seat.[21] South Africa supported India’s anti-expansionist position within BRICS due to concerns that countries like Nigeria and Morocco gaining full membership would dilute South Africa’s influence in the bloc.[22]

BRICS members and partner countries also disagree on the role of BRICS as an explicit anti-Western tool, rejecting Russia’s aims for the bloc and potentially creating future challenges to China’s vision. Brazil, India, and South Africa have tried to balance ties with the West and explicitly avoided making BRICS an anti-Western body.[23] All three members were partially against expansion due to fears that adding pro-Chinese or pro-Russian partners to the bloc would push the body toward a firmer anti-Western stance.[24] All three countries have remained largely neutral on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, refusing to support Ukraine while also avoiding openly supporting Russia to the extent China has.[25] The document adopted at the end of the 2024 summit, the Kazan Declaration, highlights this distance from Russia’s geopolitical aims. The declaration mentions Ukraine only once and encourages mediation and action in accordance with the UN Charter, falling far short of Russia’s line on the conflict.[26] The UAE joined India as the only “major defense partners” of the United States in October 2024 and emphasized that BRICS membership is part of the country’s economic focus and efforts to maintain balanced relations.[27]

Many African countries are aligned with the neutrality position and view BRICS membership as transactional and not inherently anti-Western. Egypt has historically balanced its partnerships with Russia and the West and remains reliant on billions of dollars of Western aid.[28] Ethiopia, a historically pro-Western country, has increased its ties to China and Russia over the last decade but remains heavily engaged with the West and reliant on Western-backed financial institutions.[29] New partner Algeria has long-standing ties with Russia but has sought to balance ties with Europe and has even more impetus to do so given growing tensions with Russia over Moscow’s destabilizing role in the Sahel.[30] President Ramaphosa specifically said that South Africa did not view “any particular country or bloc of countries as the enemy,” only friends, and that non-alignment with a diverse partnerships is better than and domination by any one country.[31] African leaders have repeatedly stated this desire to work with all willing partners and diversify cooperation without choosing sides in geopolitical rivalries.[32] Many leaders view an increasingly multipolar world and the competition it brings as beneficial by creating more choices, leading to better investment and offers for Africa.

Given its largely economic focus and its recent pattern of expansion, BRICS will likely prioritize increasing its engagement with countries that are suited to expand the group’s global economic leverage in certain comparative advantage sectors, which could help it pursue goals such as decreasing the influence of the US dollar. The original BRICS members already represented over 40 percent of the global population, and the inclusion of the new members and partner countries takes that total to over 50 percent.[33] The same is true for foreign exchange reserves.[34] The new BRICS+ members and partner countries control nearly the same amount of oil production as the original BRICS members.[35] BRICS members also account for a sizable minority of global GDP and goods exports. BRICS+ and partner countries represent fast-growing developing economies, with 17 of 20 countries surpassing the global annual GDP growth rate of 2.7 percent.[36]

Figure 1. BRICS+ and Partner Countries’ Comparative Advantages Following 2024 Kazan Summit

Source: Liam Karr.

The addition of new members and partner countries expands and increases BRICS’s influence in subregional economic communities and intragovernmental organizations across Africa, the Americas, and Asia. BRICS+ and partner countries now have ties to seven of the eight regional economic communities the African Union recognizes, whereas BRICS itself had had ties to only the Southern Africa Development Community. BRICS now has strong links to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations after adding Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam as partner countries. Bolivia’s inclusion as a partner country gives BRICS access to the Andean Community.

Figure 2. Regional Economic Communities and BRICS+ Engagement in Africa

Source: Liam Karr.

Leading countries such as China and Russia and new members like Iran want to channel this growing leverage toward de-dollarization. The dollar’s dominance as a reserve and trade currency gives the United States outsize influence over the global financial system that underpins its sanctions.[37] The United States and the West have used sanctions as a coercive foreign policy tool against China, Iran, Russia, and other countries. These countries and their partners—many of which are BRICS affiliates—want to dilute the power of the dollar to evade sanctions and reduce US influence in the global financial system.[38] Many smaller countries view de-dollarization as a tool to regain control over monetary and exchange rate policy and decrease foreign exchange risk.[39]

China, Iran, and Russia emphasized the importance of creating alternative payment systems to advance de-dollarization at the latest BRICS summit. Putin opened the summit by calling for an alternative payment system.[40] Russia planned to push for a new messaging system that would connect national commercial banks through the BRICS central banks, removing the need to exchange currencies through the US dollar and bypass the Swift system.[41] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said BRICS needs to create an alternative integrated trade system to mitigate sanctions and counter the US dollar during his speech to the summit.[42] The PRC Ambassador to Russia said in advance of the summit that “breakthroughs in domestic currency settlement and cross-border payment cooperation” was a primary focus area.[43] Xi specifically emphasized the need to reform the “international financial architecture” to guarantee financial security.[44] Some African leaders echoed these calls for alternative global financial mechanisms.[45]

Africa’s growing population and economies would help BRICS pursue its goals of encouraging more alternative payments in local currencies to decrease dependence on the dollar and increase the role of the “R5” currencies of the five founding BRICS members.[46] ING assessed that BRICS has the greatest chance to decrease reliance on the dollar in the sectors in which its members control the largest global shares, such as foreign exchange reserves and fuel trade.[47] BRICS adding new members and partner countries has already captured more of these markets. Further expansion with countries that have large and regionally integrated economies, especially in these key areas, would further this effort. At least 15 African countries not involved in BRICS as members or partners have expressed interest in joining the organization.

BRICS has discussed creating a common currency as a path to de-dollarization, but this option faces several challenges and is highly unlikely. ING reported that Putin has abandoned the idea and focused instead on decreasing dollar use in favor of BRICS currencies.[48] The PRC ambassador to Russia referred to the Chinese renminbi as a potential common BRICS currency instead of putting forth any plans for an alternative common currency when asked before the summit.[49]

De-dollarization faces several challenges and remains a low probability, long-term threat that is highly unlikely to manifest in the coming years. The Kazan Declaration was vague on initiatives to strengthen cross-border payments using local currencies and noted that participation in these frameworks would be “voluntary and non-binding.”[50] Many analysts also say BRICS lacks the ability to create an alternative system that functions as a parallel ecosystem that can make and receive payments with countries outside of BRICS.[51] BRICS faces more internal challenges to agreeing on key measures. One major challenge is that achieving a more united fiscal policy would involve members sacrificing some of their own fiscal sovereignty, which some pro-Western members view as unnecessary, as they are not harmed by the current system. Members disagree on what currencies should take the dollar’s place.[52] De-dollarization efforts have facilitated increasing intra-BRICS trade despite these broader challenges.[53] China and India have purchased Russian oil using local currencies despite Western sanctions, and Russian officials have said that almost all—95 percent—of Chinese-Russian trade uses yuan and rubles.[54]

Sudan

A ceasefire agreement in Sudan remains unlikely as the latest round of fighting in continues to worsen the humanitarian situation in the country in the near term. The paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have been fighting across Sudan since April 2023 to secure control over the state. Both groups jointly ruled Sudan in a delicate and informal power-sharing structure after helping overthrow both Sudan’s former dictator Omar al Bashir, in 2019, and the subsequent civilian-led transitional government, in 2022.[55]

The SAF launched offensives in Gezira, Khartoum, North Darfur, and Sennar states in late September and early October to relieve besieged troops and take back territory held by the RSF.[56] The SAF and RSF have contested control over Khartoum since the war began, in April 2023, and the SAF launched an offensive to retake areas in Khartoum from RSF control and relieve besieged SAF forces in multiple areas of the capital.[57] The SAF is also trying to break the RSF siege on SAF positions in al Fasher in western Sudan.[58] The RSF continues to hold the majority of Darfur, with SAF control limited to the North Darfur state capital, al Fasher.[59] The RSF has besieged al Fasher since April 2024.[60] The SAF recently launched a counteroffensive campaign in central Gezira and Sennar states in early October and has recaptured several areas in Gezira.[61] The RSF seized the Gezira and Sennar states in December 2023 and July 2024, respectively.[62]

Figure 3. The Situation in Sudan

Note: SPLM-N refers to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North, a pro-SAF rebel group. SLA refers to the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, a pro-SAF rebel group. SLA-TC stands for Sudan Liberation Army–Transitional Council, a neutral breakaway faction of the SLA. SSPDF refers to the South Sudan People’s Defense Forces.

Source: Thomas van Linge.

Figure 4. SAF Attempts to Relieve Besieged SAF forces in Khartoum and Eastern States

Panel A. SAF Seizes Bridges in a Surprise Attack

Panel B. SAF Captures Halfaya Bridge, Breaking Kadroo Siege

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

Figure 5. Sudan Army Advances in Eastern States

Source: Sudan War Monitor.

The RSF and SAF are unlikely to reach a ceasefire agreement to end the fighting in the short term. There are no public plans for future ceasefire talks. The United States and Saudi Arabia held talks in Geneva in August 2024, but the SAF did not attend the talks and there were no major breakthroughs for a broader cessation of hostilities.[63] The RSF and SAF also have opposing strategic objectives, with both sides repeatedly calling for each other’s dissolution and the appointment of their own governments.[64]

The RSF has carried out retaliatory, ethnically based violence in Gezira, which risks further high-level communal violence in Sudan. The RSF killed over 120 civilians in Gezira state, south of Khartoum, between October 20 and 25.[65] The UN condemned the attacks and said the level of violence is “staggering.”[66] The attacks follow the defection of the senior RSF commander in the al Gezira State, Abuagla Keikal, to the SAF on October 20.[67] Local sources reported that the RSF is targeting members of Keikal’s ethnic group and attacking villages and towns in Gezira seen as loyal to Keikal.[68]

The RSF could repeat the ethnically based violence that it has carried out in areas in Darfur since taking control of areas there in 2023.[69] The RSF grew out of the Janjaweed militias, which carried out a genocide against Darfur’s non-Arab population in the 2000s.[70] The UN said in May 2024 that the RSF has committed acts of genocide in Darfur, and the US special envoy for Sudan said in the same month that the RSF has carried out ethnic cleansing in Darfur.[71]A UN fact-finding mission called for an international peacekeeping force to protect civilians in Sudan in September but did not propose a specific approach to international intervention in the country and said its findings should “serve as a wake up call” on the need to protect Sudan’s civilians.[72]

The recent RSF attacks in Gezira state following the SAF offensive there will worsen the already poor humanitarian situation in Sudan. The attacks occurred in a key farming region as more than half of Sudan’s population faces acute food insecurity.[73] RSF fighters also reportedly looted markets and homes and set farms on fire.[74] The fighting displaced 46,000 civilians between October 20 and 27, who fled to neighboring states.[75] The SAF and RSF have targeted local aid volunteers across Sudan since the war began, in April 2023.[76] UN humanitarian agencies have reported significant logistic challenges to distributing aid due to the ongoing violence, suggesting there will be difficulties providing aid to civilians displaced from Gezira state.[77]

Figure 7. Sudan’s Civil War and Peace Process: 2023–24 Timeline

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

Foreign military support to the opposing sides has prolonged the war and hindered the progress of peace talks.[78] Iran, Russia, the UAE, and others are backing various sides in Sudan’s civil war to advance their own political and military interests in the region. The UN, United States, and other international observers have accused the UAE of funding and supplying the RSF with matériel via logistics nodes in neighboring countries.[79] The UAE recently began using Chinese drones similar to the US MQ-9 Reaper to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support based in Chad, according to a report from The New York Times in September 2024.[80] Iran restored diplomatic relations with the SAF in 2023 and began sending Mohajer-6 multi-role drones to the SAF beginning in late 2023, which have helped the SAF in battles around the capital.[81]

Russia provided weapons to the RSF in 2023 but has shifted support to the SAF since the death of Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August 2023.[82] The Russian deputy foreign minister and special representative for the Russian president in Africa and the Middle East met with the head of the SAF and other high-ranking officials in April 2024 and promised “unrestricted qualitative military aid” in exchange for the SAF implementing a 2017 naval port agreement.[83] The RSF shot down a cargo plane reportedly with a Russian crew carrying equipment and medicine to the SAF in Darfur, according to unspecified military sources.[84] Russian aircraft have reportedly made several stops in recent months to Port Sudan, a key trading hub where the SAF head is currently based, before continuing to Bamako, Mali. Russia has for years delivered weapons to the Malian junta.[85]

Figure 8. External Support in Sudan’s Civil War

Source: Liam Karr.

External military support for both sides has intensified and prolonged the civil war to the detriment of Sudanese civilians. Outside support for the factions in Sudan makes the conflict more deadly for civilians and soldiers by introducing higher-end weapon systems, such as drones.[86] The continued provision of matériel enables both sides to continue fighting and conducting human rights abuses without providing decisive advantage, complicating mediation efforts.[87] For example, Iranian drones have helped the SAF regain territory in the Sudanese capital while the SAF continues to suffer losses elsewhere, meaning the support is not decisive enough to win the SAF the war but enough to avoid a decisive defeat and continue fighting.[88]

Foreign actors involved in the Sudan war have denied participation and hindered the UN’s ability to pressure both sides to end the fighting. Russia abstained from a UNSC vote in June 2024 demanding an end to the RSF’s siege in al Fasher, North Darfur, and a cessation of hostilities.[89] The UAE and Iran denied allegations that they have provided weapons to the RSF and SAF despite UN calls for foreign actors to cease involvement in the war.[90]