Alawite Insurgents Seek to Use Sectarian Violence to Destabilize the Interim Government in Syria

Alawite insurgents are trying to foment sectarian conflict to undermine and destabilize the interim Syrian government. Sectarian violence and disinformation have intensified in Syria in recent weeks, jeopardizing the political transition from the Bashar al Assad regime. The insurgents have presented themselves as defenders of the Alawite community, as the interim government is predominantly Sunni and has done little to prevent Sunni violence against the Alawite minority. There is a growing risk that sectarian revanchists on both sides may trigger a broader conflict—similar to the way in which sectarian violence led to full-scale civil conflict in Iraq in 2005. The international community can mitigate this risk by pressuring the interim government and its military to become more representative and address the root causes of the sectarian violence and insurgency.

Sectarian violence has flared since early March, when Alawite insurgents and government forces clashed and committed sectarian murders. The insurgents conducted a coordinated assault across coastal Syria and killed Sunni civilians and government militiamen.[i] The predominantly Sunni government responded by massacring Alawites, exacerbating preexisting sectarian tensions in the area.[ii] One insurgent leader indicated that the coordinated attacks were meant to trigger sectarian reprisals from the government in order to damage Damascus’ international image.[iii] Insurgent activity has continued to spread throughout western Syria since this episode, highlighting the worsening problem that the government faces.

The government will struggle to address the underlying drivers of the insurgency because Sunni Islamists occupy key government and military posts at the expense of minorities. Some major Sunni pro-government militias have strong sectarian tendencies and have driven government abuses of the Alawites.[iv] The government cannot easily hold these militias accountable because they comprise a critical component of the government's support base. These challenges are exacerbated by the frustrations some Syrians feel toward the government due to its failures to hold many former Assad regime officials responsible for their past crimes.[v] This lack of justice in the political transition appears to have led some individuals and groups to conduct revenge killings of former Assad officials, a phenomenon that threatens to drive regime remnants to the insurgency and further worsen relations between the government and Alawites.[vi] Polling also shows distrust and concern in the Alawite community.[vii] The Alawite community, which has come to perceive threats that are both real and imagined, could see these revenge killings through a sectarian lens.[viii]

Sectarian tensions will likely continue to mount since the government cannot adequately protect civilians, and disinformation is exacerbating the crisis. Locals in western Syria have discovered executed victims in recent weeks, some of whom were Alawites who were murdered and, in some cases, tortured outside Sunni towns.[ix] These Alawites had been abducted from Alawite towns and taken to Sunni towns where their bodies were found, suggesting that they were murdered on a sectarian basis.[x] The torture and brutal style of executions indicate that these killings were sectarian rather than kidnappings for ransom. This violence will push more Alawites to the insurgency.

Anti-government actors are spreading sectarian narratives online that support insurgent objectives. Popular Alawite social media accounts, some of which post in English, have published sectarian content and both verified and unverified reports that seek to drive sectarian tension.[xi] These accounts are likely trying to delegitimize the interim government with foreign audiences and reinforce preexisting senses of disenfranchisement and fear among Syrian Alawites.

The Alawite insurgents have presented themselves as the protectors of their communities in light of this disinformation likely to cultivate further support among Alawites. The insurgents have demanded that the government “stop the massacres and violations,” echoing posts on anti-government Alawite Facebook pages.[xii] Some Alawites have refused to turn over local insurgents to the government, citing concerns about sectarian government militias in western Syria.[xiii] Insurgents will likely use Alawite support to build sanctuaries in easily defensible mountain towns.

These worsening sectarian tensions could very easily evolve into large-scale conflict that would threaten to destabilize Syria and its political transition. Insurgents could, for example, conduct an assassination campaign targeting government militia leaders and others. Such a campaign would in turn push government militias to conduct violent reprisals given their lack of discipline. The loyalty of militiamen to individual commanders—rather than to the Syrian state or army—is liable to trigger violent reprisals, as militiamen seek to avenge their commanders. The lack of strong junior leadership is likely to contribute to violence as well since effective junior leaders could prevent atrocities in such scenarios. Rising violence would force the government to commit more forces to western Syria at the expense of other priorities. Spiraling sectarian violence and insurgent activity would also undermine the non-sectarian image that the government has sought to cultivate with the West and other Syrian minorities and threaten the government's ability to secure funding from the West.

There are clear parallels between the situations in western Syria now and Baghdad in the mid-2000s, though the violence in Syria has yet to reach the level seen in Iraq at the height of communal strife. Insurgencies in both cases included former regime leaders who were sectarian revanchists and sought to upset a fragile transition.[xiv] The former Saddamist elements in Iraq provided a knowledge of governing, fighting, and organizing that most early-stage insurgencies lack. The former Assadists in the Alawite insurgency have shown that they have the same knowledge, given the coordination that they have demonstrated over hundreds of square kilometers, which indicates an operational-level proficiency that is rare among amateurs.[xv] Sectarian revanchists in both countries launched attacks that deliberately sought to trigger violent reprisals.[xvi] Syrian insurgents have not yet succeeded in driving the same level of violence seen in Iraq in the mid-2000s. The violence could expand rapidly, however, given the rampant sectarianism among both Alawite revanchists and newly empowered Sunni Islamists.  

The Alawite insurgents face significant disadvantages compared with Iraq's Sunnis, to be sure. Alawites can draw support from a small section of Syrian society, whereas the Iraqi insurgents had a larger base and external support. Hezbollah, though probably cooperating with the insurgents via smuggling, is unlikely to provide funding when it can scarcely support its own constituents after the October 7 War.[xvii] The Assad family, which has billions in remaining assets, could also support the insurgency.[xviii] Iran could also influence the insurgency in the future, probably by making contact via Hezbollah networks.[xix] The Alawite insurgents can offset the relatively low level of external support they can expect and the smaller size of the Alawite population by using western Syria’s mountainous terrain. This terrain is extremely advantageous for insurgents who can rapidly ambush road-bound counterinsurgents before disengaging. The forested valleys and hills may make rooting out and destroying insurgents extremely difficult, especially when many local Alawite villagers are unlikely to trust the predominantly Sunni security forces enough to provide them with information and support.

The sectarian violence has not yet devolved into a new civil war. An increase in sectarian violence will be very difficult for the government to reverse while fighting an insurgency, however. Western governments must be cautious as they evaluate emerging violence, though, because actors in Syria and in the region are attempting to support—intentionally or otherwise—insurgent narratives designed to undermine the interim government. The international community must put considerable pressure on Ahmed al Shara’s government to ensure that it is maximally representative and addresses sectarian narratives from the Sunni community—including those spread by imams in mosques, at least one of whom called for Sunnis to attack the Alawites.[xx] Such steps could help address some of the insurgency’s root causes. The way ahead in Syria remains fraught, however, with an increase in sectarian violence fueling a growing Alawite insurgency the most likely course of action in the coming months.