China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 10, 2023

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 8 at 5pm ET

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

1. The KMT has echoed PRC attacks on Lai Ching-te’s association with “Taiwan independence” in the lead up to his mid-August US transit. High-profile KMT parroting of PRC talking points indicates the success of PRC efforts to influence discourse in Taiwan and could advance its goal of broadening support for peaceful unification.
2. The Republic of China (ROC) arrested active-duty Republic of China Army (ROCA) personnel for allegedly passing on national security secrets to China. The pattern of ROC military personnel spying for China in conjunction with light espionage punishments indicates the ineffectiveness of current ROC laws in deterring potential spies.
3. Chinese Communist Party media published English-language reports about the recent party calls for the Chinese people to participate in counter-espionage work. This messaging comes as the CCP aims to increase foreign investment in China, which indicates that the CCP seeks to reassure foreign firms that they can safely engage in commercial activity in China.

Taiwan Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to Taiwan, including its upcoming January 13, 2024 presidential and legislative elections.

Elections

The Taiwanese (Republic of China) political spectrum is largely divided between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT). The DPP broadly favors Taiwanese autonomy, Taiwanese identity, and skepticism towards China. The KMT favors closer economic and cultural relations with China along with a broader alignment with a Chinese identity. The DPP under President Tsai Ing-wen has controlled the presidency and legislature (Legislative Yuan) since 2016. This presidential election cycle also includes the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) candidate Ko Wen-je who frames his movement as an amorphous alternative to the DPP and KMT. It is normal for Taiwanese presidential elections to have third party candidates, but none have ever won. The 2024 Taiwan presidential and legislative elections will be held on January 13, 2024 and the new president will take office in May 2024. Presidential candidates can win elections with a plurality of votes in Taiwan.

The KMT has echoed PRC attacks on Lai Ching-te’s association with “Taiwan independence” in the lead up to his mid-August US transit, indicating the KMT sees political gain in framing even Lai’s unexceptional actions as dangerous and provocative. ­­The DPP-leaning Liberty Times reported on August 1 that KMT Acting Representative in the United States Victor Chin spread rumors in US-Taiwan policy circles that Lai aimed to visit the Washington area during his upcoming transit.[1] The Biden administration has emphasized Lai will not visit Washington.[2] KMT Chairman Eric Chu later stated on August 4 that Lai has made foreign observers worried because of his Taiwan independence “DNA” and called Lai the “golden grandchild of Taiwan independence.”[3] Chu’s comments came in response to a reporter’s question about the PRC Taiwan Affairs Office’s (TAO) August 3 statement calling Lai a “troublemaker” after condemning his upcoming transit.[4] Chu did not mention the transit explicitly in his comments, but both Chin’s and Chu’s messaging aligns with the PRC narrative that Lai’s transit poses a threat to cross-strait stability.[5]

An unverified KMT English-language press release from August 4 stated that the party supports Lai’s transit, indicating it seeks to allay potential American concerns about its commitment to strong ties with the US.[6] The statement explained that the KMT “welcomes” Lai’s transit and “strongly favors” closer relations with the United States. It also rejected allegations that the KMT hopes to benefit from the perception that Lai’s transit is provocative or that the party was the source of rumors regarding a potential Lai visit to Washington. Brian Hioe, a Taiwanese journalist and former Sunflower Movement activist frequently critical of the KMT, posted the release on Twitter. The KMT did not post the release on its website, and ISW was unable to find the press release elsewhere online at the time of writing. [7] That the KMT did not publish the statement indicates the party sought to avoid drawing additional attention to the negative allegations the statement rebuts. The lack of a Chinese-language version or any similar statement to the Taiwanese press indicates the KMT did not intend to make support for US transits a focus of its domestic messaging.

The KMT’s messaging on Lai’s transit indicates the party does not prioritize addressing critiques that it is too pro-PRC in Taiwan.[8] The unreleased English-language press statement demonstrates sensitivity to such concerns in US policy circles, however.[9] Framing Lai as harmful to cross-strait stability is a major KMT talking point in its 2024 election campaign, and the TAO’s attacks on Lai reinforce this framing.[10] Failing to rebut PRC criticism of US transits blurs the distinction between mainstream objections to Lai’s record by DPP opponents and the PRC’s position of categorical opposition to high-level US­­-ROC officials interacting in any capacity, however. The KMT’s tendency to echo PRC positions for political gain complicates its efforts to reassure Washington about its commitment to Taiwan’s autonomy.

The KMT’s amplification of PRC criticism of Lai’s transit could aid the PRC’s efforts to reduce US transits and US-ROC contact more broadly. Turning US transits into an occasion for launching partisan attacks would impose political costs on Taiwanese leaders considering such trips. Chu’s criticism prompted Lai to defend himself in an August 7 interview during which he explained his prior comments on “Taiwan independence” and rejected the “golden grandson” label.[11]

High-profile KMT parroting of PRC talking points indicates the success of PRC efforts to influence discourse in Taiwan and could advance the PRC’s goal of broadening support for peaceful unification. The KMT and other DPP opponents have consistently cautioned against stances they view as provocative to the PRC, effectively allowing the PRC’s demands to acquire political weight in Taiwan.[12] Building cross-strait “trust” and “understanding” is a central element of the CCP’s stated cross-strait goals.[13] General Secretary Xi Jinping has directly linked the concept of cross-strait “mind-spirit alignment,”[14] which includes building cross-strait understanding, to increasing Taiwanese “identification with unification.”[15]

Other

The Republic of China (ROC) arrested active-duty Republic of China Army (ROCA) personnel for allegedly passing on national security secrets to China. Taiwan detained ROCA Lieutenant Colonel Hsieh and ROCA Major Ho on charges of spying for China.[16] Hsieh is also accused of developing a spy ring of past and present ROC military personnel for the PRC.[17] Seven unspecified collaborators, including active duty and retired military personnel as well as civilians, comprise the additional defendants.[18] Deputy Secretary-General to the Presidential Office Alex Huang called the incident "shameless" and called for more investigations.[19]

The arrests are part of a decade-long trend. Reuters reported that a least 21 serving or retired Taiwanese officers with a rank of captain or above have been convicted of spying for China during the last decade.[20] The Taipei District Prosecutors Office prosecuted retired ROC Air Force Major General Chien Yao-tung and retired ROCA Lieutenant Colonel Wei Hsien-yi in January 2023 for working with Chinese intelligence operative Xie Xizhang. Chien and Wei received fines and suspended prison sentences of less than two years.[21] Taiwanese Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Su Zi-yun previously stated in May that that the average sentence for Taiwanese espionage suspects is 18 months while espionage cases in the United States and Europe receive on average 19-year sentences.[22] The pattern of ROC military personnel spying for China in conjunction with light espionage punishments indicates the ineffectiveness of current ROC laws in deterring potential spies.

China Developments

This section covers relevant developments pertaining to China and the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

CCP media published English-language reports about the recent party calls for the Chinese people to participate in counter-espionage work. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) called for the normalization of mass participation in counter-espionage work on August 1 through its first publicly available WeChat message, which was in Chinese.[23] The MSS also unveiled an anonymous reporting system for users in Chinese and English, indicating that the party aims to coopt both PRC and foreign nationals in their new counter espionage drive.[24] US State Department Spokesman Matt Miller expressed concern on August 2 regarding the MSS’s counter espionage efforts encouraging citizens to spy on each other.[25] The CCP-controlled Global Times responded on August 3 by criticizing Miller and alleging the United States had double standards on surveillance security efforts.[26] The Global Times stated that the counter espionage law helps prevent China becoming “a haven for Western spies.”[27] The Global Times also stated the law does not “target the activities of foreign organizations in China” in response to a Bloomberg article reporting the cancellation of a TEDx event in Guangzhou sparked by the counter-espionage law.[28]

This English-language messaging comes as the CCP aims to increase foreign investment in China that has reached a 25-year low while the country also experiences economic deflation and falling exports.[29] The Global Times articles fit into this context and indicate that the CCP seeks to reassure foreign firms that they can safely engage in commercial activity in China.