China-Taiwan Weekly Update, August 23, 2024

Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute

Data Cutoff: August 21, 2024

The China–Taiwan Weekly Update is a joint product from the Institute for the Study of War and the American Enterprise Institute. The update supports the ISW–AEI Coalition Defense of Taiwan project, which assesses Chinese campaigns against Taiwan, examines alternative strategies for the United States and its allies to deter the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) aggression, and—if necessary—defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and cross–Taiwan Strait developments.

Key Takeaways

• The PRC carried out a 30-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait after its summer fishing moratorium ended. The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels, which the PRC may use as a pretext to expand the scope of its law enforcement activities against Taiwan.
• CCG ships intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen twice on August 16, the day the PRC’s fishing moratorium ended, and twice on August 21.
• The PRC announced that it will implement export controls for antimony on September 15. The US Department of Interior designated antimony as a critical mineral in 2018.
• The PRC is taking steps to secure its supply of critical minerals as it closes off access to other countries.
• A Chinese Coast Guard ship rammed a Philippine Coast Guard ship twice near Sabina Shoal on August 19.

Cross-Strait Relations

Taiwan

The PRC carried out a 30-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait after its summer fishing moratorium ended. The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels, which the PRC may use as a pretext to expand the scope of its law enforcement activities against Taiwan. The PRC annually bans fishing along its coastlines and in the South China Sea from early May to mid-August. Its 2024 fishing moratorium ended on August 16. 55,000 PRC fishing vessels entered the East and South China Sea at the start of the fishing season. The PRC Ministry of Transport (MOT) organized a 30.5-hour patrol of the Taiwan Strait on August 17 and 18 “to enhance maritime traffic control and emergency rescue capabilities in the Taiwan Strait, and effectively protect the safety of life and property of ships, facilities and personnel sailing and operating in the Taiwan Strait.” Two boats from the Fujian Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) and one from the East China Sea Rescue Bureau jointly carried out the patrol. One of the MSA ships was the Haixun 06, the largest PRC patrol vessel deployed to the Taiwan Strait. The patrol covered 413 nautical miles (475 miles). The MOT noted that the large number of vessels in the Taiwan Strait increased the risk of collision between fishing and commercial vessels. It listed a wide range of maritime law enforcement activities as the “main tasks” of the patrol, including “patrolling waterways in the central waters of the Taiwan Strait,” inspecting high-risk waterways, implementing traffic control, and checking passing ships.[i] Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported that the three PRC vessels briefly crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait and then sailed back toward the PRC without entering Taiwan-controlled waters.[ii] A portion of the PRC’s contiguous zone crosses over the median line. The PRC claims Taiwan and the entire Taiwan Strait as its territory and denies that any “median line” boundary exists.

The PRC patrol may expand the PRC’s claimed legal jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait to incorporate international waters near Taiwan’s Penghu Islands. The PRC state social media account Yuyuan Tantian reported in a post titled “The ability to control the Taiwan Strait is changing” that the patrol covered a wider area than in previous years, reaching two nautical miles east of the median line in the Taiwan Strait and as far south as Taiwan Shoal. Taiwan Shoal is an undersea feature southwest of Taiwan’s Penghu islands.[iii] Director of the Division of Defense Strategy and Resources at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research Su Tzu-yun said that this is the first time the PRC’s patrol route has included Taiwan Shoal. He commented that this indicates the PRC intends to expand its control to the median line and turn the Taiwan Strait into a “quasi-inland sea.”[iv]

The increase in maritime traffic in the Taiwan Strait risks a greater number of accidents and other incidents involving PRC and ROC vessels. The PRC may use such incidents as a further excuse to intensify its “law enforcement” operations against Taiwanese nationals or extend the geographic scope of such operations. Taiwanese fishermen and law enforcement authorities have reported occasional CCG operations in waters east of the median line, including attempts to expel Taiwanese fishermen from international waters near Penghu that are within Taiwan’s claimed Exclusive Economic Zone.[v]

CCG ships intruded into Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen twice on August 16, the day the PRC’s fishing moratorium ended, and twice on August 21. Taiwan’s CGA reported that four CCG ships entered Taiwan’s restricted waters around Kinmen at 9:00 am and again at 3:00 pm on August 16, three hours before and after the PRC fishing moratorium ended at noon, respectively. The ships stayed in Kinmen’s restricted waters for two hours each time. The CCG did not announce the incursions.[vi] The CCG conducted a very similar pair of incursions on August 21. Four ships simultaneously entered Kinmen’s southern restricted waters at four separate points at 8:50 am and left at 11:00 am. They entered again at 2:50 pm and left at 5:00 pm. The incursions were ten minutes longer on August 21 than on August 16 but were otherwise nearly identical.[vii] The Fujian CCG announced the August 21 patrols. It said that it had organized a fleet to “continuously strengthen law enforcement patrols in the waters near Kinmen” in August, especially after the fishing season started. The CCG said that it will further strengthen the control of the waters, “safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese fishermen, including those in Taiwan,” and “effectively ensure the normal navigation and operation order in the Xiamen-Kinmen waters.”[viii]

The PRC normalized Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) patrols around Kinmen in response to the deaths of two PRC fishermen whose boat capsized while fleeing a CGA pursuit in Kinmen’s prohibited waters on February 14. The CCG carried out incursions into Kinmen’s restricted and prohibited waters an average of five times per month between February and July. The CCG has continued its incursions into Kinmen’s waters despite the PRC and ROC recently resolving some disputes related to the February 14 capsizing incident. This indicates that the PRC remains committed to its long-term campaign of using law enforcement to establish the PRC’s legal jurisdiction around Taiwan’s outlying islands.

The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) rejected and condemned the findings of a Taiwanese investigation that exonerated Taiwan’s Coast Guard in the February 14 capsizing incident. Two PRC fishermen died on February 14 while fleeing a Taiwanese CGA pursuit in prohibited waters around Kinmen, a Taiwanese island group two miles from the PRC. The CGA boat and PRC fishing boat collided during the chase, after which the fishing boat sank. The Kinmen Prosecutor’s Office released the results of an investigation into the incident on August 16 and announced it would not prosecute the CGA personnel. It determined that the CGA personnel were not at fault in the collision and acted legally during the pursuit.[ix] TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian rejected the investigation’s findings, claiming they “disregard facts and deliberately shirk responsibilities.” She called on Taiwan to disclose the truth about the incident, “severely punish” those responsible, and prevent similar incidents in the future.[x]

The Taiwanese prosecutors released their findings weeks after PRC and ROC authorities concluded negotiations on June 30 over the capsizing incident. The ROC released the bodies of the deceased fishermen and their boat to the PRC and apologized for not recording the incident. The details of the agreement are not public. The PRC subsequently released two of the three Taiwanese fishermen it had detained, including a former soldier it had held since March.[xi]

The TAO’s reaction to the investigation’s findings is consistent with PRC demands during earlier rounds of negotiations in March, in which the PRC demanded that Taiwan reveal the truth and apologize for the incident, in addition to returning the boat and bodies. The PRC may seize on Taiwan’s decision not to prosecute anyone for the incident as an outstanding grievance that demands retribution, such as further “law enforcement” actions against Taiwan around Kinmen’s waters.

PRC researchers at Xiamen University released and quickly deleted a report advocating for the establishment of a “shadow government” that would be prepared to take control of Taiwan after “reunification.” Xiamen University’s Cross Strait Urban Planning Institute posted the short article on August 5 on the PRC social media platform WeChat. The article called for the immediate establishment of a Central Taiwan Work Committee that would be primed to enter Taiwan as a “shadow government” as soon as the PRC “reunifies” Taiwan. The committee would deeply study Taiwan’s existing system to figure out a way to “digest” the system, determine which institutions to preserve and which to change, and incorporate Taiwanese elites into the design of the new government to smooth the regime change process. The committee would also unite “anti-independence” forces in Taiwan. The post argued that the Kuomintang (KMT), the relatively PRC-friendly political party in Taiwan, is softening its “anti-independence” stance and moving toward “implicit Taiwan independence,” while “pro-unification” forces are generally disorganized and vilified in Taiwanese society. It said the establishment of the Central Taiwan Work Committee could systematize and institutionalize forces against Taiwan's independence, support them as the Communist International supported the Chinese Communist Party in its early days, and make Taiwanese people feel a greater sense of urgency with regard to unification.

The post also advocated for the establishment of a “Taiwan governance pilot zone” to conduct policy experiments, train cadres, and demonstrate what post-unification governance might look like. It proposed to situate the pilot zone in the districts of the cities of Xiamen and Quanzhou nearest to Taiwan’s Kinmen islands and to incorporate retired Taiwanese military, government, and education personnel as consultants for the pilot zone. Xiamen and Quanzhou are in Fujian Province, which is already the center of many cross-strait integration initiatives due to its location directly across the Taiwan Strait from Taiwan. The paper argued that the One Country, Two Systems model of governance that the PRC applied to Hong Kong may not be suitable for Taiwan and that the PRC should aim to fully integrate Taiwan right away.[xii]

It is unclear the extent to which the post reflects the views of CCP officials. The names of the authors were not listed on the article and the post was deleted soon after posting without explanation. Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported that the Xiamen research institute said it would republish the article later. The research institute has not done so as of August 21.[xiii] Mainland PRC media did not report on the article. Xiamen University is one of at least 75 public universities subordinate to the PRC Ministry of Education.[xiv] The Cross-Strait Urban Planning Institute is part of its architecture and civil engineering school.

China

The PRC announced that it will implement export controls for antimony on September 15.[xv] The US Department of Interior designated antimony as a critical mineral to the economy and national security in 2018.[xvi] Antimony has a variety of military applications, including night vision goggles, strengthening shielding materials, explosives, flares, nuclear weapons, and infrared sensors.[xvii] The export controls on antimony follow a pattern of the PRC’s increasing securitization of critical minerals. The PRC implemented export restrictions on gallium and germanium in August 2023 and high-grade graphite in December 2023.[xviii] All three minerals are US-designated critical minerals. Gallium and germanium have applications in aerospace, military, and telecommunications due to their use in the manufacture of optoelectronic devices and fundamental inputs such as integrated circuits, semiconductors, and transistors.[xix] Graphite has extensive industrial and military applications, including the manufacture of missile guidance systems, artillery components, firearms, and military aircraft.[xx]

The PRC’s export controls will complicate the United States’ access to antimony. The PRC is the world’s leading producer of antimony, accounting for 48% of global production in 2023. The PRC accounted for 63% of US antimony imports from 2019–2022.[xxi] The United States has not mined its antimony since 2001.[xxii] The United States’ annual demand for antimony is greater than any other single country’s mine production.[xxiii]

The PRC is also taking steps to secure its supply of critical minerals as it closes off access to other countries. PRC Minister of Natural Resources Wang Guanghua publicly urged the PRC to increase production of strategic minerals to guard against “unexpected domestic or external emergencies that could bring negative impacts.”[xxiv] Improving access to strategic minerals for national security purposes was among the policy measures that the PRC outlined in a resolution following the Third Plenum in July.[xxv] PRC Premier Li Qiang toured Australian lithium processing plants on June 17, following an agreement to repair ties after several years of trade tensions.[xxvi] The PRC Ministry of Natural Resources designated lithium as a strategic mineral in 2016.[xxvii]

The PRC encountered a recent setback regarding its access to rare earth minerals in Australia, however. Australian Treasurer Jim Chalmers ordered the PRC national-owned Yuxiao Fund from an Australian rare earth mining company on June 3 after using apparent proxy companies to increase its stake, despite denial by the government’s Foreign Investment Review Board.[xxviii] A corporate filing from 2023 reveals the head of the Yuxiao Fund, Wu Tao, as a mining magnate with connections to the PRC government.[xxix]

Southeast Asia

Philippines

A Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) ship rammed a Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship twice near Sabina Shoal on August 19. The collisions caused significant damage to the hull of the PCG ship. The PCG ship continued its mission to supply personnel at other Philippine-occupied islands in the South China Sea, however.[xxx] The Sabina Shoal is 75 nautical miles from the Philippine island of Palawan and is within the Philippines’ United Nations-recognized Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Sabina Shoal belongs to the Spratly Islands, which is a semi-submerged archipelago that the PRC and Philippines both claim in its entirety. CCG and Chinese Maritime Militia (CMM) boats frequently resort to ramming against rival claimants in the South China Sea to deter their presence in PRC-claimed waters without escalating to outright violence.[xxxi]

The CCG and PRC MFA stated that the Philippines was responsible for the incident and that the PCG ship deliberately caused the collision.[xxxii] PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela denied the PRC’s version of events and blamed the CCG for the collision.[xxxiii] The US Department of State issued a press statement that condemned the PRC for deliberately colliding with the PCG ship and reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to defending the Philippines in the South China Sea under the two countries’ mutual defense treaty.[xxxiv]

The PRC and the Philippines both accuse each other of attempting to establish footing at Sabina Shoal to assert control over the feature. PCG spokesperson Jay Tarriela stated on May 11 that the PCG was committed to maintaining a presence at Sabina Shoal to monitor PRC attempts at land reclamation, which he claimed aimed to build an artificial island on the shoal.[xxxv] The PRC MFA stated that the accusation was an attempt to mislead the international community.[xxxvi] The CCG anchored its largest ship near Sabina Shoal on July 3 and remained there for 38 days.[xxxvii] The PRC communicated its intent to stop the Philippines from adding to its presence there days before the incident. State-owned tabloid Global Times reported on August 14 that the PRC would not allow the Philippines to “expand its occupation” of the shoal.[xxxviii]

PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson stated on August 16 and 19 that the Philippines’ presence at Sabina Shoal violates the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC).[xxxix] The DOC is a non-binding document between ASEAN countries and the PRC that affirms the signatories’ commitment not to act in an escalatory manner or resort to violence in territorial disputes.[xl] The PRC’s accusation possibly refers to a provision of the DOC that states that members will refrain from inhabiting previously uninhabited features in the South China Sea. The PRC’s ramming of the PCG ship represents its own violation of the DOC’s provision not to use violence in territorial disputes. The parties have failed to solidify a binding code during the last two decades amid the PRC’s aggressive militarization of the South China Sea. The PRC denied the validity of alternative regional security frameworks in response to the Philippines’ calls in November to establish an ASEAN-led South China Sea code of conduct.[xli]

A PRC-controlled Sabina Shoal would improve the PRC’s ability to assert its claim over the Second Thomas Shoal and other nearby features in the South China Sea. The PRC has built military infrastructure on the features of the Spratly Islands that it occupies to counter the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. For example, the PRC’s two most militarized features in the Spratly Islands are Subi Reef and Mischief Reef, both of which are directly adjacent to the two most militarized Philippine-controlled features, Thitu Island and Second Thomas Shoal, respectively. The infrastructure on both of the PRC-controlled features enables the PRC to sustain deployments of naval ships and aircraft in the South China Sea.[xlii]

Controlling the shoal, which is near the Philippines as one of the easternmost features in the Spratly Islands, likely would enable the PRC to more easily intercept Philippine vessels sailing from Palawan to prevent them from accessing or establishing a presence around other disputed features. PRC infrastructure on the shoal, especially facilities that accommodate CCG or naval vessels, would better position CCG ships to frustrate Philippine resupply missions to the Sierra Madre military outpost on Second Thomas Shoal, which is 35 nautical miles to the west.

Vietnam

The PRC and Vietnam signed fourteen economic deals and pledged to increase diplomatic efforts pertaining to the South China Sea. These agreements reflect Vietnam’s desire to avoid picking sides in South China Sea disputes. Vietnamese President To Lam met with Xi Jinping on August 14, during which they signed fourteen bilateral agreements, mostly focusing on infrastructure and trade regulations. The PRC and Vietnam also issued a joint declaration on August 20 that reiterated their desire to diplomatically resolve issues in the South China Sea and cooperate to build a “China-Vietnam community of shared destiny with strategic significance.”[xliii] The two countries agreed that they would implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and push for the negotiation of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC). The COC is an agreement between the PRC and ASEAN member states that has been under negotiation for over a decade. The COC will provide guidelines for state behavior in disputed waters to reduce maritime tensions in the region.[xliv] The PRC and ASEAN have had difficulty completing negotiations due to disagreements on the proposed geographic scope of the COC and the binding nature of such an agreement.[xlv] This led to the completion of the non-binding DOC in 2002, with sporadic negotiation attempts taking place up to the present day.[xlvi] Defense ministers and public security officials from the PRC and Vietnam also met and promised to continue bilateral engagement on security issues.[xlvii]

These high-level meetings occurred only a few weeks after the announcement of joint coast guard exercises between Vietnam and the Philippines and the corresponding agreement to expand coast guard cooperation between the two countries. Both the Philippines and Vietnam have experienced PRC incursions into their territorial waters, but the two countries have pursued very different courses of action regarding the PRC. Vietnam’s engagement with CCP leadership indicates that they see positive relations with the PRC as a key component of their national security and economic development.

Myanmar

The PRC promised to support the Myanmar junta’s upcoming elections and plans for government transition. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar from August 14–15.[xlviii] Wang met with top leaders from Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC), who took control of the country in a military coup in 2021. During this meeting, Wang reiterated the PRC’s support for the SAC and expressed his desire for the SAC to bring about an end to the conflict. The PRC has supported the SAC since the coup occurred, and the two governments have been working together on a number of cooperative efforts including building the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, maintaining existing oil and gas pipelines, and reducing transnational crime.[xlix] The PRC brokered a short-lived ceasefire between the SAC and a group of militias known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance after the militias conducted the massive Operation 1027 joint offensive along the PRC border last October.[l] Since the resumption of fighting this June, resistance forces have taken even more territory within the border areas.[li]

The PRC has promised additional support for the SAC’s upcoming census and elections. Wang Yi reiterated the PRC’s support for democratic transition in Myanmar during an August 16 meeting with leaders from Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia.[lii] During this meeting Wang also stated the PRC’s support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ “Five-Point Consensus,” the organization’s peace plan for Myanmar. Pro-democracy forces in Myanmar widely criticized the Five Point Consensus and claimed that it was a way to legitimize the junta’s control. The junta’s proposed elections have been widely criticized, as the junta has forcibly dissolved almost 40 political parties in Myanmar and banned several others from participating in the upcoming election.[liii] The dissolved parties include the National League for Democracy (NLD), whose overwhelming electoral victory in 2021 sparked the military coup.

The United States met with representatives from Myanmar’s opposition movement after Wang’s statements. US State Department Counselor Tom Sullivan and USAID Assistant Administrator Michael Schiffer met with leading members of Myanmar’s shadow National Unity Government (NUG), the National Unity Consultative Council, and representatives for key Ethnic Resistance Organizations.[liv] During this meeting, the US representatives voiced their support for the opposition and stated that they would continue to expand direct support to pro-democracy actors and improve their ability to provide humanitarian aid and public services to those in need. While the US representatives also called for an end to the crisis, analysts believe that recent rebel victories will embolden opposition groups to move towards areas in central Myanmar.[lv]

Indonesia

Indonesia and the PRC agreed to organize joint military training as part of their first “2+2” diplomatic and military dialogue. Indonesia will host a US-led regional military exercise next week. Senior PRC and Indonesian foreign ministry and defense officials met in the two countries’ first “2+2” dialogue in Jakarta on August 12 to discuss strengthening diplomatic and defense ties. A statement that the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs released on August 13 announced cooperation on various issues including joint military training.[lvi] It did not provide any details on the arrangement. Indonesia will host the US-led Super Garuda Shield exercises from August 26 to September 5. The exercises will include dozens of other countries including Japan, Australia, South Korea, Germany, Singapore, and Malaysia.[lvii]

Indonesia has participated in separate joint military exercises with the PRC and the United States as part of a policy of engaging with both major powers to avoid being drawn into one side of the geopolitical rivalry.[lviii] Indonesia’s push for military modernization, spearheaded by Defense Minister and incoming president Prabowo Subianto, may lead to closer defense cooperation and new arms deals with other countries including the PRC. The South China Morning Post cited analysts who said Indonesia has been “lukewarm” about developing a defense partnership with the PRC, however. Indonesia procures most of its military equipment from European and other Western-aligned countries.[lix]

Europe

Germany

The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) criticized the scheduled transit of two German warships through the Taiwan Strait in September. The German frigate Baden-Wuerttemberg and replenishment ship Frankfurt am Main are visiting ports in East Asia and awaiting orders to transit the Taiwan Strait in September. The United States and other nations have sent warships through the Taiwan Strait several times in 2024, including a Canadian transit on July 31. The upcoming German transit will be Germany’s first since 2002, however.[lx] MFA spokesperson Mao Ning responded to the news and said that “China has always opposed undermining China's territorial sovereignty and security under the guise of ‘freedom of navigation.’”[lxi] The PRC perceives itself as surrounded by a coalition of US-aligned nations that seek to contain it. It has repeatedly criticized “external interference” in the region and especially in the “Taiwan question,” which it considers to be its internal affair.

Russia

PRC Premier Li Qiang traveled to Russia to meet with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin for the 29th meeting between PRC and Russian prime ministers on August 21. The PRC readout called for the PRC and Russia to strengthen coordination in international affairs, better safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of Russia and China, and promote the continuous development of the comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries in the new era.[lxii] The two prime ministers signed an updated version of the PRC-Russia investment cooperation planning outline as well as cooperation agreements spanning education, science and technology, chemicals, green construction, maritime search and rescue, cross-border cargo transportation, and facilitation of citizen exchanges.

Mishustin stated that the two countries should jointly defend their interests and the principles of the multipolar world order in the face of pressure from Western sanctions. Mishustin claimed that Western countries wanted to contain the PRC and Russia’s economic and technological potential to maintain their global dominance.[lxiii]

Li met with Russian President Vladimir Putin after meeting with Mishustin. Li expressed the PRC’s interest in expanding cooperation with Russia outside of traditional areas to include scientific and technological innovation in emerging sectors.[lxiv] Li signaled the PRC’s willingness to strengthen multilateral coordination with Russia and promote multi-polarization.

Iran

Iran is seeking security partnerships with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in low-cost satellites capable of capturing high-resolution imagery.[lxv] This capability could enable Iran to enhance its intelligence-gathering capabilities to improve the effectiveness of its strikes. The Washington Post, citing unspecified Western security officials, reported on August 16 that Iran is seeking a partnership with two Chinese satellite companies specializing in manufacturing and operating small, low-cost satellites with optical equipment capable of producing high-resolution images. The Washington Post reported that the optical equipment of the Chinese satellites is “at least twice as sensitive” as the most advanced satellites currently operated by Iran. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Chinese companies have exchanged multiple delegations over the past few months in an attempt to secure these partnerships.

Higher resolution satellite imagery could allow Iranian military services to improve their targeting practices for future operations targeting US, Israeli, and Arab military bases. Iran would also almost certainly share this targeting information with its proxies and partners to enable their attacks. Iranian state media previously reported in July 2020 that the IRGC used its satellites to collect intelligence on US military positions in the region.[lxvi] The United States previously sanctioned one of the companies Iran is pursuing a partnership with, Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., due to its support for Russia’s Wagner Group.[lxvii]