Congo War Security Review Special Edition: Slow and Steady—What to Make of DRC-M23 Peace Talks

Data Cutoff: April 25, 2025, at 15:00 EST

The Congo War Security Review is a daily review of activity related to the war in the eastern DRC between M23 and its Rwandan backers and pro-Congolese government forces, published every Monday through Friday. 

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Key Takeaway: A détente between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda will likely limit the scale of violence in the eastern DRC, but proxy fighting between the various pro-Congolese militia groups and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels will almost certainly continue in the absence of a broader agreement with M23. Qatar and the United States have successfully advanced peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda over the conflict in the eastern DRC. Separate negotiations between the DRC and Rwandan-backed M23 rebels have made much slower progress, however. Pro-government Wazalendo fighters and other anti-Tutsi militias are a significant obstacle to peace- and trust-building efforts—regardless of DRC-M23-Rwanda negotiations—because the militias are not involved in these talks and the DRC is likely unable to control the militias.

Assessment:

Qatar and the United States have advanced peace talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda over the conflict in the eastern DRC since March. Qatar mediated a ceasefire between the DRC and Rwanda on March 18.[1] Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe said that Qatari-mediated peace talks between the DRC and Rwanda resulted in “significant progress toward peace” on April 15.^[2] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, DRC Foreign Minister Thérèse Wagner, and Nduhungirehe signed a declaration of principles agreement on April 25, which “outlines a pathway to peace, stability, and integrated economic development” in the eastern DRC.[3] US President Donald Trump’s senior adviser for African affairs, Massad Boulos, had met with several heads of state in the Great Lakes region and the Qatari foreign minister in April to lay the groundwork for the agreement.[4]

These efforts have led to a decrease in fighting between the Congolese army (FARDC) and the thousands of Rwandan forces in the DRC and FARDC and Rwanda-backed M23 rebels since early April.  Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) reported in early April that Rwandan forces had ceased direct operations after the ceasefire and that FARDC’s involvement in engagements in North and South Kivu provinces declined to 20 percent of all clashes.^[5]

Separate negotiations between the DRC and M23 have made much slower progress. The DRC and M23 released a joint statement on April 23 after several weeks of negotiations.[6] The two parties jointly committed to “an immediate cessation of hostilities” for the first time publicly and a “categorical rejection of any hate speech.”[7] The joint statement added that the DRC and M23 “agreed to work toward a truce that would facilitate a broader ceasefire.”[8]

The joint statement represents a minor DRC concession. The DRC had previously rejected M23’s demands for direct negotiations and labeled the group as “terrorists” before the Qatar-mediated talks.[9] The Congolese magazine Eco News interpreted the joint statement as the DRC “abandoning the label ‘terrorists’ [and] now recognizing the M23 as a ‘peace partner.’”^[10] The joint statement mirrored some talking points often repeated by M23, including “addressing the root causes” of the conflict and refraining from targeted hate speech against ethnic communities.[11]

The DRC-M23 joint statement indicates that the two sides have not yet reached a stable ceasefire or made significant steps toward a long-term peace agreement. The joint statement is vague, unclear, and lacks tangible details. The joint statement committed both parties to continue to observe the informal pause in fighting, which has not actually stopped fighting in the eastern DRC, as they continue negotiations toward a “truce” that will support the broader ceasefire.[12] The statement did not go beyond previous African-led peace initiatives’ readouts, which have failed to produce a stable peace deal. French media characterized the joint statement as a fragile “statement of intent” rather than a binding ceasefire agreement.[13] CTP continues to assess that both sides will remain open to short-term and nonbinding ceasefires as they seek to manage international pressure and set military conditions for future offensives.[14]

The DRC and M23 likely disagree on several preconditions for more substantive discussions. Initial talks in late March failed to produce “concrete results,” and the latest talks were briefly postponed in early April.^[15] Multiple Congolese and French media sources reported that several “deep disagreements” impeded negotiations as early as April 13.[16] M23 rejected the DRC's demand that M23 demobilize and disarm before further discussions.^[17] M23 additionally claimed that the DRC had not met its preconditions to grant amnesty to a specific list of individuals and had instead released detainees who were not on the list.^[18] The DRC rejected M23’s demand that the Congolese army (FARDC) and pro-Congolese government militia fighters demilitarize Walikale town—a district capital from which M23 withdrew in early April as talks began in a gesture of “goodwill.”^[19]

These disputes have significantly impeded progress toward a ceasefire or a broader peace deal, nearly derailed the joint statement, and are an obstacle to future talks. Reuters reported on April 23 that the DRC and M23 delegations were frustrated with the pace of negotiations.”[20] The French magazine Jeune Afrique on April 24 cited a “source close to the Qatari mediation” team who said that M23 officials used the reports that talks were moving slowly to pressure the DRC delegation.[21] Continued negotiations and plans to release the joint statement were reportedly in jeopardy for nearly a week, and M23 had even left Qatar due to the disagreements before either side had signed the document^.[22] The DRC government spokesperson, Patrick Muyaya, said during a press conference to discuss the joint statement on April 24 that “some points remain to be resolved to allow for significant progress” in DRC-M23 negotiations.^[23] The Congolese media outlet Radio Okapi reported April 23 that M23 conditioned another round of talks on the DRC replacing its negotiating team.[24] It remains unclear when the next round of negotiations will occur.

The Congolese government is likely unable and unwilling to agree to M23’s maximalist demands, which makes a long-term peace agreement far off. M23 aims to legitimize control over the areas that it has captured in North and South Kivu, including in two provincial capitals—Goma and Bukavu—and possibly expand its influence in the DRC as a legitimate political party.[25] M23 has demanded that the DRC implement the 2013 Nairobi peace deal, which stipulated that M23 would demilitarize and become a political party and that the DRC would facilitate the return of refugees, among other provisions.[26] DRC President Félix Tshisekedi is unlikely to support a deal that legitimizes M23 control of eastern DRC because such a deal would severely undermine his legitimacy and power base in Kinshasa.[27] M23 also does not pose an existential threat directly, as it would have to travel roughly 500 miles to reach the DRC’s economic engine in the mineral-rich Katanga region and nearly 1,000 miles to Kinshasa across poor roads. Reuters quoted a “Congolese government source” on April 23 who said that the Qatari-mediated talks had faced obstacles because M23 “asked for too much” and the DRC “could not give in to every whim.”[28]

The DRC has pushed nonstarter conditions for M23 despite M23 holding significant leverage in the eastern DRC. The DRC demanded that M23 and “other armed groups” in its alliance disarm without reintegration into the FARDC.^[29] This stance is a demand for M23 to capitulate with none of the economic, security, or political benefits that reintegration would bring and is at odds with M23’s advantageous position in the eastern DRC. The group currently controls Goma and Bukavu, plus half of the district capitals across the two provinces. Pro-Congolese government militias have pressured M23-controlled areas in recent weeks, but these militias and FARDC have not shown that they can recapture key M23-held population centers.^[30]

The underlying disagreements between the DRC and M23 parallel previous collapses in negotiations where the DRC refused to accede to M23’s demands. Former Congolese President Joseph Kabila initially agreed to the 2013 Nairobi peace deal but never implemented it. Negotiations stalled in November 2021 after the DRC refused to implement the 2013 Nairobi peace agreement.^[31] The core elements of the DRC’s and M23’s current demands include aspects of the 2013 deal, including  M23 amnesty and demobilization without integration.^[32] This saga shows that Congolese politicians will negotiate with M23 and even agree in principle to power-sharing settlements but are ultimately unwilling to accede to M23’s demands and commit to lasting solutions to the conflict due to domestic political constraints and the group’s distance from more politically sensitive areas of the DRC.

Qatar and the United States have helped drive the little progress that DRC-M23 talks have made. Reuters reported on April 9 that the United States “directly” pressured M23 to withdraw from Walikale town and FARDC to not attack as M23 retreated.^[33] Boulos met separately with Tshisekedi and Rwandan President Paul Kagame in early April and said on April 17 that US pressure on Rwanda and M23 halted M23’s offensive toward Kisangani—the DRC’s fourth largest city and 265 miles west of its furthest advance—and led it to withdraw from Walikale town.^[34]

Qatari mediation efforts have also contributed to progress in the negotiations. Qatar contributed to M23’s withdrawal from Walikale town.^[35] M23 spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka claimed on April 3 that M23 withdrew from Walikale town to foster goodwill for the planned talks on April 9.^[36] Jeune Afrique reported in late March that Qatar had “opened a channel of communication” with M23 and “sent discreet messages to slow down their advance [in the eastern DRC]” and see M23 “show good faith.”^[37] Reuters cited diplomatic sources on April 23 who said that Qatar pressured the two sides to release the joint statement and commit to working toward a truce.[38]

The détente between the DRC and Rwanda will likely limit the scale of violence in the eastern DRC, but proxy fighting between the various pro-Congolese militia groups and M23 will almost certainly continue in the absence of a broader agreement with M23. Pro-Congolese government militia groups—known as Wazalendo—have attacked M23 positions across the eastern DRC in April despite the DRC-Rwanda ceasefire. ACLED recorded a significant increase in Wazalendo involvement in fighting since late March, and Wazalendo groups launched offensives on M23 positions near Goma and Bukavu in mid-April.^[39]

Figure 1. M23 Advances in Eastern DRC

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

M23 has launched counterattacks against pro-Congolese government militias and could launch broader offensives against these groups in the coming weeks and months. M23 has already conducted clearing operations north of Goma and around Bukavu in March and April in response to the militia attacks.[40] Congolese media reported on April 23 that M23 had massed forces and military equipment in Walikale district to recapture Walikale town.^[41] M23 attacked militia forces on the road to Walikale town (RP529) as the M23 delegation left Doha on April 22 for the first time since the group withdrew from Walikale town in early April, but the militias repelled the attack.^[42] M23 attacked Wazalendo positions near Nyabiondo—about 10 miles west of the Masisi district capital on the RP529—on April 25 after redeploying forces from Masisi town.^[43] M23 separately tried to recapture the operationally significant area of Kaziba in central South Kivu on April 23.^[44] M23’s control of Kaziba would allow M23 to reopen several potential lines of advance westward to Mwenga district on the RN2 road, eastward to the RN5 on the border with Rwanda and Burundi, and southward via a forested route toward Fizi district and Uvira town on Lake Tanganyika.^[45] The FARDC reportedly repositioned its forces around Uvira and in the Fizi highlands to protect Uvira from a potential M23 offensive on the town on April 24.[46]

Figure 2. M23 Advances Westward Toward DRC Interior

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

Figure 3. M23 Advances Southward in South Kivu Province

Source: Yale Ford and Liam Karr.

Wazalendo and other anti-Tutsi militias are a significant obstacle to peace- and trust-building efforts—regardless of DRC-M23-Rwanda negotiations—because the militias are not involved in these talks and the DRC is likely unable to control the militias. M23 and Rwanda have demanded that FARDC turn on Wazalendo and suspected militants from the ethnic Hutu armed group Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR)—a group linked with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and continued anti-Tutsi activity—as part of any long-term peace agreement.^[47] Jeune Afrique reported on April 24 that the Wazalendo attack on Goma contributed to “heightened tensions” between the two sides in Doha and almost led the M23 delegation to return to the DRC.[48] FARDC has faced long-standing difficulties in constraining, demobilizing, or integrating militia fighters into its ranks.[49] Domestic and international efforts to demobilize and reintegrate Mai-Mai militias, which were the predecessor to the Wazalendo militias, failed and led to persistent violence in the eastern DRC in the decades after the Second Congo War.[50] The UN reported in December 2024 that FDLR fighters are embedded into pro-Congolese government militia units and that the DRC government “continued to systematically rely on and cooperate with [pro-Congolese government militias] and FDLR.”^[51]

These militias have continued attacking M23 despite the recent negotiations and joint statement. The United Nations reported in April 2025 that FDLR “intensified its collaboration” with Wazalendo militia groups allied to the FARDC.[52] A Wazalendo militia leader said in mid-April that Wazalendo fighters “do not agree on the discussions taking place in Doha” and that the talks do not “concern us.”[53] A Congolese politician from the Walikale district attempted to declare a ceasefire on behalf of Wazalendo fighters as part of the Doha talks in mid-April, but the fighters said that they would keep fighting.[54] Wazalendo fighters reportedly rejected the DRC-M23 joint statement and said that they would keep fighting on April 24.^[55] Wazalendo fighters reportedly clashed with their FARDC allies in Uvira town and the surrounding hills in South Kivu on April 24 and April 25 after Wazalendos rejected the DRC-M23 joint statement.^[56]