Hamas' View of the October 7 War

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Executive Summary

Military conditions are being set in the Gaza Strip that could lead to the defeat of Hamas, but these conditions will fail to achieve an enduring end to the war without a political solution. The military defeat of Hamas is an essential precondition for the establishment of a new government in Gaza that will be willing and able to make and keep an enduring peace. Defeat is a temporary military effect, however. Israel must cement Hamas’ defeat by setting a clear and obtainable political endstate for this war, and the US and its regional partners must also recognize that a ceasefire in the current conditions will virtually ensure the renewal of Hamas attacks on Israel and future major war in the Gaza Strip.

Hamas initiated a war on October 7, 2023, that it believes is one step towards destroying the Israeli state. Hamas does not seek to create an independent Gazan state or an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hamas sees its political control of the Gaza Strip as one step towards its ultimate goal of controlling all of Israeli territory. Hamas, if it survives this war, will prepare to initiate the next war against the Israeli state. Hamas and its allies in Iran’s Axis of Resistance (AoR) are learning new lessons that they will likely incorporate into their operations in future wars aimed at Israel’s destruction.

Hamas’ long-term effort to embed itself in Palestinian society and politics makes defeating and replacing it very difficult, but not impossible. Hamas’ combination of social services and outreach with coercive measures have ensured that Hamas retains significant support in Gaza relative to the very limited number of other entities that could replace it, despite the extremely destructive war that Hamas initiated. Hamas’ coercive apparatus makes it extremely difficult for possible Hamas alternatives in the Gaza Strip to begin to build their own governance system because to do so while Hamas remains militarily active risks near-certain death. It is not impossible to destroy Hamas’ political and military system, but doing so will require Hamas’ military defeat and a long transition to a new Palestinian-led government in the Gaza Strip.
Support from Iran and its regional allies and proxies combined with Hamas’ internal development enabled the October 7 attacks. This combination will likely drive future Hamas attacks on Israel. Several key Hamas leaders, notably Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar and Hamas Gaza military commander Mohammad Deif, helped the group develop its offensive doctrine and key military infrastructure—including tunnels—that enabled both the October 7 attacks and the subsequent defensive campaign against the Israeli ground operation. Iran and its regional allies and proxies provided more advanced weapons and probably helped Hamas develop the plans that would form the basis for the October 7 attacks.

Hamas will likely survive this war in an extremely weak position, but it could acquire the requisite resources to rebuild itself unless Israel sets both military and political conditions to prevent Hamas’ reconstitution. Israel and its partners should exploit Hamas’ current weakness by building a new political authority in the Gaza Strip that can replace Hamas. Militarily defeating Hamas is a requirement for replacing the group’s political control in the Gaza Strip. Hamas has attempted to reconstitute itself during the war both by reorganizing its forces and recruiting new fighters and by building new but rudimentary weapons. This reconstitution effort will accelerate as the war ends and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) leaves the Strip, unless Israel or another capable entity can interdict Hamas resupply from abroad. The IDF has severely degraded Hamas, but Hamas’ remnants can still kill and threaten any alternative political authority that seeks to replace Hamas’ control.

Israel and its international partners, including the United States, should maintain the current course in order to defeat Hamas militarily while simultaneously preparing to create an external security force to protect a new Palestinian-led authority and to prevent Hamas from reconstituting. Israel and its partners cannot introduce a new government without protecting it or defeating Hamas, and the establishment and consolidation of a new government will take considerable time. An external security force will probably not agree to conduct major operations on Israel’s behalf, but the external force will be needed to continue to suppress Hamas remnants as Israel and its partners transition control to the new governing authority. Israel may need to retain the freedom to conduct operations to continue targeting Hamas, depending on whether Israel can generate support for an external security force. the quality of such external forces, and their rules of engagement. Finally, Israel and its partners will need to install an inspections regime along the Rafah border to ensure that Hamas cannot be resupplied either through a border crossing or by smugglers.

There will be no permanent peace while Hamas remains a surviving political and military entity. No ceasefire that ends this war without setting conditions to prevent Hamas’ reconstitution will preclude Hamas from launching a new war in the future. Hamas sees any ceasefire as an interim truce that the group can use to prepare for the next round of fighting that its leaders will initiate for reasons and at a time of their choosing. Hamas will not end its multigenerational war to destroy the Israeli state until it is compelled to do so. Failure to defeat Hamas in this war condemns Israel and its partners—including the United States—to planning to fight a future war against Hamas, which will again be backed by Iran. Iran and its allies and proxies may support Hamas more aggressively in a future war, including by launching ground attacks from Lebanon, the West Bank, or the Golan Heights. Defeating Hamas in this war means that Israel will have removed one pressure point from which Iran and its partners can threaten Israel’s existence.

This paper describes Hamas’ aims on October 7 and the reality that a failure to destroy Hamas militarily will prevent a sustainable peace. The paper does not attempt to evaluate the legality of the behavior of either side in this war. It also is not attempting to ascribe blame to any particular actor for the activities of either side. It specifically does not seek to assign praise or blame for the success or failure of IDF activities. Multiple domestic Israeli and international factors have informed Israeli decisionmaking at every level of war, and this paper does not attempt to disentangle them. The purpose of this paper is rather to understand Hamas’ decisionmaking throughout the war and how it seeks to shape the postwar environment to its benefit.

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