Iran Update, February 7, 2023

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani and James Motamed

CTP is rescoping these updates to provide more comprehensive coverage of Iran and its Axis of Resistance in addition to our usual coverage of the Mahsa Amini protest movement and supreme leader succession. We will publish these updates Monday through Friday moving forward.

Multiple Iranian political factions, including hardliners, are coalescing around the assessment that the regime has lost touch with its people. Former moderate President Hassan Rouhani continued to frame the deepening divides between Iranian leadership and its population as an urgent threat and suggested that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has failed to sufficiently address such divides on February 7. Rouhani described Khamenei’s efforts to grant amnesty to and commute the sentences of “tens of thousands” of prisoners and arrested protesters as “a starting point.” Rouhani called on the regime to pursue policies aimed at addressing protester grievances, including reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and easing ongoing internet restrictions. Rouhani also stated that actions that damage “human dignity. . . go against national security and public interests,” inverting the regime’s narrative that anti-regime dissidents and critics threaten Iranian internal security.[i] Rouhani previously criticized the regime for marginalizing moderate and reformist actors in the Iranian political sphere in an interview on February 1, as CTP previously reported.[ii]

It is noteworthy that Rouhani did not comment on Mir Hossein Mousavi’s calls for “foundational” change in Iran. Mousavi, who partly led the 2009 Green Movement, adopted a largely revolutionary tone in his February 4 statement and discussed the need for a referendum on whether to maintain the Islamic Republic.[iii] Rouhani had the opportunity to but did not reject or distance himself from Mousavi’s statement. CTP has not presently observed other prominent moderate and reformist politicians dismiss Mousavi’s calls for significant structural changes to the regime, which could signal implicit support for Mousavi’s proposals. Mousavi’s comments may alternatively embolden some moderates and reformists to continue to promote targeted reforms.

Some hardline figures, including officials close to Khamenei, have also acknowledged the deep societal divides in recent days. Hardline politician and Expediency Discernment Council member Mohammad Reza Bahonar described the Mahsa Amini protest movement as “unprecedented” in a televised interview on February 4. Bahonar warned that the regime had failed to listen to or address protester grievances and that anti-regime activity would eventually resume.[iv] Supreme Leader Military Adviser IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi similarly admitted that the regime “had problems” while commemorating the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on February 6.[v]  Hardline Islamic Coalition Party Secretary General Asadollah Badamchian separately stated that the regime faced a ”crisis of the republic”  and called for increased political participation on February 7.[vi]  The explicitly revolutionary tone of the Mahsa Amini movement, during which demonstrators from across the socioeconomic spectrum protested the founding ideology of regime, may have facilitated these hardliner acknowledgments of fissures between Iranian leadership and their people.[vii]

Hardline factions are continuing to misdiagnose the root problems that have driven the recent protests, however. Badamchian proposed increased social control and indoctrination measures to bridge societal divides on February 7.[viii] Health Minister Bahram Eynollahi additionally warned that the regime would close health care and medical facilities if they failed to comply with regime-imposed veiling laws.[ix] CTP previously assessed that Khamenei will not offer meaningful sociopolitical concessions to protesters and has instead empowered hardline security figures to enforce mandatory veiling standards in recent months.[x]

Senior Iranian officials offered to provide humanitarian aid to Syria and Turkey following a 7.8-magnitude earthquake on February 6 amidst criticisms of the regime’s poor handling of a recent domestic earthquake.[xi] President Ebrahim Raisi expressed readiness to do “whatever it takes” to help Syria recover from the earthquake in a phone call with Syrian President Bashar al Assad on February 7.[xii] Senior Iranian military officials additionally offered to provide humanitarian support to Syria and Turkey. State-affiliated news outlets reported that the regime sent 45 tons of medical, food, and humanitarian aid to the Damascus International Airport on February 7.[xiii] The Iranian Neighborhood Youth Union posted images juxtaposing Iran’s humanitarian aid to Syria and Turkey with its emergency response to a recent earthquake in northwestern Iran on January 28. Citizens in Khoy, West Azerbaijan Province, where the earthquake struck, reportedly lack access to basic goods and shelter.[xiv] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei sent Red Crescent Organization Supreme Leader Representative Hojjat ol Eslam Abdol Hossein Moazi to Khoy to deliver his message "of love, sincerity, and greetings” on February 7, although it is unclear what tangible aid, if any, Moazi brought.[xv]

 Key Takeaways

• Multiple Iranian political factions, including hardliners, are coalescing around the assessment that the regime has lost touch with its people.
• Senior Iranian officials offered to provide humanitarian aid to Syria and Turkey following a 7.8-magnitude earthquake on February 6 amidst criticisms of the regime’s poor handling of a recent domestic earthquake.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across one province.
• The Artesh Air Defense Force unveiled a new underground air base and cruise missile on February 7.
• Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani met with Russian Presidential Assistant Igor Levitin in Moscow.
• The Financial Times reported that Tehran has substantially increased its efforts to help Moscow evade oil sanctions in recent months.
• Iranian leadership may seek to use unspecified debts and infrastructure projects in Iraq to circumvent sanctions.
• Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have deployed to Syria to provide humanitarian aid to earthquake victims

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least two protests occurred in one city across one province on February 7. CTP assesses with moderate confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Kian Tire Company workers

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Poultry workers

Protest coordinators and organizations called for demonstrations on the following date:

February 16:[xviii]

• Type: Countrywide anti-regime protests, and 40-day commemoration ceremony of executed protesters in Tehran
• Location: Countrywide

The Artesh Air Defense Force unveiled a new underground air base and cruise missile on February 7. Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Artesh Commander Major General Abdol Rahim Mousavi inaugurated the Eagle 44 Underground Artesh Air Defense Force Base, which operates fighter jets, bombers, and UAVs. Iranian media reported that the base was designed to sustain a nuclear bomb and ballistic missile attack and contains a protected radar instillation, control center, and security communications facility. The Artesh Air Defense Force additionally revealed the Asef air-launched, long-range cruise missile on February 7, which can be installed on Su-24 tactical bombers. The Asef can also, presumably, operate on Su-30 and Su-35 aircraft.[xix] Parliamentarian Shahryar Heydari previously stated that Iran will receive an unspecified number of Su-35s from Russia early in the next Persian calendar year (March 2023-March 2024), as CTP previously reported.[xx]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani met with Russian Presidential Assistant Igor Levitin in Moscow on February 7. Shamkhani and Levitin discussed expanding Russo-Iranian economic ties and evading US sanctions during the meeting. Levitin stressed the importance of improving energy and transportation cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. Levitin also discussed completing the Rasht-Astara railway, a transportation corridor that operates within the framework of the International North–South Transport Corridor and will connect existing Azerbaijani, Iranian, and Russian railways.[xxi] Shamkhani praised economic, defense, security, scientific and commercial ties Russia and Iran upon his arrival to Moscow and claimed that Russo-Iranian ties had ”fundamentally” expanded.[xxii]

Shamkhani will also attend in the fifth session of the Moscow Format Consultations on Afghanistan on February 8 with Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani special envoys, representatives, and national security organization chiefs.[xxiii] Russia spearheaded the Moscow Format Consultations in 2017 to facilitate political reconciliation between the former Afghan republic and the Taliban.[xxiv] The meeting will not include Taliban representation.

Shamkhani will separately meet with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to discuss the implementation of Russo-Iranian economic, technological and trade projects on an unspecified date.[xxv] Iranian media reported that Shamkhani will discuss ”issues of mutual interests” with a number of additional unspecified Russian government officials during his visit as well.[xxvi]

The Financial Times reported that Tehran has substantially increased its efforts to help Moscow evade oil sanctions in recent months. Iran has reportedly used at least 16 vessels to illicitly ship Russian crude oil since December 2022, a significant uptick from the nine reported vessels that Tehran had switched to Russian transportation routes before December. The Financial Times added that the volume of Russian crude oil shipped on Iranian-identified vessels had surged from less than three million barrels in November 2022 to over nine million barrels in January 2023.[xxvii]

Iranian leadership may seek to use unspecified debts and infrastructure projects in Iraq to circumvent sanctions. Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani reportedly promised to repay Iraqi debts to Iranian firms during a meeting with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Diplomacy Mehdi Safari on February 7.[xxviii] Safari also announced that Iraq will fund construction of a new railway and highway traveling into Iraq from Iran. An unidentified source close to the US Embassy in Iraq claimed that the US Treasury’s Assistant for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence presented the Iraqi Central Bank head Ali al Alaq with evidence of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias smuggling US dollars into Iran.[xxix] The New York Federal Reserve placed new restrictions on several private Iraqi banks in December 2022 intended to target individuals laundering US dollars into Iran.[xxx]

Military and Security Affairs

Iranian-backed Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) have deployed to Syria to provide humanitarian aid to earthquake victims.[xxxi] Iranian proxy Telegram channels heavily circulated reporting of multiple PMF convoys crossing into Syria with the aid.[xxxii] Iranian-backed militias may have greater freedom of movement across Syria due to the earthquake and may use this freedom to consolidate their positions in locations throughout Syria, particularly northwestern Syria, that they cannot easily access ordinarily under the guise of humanitarian relief efforts.