Iran Update, April 10, 2023

April 10, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Palestinian militants expanded rocket attacks into Israel from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip to the Golan Heights. Palestinian militants have carried out a series of rocket attacks into Israel since April 6 in retaliation for Israeli security forces raiding the Al Aqsa Mosque on April 4, as CTP previously reported.[i] The attacks have originated from multiple countries—including the potential Sinai Peninsula attack and a series of terrorist incidents in the West Bank on April 7[ii]—and have targeted different areas in Israel.  Palestinian militants launched two waves of two or three rockets into Israel from positions in the Golan Heights on April 8.[iii] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted several of the rockets and the rest fell on uninhabited terrain near Avnei Eitan approximately five kilometers from the Sea of Galilee.[iv] Iran-aligned Lebanese outlet Al Mayadeen claimed the Syria-based Quds Brigade militia carried out the attack.[v] A social media account affiliated with the group denied any involvement in the attack and stated it has no presence in southern Syria.[vi] The IDF also downed a Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) quadcopter surveillance drone that crossed into northern Israel on April 7.[vii] Israeli open-source intelligence social media accounts widely reported on April 8 that the Egyptian army thwarted an attempt by Iranian-backed Palestinian militants to conduct a rocket attack against Eilat in southern Israel.[viii]

The IDF responded to the April 8 attacks by striking Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southwest Syria. IDF artillery and combat drones targeted positions in the Golan Heights occupied by the SAA 90th and 52nd Brigades.[ix] The IDF also conducted airstrikes on an SAA radar site, military positions occupied by the Iranian-backed SAA Fourth Division, and an unspecified target near the Yarmouk refugee camp outside Damascus.[x] One of the airstrikes destroyed a road leading to a villa located approximately five kilometers from the Syrian presidential palace and owned by Maher al Assad, the Fourth Division commander and brother of Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[xi] CTP has not observed any evidence that SAA personnel were directly involved in the April 8 rocket attacks that originated from the Golan Heights.

Iran may view the Palestinian attacks into Israel as an opportunity to redouble its efforts to transfer air defense and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) into Syria. Iran has long sought to transfer air defense systems and PGMs into Syria and station the equipment at Iranian or Iranian-backed militia sites across the country.[xii]CTP previously reported that the Iranian regime has also publicly expressed its intent to sell air defense systems to the Assad regime, although Iranian personnel may still operate the systems sold to the Assad regime.[xiii] CTP has also previously reported that Israel is conducting an intensive military campaign to disrupt Iranian transportation networks into Syria and destroy sites that house and produce advanced weapons in Syria.[xiv] The IDF’s attacks into Syria have responded to Palestinian rocket attacks since April 6, however. The last target linked to advanced Iranian weapons that Israel struck was on March 22. Iran may perceive Israel’s focus on the threat of Palestinian militia rocket attacks presents an opportunity to surge PGM and air defense assets into Syria. The maps below show the change in the targets Israel has struck in Syria since April 4, compared to the preceding three months. Israel has focused on Palestinian and SAA locations in southwest Syria during the last week, rather than Iranian convoys transporting weapons, lines of communication, and military production sites.

CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran has facilitated the rocket attacks from Palestinian militants in part to distract Israel from the transfer of Iranian air defense and PGM systems into Syria. Hamas likely needed permission from LH to conduct the April 6 rockets attacks from southern Lebanon, as CTP previously assessed.[xv] LH often acts as an intermediary for Iranian coordination with Iranian-backed Palestinian groups. Iran may be urging Hamas to continue rocket attacks to keep Israeli military activity focused away from Iranian efforts to bring PGM and air defense systems into Syria through Damascus and Aleppo airports or via truck. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh met with LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah on April 9, suggesting ongoing and high-level coordination of the groups’ military activities.[xvi] Leadership from Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian militia groups arrived in Damascus on April 10 to allegedly pay their respects to the outgoing Iranian ambassador to Syria.[xvii] Iranian regime media reported IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Ghaani also arrived in Damascus on April 10, which suggests the reason for his visit included meeting with the Palestinian militants.[xviii]

The Iranian regime is trying to leverage the recent Israeli raids on al Aqsa Mosque to politically unite Muslim countries against Israel and prevent further expansion of the Abraham Accords. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf criticized Israel’s attacks on the Palestinian territories and the recent raid on al Aqsa Mosque and called on OIC countries to “outlaw normalizing relations with Israel and using Israeli goods” on April 10.[xix] President Ebrahim Raisi additionally called on Muslim states to condemn the al Aqsa Mosque raids and to form a broad coalition against Israel on multiple occasions between April 6 and 9.[xx] Raisi further emphasized how Iran and its Axis of Resistance is beginning to benefit from current regional dynamics.[xxi] Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani separately stated that Iran is confident that Muslim countries will “rise“ in support of ”the oppressed Palestinian nation“ on April 8.[xxii] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami argued on April 8 that the pattern of Gulf normalizations with Israel will end following the al Aqsa incident.[xxiii] Interim Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami similarly stated on April 7 that Iran had reversed attempts to create a united Arab-Israeli anti-Iran front as regional states increasingly seek to normalize ties with Iran, citing the March 10 Iran-Saudi normalization agreement.[xxiv]

Regime attempts to unite the region against Israel coincide with heightened kinetic and rhetorical escalations between Iran and Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi expressed on April 5 Israel’s readiness to preemptively strike Iran without US support.[xxv] Artesh Commander Major General Abdul Rahim Mousavi responded to Halevi’s comments on April 10, stating that “Israel is too inferior a country to be considered a threat to Iran.”[xxvi] Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Kiomars Heydari separately warned on April 10 that Iran would provide a “toothbreaking and crushing” response to a foreign attack.[xxvii] Iran and Israel have also been engaged in a tit-for-tat escalation cycle in Syria in recent days, as CTP previously reported.[xxviii] The New York Times separately reported on April 8 that the US had warned Israeli shipping companies of a potential IRGC Aerospace Force drone attack on Israeli tankers in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.[xxix]

Iranian officials participated in a series of diplomatic engagements between April 7 and 9 to preserve Iranian strategic interests in the Caucasus. The regime’s interests in this region include keeping overland trade routes open, preventing Israel from operating against Iran from Azerbaijan, and preempting the spread of separatist sentiments among Iran’s Azeri minority. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani discussed the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) in separate meetings with Armenian National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan and Russian Presidential Aide Igor Levitin in Tehran on April 9.[xxx] The INSTC is a land route through the Caucasus which enables Iran to export products to Russia and Europe. Shamkhani may have discussed the INSTC with Grigoryan and Levitin in the context of Azerbaijani efforts to link mainland Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region—an Azerbaijani exclave in western Armenia.[xxxi] Connecting the Nakhchivan Autonomous Region to mainland Azerbaijan would cut off Iran from an overland route in the Caucasus.[xxxii] The regime regards territorial changes in the Caucasus as a threat to Iran’s internal security, likely fearing that territorial changes could precipitate calls for separatism among Iran’s large Azeri minority in northwestern Iran.[xxxiii] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately held two phone calls with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov on April 7 and 8.[xxxiv] Iranian state media reported that Abdollahian and Bayramov discussed “misunderstandings” between Iran and Azerbaijan, likely referring to the regime’s disapproval of growing Azerbaijani-Israeli ties.[xxxv] Regime officials have strongly criticized Azerbaijan’s decision to open an embassy in Israel in recent days.[xxxvi] The regime has additionally repeatedly accused Azerbaijan of allowing Israel to use its territory as a base to organize and launch operations against Iran, as CTP previously reported.[xxxvii]

The regime has failed to prevent further poisonings as Iranian officials issue inconsistent messaging about the nature of the attacks. CTP recorded at least twenty-two student poisoning incidents between April 8 and 10 across twelve cities and eight provinces, resulting in several hospitalizations.[xxxviii] Iranian social media users circulated uncorroborated reports that the Ministry of Guidance advised Iranian state-owned and state-affiliated media to avoid covering poisonings and poisoning-related incidents.[xxxix] CTP did not observe Iranian state-owned and state-affiliated media coverage of poisonings following this report although more instances of poisonings did occur, which adheres to the uncorroborated reports. Impacted students’ symptoms remain consistent with prior incidents of reported poisonings throughout March and early last week.[xl] Deputy Health Minister Saeed Karimi stated that at least ten percent of the affected students showed respiratory symptoms, acknowledging in effect that the symptoms are not psychosomatic as regime officials have previously claimed.[xli] Parliament Poisoning Fact-Finding Commission Head Hamid Reza Kazemi similarly acknowledged that poisonings occurred, but denied reports of student hospitalizations.[xlii] Parliamentarian Mehrdad Karami denied that poisonings were deliberate attacks, arguing that students were nauseated by ”the smell of oil.”[xliii] A reliable Kurdish human rights organization Hengaw separately reported that one 16-year-old male student died on April 9 due to complications from a poisoning attack last month in Tehran, directly contradicting Karami’s statement.[xliv]

Protest activity increased sharply on April 9 in response to deteriorating economic conditions and recent student poisonings. CTP recorded 18 protests in 16 cities across 12 provinces on April 9. The majority of these protests were economically motivated, indicating that the regime’s success in stabilizing the Iranian rial in recent days has not been sufficient to alleviate economic hardships among large segments of the population.[xlv] Various government officials and institutions have announced in recent weeks that Iran’s inflation rate hovers between 40 and 50 percent, making it difficult for many Iranians—such as retirees with fixed incomes—to afford basic goods.[xlvi] Residents in Saghez, Kurdistan Province additionally protested the poisoning of schoolgirls in this city on April 9.[xlvii] Iranian social media users circulated videos of security forces reportedly shooting at protesters in Saghez, highlighting the regime’s sensitivity to the issue of student poisonings.[xlviii] CTP previously observed similar levels of protest activity on March 13 and 14, when Iranian citizens participated in anti-regime protests for Chahar Shanbeh Souri.[xlix] The Chahar Shanbeh Souri protests were primarily fueled by general anti-regime frustrations as opposed to poor economic conditions, however.

Key Takeaways

• Palestinian militants expanded rocket attacks into Israel from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip to the Golan Heights.
• The IDF responded to the April 8 attacks by striking Syrian Arab Army (SAA) positions in southwest Syria.
• Iran may view the Palestinian attacks into Israel as an opportunity to redouble its efforts to transfer air defense and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) into Syria.
• CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran has facilitated the rocket attacks from Palestinian militants in part to distract Israel from the transfer of Iranian air defense and PGM systems into Syria.
• Iranian officials participated in a series of diplomatic engagements between April 7 and 9 to preserve Iranian strategic interests in the Caucasus.
• The Iranian regime is trying to leverage the recent Israeli raids on al Aqsa Mosque to politically unite Muslim countries against Israel and prevent further expansion of the Abraham Accords.
• Protest activity increased sharply on April 9 in response to deteriorating economic conditions and recent student poisonings.
• At least five protests occurred in five cities across five provinces on April 8, 18 protests occurred in 16 cities across 12 provinces on April 9, and one protest occurred in one city across one province on April 10.
• Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Chief Ahmad Reza Radan announced that the LEC will begin using advanced surveillance capabilities to widely enforce mandatory veiling in public spaces on April 15.
• The Iranian rial remained relatively stable between April 7 and April 10, depreciating from 505,500 rials to one US dollar on April 7 to 506,000 rials to one US dollar on April 10.
• IRGC-affiliated media circulated reports of cabinet reshuffles within the Raisi administration’s economic team.
• Iranian and Saudi officials continued to discuss reestablishing diplomatic relations on April 10.
• IRGC Ground Force (GF) Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization Head Ali Kouhestani announced on April 9 that the IRGC-GF had successfully tested the new Meraj-532 kamikaze drone.
• Iranian-backed militants launched two rockets at US Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor province, Syria on April 10.
• Iranian-backed militants deployed to Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor province on April 10.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least five protests occurred in five cities across five provinces on April 8. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[l]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Farmers

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[li]

• Size: Medium
• Demographic: Nurses and emergency personnel

Tehran City, Tehran Province[lii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Shahid Beheshti University students protesting mandatory veiling

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Jolfa, East Azerbaijan Province[liii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Jolfa Aras Paraplastic Company workers

Divandarreh, Kurdistan Province[liv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Protesting student poisonings

At least 18 protests occurred in 16 cities across 12 provinces on April 9. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[lv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province[lvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Family members of Javad Heydari

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[lvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[lviii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Shoush, Khuzestan Province[lix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Shoushtar, Khuzestan Province[lx]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[lxi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Protesting student poisonings

Yazd City, Yazd Province[lxii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Ardabil, Ardabil Province[lxiii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Hamedan City, Hamedan Province[lxiv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[lxv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[lxvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Bandar Mahshahr, Khuzestan Province[lxvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Fired workers

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[lxviii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Electricity operators

Marivan, Kurdistan Province[lxix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Khorramabad, Lorestan Province[lxx]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication retirees

Arak, Markazi Province[lxxi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[lxxii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Telecommunication Retirees

At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on April 10. CTP assesses with high confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province[lxxiii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Nurses

Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Chief Ahmad Reza Radan announced that the LEC will begin using advanced surveillance capabilities to widely enforce mandatory veiling in public spaces on April 15. Radan clarified that the LEC would send identified unveiled women a “warning text” and impound the vehicles of second-time offenders. Some Iranian officials have recently suggested that repeat offenders may also face fines and other legal consequences.[lxxiv] Radan noted that mandatory veiling standards extended to shopkeepers and restaurant owners who service unveiled women and warned that the LEC would continue to seal such facilities.[lxxv] The LEC—the entity that encompassed the Morality Patrol that led to the violent killing of Mahsa Amini on September 16 and months of anti-regime protests—is publicly resuming hijab enforcement. CTP previously assessed on December 23 that the regime would expand an Orwellian surveillance-punishment model relying on collective punishment through shutting down non-compliant businesses and remote punishments such as seizing financial assets in state banks as alternatives to physical confrontations.[lxxvi]

Economic Affairs

The Iranian rial remained relatively stable between April 7 and April 10, depreciating from 505,500 rials to one US dollar on April 7 to 506,000 rials to one US dollar on April 10.[lxxvii]

IRGC-affiliated media circulated reports of cabinet reshuffles within the Raisi administration’s economic team. IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency reported that Program and Budgeting Organization Head Massoud Mir Kazemi will resign at an unspecified date and be replaced with high-ranking tax official Davoud Manzour.[lxxviii] Another IRGC-affiliated outlet, Tasnim News Agency, separately reported that Economic Affairs and Finance Minister Ehsan Khandouzi will resign in the coming weeks without providing further details.[lxxix]

Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy

Iranian and Saudi officials continued to discuss reestablishing diplomatic relations on April 10. Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani confirmed the presence of a Saudi “technical” delegation in Tehran on April 10 and announced that an Iranian delegation will travel to Saudi Arabia “in the next two to three days.” Kanani added that Iran and Saudi Arabia are in the process of appointing ambassadors.[lxxx] The Saudi Ambassador to Oman Abdollah bin Saud Al-Anzi separately met with his Iranian counterpart Ali Najafi in Muscat on April 10.[lxxxi]

External Security and Military Affairs

IRGC Ground Force (IRGC-GF) Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization Head Ali Kouhestani announced on April 9 that the IRGC-GF had successfully tested the new Meraj-532 kamikaze drone. The Meraj drone can allegedly travel 450 km in a one-way mission, has a maximum altitude of 3.6 km, can stay aloft for three hours, and can carry a 50 kg warhead.[lxxxii]

Iranian-backed militants launched two rockets at US Conoco Mission Support Site in Deir ez Zor province, Syria on April 10. US CENTCOM stated that one rocket landed within the vicinity of the outpost and the other crashed shortly after launch.[lxxxiii] The attack did not harm any US personnel or property. Iranian-backed militants last targeted US forces in eastern Syria on March 25, as CTP previously reported.[lxxxiv]

Iranian-backed militants deployed to Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor province on April 10. Two buses of militants from Fatemiyoun Division—Iran’s Afghan Shia proxy—arrived in Al Mayadin from positions in the vicinity of Palmyra, Homs province. Eye of Euphrates reported that local Lebanese Hezbollah and IRGC Quds Force leadership received the militants upon their arrival.[lxxxv] A separate convoy of Fatemiyoun militants crossed the Al Qaim Iraq-Syria border crossing before stopping in Al Mayadin.[lxxxvi] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights similarly reported that four buses of Syrian Arab Army Fourth Division militants similarly arrived in Al Mayadin from Homs and Hama Provinces.[lxxxvii]

Unidentified militants crashed two kamikaze drones in Duhok and Erbil provinces on April 10. Shafaq News reported that local security officials are examining the wreckage and have not issued a statement on the likely perpetrators.[lxxxviii] An Iranian proxy Telegram channel posted a video of the drone that crashed in Duhok province.[lxxxix] The drone does not appear to match any kamikaze drone models that the IRGC or Iranian-backed militants possess. Iranian Arabic media outlet Al Ahad claimed one of the drones targeted US forces at Erbil International Airport.[xc] CTP has not observed any evidence to corroborate this claim.