Iran Update, April 14, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12.[1] The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China, according to Iranian and Arab officials.[2] It would be very difficult for the United States to guarantee permanent sanctions relief, given that such a requirement would have to span multiple US presidential administrations. The issue of guaranteeing sanctions relief was a point of contention between Iran and the United States under the Biden administration.[3] Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program.[4] Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.[5] The JCPOA limited Iranian uranium enrichment to 300 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride enriched up to 3.67 percent for fifteen years.[6]

It is unclear if Iran would agree to dismantle its advanced centrifuges in addition to reducing its current stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran has installed advanced centrifuges at its main nuclear facilities—Natanz and Fordow—in recent years. These advanced centrifuges have increased the rate at which Iran can enrich uranium. Iran currently has 274.8 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium, which is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce around six nuclear weapons.[7]

It is unclear whether Iran seeks to return to the JCPOA in its current format. The JCPOA contains various restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program that will expire in 2030. These restrictions are referred to as “sunset provisions.” It is unclear, if Iran were to agree to return to the JCPOA, whether the sunset provisions would renew for an additional 15 years. It is also unclear whether Iran would agree to a new nuclear deal that included permanent restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program. US President Donald Trump repeatedly criticized the existence of sunset provisions in the JCPOA prior to withdrawing from the agreement in 2018.[8]

Iran could rebuild its nuclear program at a faster pace after the expiration of sunset provisions, or if a new agreement collapses, if Iran maintains its current advanced centrifuge technology. Iran has increased its number of operational centrifuges since it signed the JCPOA in 2015.[9] Iran is also developing new advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-8, which Iranian officials have claimed is “sixteen times” more capable than the IR-1 centrifuge.[10] Even if Iran were to agree to downblend its stockpile of enriched uranium, Iran would likely be able to re-enrich this stockpile at a relatively fast pace, compared to before 2015, if it maintains its current advanced centrifuges.

Note: This list is not exhaustive and only includes the main Iranian violations of the JCPOA.[11]

The United States presented its demands and red lines ahead of the nuclear talks on April 12. Witkoff told the Wall Street Journal on April 11 that the United States' “opening demand” would be the dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program but acknowledged that the United States is open to “find[ing] compromise” with Iran.[12] Witkoff stressed that the United States’ “red line” is preventing Iranian weaponization. Trump similarly stated on April 14 that Iran must abandon the “concept of a nuclear weapon.”[13]

Iranian and US officials presented the April 12 talks as “positive” and “constructive.” Significant obstacles and challenges remain before a deal can be reached, however.[14] Araghchi stated on April 12 that the United States and Iran expressed their intention to reach an agreement in “the shortest possible time,” but acknowledged that reaching a deal will “not be an easy task.”[15] The White House released a statement on April 12 that called the talks “positive and constructive,” while acknowledging that solving the Iranian nuclear issue is “very complicated.”[16] Iran and the United States agreed to hold a second round of nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 19.[17]

Iran is increasing its diplomatic activity with third parties ahead of the April 19 nuclear talks. Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi announced on April 14 that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi will visit Tehran on April 16.[18] Gharibabadi traveled to Moscow on April 14 and met with Russian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Sergei Vershinin.[19] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi will also travel to Moscow in the coming days.[20] Iran has consistently engaged with Russia on the nuclear issue in recent weeks.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on the Iranian armed forces to maintain maximum “hardware and software readiness” during a meeting with senior military officials and commanders on April 13.[21] Khamenei described the Iranian armed forces as Iran’s “shield” and praised the diverse and unified command structure of the Iranian armed forces. Khamenei criticized the West’s double standards, claiming that Western countries possess “the most catastrophic weapons” but try to prevent Iranian "defense growth." Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri presented a report during the meeting about regional developments and Iran‘s response to the October 7 War. Bagheri highlighted Iranian deterrence efforts, weapons development, and joint exercises.

Senior Iranian officials continue to be concerned about a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit’s combat capability and defense readiness.[22] Sabahi Fard emphasized that expanding missile and defense systems is essential for protecting Iranian airspace against potential threats. The visit is part of a series of inspections that Sabahi Fard has conducted to Iranian air defense sites in recent days. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.[23]

The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government implemented a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam on April 14.[24] SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF withdrew to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, eight kilometers from the dam, on April 12.[25] Transitional government forces will establish a barrier between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which have been fighting in the area since December 2024.[26] The SNA is nominally integrated under the Syrian Defense Ministry’s command, but the groups that comprise the SNA still receive salaries from Turkey.[27] The transfer of control of the dam comes after the successful integration of two historically Kurdish areas of Aleppo City into the transitional government’s area of control.[28] The deployment of government forces to the Tishreen Dam reduces the risk of an SNA or Turkish military operation against the SDF and promotes the transitional government’s ceasefire with the SDF.

Fundamental disagreements over federalism and military integration remain between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, despite progress on other fronts.[29] Abdi and Syrian President Ahmed al Shara agreed on an integration framework on March 10 and have since taken several concrete steps toward peace and integration.[30] The SDF has ceded control of disputed territory in Aleppo City and eastern Aleppo Province to the transitional government since April 1.[31] The SDF has also granted the transitional government control over its hydrocarbon resources to “meet its oil and gas needs.”[32] Abdi hinted on April 14 at future areas of progress between Damascus and the SDF, including transferring control of Arab-majority Deir ez Zor and Raqqa provinces to the transitional government after SDF institutions are integrated into the government.[33] Abdi also outlined two long-held “red lines” that Shara is unlikely to agree to: federalism and the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a military bloc.[34] Abdi noted that he cannot accept administrative power “concentrated solely in Damascus” and that the SDF must “preserve their distinct identity within the ranks of the new Syrian national army.”[35] Neither of these demands are new or surprising, and neither issue was addressed in the March 10 integration framework. Kurdish groups have previously expressed serious concern about Shara’s consolidation of power though the draft Syrian constitution.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• April 12 Nuclear Talks Between Iran and the United States: Iran and the United States held nuclear talks in Muscat, Oman, on April 12. The Iranian delegation, which was led by Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, presented Iran’s demands and red lines to the US delegation, which was led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff. The Iranian demands include sanctions relief guarantees, access to billions of dollars of frozen Iranian assets, and an end to the US maximum pressure campaign targeting Iranian oil exports to China. Araghchi emphasized that Iran will not agree to completely dismantle its nuclear program. Unspecified Iranian officials told the Wall Street Journal on April 12 that Iran would be willing to reduce its uranium enrichment to 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) levels, however.
• Iranian Air Defense Readiness: Khatam ol Anbia Air Defense Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Alireza Sabahi Fard visited the Shahid Bordbar Air Defense Group in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province, on April 12 to assess the unit’s combat capability and defense readiness. Sabahi Fard visited air defense zones in Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province, on April 4 and Bushehr Province on April 6.
• SDF Withdrawal from Tishreen Dam: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian transitional government implemented a deconfliction agreement around the Tishreen Dam on April 14. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF withdrew to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, eight kilometers from the dam, on April 12. Transitional government forces will establish a barrier between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and the SDF, which have been fighting in the area since December 2024.
• SDF Integration into the Syrian Transitional Government: Fundamental disagreements over federalism and military integration remain between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government, despite progress on other fronts. SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi outlined two long-held “red lines” that Syrian President Ahmed al Shara is unlikely to agree to: federalism and the integration of the SDF into the new Syrian army as a military bloc. Abdi noted that he cannot accept administrative power “concentrated solely in Damascus” and that the SDF must “preserve their distinct identity within the ranks of the new Syrian national army.”

Syria

Syrian media reported that the Syrian Defense Ministry (MoD) appointed the commander of the Turkish-backed Sultan Murad Division as deputy defense minister and commander of the "northern region” in the new Syrian army.[37] Fahim Issa previously commanded the Sultan Murad Division, which is a faction in the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).[38] Issa also previously commanded the SNA’s Second Corps and Thairoun Liberation Front.[39] Syrian media reported that Issa has close ties to Suleiman Shah Brigade Commander Abu Amsha and Hamza Division Commander Sayf Abu Bakr.[40] Abu Amsha and Abu Bakr both lead divisions in the new Syrian army.[41] The Sultan Murad Division has committed human rights abuses against Kurds in Aleppo alongside the Hamza Division.[42] Issa is a Turkish nationalist and is reportedly a member of the Grey Wolves.[43]

Syrian media reported on April 14 that the Syrian MoD set soldiers’ salaries to $200 for married personnel and $150 for single personnel, citing a government source.[44] Syrian media separately reported that some MoD employees and soldiers have received their salaries.[45] It is unclear whether these salaries are monthly or yearly. The Assad regime previously paid Syrian Arab Army (SAA) conscripts between $15 and $17 per month in 2024.[46] Unspecified sources told Syrian media that the salaries are not yet finalized as the MoD still needs to adopt a salary scale that considers rank and other unspecified categories.[47]

The Syrian MoD has begun to train newly formed army divisions. A Syrian journalist reported on April 11 that the new 76th Division conducted exercises that focused on artillery, missiles, sniping, and ground and air defense.[48] Photos posted on social media showed at least 100 men participating in the exercises.[49] Sayf Abu Bakr leads the 76th Division, which operates in Aleppo Province.[50] Abu Bakr previously commanded the Hamza Division and is sanctioned by the United States.[51]

Unspecified individuals denotated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting the head of the General Security Services for eastern Daraa Province in Khirbet Ghazaleh, Daraa Province, on April 14.^ix The official, Mohammad al Sakhni, is a former HTS commander who now oversees GSS forces in eastern Daraa Province.[52] Sakhni was not injured in the attack.[53] No group has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.

Anti-government Salafi-jihadi militia Saraya Ansar al Sunnah urged its followers on April 13 to conduct a lone wolf assassination targeting an alleged former regime informant in Aleppo Province.[54] The group published a flyer on its Telegram channel that called for individuals to assassinate Ibrahim Mustafa al Ghazi al Alloush, a real estate businessman based in Aleppo Province.[55] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has primarily conducted attacks in Homs Province and has only claimed two attacks in Aleppo Province since it began conducting attacks in February 2025.[56] Its call for a lone wolf attack may reflect that the group lacks an established network and operational capacity in Aleppo.

A militia called the Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade claimed on April 13 that it assassinated an SDF supporter and former regime informant in Qamishli, Hasakah Province.[57] The group published a statement naming seven additional individuals as targets and accused the individuals of supporting the Assad regime and its “new militias,” likely referring to the SDF.[58] It warned Syrians against cooperating with the SDF and urged SDF fighters to defect and return to their villages. The group’s identity remains unclear. The group may have adopted the name of a former opposition faction, Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade, which was part of the Free Syrian Army and fought Kurdish forces in Ras al Ain between 2012 and 2013.[59] The new group does not use the same iconography as the former Ahrar al Jazeera Brigade, however. The group‘s April 13 statement featured the revolutionary Syrian flag, which suggests that the group likely does not oppose the transitional government.[60] It is also possible that the group is comprised of Arab tribesmen who hold grievances against the SDF.

The Syrian transitional government continues to secure significant economic support from Arab countries. Reuters reported on April 14 that Saudi Arabia will pay Syria’s $15 million debt to the World Bank.[61] Paying this debt will enable the transitional government to request additional financial assistance from the World Bank to help rebuild its public sector. Reuters also reported on April 12 that Syrian officials, including Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani, Finance Minister Mohammed Yosr Bernieh, and Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh, will attend the International Monetary Fund-World Bank Spring Meetings in Washington, DC, between April 21 and 26.[62] Syrian President Ahmed al Shara separately discussed efforts to rebuild the Syrian economy with Emirati President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan during a visit to Abu Dhabi on April 13.[63] These reports are part of ongoing economic and political support from Arab countries for Syria. Qatar recently agreed to supply Syria with two million cubic meters of natural gas per day to help boost the Syrian electricity supply.[64]

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara discussed bilateral relations with Kurdistan Regional Government President Nechirvan Barzani on the sidelines of the Antalya Forum in Turkey on April 11.[65] Kurdish media reported that Barzani emphasized the importance of Kurdish representation in the Syrian government during his meeting with Shara.[66]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr urged members of his militia, Saraya al Salam, to update their voter registration ahead of the November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections.[67] Sadr announced on March 27 that his Shia Nationalist Movement would not participate in the elections.[68] Sadr’s message to Saraya al Salam members follows an Iraqi media report on April 6 that “unspecified changes in the coming months” could cause Sadr to participate in the elections “directly or indirectly.”[69]

Some Iraqi parliamentarians reportedly seek to amend the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the parliamentary elections.[70] The Iraqi federal government recently announced that the elections will proceed under the current electoral law, despite State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki’s opposition to the current law.[71] Iraq’s current electoral system allocates seats to political parties in a way that often disadvantages smaller parties. A parliamentarian who reportedly has ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias submitted a draft proposal to parliament on April 1 to amend the electoral law.[72] Parliamentarian Ahmed al Sharmani told Iraqi media on April 12 that parliament has the authority to alter the current electoral law.[73] Sharmani is a member of the Emtidad Movement, which was established after the 2019 Iraqi protest movement.[74] A member of the Sunni Azm Alliance, which is headed by Muthanna al Samarrai, told Iraqi media on April 13 that Sunni political parties reject any amendment to the current electoral law.[75]

Turkish and Iraqi officials agreed to form a joint committee to discuss Syrian internally displaced persons (IDP) camps during a meeting on the sidelines of the Antalya Forum on April 14.[76] Iraqi and Turkish officials announced that the committee will address issues related to al Hol and al Roj camps.[77] The Iraqi federal government regularly repatriates Iraqi citizens from al Hol camp.[78]

An unspecified security source speaking to Asaib Ahl al Haq-controlled media reported that the Interior Ministry appointed Major General Saad al Halfi as head of the Iraqi Federal Police.[79] Halfi previously served as commander of the Second Federal Police Division.[80] Halfi replaced Lieutenant General Saleh al Ameri, who was appointed as a technical advisor to the interior minister. The Iraqi Federal Police partners with international coalition forces to combat ISIS under Operation Inherent [81]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

US Central Command (CENTCOM) has conducted at least 47 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since April 11.[82] CENTCOM conducted at least three sorties of airstrikes targeting reported Houthi weapons depots, including at least three airstrikes targeting Bani Hashish District, Sanaa Governorate, on April 11, at least five airstrikes targeting al Sawmaa District, al Bayda Governorate, on April 12, and at least three airstrikes targeting Bani Matar District, Sanaa Governorate, on April 13.[83] The Houthi Health Ministry reported that the airstrikes on Bani Matar District killed six individuals and injured 20 others.[84] CENTCOM separately conducted at least two airstrikes targeting a likely Houthi communications site in Baraa, eastern Hudaydah Governorate.[85]

The Houthis claimed that they have launched three drones and two ballistic missiles at Israeli military sites across Israel since April 11.[86] The Houthis claimed that they launched two drones targeting two Israeli military targets near Tel Aviv on April 11.[87] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intercepted a drone on April 11.[88] A Jordanian military source told Yemeni media that a drone crashed in southern Jordan on April 11.[89] The Houthis claimed that they launched two ballistic missiles targeting Israeli missile and drone launch sites at Sdot Micha Base in Ashdod and Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel on April 13.[90] The IDF intercepted one of the missiles.[91] The Houthis also claimed on April 13 that they launched a drone targeting an unspecified target in Ashkelon, southern Israel.[92] The IDF has not acknowledged this drone attack at the time of this writing.

The Houthis separately claimed on April 13 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over Hajjah Governorate.[93] The Houthis claimed that they have shot down 19 US drones since the start of the October 7 War.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The Iranian rial appreciated from 1,005,500 rials to one US dollar on April 11 to 879,000 rials on April 14. The appreciation of the rial between April 11 and April 14 was largely due to the nuclear talks that the United States and Iran held in Oman on April 12.[94]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.