Iran Update, April 26, 2023

April 26, 2023, 4:30 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani

An unidentified man shot and killed Shia cleric and Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in a bank in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26.[i] The assailant was a bank security guard who intentionally targeted Soleimani, although his motive remains unclear.[ii] Soleimani most recently represented Sistan and Baluchistan in the Assembly of Experts--the regime body responsible for selecting the supreme leader.[iii] Soleimani previously served as the Friday prayer leader of Kashan, Esfahan Province and Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province between 2001 and 2022.[iv] Soleimani oversaw Sunni affairs during his tenure as Zahedan Friday Prayer Leader.[v] Soleimani’s connections to the historically restive Sistan and Baluchistan Province are noteworthy following heightened tensions between Iranian officials and Sistan and Baluchistan residents in recent months.

Soleimani’s murder also follows a series of attacks on clerics within the past year.[vi] An unidentified individual stabbed a cleric and fled on a motorcycle in Tehran on February 13, as CTP previously reported.[vii] Unidentified individuals separately stabbed and wounded four clerics in Qom on December 18.[viii] An unidentified man additionally stabbed Esfahan Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Yousef Tabatabai Nejad in June 2022.[ix] It is unclear if these incidents are becoming more frequent or if they reflect heightened anti-regime sentiments. It is additionally unclear if the regime is interpreting these incidents as such.

Iranian state media and officials issued conflicting messaging on the nature of the attack. Iranian officials called for an investigation into Soleimani’s death and described him as a martyr.[x] Regime-affiliated outlets initially reported that a bank security guard used a firearm to intentionally target Soleimani, but later stated that an unidentified individual stole the weapon from the security guard.[xi] Mazandaran Provincial Governor Mahmoud Hosseini Pour claimed that the bank security guard used his weapon to aimlessly fire at a group of individuals. Hosseini Pour added that the incident was not a terrorist attack.[xii]

Fanouj, Sistan and Baluchistan Province residents protested the death of a 16-year-old boy in front of the city Law Enforcement Command (LEC) headquarters on April 25.[xiii] LEC officers reportedly ran over a 16-year-old boy while he was riding a motorcycle on April 25. Iranian social media users circulated videos of LEC officers shooting at the protesters, injuring three individuals.[xiv] The regime deployed a “large number of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) forces” from Iranshahr—a city approximately 160 kilometers away from Fanouj—to Fanouj on April 25 in response to the incident.[xv] Sistan and Baluchistan Province LEC Social Deputy Colonel Ali Rahimi denied in an interview with IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency on April 25 that the LEC was involved in the death of the 16-year-old motorist.[xvi] Rahimi added that LEC officers “were forced to shoot in the air” after the crowd began throwing stones and glass at the headquarters.  Security forces previously killed roughly 100 individuals during the “Bloody Friday” Massacre in Zahedan in September 2022, sparking months of ongoing anti-regime activity within the province.[xvii]

Key Takeaways

• An unidentified man shot and killed Shia cleric and Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in a bank in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26.
• Fanouj, Sistan and Baluchistan Province residents protested the death of a 16-year-old in front of the city Law Enforcement Command (LEC) headquarters on April 25. 
• At least three protests occurred in three cities across three provinces on April 26.
• CTP recorded reported student poisonings in two cities across two provinces on April 26.
• The Washington Post reported on April 26 that the World Health Organization (WHO) had offered to assist the Iranian Health Ministry investigate ongoing poisoning incidents on an unspecified date.
• Iranian authorities arrested two former advisors of reformist politician Mir Hossein Mousavi on April 25.
• Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Yemeni National Salvation Government Chief Negotiator Mohammad Abdol Salam in Muscat, Oman on April 25.
• The Iranian Minister of Roads and City Construction Mehrad Bazerbash announced that the Syrian-Iranian Joint Economic Forum established eight new committees focusing on Iranian investment, energy, and electricity during a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad on April 26.
• A Kataib Hezbollah (KH) delegation arrived in Albu Kamal city, Deir ez Zor province on April 25 to replace Iranian militias according to a report from Eye of Euphrates.
• Members of the Shia Coordination Framework—via Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani—are consolidating government resources through budget allocation and office appointments.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least three protests occurred in three cities across three provinces on April 26. CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[xviii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Engineers

Shiraz, Fars Province[xix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Nurses

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xx]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

CTP recorded student poisonings in two cities across two provinces on April 26.

The Washington Post reported on April 26 that the World Health Organization (WHO) had offered to assist the Iranian Health Ministry investigate ongoing poisoning incidents on an unspecified date. The WHO added that an expert team “is on standby for deployment should this be requested,” suggesting that Iranian officials have not yet responded to the offer. The Post interviewed Iranian doctors, who alleged that regime officials instructed them to diagnose poisoning victims with stress. An Iranian schoolteacher at an impacted school additionally told the Post that intelligence officials had returned to the school on several occasions to confiscate CCTV footage of parents chanting anti-regime slogans. The teacher noted that poisoning incidents impacted teachers as well as students, resulting in lasting side-effects in some individuals.[xxi]

Iranian authorities arrested two former advisors of reformist politician Mir Hossein Mousavi on April 25. Iranian media tied the arrest of Alireza Beheshti Shirazi, who previously advised and managed Mousavi’s public relations office, and Ghorban Behzadian Nejad, who headed Mousavi’s 2009 presidential campaign, to their participation in a virtual conference titled “Dialogue to Save Iran” on April 21.[xxii] Anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that the conference included the discussion of the Islamic Republic’s collapse and a new constitution.[xxiii] Mousavi had previously called for ”foundational change” in Iran on February 4.[xxiv]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Yemeni National Salvation Government Chief Negotiator Mohammad Abdol Salam in Muscat, Oman on April 26.[xxv] Abdollahian emphasized Iran’s support for reaching a comprehensive ceasefire between Yemeni political groups and lifting the blockade on Yemen.

External Security and Military Affairs

The Iranian Minister of Roads and City Construction Mehrad Bazerbash announced that the Syrian-Iranian Joint Economic Forum established eight new committees focusing on Iranian investment, energy, and electricity during a meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad on April 26.[xxvi] The Syrian-Iranian Joint Economic Forum established eight new committees to facilitate Iranian investment and economic activity in Syria. The Syrian Minister of Industry Dr. Abdul Qadir Jokhadar met with the Deputy Iranian Oil Minister and Director of the Iranian General Company for Petrochemical Industries Morteza Shahirazai to discuss developing industrial technology and production lines.[xxvii]

A Kataib Hezbollah (KH) delegation arrived in Albu Kamal city, Deir ez Zor province on April 25 to replace Iranian militias according to a report from Eye of Euphrates.[xxviii] Unspecified sources claimed that the KH delegation will replace some of the Iranian militants currently operating in Albu Kamal. The Iranian militias will reportedly be transferred to Badia, Homs, and southern Syria.

Iranian militias test flew an unspecified drone from Boqrus to Makhan, Al Mayadeen District on April 26 as part of a training exercise.[xxix] CTP previously assessed that Iranian trainers sent to Deir ez Zor Province between April 17 and 19 may have been training Iranian-backed militants in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.[xxx]

Members of the Shia Coordination Framework—via Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani—are consolidating government resources through budget allocation and office appointments. Sudani claimed that he will replace cabinet ministers and provincial governors as a result of his six-month evaluation.[xxxi] Sudani maintained that he is the sole decision-maker to determine who is replaced; once again denying claims that the Shia Coordination Framework – a political coalition of Shia political parties – was directing the changes. State of Law Coalition member Saad al Mutalabi claimed that Sudani would replace any Shia ministers with a Shia individual from the same party but that Sudani has the authority to replace a Sunni official with a Shia one.[xxxii] Mutalabi’s statement confirms CTP’s previous assessment that the Sudani administration is likely sidelining Sunni opposition from office.[xxxiii]

Deputy Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi met with framework-alligned National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim to discuss approving the 2023-2025 budget.[xxxiv] Mandalawi also met with Minister of Transportation Razzaq Muhibis al Saadawi to discuss increasing the budget for the Ministry of Transportation.[xxxv] CTP previously reported that Saadawi is expected to be replaced during Sudani’s ministerial replacements.  Saadawi is a member of the Shia Coordination Framework party al Fatah. According to Mutulabi, Saadawi would be replaced by a fellow al Fatah member. The 2023-2025 budget is a means by which the Shia Coordination Framework may allocate resources among its allies.