Iran Update, April 9, 2025

Information Cutoff 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand.[i] A senior Hezbollah official told Reuters on April 9 that Hezbollah is willing to discuss disarmament with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun.[ii] Iranian media separately argued on April 9 that the United States must negotiate with Axis of Resistance groups directly because these groups operate "independently.”[iii] These reports follow similar reports in recent days that claimed that Iran is reducing its support for the Houthis and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[iv] This informational campaign is part of a long-running Iranian campaign that seeks to obfuscate Iranian support for its proxies and absolve Iran of responsibility for its proxies’ actions.

Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.[v] Iran has financially supported the military reconstitution of Lebanese Hezbollah since the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire went into effect in November 2024.[vi] UK-based outlet The Times reported on April 9 that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force sent advanced missiles to unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in early April 2025.[vii] Iranian-backed Iraqi militia sources separately told Emirati media on April 9 that the militias disagree about whether to disarm.[viii] This report refutes earlier statements made by members of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to Western media on April 7 that the militias had agreed to disarm.[ix] CTP-ISW continues to assess that Iran is unlikely to abandon its support for the Axis of Resistance as it serves as a key component of Iran’s long-standing regional strategy and deterrence against the United States and Israel.

Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. Some senior US and Israeli officials have recently called for the complete dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program.[x] IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would "retain enrichment for non-weapons needs."[xi] Iran currently has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce six nuclear weapons.[xii] Iranian Supreme Leader Adviser Ali Shamkhani stated on April 9 that Iran's network of nuclear facilities and technology is "stabilized, irreversible, and indestructible."[xiii] An unspecified Iranian official similarly told Western media that the Iranian nuclear program "cannot be dismantled."[xiv]

Israeli media reported on April 9 that the United States set a 60-day deadline, starting on April 12, for Iran to agree to a new nuclear deal.[xv] Iran and the United States are expected to hold nuclear talks in Oman on April 12. Negotiations for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) took around 20 months.[xvi]  Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel's demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a "long-term" deal. Iran has explicitly rejected some of these demands, including the full dismantlement of its nuclear program.[xvii] Trump previously warned in late March 2025 that "there will be a bombing" if Iran does not agree to a new nuclear deal.[xviii] Senior Iranian officials have threatened to attack US bases and forces in the Middle East in response to a potential strike on Iran.[xix]

Iran reportedly recently delivered advanced missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, possibly in order to diversify its strike options in response to a potential US or Israeli strike on Iran. The Times reported on April 8 that Iran delivered an unspecified number of Arqab cruise missiles and Jamal 69 ballistic missiles to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xx] Arqab cruise missiles, also known as Paveh missiles, have a range of around 1,650 kilometers.[xxi] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, frequently used Arqab missiles to attack Israel between May and November 2024.[xxii] Iran has reportedly supplied Iranian-backed Iraqi militias with Jamal 69 ballistic missiles, or Iranian Zolfaghar missiles, since 2018.[xxiii]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have increasingly threatened to target US forces in Iraq and Syria in recent days. Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada Secretary General Abu Alaa al Walai implied on April 2 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would respond to a US or Israeli strike on Iran.[xxiv] The Popular Campain to Expel the American Occupation threatened to target the US Embassy in Baghdad if Iran is attacked.[xxv] These threats mirror Iranian efforts to discourage a US or Israeli strike on Iran by threatening attacks on the United States in Iraq.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City.[xxvi] The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.[xxvii] Mashat largely serves as a figurehead in the Houthi regime, while the head of the presidential office, Ahmed Hamed, exerts control and influences decision-making behind the scenes.[xxviii] Hamed has close ties to Houthi Supreme Leader Abdulmalik al Houthi and fought alongside Abdulmalik in the early 2000s.[xxix] Abdulmalik appointed Hamed as head of the presidential office in January 2018.[xxx]

CENTCOM has conducted at least 20 airstrikes targeting Houthi infrastructure and leadership in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on April 8.[xxxi] The military base that CENTCOM struck on Mount Nuqum reportedly contains underground weapons depots and tunnel networks.[xxxii] CENTCOM conducted at least four airstrikes in two separate sorties targeting communications sites. These sites likely support Houthi operations in Houthi territory as well as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and against Israel.[xxxiii] CENTCOM targeted likely Houthi barracks in Amin Muqbil on the outskirts of Hudaydah City.[xxxiv] Airstrikes targeting communications sites and strategic points near Houthi-controlled ports will likely impede the Houthis’ logistics, including the Houthis’ ability to move military supplies and coordinate operations.[xxxv]

Internationally recognized Yemeni government officials argued on April 8 and 9 that a ground offensive, in addition to airstrikes, against the Houthis is the only way to eliminate the Houthi threat to international shipping.[xxxvi] These officials called for international support for a ground offensive. CENTCOM Commander General Erik Kurilla separately met with several US defense partners and allies in the Middle East between April 1 and 5 to discuss regional developments.[xxxvii] Kurilla held separate meetings with the Chief of Staff of the Yemeni Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Sagheer Ahmed Aziz, and the Chief of General Staff of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, General Fayyad bin Hamed al Ruwayli, in Riyadh between April 3 and 5.[xxxviii] The officials likely discussed the CENTCOM airstrike campaign against the Houthis in Yemen and may have discussed cooperation with the Yemeni Armed Forces and Saudi Arabian Armed Forces to address the Houthi threat.

A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025.[xxxix] Mohammed Jabar acknowledged in an interview with a UAE-based outlet that he coordinated the March 6 attacks against transitional government forces.[xl] Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad.[xli]  Tartous security forces previously said that Assadist insurgents received salaries from abroad and used foreign communications equipment.[xlii] Jabar’s admission supports the assessment that Iran and Iranian-backed militias did not fund or oversee the Assadist insurgency in March.

Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.  Jabar echoed a sectarian justification for the Alawite insurgency, claiming that his forces rose up without preparation in self-defense after transitional government forces targeted Alawites across coastal Syria.[xliii] Jabar also expressed personal grievances against the Shara government for seizing his property in Latakia.[xliv] The tactical proficiency of the insurgents’ actions, such as blocking the transitional government’s route to the Syrian coast, suggest that insurgents planned and coordinated the attacks in advance, contrary to Jabar’s claims.[xlv]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Information Operation: Iran and the Axis of Resistance are continuing to conduct an information operation targeting the West ahead of “high-level” talks between Iran and the United States on April 12. This campaign likely seeks to set conditions for Iran to argue during the negotiations that it is distancing itself from the Axis of Resistance, which is reportedly a US demand. Iran is continuing to support the Axis of Resistance despite its claims to English-language media that it is reducing support for its proxies and partners.
• Iranian Nuclear Program: Iran has continued to reject demands to fully dismantle its nuclear program. IRGC-affiliated media published an article on April 9 stating that Iran could agree to reduce its uranium enrichment but would "retain enrichment for non-weapons needs." Israeli media reported on April 9 that Israel's demands include Iran dismantling its nuclear program, halting ballistic missile production, ceasing support for the Axis of Resistance, and agreeing to a "long-term" deal.
• CENTCOM Airstrikes in Yemen: US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted at least 10 airstrikes on April 8 targeting a Houthi military base on Mount Nuqum on the eastern outskirts of Sanaa City. The strike reportedly injured Houthi President Mahdi al Mashat and a senior Houthi intelligence officer.
• Syrian Insurgency: A Syrian businessman and former militia leader admitted on April 8 that he ordered his forces to fight the Syrian transitional government in coastal Syria in early March 2025. Jabar is the former leader of a pro-Assad militia called the Desert Falcons. Jabar fled to Russia in 2016 following disagreements with Bashar al Assad. Jabar may have admitted his role in the insurgency to perpetuate Alawite sectarian narratives that the insurgency was an act of self-defense.

Syria

Alawite insurgents attacked transitional government forces at a checkpoint in Kasab, Latakia Province, on April 8.[xlvi] Kasab is located near the Turkey-Syria border. The Syrian transitional government has established checkpoints across western Syria to improve security and limit insurgent freedom of movement. The fighters manning these checkpoints have killed civilians—both in extrajudicial killings and accidentally—on several occasions, which risks damaging the relationship between security forces and the local population and providing opportunities for insurgents to exploit.[xlvii]

Transitional government forces seized over thirty 120mm mortar shells used by Alawite insurgents in a forested area of Beit Yashout, Latakia Province, on April 9.[xlviii]  Assadist insurgents fled to forested hills away from population centers during transitional government counterinsurgency operations in March, which suggests that the insurgents used the mortar shells during the early March insurgent campaign.[xlix]

A Sunni sectarian militia expressed support for hardline Salafi-jihadi ideology similar to the ideology of al Qaeda and ISIS on April 9.[l] Saraya Ansar al Sunnah claimed that it killed nearly 20 non-Sunni individuals across three provinces in the last week.[li] This sectarian militia has fewer than a thousand followers on multiple Telegram channels, demonstrating that the group’s hardline ideology has not gained traction in the Syrian information space at this time. Saraya Ansar al Sunnah has made repeated sectarian statements in recent weeks warning that it would target Alawites for crimes committed by the Assad regime and continue its attacks until Alawites and Shias were “eliminated” or displaced from the region.[lii] Social media users have accused transitional government forces of committing some of the attacks that Saraya al Sunnah has claimed that it committed..[liii] Attacks by Sunni sectarian militias within close proximity to government forces risk further decreasing trust between Alawites and government forces.

The Turkish foreign minister confirmed on April 9 that Turkey is open to holding talks with Israel to create a deconfliction line to avoid potential conflict over Israeli strikes in Syria.[liv] The Turkish Defense Ministry denied on April 8 that it had held talks with Israel.[lv] Middle East Eye reported on April 7 that talks between Turkey and Israel began after Israel struck Tiyas Airbase in Homs Province.[lvi] Israel struck Tiyas Airbase on March 21, March 24, and April 2.[lvii] An open line of communication between Turkey and Israel could possibly prevent a potential stand-off between the two countries, particularly one that may be triggered if Israel continues to strike Syrian bases and Turkey continues to develop plans to base its forces in Syria.

A second group of US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters withdrew from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods in Aleppo City on April 9.[lviii] Nearly 500 SDF fighters withdrew from the two historically Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo City to SDF-controlled areas east of the Euphrates River.[lix] Syrian media circulated videos on April 9 that showed a convoy of SDF vehicles withdrawing from Aleppo City.[lx] Syrian transitional government forces supervised the withdrawal and deployed to the two neighborhoods to backfill the SDF.[lxi] Around 500 SDF fighters previously withdrew from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods on April 4 after the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) agreed to transfer control of the two neighborhoods to the Syrian transitional government.[lxii] The YPG is the military arm of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which dominates the SDF.

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

The Iraqi Council of Ministers announced that the upcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections will take place on November 11, 2025.[lxiii] An official from the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), which is the Iraqi electoral commission, told Kurdish media on April 9 that the Council of Ministers set this date in coordination with IHEC.[lxiv] Iraqi electoral law requires parliamentary elections to occur at least 45 days before the end of the four-year legislative term, which corresponds to November 25, 2025.[lxv]

The Iraqi federal government signed memorandums of understanding (MoUs) with two US-based companies on April 9 to increase Iraq’s electricity supply.[lxvi] The Iraqi federal government signed an MoU with GE Vernova for a 24,000-megawatt gas power plant. The government also signed an MOU with UGT Renewables to develop a 3,000-megawatt solar energy project and modernize electricity transmission networks. The Iraqi Chamber of Commerce separately signed an MoU with the US Chamber of Commerce to strengthen US-Iraqi economic cooperation. These MoUs follow the United States’ revocation of a waiver for Iraq to import Iranian electricity on March 10 as part of the US “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.[lxvii]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a drone attack on an unspecified Israeli military target in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area on April 9.[lxviii] The IDF has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

The Houthis claimed that they conducted a drone attack targeting the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier in the Red Sea on April 9.[lxix] CENTCOM has not commented on the attack at the time of this writing.

The Houthis claimed on April 9 that they shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over al Jawf Governorate in Yemen.[lxx]  CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim.

US State Department Spokesperson Tammy Bruce reiterated on April 9 that the United States will “not tolerate” any country or commercial entity that supports the Houthis.[lxxi] Bruce noted that offloading ships at Houthi-controlled ports or providing oil to the Houthis risks violating US law.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

CTP-ISW will not be covering the new Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip. We have reprioritized our Middle East coverage to focus on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian domestic security, and Iranian efforts to rebuild its networks into the Levant, including the Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel and its partners have destroyed Hamas' military organization and severed the group's ability to resupply itself, we are now focused on how Iran seeks to rebuild its lines of communication with Hezbollah and Hamas through Syria.    

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

The United States sanctioned five Iranian entities and one individual on April 9 for supporting the Iranian nuclear program.[lxxii] The sanctions targeted entities and individuals that support the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and its subordinate, the Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA). US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that the US Treasury will continue to use all available tools to prevent Iran from advancing its nuclear program and “broader destabilizing objectives.”[lxxiii]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.