Iran Update, August 12, 2024

Information Cutoff: 2:00pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

US and Israeli officials have warned that Iran will likely conduct a large-scale, coordinated attack targeting Israel in the days ahead.[i]  White House National Security Communications Adviser John Kirby expressed concern on August 12 about the “increasing probability that Iran and its proxies will attack in the coming days.”[ii] Israel similarly assesses that Iran will likely attack Israel directly “within days,” according to unspecified sources speaking to Axios.[iii] These warnings are consistent with Western intelligence sources previously assessing that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah may attack Israel on the Jewish holiday Tisha B’Av on August 12-13.[iv]

The unspecified sources separately told Axios that the Israel expects Lebanese Hezbollah to attack first followed by a direct Iranian attack.[v] Axios similarly reported on August 5 that the United States expects Iran and its Axis of Resistance to conduct “two waves” of attacks on Israel, citing unspecified US officials.[vi] The officials added that the Iran-Hezbollah attack will likely be “bigger” than the Iranian drone and missile attack on Israel in April 2024 and that Iran and Hezbollah might target military sites near civilian areas.[vii] These statements are all consistent with CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel in response to Israel killing senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.[viii]

The United States deployed the USS Georgia guided-missile submarine to the Middle East and ordered the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, which is equipped with F-35C fighter jets, to accelerate its transit to the region on August 12.[ix] The deployment of the USS Georgia is part of US force posture changes ahead of Iran’s and Iranian-backed groups’ expected attack on Israel. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the deployment following a phone call with Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, during which Austin emphasized the United States’ “commitment to take every possible step to defend Israel.”[x] The US Department of Defense previously announced on August 2 that it would deploy air- and sea-based cruise missile defenses, ballistic missile defense-capable cruisers and destroyers, and additional fighter jets to the Middle East.[xi] F-22 Raptors arrived in the Middle East on August 8.[xii]

Iran is expected to imminently deliver hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia to support its invasion of Ukraine.[xiii] European intelligence sources told Reuters that Iran and Russia signed a contract in December 2023 for Iran to deliver Ababil close-range ballistic missiles[xiv] Fateh-360 short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. This reporting is consistent with a previous Wall Street Journal report saying that a Russian delegation visited an Iran in December 2023 to “observe” Iranian [xv] including the Ababil missile. Ababil missiles have a range of around 86 kilometers[xvi] Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry officials displayed a miniature replica of the Ababil missile for the first time at a Russian military exhibition in August 2023. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh later showcased an Ababil missile during former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s visit to Tehran in September 2023. Fateh-360 msiles have a range of around 120 kilomers and can rry[xvii]payload of 150 kilograms. The European intelligence sources speaking to Reuters [xviii]that dozens of Russian military personnel are currently training in Iran on how to operate Fateh-360 missiles.[xix]

Western and Ukrainian sources have previously warned that Iran may be preparing to provide Russia with short-range ballistic systems, including multiple systems with maximum ranges and payloads significantly greater than the limits imposed upon Russia under its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) obligations.[xx] The missiles that Iran is planning to deliver to Russia are too short-range for Iran to be able to use them against Israel, so Iran may not feel that providing these missiles to Russia will reduce its ability to conduct an effective direct attack on Israel. These short-range ballistic missiles will likely allow Russian forces to strike Ukrainian near-rear targets while reserving its own missile stockpiles (such as Iskander missiles) for deep-rear Ukrainian targets.[xxi] [Note: A similar version of this text appears in CTP-ISW's Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2024.]

Iranian Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Coordination Deputy Brigadier General Ali Shadmani traveled to Moscow on August 12 to attend an annual Russian military exhibition.[xxii] The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations.[xxiii] Iranian state media reported that Shadmani will meet with senior Russian military officials, view “the latest combat technologies” at the Army 2024 military exhibition, and meet with high-ranking foreign military delegations on the sidelines of the exhibition.[xxiv] An Iranian military delegation headed by Armed Forces General Staff Deputy Chief Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh visited the Army 2023 Russian military exhibition in August 2023.[xxv] The Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry showcased a variety of Iranian-made defense products, including air defense systems, drones, and missiles, at the exhibition in 2023.[xxvi]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian submitted 19 cabinet minister nominations to Parliament on August 11.[xxvii] Pezeshkian nominated five individuals who held senior positions in the Hassan Rouhani administration and three individuals who held senior positions in the Ebrahim Raisi administration.[xxviii] Pezeshkian nominated one woman. The average age of his proposed cabinet is 59.7 years old.[xxix] Parliament will begin voting to approve the nominees on August 17.[xxx] Pezeshkian nominated the following individuals:

• Aziz Nasir Zadeh: Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister
• Abbas Araghchi: Foreign Affairs Minister
• Esmail Khatib: Intelligence and Security Minister
• Eskandar Momeni: Interior Minister
• Ali Reza Kazemi: Education Minister
• Sattar Hashemi: Information and Communications Technology Minister

• Abdul Naser Hemmati: Economic Affairs and Finance Minister
• Mohammad Reza Zafar Ghandi: Health, Treatment, and Medical Education Minister

• Ahmad Midari: Cooperatives, Labor, and Social Welfare Minister
• Gholam Reza Nouri Ghazaljeh: Agricultural Jihad Minister
• Amin Hossein Rahimi: Justice Minister
• Farzaneh Sadegh Malvajard: Roads and Urban Development Minister
• Mohammad Atabek: Industry, Mining, and Trade Minister
• Hossein Simai Saraf: Science, Research, and Technology Minister
• Abbas Salehi: Culture and Islamic Guidance Minister
• Mohammad Reza Salehi Amiri: Cultural Heritage, Tourism, and Handicrafts Minister
• Mohsen Pak Nejad: Oil Minister
• Abbas Ali Abadi: Energy Minister
• Ahmed Dunyamali: Sports and Youth Minister

Aziz Nasir Zadeh currently serves as the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) deputy chief.[xxxi] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Nasir Zadeh as AFGS deputy chief in September 2021—the first time an Artesh Air Force officer has held such a senior position in the military hierarchy.[xxxii] Nasir Zadeh is a former F-14 pilot who served as the commander of the Artesh Air Force from 2018 to 2021.[xxxiii] Nasir Zadeh began his military career as a pilot in the Artesh Air Force during the Iran-Iraq War.[xxxiv]

Abbas Araghchi played a prominent role in the nuclear negotiations with the West under the Hassan Rouhani administration and served as Rouhani's deputy foreign affairs minister for policy between 2017 and 2021.[xxxv][xxxvi]

Esmail Khatib served as intelligence and security minister under former President Ebrahim Raisi. Khatib has close ties to both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the IRGC.[xxxvii] Khatib previously headed the security department of the US-sanctioned bonyad Astan Quds Razavi. Khatib recently claimed that Israel killed Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran “with the green light of the United States.”[xxxviii]

Eskandar Momeni served in the IRGC Ground Forces 25th Karbala Division during the Iran-Iraq war. Momeni later served as the Khorasan Razavi Province police chief when Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf was the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) commander.[xxxix] Momeni was also the LEC deputy commander and most recently headed the LEC Anti-Narcotics Headquarters.[xl]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian filled four cabinet positions on August 10. Pezeshkian retained Mohammad Eslami as director of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization.[xli] Eslami has held this position since August 2021.[xlii] Pezeshkian also appointed Saeed Ohadi as president of the Martyrs’ and Veterans’ Affairs Foundation, which is affiliated with the IRGC and provides loans to former Iranian military personnel and their families.[xliii] Ohadi previously headed the foundation from 2020 to 2021 under former President Hassan Rouhani.[xliv] Ohadi was a deputy tourism minister in the Ebrahim Raisi administration.[xlv] Pezeshkian lastly appointed Zahra Behrouz Azar as vice president for women and family affairs and Hossein Afshin as vice president for science, technology, and the knowledge-based economy.[xlvi]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister-designate Abbas Araghchi described his foreign policy agenda during a meeting with the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee on August 12.[xlvii] Araghchi stated that he would pursue, as foreign minister, “hostility management” with the United States and ”honorable, functional, and opportunity-oriented interactions” with Europe. Araghchi further said that he would try to both lift and neutralize sanctions.[xlviii] Lifting sanctions refers to pursuing nuclear negotiations with the West, while neutralizing sanctions refers to mitigating the effect of sanctions by building indigenous capacities and bilateral relationships with regional and extra-regional countries. Araghchi’s comments mirror recent statements from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei about nuclear negotiations. Khamenei said on July 21 that the Masoud Pezeshkian administration should try to both lift and neutralize sanctions.[xlix] Araghchi is likely trying to present himself as completely aligned with Khamenei in order to increase the likelihood that Parliament will approve him as foreign minister.

Mohammad Javad Zarif resigned as Iranian vice president for strategic affairs on August 11—only 10 days after Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed him to the position.[l] Zarif is known most prominently for his role as Iranian foreign affairs minister from 2013 to 2021. Zarif presented his resignation as vice president for strategic affairs as his response to Pezeshkian submitting his cabinet nominees to Parliament. Zarif expressed disappointment with the nominees and claimed that only three of the nominees were the top recommendations of the transition team, which Zarif led. Zarif in announcing his resignation apologized to the Iranian people for failing to secure a younger and more diverse list of nominees.[li] Zarif has a long history of tendering his resignation from senior regime positions in order to protest certain intra-regime dynamics or political outcomes.[lii]

The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee—a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—threatened to attack US forces if the United States conducts attacks within Iraq or uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran.[liii] The coordination committee added that it is not “bound by any restrictions” regarding attacking US forces.[liv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, mostly operating under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq moniker, conducted over 170 attacks targeting US troops in Iraq and Syria between October 2023-January 2024.[lv] A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat al Nujaba’s (HHN) political bureau, Mahdi al Kaabi, announced the [lvi]attacks on July 30. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia e claimed six attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since July 17, when CTP-ISW assessed the mil[lvii]resume their attack campaign targeting US forces in the Middle East.

Iraqi media reported on August 11 that this announcement follows a conversation between US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani about US force protection in Iraq.[lviii] Sudani is trying to limit escalation between the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, according to multiple Iraqi media outlets on August 12.[lix] An unspecified source claimed that Sudani requested a guarantee from Blinken that the United States would not attack any sites tied to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in return for Sudani trying to keep the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from attacking US forces.[lx] The United States has conducted multiple self-defense strikes targeting Iranian-backed militia sites in Iraq, including a July 30 strike on militants who were preparing to launch a one-way attack drone at an International Coalition base.[lxi] Another source “close to the Iraqi factions” reported that Sudani sent a message to the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias confirming that the Iraqi federal government is working to remove US forces from Iraq but adding that the Iraqi federal government will not allow violations of the law or any targeting operations against US forces.[lxii]

An anonymous Islamic Resistance in Iraq source told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is developing “new mechanisms” for attacking Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria.[lxiii] The source specified that one such strategy has been deliberately conducting operations under militias with unknown names, headquarters, and leaders.[lxiv] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have notably used facade groups to obscure their involvement in attacks and operations since 2020.[lxv] Newly formed militia al Thawriyyun has conducted three attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria since July 25 and may have ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah.[lxvi] The  Islamic Resistance in Iraq source added that the group is constantly coordinating with “fronts” in Yemen and Lebanon, implying the Houthis and Hezbollah.[lxvii] CTP-ISW has previously observed multiple instances of coordination between Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in recent months.[lxviii]

Hamas has refused to participate in ceasefire-hostage negotiations in Qatar scheduled for August 15.[lxix] Hamas asked international mediators on August 11 to ” oblige” Israel to accept “a plan to implement” a previous ceasefire proposal that Hamas submitted in July 2024—instead of conducting further negotiations.[lxx] This Hamas ceasefire proposal reportedly compromised on one of Hamas’ maximalist demands by allowing a partial IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip during the first phase of a three-phase ceasefire agreement.[lxxi] Hamas’ previous position demanded a complete IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip during the first phase.[lxxii] Hamas also stated that Israel killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and a recent Israeli airstrike in Gaza City showed that Israel is “not serious about a permanent ceasefire.”[lxxiii] The United States, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates released a joint statement on August 8 calling on Israel and Hamas to join a final round of negotiations.[lxxiv]

Hamas also condemned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for adding “new conditions that were not proposed throughout the negotiation process.”[lxxv] Hamas was likely referring to Netanyahu’s office releasing a statement in July 2024 identifying four “non-negotiable principles” for a deal with Hamas.[lxxvi] These principles were not present in previous unofficial ceasefire proposals negotiated between Israel and Hamas. These principles involve Israel retaining control of the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, monitoring the flow of Palestinians into the northern Gaza Strip, and obtaining the “maximum number of live hostages. . . in the first phase of the three-stage deal.”[lxxvii] Israel and Hamas had previously discussed releasing female, elderly, and injured hostages in the first phase of the deal, making the latter principle a particularly notable change from previous negotiations.[lxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Israel: US and Israeli officials have warned that Iran will likely conduct a large-scale, coordinated attack targeting Israel in the days ahead. These statements are all consistent with CTP-ISW's ongoing assessment that Iran and its Axis of Resistance will most likely conduct a coordinated, large-scale drone and missile attack on Israel in response to Israel killing senior Axis of Resistance leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, in recent weeks.
• Russia: Iran is expected to imminently deliver hundreds of ballistic missiles to Russia to support its invasion of Ukraine. Western and Ukrainian sources have previously warned that Iran may be preparing to provide Russia with short-range ballistic systems, including multiple systems with maximum ranges and payloads significantly greater than the limits imposed upon Russia under its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) obligations.
• Iran: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian submitted 19 cabinet minister nominations to Parliament. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister-designate Abbas Araghchi described his foreign policy agenda during a meeting with the Iranian Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee.
• Iraq: The Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee—a coordinating body for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—threatened to attack US forces if the United States conducts attacks within Iraq or uses Iraqi airspace to attack Iran.
• Gaza Strip: Hamas has refused to participate in ceasefire-hostage negotiations in Qatar scheduled for August 15.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias mortared Israeli forces around the Netzarim Corridor, south of Gaza City, on August 12.[lxxix] Commercially available satellite imagery from August 11 suggests that Israeli forces have continued to demolish buildings south of the Netzarim Corridor near Wadi Gaza. Israeli media reported in July 2024 that Israel Defense Forces (IDF) combat engineers were creating a four-kilometer-wide buffer zone around the Netzarim Corridor.[lxxx]

Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces that are re-clearing eastern Khan Younis on August 12. Three Palestinian militias mortared Israeli forces in eastern and northeastern Khan Younis.[lxxxi] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed that it detonated a minefield targeting Israeli armor advancing northeast of Khan Younis.[lxxxii] The IDF did not confirm on August 12 that its 98th Division continued clearing operations in Khan Younis. The IDF stated that it re-entered Khan Younis on August 9 in response to intelligence indicating the presence of additional Palestinian militia infrastructure in the area.[lxxxiii]

Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor in Rafah on August 12. The IDF 162nd Division has operated in Rafah since May 2024.[lxxxiv] Hamas and PIJ detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting an Israeli tank in Tal al Sultan, western Rafah.[lxxxv] Palestinian militias also targeted Israeli forces with sniper fire and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) in Tal al Sultan. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) similarly targeted Israeli forces in eastern Rafah with RPGs.[lxxxvi]

The IDF released an additional 12 names and photos of Hamas and PIJ fighters that died in the Israeli airstrike on al Tabaeen school mosque in Gaza City on August 10.[lxxxvii] The IDF said that the airstrike targeted a Hamas and PIJ “military facility.”[lxxxviii] The IDF previously confirmed the identities of 24 fighters who died in the airstrike.[lxxxix] Hamas claimed that the airstrike killed hundreds of civilians.[xc]

Hamas military spokesperson Abu Obeida claimed on August 12 that Hamas guards killed an Israeli hostage and wounded two other hostages.[xci] Obeida claimed that Hamas is providing medical care to the two wounded hostages and is investigating why the guards shot the hostages. Hamas did not include proof of the claim. The IDF said that it is aware of the claim but that it has not received intelligence to confirm or refute Hamas’ claim.[xcii] Palestinian militias have previously lied about the fate of Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip.[xciii]

Palestinian militias conducted at least two rocket attacks into southern Israel on August 12. Palestinian fighters fired a rocket from Khan Younis at an Israeli town near the Gaza Strip.[xciv] The rocket struck an open area.[xcv] The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement separately fired two rockets into southern Israel.[xcvi]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on August 11.[xcvii] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and PIJ fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting Israeli forces in Jenin.[xcviii] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades separately fired small arms targeting an IDF checkpoint north of Jericho Governorate.[xcix] PIJ and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades conducted a combined attack targeting an IDF checkpoint using small arms in Tayibe west of Tulkarm.[c]

Hamas claimed the August 11 shooting attack that killed one Israeli civilian and injured another near the Israeli settlement of Mehola in the northern Jordan Valley.[ci] Hamas fighters opened fire on multiple civilian vehicles in the attack. Hamas claimed that the fighters who conducted the attack then returned to their respective bases.[cii] The IDF deployed several units to the Jordan Valley following the attack.[ciii] Hamas claimed that the attack was in response to the Israeli airstrike on al Tabaeen school mosque in Gaza City on August 10 and other recent Israeli strikes in the Gaza Strip.[civ]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli settlers attacked Israeli forces and Palestinians across the West Bank as a reaction to the August 11 Hamas shooting attack in the Jordan Valley.[cv] Groups of settlers reportedly pelted stones at IDF personnel in multiple locations across the West Bank, however, no IDF casualties were reported. Israeli settlers additionally targeted Palestinians and set fire to ”Palestinian vehicles” in various locations across the West Bank.[cvi] The Israeli Army Radio correspondent noted that at least two Arab Israeli citizens were injured during the confrontations.[cvii]

IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi discussed the August 11 Hamas shooting attack with senior Israeli military and civilian officials in the Jordan Valley.[cviii] Halevi visited the shooting scene, met with IDF Central Command commander, among other local Israeli officials, and initiated a preliminary investigation into the shooting. Halevi vowed to catch the Hamas cell that conducted the attack.[cix]

Israeli Army Radio reported that IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi is considering establishing an IDF Division alongside the Jordanian border amid growing security threats there.[cx] The division would be responsible for ”hundreds of kilometers of border“ from the Jordan Valley to the south of Wadi Araba[cxi] The area currently falls under the jurisdiction of the IDF Central and Southern commands.[cxii]  An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that the proposals driven by the fear of a potentially ”destabilizing Jordanian border.”[cxiii] The Israeli security establishment reportedly assessed that Iran is using the Israel-Jordan border to smuggle weapons into Israel and arming Palestinian militia cells inside Israel.[cxiv] The correspondent said that Halevi will likely make a decision on the new division in the coming days.[cxv]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Lebanese Hezbollah conducted at least six attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cut-off on August 11.[cxvi] Hezbollah launched rockets targeting the IDF 146th Division headquarters in the western Galilee.[cxvii] The IDF reported that it detected 30 launches toward the Western Galilee and that many rockets fell in open areas.[cxviii] Hezbollah separately attacked an IDF surveillance site with anti-tank guided missiles in Metulla in northern Israel.[cxix]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Iranian Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani discussed the Israeli killing of Ismail Haniyeh with foreign and Hamas officials on August 11. Bagheri Kani congratulated Yahya Sinwar on his appointment as Hamas political bureau chairman in a phone call with Hamas Deputy Leader in the Gaza Strip Khalil al Haya.[cxx] Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi emphasized Chinese support for the Iranian right to defense and claimed that the Israeli killing of Haniyeh undermined ceasefire-hostage negotiations and regional stability in a phone call with Bagheri Kani.[cxxi] Bagheri Kani also spoke to his Belgian and Dutch counterparts, who urged Iran to practice restraint and to avoid further deteriorating the security situation in the Middle East.[cxxii]

Houthi media claimed that the United States and United Kingdom conducted airstrikes near Kamaran Island, Hudaydah Governorate, Yemen.[cxxiii]