Iran Update, December 27, 2023

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are driving an escalation cycle that combines military and political pressure to try to expel US forces from Iraq.
2. US, UN, Saudi, and Yemeni officials are negotiating an agreement to end the war in Yemen, which will not remove the threat the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb.
3. The IRGC spokesperson claimed that the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel was retaliation for the United States’ targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani. This was a failed effort to show unity across the Axis of Resistance and portray Iran as a leader.
4. The IDF officially began operations against Palestinian militias in Khuzaa south of Khan Younis on December 27.
5. Palestinian political factions, including Hamas and PIJ, affirmed their unity against Israel on December 27. They stressed the need for a reform of Palestinian governance after the end of the war but did not specify what reform would entail.
6. An Israel Army Radio correspondent reported on December 27 that the IDF intercepted an Iranian-made drone over the Mediterranean Sea that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched from Iraq.
7. Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct trade using their national currencies rather than the US dollar.

Iran and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are driving an escalation cycle that combines military and political pressure to try to expel US forces from Iraq. Iranian-backed militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said on December 11 that expelling US forces requires political efforts from the government and military efforts from the militias.[i] Iranian-backed attacks against US forces combine both military and political effects to drive US forces from Iraq, which is a long-held objective for Iran and its proxies. Iranian-backed militias—not the United States—are driving the escalation in Iraq by conducting attacks that risk killing US military personnel to trigger US self-defense airstrikes against the militias.[ii] These Iranian-backed groups then frame these self-defense airstrikes as a violation of Iraqi sovereignty to argue that the Iraqi government should expel the United States from Iraq. The United States is in Iraq at the invitation of Iraq’s government to defeat ISIS, meaning that Iranian-backed attacks on an Iraqi partner are themselves a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.[iii]

The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are using legal and political pressure to drive out US forces, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[iv] The militias’ military lines of effort create the conditions for Iranian-backed proxies to increase the legal and political pressure on Iraq’s parliament and prime minister. The Badr Organization-chaired Iraqi Parliamentary Security and Defense Committee drafted a new resolution to expel US forces from Iraq in response to a US self-defense strike targeting Kataib Hezbollah in November, and multiple Iranian-backed politicians have called for the expulsion of US forces in the wake of the December 25 US airstrikes.[v] The November strike was in response to a KH ballistic missile attack targeting US forces in Iraq.[vi] Iranian-backed proxies called US forces a “threat” and demanded a timetable for a US withdrawal in separate statements after the December 25 US airstrikes.[vii] The US strikes were a response to an Iranian-backed attack that wounded two US service members and severely injured a third.[viii] The agreement that allows the US military presence in Iraq is an executive agreement, but a non-binding resolution will still impose political pressure on the prime minister to expel US forces.[ix] The prime minister could choose to expel US forces by introducing a timetable, such as the one former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki set in the 2000s.

US, UN, Saudi, and Yemeni officials are negotiating an agreement to end the war in Yemen, which will not remove the threat the Houthis pose to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al Mandeb.

US, UN, Saudi, and Yemeni officials told the Wall Street Journal that there is now an “informal three-year roadmap” to “end” the war in Yemen.[x] The negotiations did not include key Yemeni belligerents.[xi] A US official told the Journal that the United States is “separating” the Yemeni “peace” process and the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. “Sources familiar with Saudi thinking” said that Riyadh urged Washington not to retaliate against the Houthis, however.[xii] Saudi Arabia seeks to prevent US strikes targeting the Houthis, believing that US strikes risk derailing the peace process.[xiii] Reaching an agreement would not change Riyadh’s calculus, as discouraging US efforts to deter Houthi terrorism and piracy in the Red Sea would prevent a breakdown in the agreement.[xiv]

The IRGC spokesperson claimed that the October 7 Hamas-led attack on Israel was retaliation for the United States’ targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani in a failed effort to show unity across the Axis of Resistance and portray Iran as a leader.[xv] IRGC Spokesperson Brigadier General Ramazan Sharif claimed that Hamas’ October 7 attack on Israel that killed 1,200 civilians was in response to the United States’ targeted killing of RGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.[xvi] Iran funded, supported, and provided the weapons and training used in the October 7 attacks, but was reportedly surprised by the scope and timing of the attacks.[xvii]

Hamas denied the Iranian claim, likely to present itself domestically and internationally as only the defender of Palestine and thereby obfuscate its role as the initiator of the current war and an extension of Iran’s regional project. Iran has provided weapons, materiel, training, and guidance to Hamas, and the group is a member of Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance.[xviii] The group's leaders frequently meet with Iranian officials and coordinate their actions with Iran.[xix]

Hamas likely seeks to frame itself as the defender of Palestine in part to prevent blowback from its domestic audiences. Palestinians have borne the brunt of Hamas’ decision to launch its war against Israel with the October 7 terrorist attacks. Hamas’ popularity decreased in the Gaza Strip after the 2008 and 2014 Israeli ground operations.[xx] Recent polls show that support for Hamas remains high in Gaza, although anecdotal evidence suggests that some Gazans increasingly blame Hamas for starting the war and/or for failing to provide for and protect civilians having begun it.[xxi] Hamas officials found after Israeli operations in Gaza City in 2014 that the Gazan public "did not feel they were getting the benefits [from Hamas] for tolerating the bombing of Gaza by Israel,” for example.[xxii] Accepting Iran’s claim that Hamas attacked Israel to avenge the death of an Iranian general could alienate Gazans. Iran’s presentation of the October 7 attacks as an offensive action in response to the Soleimani strike also undermines the current Hamas narratives that it is acting defensively against Israeli "aggression” and on behalf of the Gazan people rather than solely on behalf of Iran.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Hamas used more sophisticated weapons systems as it continued to try to defend against Israeli advances in Jabalia. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—said that it fired an RPO-A thermobaric rocket for the first time during this war at an Israeli special operations forces (SOF) unit in a house on Old Gaza Street in Jabalia.[xxiii] The group also detonated at least one explosively formed penetrator targeting Israeli forces during a six-hour engagement in the al Saftawi area.[xxiv] Al Qassem Brigades fighters also fired two Igla man-portable air defense systems targeting two Israeli helicopters over Jabalia.[xxv] The group did not shoot down the helicopters.

Palestinian militias other than Hamas continued to attack Israeli forces in Sheikh Radwan. The National Resistance Brigades—the armed wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—and the Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the armed wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—engaged Israeli forces in two separate attacks in Sheikh Radwan.[xxvi]

The Israel Defense Forces Navy provided fire support to Israeli forces in northern al Shati Camp on December 27, which is consistent with holding operations.[xxvii] Violence decreases during a hold phase but is not absent as the holding force seeks the complete destruction of the enemy force.

The IDF continued clearing operations in Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods in Gaza City. An IDF unit captured a rocket launch site and a tunnel shaft in an orchard near Darraj and Tuffah on December 27.[xxviii] Palestinian fighters engaged the IDF with small arms and anti-tank fire as the IDF cleared the orchard.[xxix] A separate IDF unit called in air support during clearing operations in Darraj to eliminate a large number of Hamas fighters.[xxx]

The IDF’s line of advance reached eastern Bureij on December 27, according to satellite imagery published by the New York Times.[xxxi] The IDF announced that it began operations in Gaza’s Central Governorate on December 26.[xxxii] Palestinian militias attempted to defend against the Israeli advance using mortars and anti-tank fire.[xxxiii] The al Quds Brigades—the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military wing—claimed that it destroyed an Israeli tank east of Bureij.[xxxiv] Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and the PFLP’s Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades also engaged Israeli forces using small arms and anti-tank fire.[xxxv] The Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades said that their “strike unit” attacked Israeli advances towards eastern Bureij.[xxxvi]

Palestinian militias continued defensive operations against Israeli clearing efforts in  Khan Younis.  The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades conducted three attacks with anti-tank rockets targeting Israeli forces and tanks in Khan Younis.[xxxvii]  The al Quds Brigades ambushed an Israeli infantry unit at close range in Khan Younis.[xxxviii] The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas' military wing—attacked Israeli forces at least four times in northern and eastern Khan Younis using mortars, RPGs, and small arms.[xxxix] National Resistance Brigades—the armed wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)— detonated IEDs targeting an Israeli military vehicle in central Khan Younis.[xl] The IDF said its forces have fought in Palestinian fighters deep Khan Younis for the past two weeks.[xli] The Israeli forces have destroyed tunnel openings, launched dozens of attacks with precision munitions, and raided Hamas outposts during the operation. [xlii]

The IDF officially began operations against Palestinian militias in Khuzaa south of Khan Younis on December 27. IDF Gaza Division Commander Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld issued a statement acknowledging that the IDF began operating in the town southeast of Khan Younis to pursue fighters and subterranean infrastructure.[xliii] Rosenfeld said fighters from Khuzaa participated in the October 7 assault on Nir Oz.[xliv]   Palestinian media reported that Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces advancing southward in the adjacent town to Khuzaa on December 26.[xlv] The al Qassem Brigades attacked Israeli SOF in a building in Khuzaa on December 25.[xlvi]

The Israeli security cabinet discussed the first section of the Egyptian three-phase peace proposal on December 27.[xlvii] The Israeli security cabinet is a 14-person cabinet.The first phase of the agreement resembles the humanitarian pause and prisoner/hostage exchange Israeli and Hamas completed in late November.[xlviii]  The first phase of the agreement would have Hamas release 40 Israeli hostages in exchange for Israel releasing 140 Palestinian prisoners and force the IDF to withdraw from residential areas in the Gaza Strip.[xlix] The Israeli security cabinet is only discussing this first phase of the proposal. The Israeli security cabinet is not discussing the subsequent phases of the proposal that would release Israeli soldiers from Hamas custody and determine the form of a transitional government in the Gaza Strip that would include “various Palestinian factions, including Hamas.”[l] The security cabinet did not vote on the plan.[li] 

Hamas officials have said repeatedly in recent days that they would refuse to release any hostages prior to a complete ceasefire that forces Israel to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and leaves Hamas in power.[lii] The third phase proposal and Hamas’ counterproposal are incompatible with Israel’s stated war aims. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu restated his war objectives of destroying Hamas militarily and politically in Gaza on December 25.[liii] Any agreement that maintains Hamas’ military and political role in the Gaza Strip would be tantamount to Israel’s defeat in this war because it would preserve Hamas as a governing body and military force, as well as provide Hamas safe haven to reconstitute itself and threaten Israel again in the future.

Palestinian political factions, including Hamas and PIJ, affirmed their unity against Israel on December 27. The Central Command of the Palestinian Forces Alliance met in Beirut to discuss joint goals of withdrawing Israeli forces from Gaza, swapping all Israeli hostages for all Palestinian prisoners, and attaining humanitarian aid for Gaza.[liv] The groups that are part of the alliance include Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, and the Palestine Liberation Front. The political factions stressed the need for a reform of Palestinian governance after the end of the war but did not specify what reform would entail.[lv] The meeting is notable in context of the Egyptian peace deal that Hamas and PIJ rejected on December 25.[lvi] A Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee delegation will travel to Cairo in the next few days for talks with Egyptian officials about the Egyptian three-phase peace proposal.[lvii] The PLO is expected to discuss the makeup of a potential, unified government that would run the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[lviii]

Palestinian militias conducted one indirect fire attack into Israel on December 27. The Quds Brigade fired mortars and rockets at Nahal Oz in southern Israel.[lix]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian fighters in six locations across the West Bank from December 26 through December 27.[lx] The Israeli forces conducted a counterterrorism raid in Nur Shams refugee camp on December 26.[lxi] Israeli forces uncovered IEDs that had been buried under and next to roads its forces were operating on.[lxii] Palestinian fighters also threw IEDs at Israeli forces during clashes that lasted from December 26 through December 27.[lxiii] Israeli forces ordered an air strike on fighters that it said were throwing explosives at its forces.[lxiv]

Fatah—the political wing of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—called for strikes in the West Bank to mourn the death of six Palestinian fighters who were killed in the Israeli airstrike in Tulkarm.[lxv] The al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed that the six fighters were members of its Rapid Response unit operating in the Nur Shams refugee camp.[lxvi] 

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed six attacks targeting Israeli civilian and military targets on December 27.[lxvii] LH conducted a combined drone, mortar, and rocket attack targeting Israeli military positions in the disputed Shebaa Farms.[lxviii] The IDF said LH’s three drones did not hit their intended targets.[lxix] LH said that it launched 30 rockets at Kiryat Shmona in retaliation for an Israeli airstrike that killed three people in southern Lebanon.[lxx] Israel said that it struck several LH positions in southern Lebanon on December 27.[lxxi]

The IDF continued to discuss the threat that LH poses along Israel’s northern border on December 27. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi held a situation assessment and approved “a variety of” future, unspecified plans in the Northern Command, which is responsible for northern Israel and the border with Lebanon.[lxxii] Halevi stated that the military is “at a very high level of readiness,” and that the IDF needs to be ready for an offensive into southern Lebanon, if necessary.[lxxiii]  Israeli officials agreed on December 19 to give the Biden administration time for a diplomatic solution between Israel and LH but added that they “wanted to see progress in the next few weeks.”[lxxiv] Israeli officials seek to use diplomatic measures to pressure the Lebanese state to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which bars LH military units from operating south of the Litani River.[lxxv] The Israeli Army Spokesperson Daniel Hagari said that LH is endangering the stability of the region for the benefit of Hamas and compared LH to Hamas on December 26.[lxxvi] 

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

An Israel Army Radio correspondent reported on December 27 that the IDF intercepted an Iranian-made drone over the Mediterranean Sea that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias launched from Iraq.[lxxvii]  IDF Army Radio correspondent said that the drone appeared to be heading toward the Karish gas field.[lxxviii] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed on December 22 that it had attacked a “vital target” in the Mediterranean Sea.[lxxix] The IDF did not confirm that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq conducted such an attack.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a drone attack targeting US forces at Erbil International Airport in Erbil Province, Iraq, on December 27.[lxxx] Kataib Hezbollah, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, also conducted an attack on US forces at Erbil International Airport on December 25 that wounded three US service members.[lxxxi]

The Iraqi Army Chief of Staff announced plans to complete the transfer of security responsibilities from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Interior in 2024.[lxxxii] The Iraqi Army has already transferred security responsibilities to local police in various southern and central provinces, including Babil, Najaf, Al Muthanna, and Wasit.[lxxxiii]

IRGC Quds Force officer Brigadier General Razi Mousavi, who was killed in Syria on December 25, oversaw logistics and acquisitions in Syria, according to former IRGC Quds Force Officer Mansour Hajit Pour.[lxxxiv] Pour told IRGC-affiliated news outlet Tasnim that Mousavi started his career with the Quds Force in Lebanon 30 years ago.[lxxxv] Mousavi also worked closely with Syrian President Bashar al Assad and former IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani to combat ISIS.[lxxxvi] Pour said that Mousavi’s primary responsibility in Syria was overseeing logistics and providing “strategic products.”[lxxxvii] Pour’s description is consistent with Western and anti-regime media reporting that said that Mousavi headed Quds Force Unit 2250.[lxxxviii] Unit 2250 manages Iranian weapons shipments to LH and Iranian-backed groups in Syria.[lxxxix] The IRGC Quds Force has coordinated the deployment of hundreds of Iranian-backed fighters in southern Lebanon and southwest Syria since the Israel-Hamas war began.[xc] These fighters include military engineers and missile experts, among others.[xci]

The Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces held a funeral procession for Mousavi in Najaf, Iraq, on December 27.[xcii] Mourners carried Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba flags in the funeral procession.[xciii]  Iranian Ambassador to Iraq and former IRGC Quds Force officer Mohammad Kazem al-e Sadegh attended Mousavi’s procession.[xciv] Iran will hold Mousavi’s official funeral ceremony in Imam Hussein Square, Tehran on December 28.[xcv]

Atomic Energy Organization head Mohammad Eslami denied on December 27 that Iran has increased its production rate of highly enriched uranium to 60 percent.[xcvi] Eslami’s denial is in response to Western media reports on December 26 that said that Iran increased its production rate of highly enriched uranium to 60 percent.[xcvii] Eslami stated that the reports show “nothing new” and insisted that Iran is operating within the International Atomic Energy Agency framework. Eslami stated that the leaked report is an attempt to turn attention away from the Israel-Hamas war.

Central Bank of Iran Governor Mohammad Farzin traveled to Moscow on December 26 to discuss banking and finalize trade agreements with Russian officials.[xcviii] IRIB reported that the bank managers of the Bank of Russia and the National Bank of Iran established a credit line worth 6.5 billion rubles (approx. $70 million) to allow Iran to import basic goods from Russia. Iran and Russia finalized an agreement to conduct trade using their national currencies —rather than the US dollar— on December 27.[xcix] Iranian media said that this agreement allows previously established non-SWIFT messaging systems and bilateral brokerage relations to now be used by banks and economic operators.[c]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Yerevan, Armenia, on December 27 to discuss peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan with Armenian officials.[ci] Abdollahian met with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and National Security Council Secretary Armen Grigoryan.[cii] Abdollahian stated that the United States must end its support for Israel if it seeks a “dignified exit” from the Israel-Hamas war during a press conference with Mirzoyan.[ciii]