Iran Update, February 16, 2023

February 16, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Iran and its proxies may be preparing for a major effort with military elements in northern Syria. Senior officers from the IRGC Quds Force, its Iraqi proxies, the Assad regime, and possibly Russian forces have participated in a flurry of meetings throughout Syria in recent days. These meetings are noteworthy given their frequency and the seniority of their participants. Local media has framed many but not all of these meetings as ostensibly related to earthquake relief.[i] That explanation is improbable considering that most participants lead or represent military and paramilitary groups but do not include the officials who would normally be involved in delivering humanitarian assistance and because of reports that Iran is moving fighters and weapons in ostensibly humanitarian convoys. The order of the recent meetings is as follows:

• February 8: IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani and senior IRGC officer Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi traveled to Aleppo, Syria.[ii]
• February 9: The commander of Russian forces in Syria, Colonel General Andrey Serdyukov, traveled to Aleppo and may have met with Ghaani and other Iranian officers.[iii]
• February 10: Syrian President Bashar al Assad traveled to Aleppo and met with Iraqi proxy leader Abu Fadak al Mohammedawi. Mohammedawi is currently the chief of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces and was previously the secretary general of Iraqi proxy Kataib Hezbollah.[iv]
• February 12: Ghaani met with Latakia Provincial Governor Amer Ismail Hilal. Officials from Lebanese Hezbollah may have accompanied Ghaani.[v]
• February 13: Ghaani and Mohammedawi met with Assad at the Aleppo International Airport.[vi]
• February 16: Assad met with chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces Falih al Fayyadh in Damascus.[vii]

These meetings notably did not include representatives of the Syrian or Iranian foreign ministries or of the organizations normally responsible for emergency responses, healthcare, finances, or economic activities.

CTP previously assessed that the Quds Force may be reinforcing its military presence in northern Syria under the guise of providing humanitarian relief following the earthquake.[viii] Iranian-backed militants have been smuggling likely weaponry and military equipment disguised as humanitarian aid convoys through eastern Syria since the earthquake on February 5.[ix] Pro-Syrian-opposition Thiqa News reported that five trucks with disaster relief markings arrived at a military storage warehouse in Hama Province on February 16.[x] Thiqa News also reported that Iranian-backed forces in more than 150 vehicles—many likely transporting military equipment and weapons—had arrived in Aleppo by February 13.[xi]

It is difficult to assess at this time what these officials have discussed in their recent meetings, and CTP is considering several hypotheses. Iran and its proxies may be discussing supporting a pro-Assad-regime offensive into Idlib Province—currently held by former al Qaeda affiliate and currently Turkish-backed Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al Sham—amidst the Turkish government’s distraction and disrupted operations. The February 5 earthquake caused widespread destruction in Gaziantep and other areas along the Turkey-Syria border.[xii] The Turkish military (and possibly Erdogan’s government altogether) may be too preoccupied with disaster relief operations to mobilize to deter a pro-Assad-regime offensive before it begins--or at least Iran and its partners may hope so. Iran may not intend to execute this potential offensive into Idlib, on the other hand, but could instead intend to use its threat to improve its own and the Assad regime’s bargaining positions with Turkey. Iran and its proxies may be alternatively discussing efforts to entrench themselves further in northern Syria, and around Aleppo specifically, to repel any future Turkish ground incursion in the months and years ahead.  CTP will continue to monitor the situation for indicators of which course of action the Iranians and their proxies and partners might take.

Protest organizers successfully generated significant turnout for the planned countrywide protests on February 16. CTP recorded 15 protests in 13 cities across 12 provinces on February 16, the most significant uptick in anti-regime protest activity since CTP assessed the Mahsa Amini protest movement culminated in January 2023.

This success suggests that the factors that initially drove the protests to culminate have subsided to varying extents. These factors included extremely cold weather and severe pollution, the heavy securitization of some Iranian cities and towns, protester exhaustion and the need to return to work and normal life, and the imprisonment of many thousands of protesters. CTP previously argued that these factors were temporary and would subside with time. Weather conditions in Iran have improved marginally in recent weeks. The regime has deployed security forces, especially to northwestern Iran to assist with earthquake relief efforts and preempt unrest following the earthquake, possibly reducing the securitization of some Iranian cities and towns. Protesters have had time to recuperate. And the recent amnesty of “tens of thousands” of protesters has released many from prison, although CTP cannot verify how many protesters on February 16 were part of this amnesty. Protest groups may have realized that they could take advantage of these changing factors to drive increased turnout when planning the demonstrations on February 16. The groups have also been saying that they have been actively reorganizing themselves and did post clear and unambiguous calls for the February 16 protests in contrast with the disorganization and confusion that had marked some of their earlier failed attempts to bring demonstrators into the streets.[xiii]

This latest uptick in protest activity demonstrates once again that the choice to engage in anti-regime protests and acts of political defiance lies with the Iranian people. Neither the regime nor the protest groups are able to decide when protests do or do not occur. It is uncertain whether the Iranian people will choose to sustain this increased protest activity. It is clear, however, that anti-regime sentiments remain strongly entrenched among certain segments of the population.

Hardline Iranian media is continuing to give increased public attention to prominent moderates and reformists who have criticized the regime. Tasnim News Agency, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), published an article on February 16 criticizing former moderate President Hassan Rouhani and the performance of his administration.[xiv] The article claimed that Rouhani had the lowest approval rating of any Iranian president after the revolution. Tasnim News Agency was responding to Rouhani’s recent criticisms of the regime and efforts to reenter the political space, which CTP reported previously.[xv] Hardline media has similarly focused on attacking former reformist President Mohammad Khatami and reformist politician Mir Hossein Mousavi in recent days, further drawing attention to their criticisms of the regime.[xvi] These attacks are injecting the arguments and views of these moderate and reformist leaders into the hardline information space even as hardliners try to discredit them.

Hardliners may be intentionally giving air to moderate and reformist individuals and their views in an attempt to lure some alienated segments of the population back toward the regime. Hardliners have consolidated control over the three branches of the formal Iranian government—the presidency, parliament, and judiciary—since 2019, locking many prominent moderates and reformists out of government and out of political discourse more generally. These actions likely antagonized many moderate and reformist supporters. Highlighting the presence of diversity across the Iranian political spectrum and the public debate among officials may be intended to reduce moderate and reformist supporters disillusionment with the Islamic Republic. Expediency Discernment Council Mohammad Reza Bahonar may have been articulating this theory when he endorsed political activity from “benign reformists” on February 15.[xvii]

Senior Iranian officials promoted the slogan “Woman, Chastity, Security” on February 14, capturing much of the regime response to the Mahsa Amini protests. Vice President for Women’s and Family Affairs Ensieh Khazali and Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib attended a conference titled “Woman, Chastity, Security”—an alternative to the popular “Woman, Life, Freedom” chant that has pervaded recent protests.[xviii] This alternative slogan is not entirely new and has circulated on social media to a limited extent in recent months. The use of the slogan nevertheless captures how Iranian political and security leaders have largely responded to the protests by calling for greater ideologization and using extreme force rather than addressing core protester grievances. The continued emphasis on this rhetoric suggests that the Raisi administration remains committed to this approach.

Key Takeaways

• Iran and its proxies may be preparing for a major effort with military elements in northern Syria.
• Protest organizers successfully generated significant turnout for the planned countrywide protests on February 16. At least 15 protests occurred in 13 cities across 12 provinces.
• Hardline Iranian media is continuing to give increased public attention to prominent moderates and reformists who have criticized the regime.
• Senior Iranian officials promoted the slogan “Woman, Chastity, Security” on February 14, capturing much of the regime response to the Mahsa Amini protests.
• An unidentified individual threw homemade hand grenades at a Basij base in Mohammad Shahr, Alborz Province.
• The UN released a report detailing that unidentified member states assess that the de facto leader of al Qaeda, Saif al Adel, is currently living in Iran.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least 15 protests occurred in 13 cities across 12 provinces on February 16. CTP assesses with high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Karaj, Alborz Province[xix]

• Size: Small
• Area: Golshahr

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[xx]

• Small: Small

Rasht, Gilan Province[xxi]

• Size: Small

Rouydar, Hormozgan Province[xxii]

• Size: Small

Izeh, Khuzestan Province[xxiii]

• Size: Small

Arak, Markazi Province[xxiv]

• Size: Small

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[xxv]

• Size: Small

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxvi]

• Size: Medium
• Area: District 8
• Notes: It is unclear if protest activity reported from Haft Hoz and Tehran Pars are separate protests or represent one protest within this district. It is possible that two distinctive protests occurred.

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxvii]

• Size: Small
• Area: Districts 2 and 5
• Notes: It is unclear if protest activity reported from Sattar Khan, Sadeghiyeh and Ferdows are separate protests or represent one protest within these districts. It is possible that three distinctive protests occurred.

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxviii]

• Size: Small
• Area: Naft Town

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Ghazvin City, Ghazvin Province[xxix]

• Size: Small

Javanroud, Kermanshah Province[xxx]

• Size: Small
• Notes: Footage shows fires lit in city street, suggesting that protests occurred on this date

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xxxi]

• Size: Small

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[xxxii]

• Size: Small
• Notes: Footage shows fires lit in city street, suggesting that protests occurred on this date

Yazd City, Yazd Province[xxxiii]

• Size: Small

NOTE: CTP defines small protests as fewer than 100 individuals, medium protests as between 100 and 1,000, and large protests as over 1,000.

An unidentified individual threw homemade hand grenades at a Basij base in Mohammad Shahr, Alborz Province on February 15.[xxxiv]

Supreme Leader Representative to Sistan and Baluchistan Province Mostafa Mahami urged locals to end their weekly protests every Friday.[xxxv] Mahami called for calmness and security in the province and argued that the protests only worsen domestic conditions. Mahami added that the anti-revolutionary path is a “dead end” and that those who have strayed “will return to the Islamic Revolution.” This statement echoes Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s speech on February 15 in which Khamenei suggested that the regime will welcome protesters in Iran’s restive northwest region back into the fold of the Islamic Republic.[xxxvi]  It is noteworthy in the context of IRGC Spokesman Ramazan Sharif’s February 14 warning that separatists in Kurdistan and Sistan and Baluchistan Province threatened the Islamic Republic, suggesting that the regime may be preparing to crack down on those areas again.[xxxvii]

Foreign Affairs and Diplomacy

The UN released a report detailing that unidentified member states assess that the de facto leader of al Qaeda, Saif al Adel, is currently living in Iran.[xxxviii] The US State Department expressed support for this assessment on February 15.[xxxix] Adel is a former Egyptian lieutenant colonel and has been a senior officer in al Qaeda for decades. He became al Qaeda leader after the US killed his predecessor, Ayman al Zawahiri, in Kabul, Afghanistan in July 2022. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian denied that Adel is living in Iran in response to the UN report.[xl]

External Security and Military Affairs

Likely Iranian-backed militants flew a reconnaissance drone over the Conoco Mission Support Site on February 14 near Deir ez Zor City, Deir ez Zor Province. An unspecified Iranian military advisor in Syria said the Iranian-backed militants piloted the drone over the Conoco Mission Support Site to test the US air defense systems, according to IRGC-affiliated news Tabnak Online.[xlii] US forces downed the drone without incident.[xliii] The drone was likely a Yazdan short-range intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drone and did not carry a payload.[xliv] CTP has not observed any additional indicators of Iran preparing to attack US forces. The last recorded Iranian ISR drone flight over US positions in eastern Syria occurred on September 28.[xlv] Iranian-backed militants did not conduct an attack on US positions in eastern Syria in the days or weeks immediately following the September 28 ISR flight. Iran may have sought to update its intelligence on US positions with the ISR flight on February 14. Iranian-backed forces have intensively smuggled likely weaponry and military equipment through Deir ez Zor Province under the guise of humanitarian aid since the February 5 earthquake.

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah delivered a speech in commemoration of Hezbollahi “resistance martyrs” on February 16. Nasrallah announced that LH will continue humanitarian aid shipments to areas in northwestern Syria affected by the February 5 earthquake. LH dispatched a 23-truck convoy on February 12 to allegedly deliver humanitarian aid to disaster-stricken areas in Latakia Province, Syria.[xlvi] Nasrallah also expressed solidarity with Bahraini dissidents on the 12th anniversary of the anti-government protest wave that began on February 14, 2011.