Iran Update, February 20, 2025

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update every weekday.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

NOTE: CTP-ISW will produce the update Monday through Friday beginning February 20, 2025, due to the decrease in military activity in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon and the defeats of Hamas and Hezbollah. We will resume daily, seven-day coverage if circumstances change. CTP-ISW will notify our readers when we resume seven-day coverage. CTP-ISW will continue to produce daily Syria maps. We will publish weekend Syria maps on Mondays. We will cover and assess Axis of Resistance activities in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon at a less granular level moving forward. We will continue to publish analysis on other key US interests in the region, such as the defeat of ISIS and Syrian stability. We will also continue to adjust our Middle Eastern coverage and make those adjustments clear in response to regional dynamics and priorities, just as we did immediately after Hamas' October 7 attack into Israel and the fall of the Assad Regime.   

Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Several senior IRGC commanders, including IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Ali Fadavi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh, have warned in recent days that Iran will conduct a third “True Promise” attack against Israel.[i] Iran named its previous two direct attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 “True Promise I” and “True Promise II,” respectively.[ii] Iranian military officials initially threatened to conduct a third direct attack on Israel after the IDF conducted strikes in Iran in late October 2024.[iii] These threats gradually subsided in the weeks following the IDF strikes, however. IRGC commanders have likely resurfaced these threats in recent days to try to deter an Israeli attack on Iran and to reassure the Iranian population that the IRGC would respond to any Israeli attack on Iranian territory.

Hajji Zadeh highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”[iv] Hajji Zadeh was likely referring to the S-300 air defense systems that the IDF struck in October 2024. The October 2024 IDF strikes rendered Iran's S-300 air defense systems inoperable, likely by destroying the radars that the systems rely on.[v] Hajji Zadeh added that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s “first follow-up" during meetings with Hajji Zadeh, Salami, and Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri is about the issue of “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems.[vi] Khamenei’s prioritization of this issue highlights his concern about a potential external attack on Iran. Hajji Zadeh claimed that Iran will install “anti-ballistic [missile] defense systems” in Tehran and other major Iranian cities in the next Persian calendar year, which begins in late March 2025.[vii]

The Syrian Preparatory Committee held “dialogue sessions” for Raqqa and Hasakah provinces in Damascus on February 20 in which some participants expressed anti-Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) views. The Preparatory Committee’s “dialogue sessions,” which have thus far taken place in provincial capitals rather than in the national capital, are meant to help the interim government "develop an integrated action plan” for the National Dialogue Conference.[viii] This conference will reportedly facilitate the drafting of a new Syrian constitution.[ix]  Preparatory Committee member and Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-affiliated Muhammad Mastat stated that the Raqqa dialogue session took place in Damascus due to SDF “threats, repression and silence against the people of [Raqqa] province.”[x] Syrian state media quoted an anonymous participant from the SDF stronghold of Qamishli who demanded that the new Syrian state correct injustices that the Assad regime committed against Kurds, but did not otherwise discuss protections for the Kurdish population.[xi] SANA reported that attendees at the Raqqa dialogue session discussed SDF “crimes and violations” against locals, including wrongful imprisonment.[xii]  Preparatory Committee spokesperson Hassan al Daghim emphasized that Hasakah, Deir ez Zor, and Raqqa must rejoin the Syrian state under “one army” and called for the dissolution of all military formations outside of the Syrian Defense Ministry.[xiii] The interim government has repeatedly called on the SDF to dissolve in recent weeks.[xiv]

The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. A minority Kurdish party, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants.[xv] The KNC is dominated by the Syrian wing of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). KDP President Masoud Barzani has called on the interim government to respect Kurdish rights and the SDF to cooperate with the KNC in negotiations with Damascus.[xvi] Preparatory Committee members have repeatedly stated that the SDF and its political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), will not be invited to the National Dialogue Conference.[xvii] A Kurdish activist posted a video on February 20 of the Syrian interim government purportedly ejecting a ”representative of the SDF (AANES) from the National Dialogue Committee Session.”[xviii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the authenticity of this video. The Deir ez Zor Province dialogue session is scheduled to take place in Deir ez Zor City on February 21.[xix] It remains unclear if representatives from the SDF-controlled eastern bank of the Euphrates River, which constitutes about half of Deir ez Zor Province, will be allowed to attend the session. The potential exclusion of Kurdish groups from dialogue sessions would likely impact the trajectory of the National Dialogue Conference and subsequent drafting of the constitution.

These dialogue sessions are taking place about a week before the March 1, 2025, internal deadline that HTS set for itself to form a transitional government. Interim Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani said on February 12 that Syria will “be launched [on] March 1” and “represent the Syrian people as much as possible.”[xx] The HTS ”Victory Conference” in late January 2025 resulted in the appointment of HTS leader Ahmed al Shara as interim president. Shara is responsible for establishing a transitional legislature.[xxi]

Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20.[xxii] Azaz is located near the Syria-Turkey border. Security forces dismantled the VBIED.[xxiii] This is the eleventh car bomb or VBIED that has detonated or been dismantled in Syrian interim government and SNA-controlled territory in Aleppo Province since late December 2024, most recently on February 3.[xxiv] No actor or group has claimed responsibility for the recent car bomb and VBIED attacks, and it is unclear if the same actor has conducted every attack. Turkish and anti-SDF Syrian media frequently claimed that the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the SDF conduct these attacks, which the SDF has consistently denied.[xxv]

The PKK may have conducted some of these attacks, including the attempted car bomb attack in Azaz. Several of the attacks involved relatively advanced VBIEDs that caused high civilian casualties.[xxvi] A relatively organized cell is required to manufacture and transport such VBIEDs prior to their detonation. The PKK has historically operated in northwestern Syria, particularly in northern Aleppo Province, and some of its cells almost certainly remain in the area.[xxvii] ISIS also has some presence in northern Aleppo Province, but it has deprioritized this area in recent years and it very likely lacks the sort of well-developed safe zones required to build and deploy VBIEDs.

It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.[xxviii] Abdi, who is a relative moderate within the SDF, has also verbally agreed to eject foreign PKK fighters from Syria.[xxix] The expulsion of PKK fighters from Syria—many of whom answer to the PKK’s headquarters, not Abdi—which would both increase Abdi’s own power and help him secure a deal with Damascus.[xxx] A deliberate decision by Abdi to permit these attacks on civilians in northern Syria risks scuttling talks with Damascus and destroying the SDF project that Abdi has built since 2015.

Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections. Some Shia Coordination Framework members are concerned that the return of Iraqi nationalist Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr to Iraqi politics could threaten the seat shares of their individual parties in parliament and allow Sadr to control parliament.[xxxi] The Shia Coordination Framework is a loose collection of Shia parties, some of which are backed by Iran. Sadr won the most seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections and his movement nearly formed a government with Kurdish and Sunni backing before Sadr withdrew from politics in 2022.[xxxii] His withdrawal from politics enabled the Shia Coordination Framework to gain the majority of seats in parliament. An unspecified Sadrist source said on February 20 that Sadr will not participate in the upcoming elections regardless of whether Iraq uses an “electoral district or Saint Lague system.”[xxxiii] The Iraqi parliament has previously frequently modified the Iraqi electoral law before parliamentary elections.[xxxiv] The French Saint Lague system that Iraq used during elections between 2014 and 2020 allocated seats proportionally to Iraqi political parties in a way that often disadvantaged smaller parties.[xxxv] Iraq adopted a majoritarian system in 2020 that enabled smaller parties to win more seats in parliament.[xxxvi] Sadr’s movement won the largest number of seats in the October 2021 elections, largely due to internal competition within the Shia Coordination Framework.[xxxvii]

Parliament passed an amendment to the electoral law in 2023 to return Iraq to the Saint Lague system, likely to favor larger Shia Coordination Framework parties in the October 2025 elections.[xxxviii]  State of Law Coalition head Nouri al Maliki recently called on parliament to approve an amendment that would decrease the number of electoral districts in each province, which would further return Iraq to its pre-2020 electoral system.[xxxix] 

Maliki reportedly seeks to amend the electoral law because he is concerned that Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani will prioritize winning a second term as prime minister over ensuring that the Shia Coordination Framework retains its majority in parliament.[xl] Unidentified Shia sources told Saudi media in September 2024 that Sudani has allied politically with 50 unspecified Shia Coordination Framework members, around 60 parliamentarians, and multiple provincial governors. Maliki may be concerned that Sudani’s political aspirations could lead him to further divide the Shia Coordination Framework’s support among Shia voters, which would weaken the Shia Coordination Framework against Sadr’s movement in the upcoming elections.

Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Shia Coordination Framework is publicly supporting Sadr’s involvement in the parliamentary elections because Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani called for the participation of all Shia political parties in the political process.[xli] Some Shia Coordination Framework members may be concerned that Sadr could call for protests if his political party does not participate in the upcoming elections, which would risk destabilizing the country. Sadr has periodically called for protests, including after the 2021 elections.[xlii] Sadr’s supporters and Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fighters clashed following Sadr’s withdrawal from politics in June 2022.[xliii] Sadr’s Saraya al Salam militia also initially supported the October 2019 protests and continued to support the protesters until well after the protest movement caused the collapse of the Adel Abdul Mahdi government.[xliv] Many of the pro-Iran factions that are part of the Shia Coordination Framework supported the Mahdi government. The fall of Mahdi‘s government led to the premiership of Mustafa al Kadhimi, whose government threatened some of the Shia Coordination Framework factions. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Rhetoric: Senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders have resurfaced threats to conduct a direct attack on Israel, likely to try to shape Israeli decision making and deter a potential Israeli strike on Iran. Hajji Zadeh also highlighted Iran’s vulnerability to an external attack in an interview on February 18. Hajji Zadeh stated that Iran’s “anti-ballistic [missile] defense” systems suffered damage during “recent incidents.”
• Syrian Constitution: The composition of the Raqqa and Hasakah dialogue sessions was likely influenced by the fact that it took place in Damascus and that the HTS-affiliated Preparatory Committee refused to invite the SDF. The Kurdish National Council (KNC), criticized the decision to hold the dialogue sessions outside areas controlled by the SDF and the composition of the session participants. This is notable given the KNC’s long-standing opposition to the SDF.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria: Interim government Internal Security Forces seized a possible PKK vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in Azaz, northwestern Aleppo Province, on February 20. It is highly unlikely that SDF commander Mazloum Abdi has command and control over PKK elements operating in Azaz and other areas behind the frontline. Abdi has denied that the SDF is involved in the recent attacks and has significant incentives to avoid undermining ongoing negotiations with the Damascus government.
• Iraqi Elections: Key Iraqi political parties, including the main Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties, are attempting to solidify their control of the Iraqi state by amending the Iraqi electoral law ahead of the October 2025 parliamentary elections.
• Iraqi Politics: Some Iraqi Shia politicians and notable Shia religious figures are concerned that Sadr’s potential non-involvement in the upcoming elections could destabilize Iraq. Shia Coordination Framework members may seek to include Sadr in the upcoming elections to head off the risk of protests while simultaneously changing the electoral law to disadvantage Sadr and other small parties. This move would protect Iraq’s stability by avoiding protests while also ensuring that elements of the Shia Coordination Framework could control the government.

Syria

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to target SDF positions near Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 19. Turkey and the SNA targeted several SDF positions near the Tishreen Dam with airstrikes and artillery.[xlv] The SDF reported that it shot down an SNA drone near the dam on February 20.[xlvi]

Turkey and the SNA have continued to target the SDF along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on February 19. The SDF reported on February 20 that the SNA fired artillery, tank guns, rockets, and mortars at several villages along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, including Ghasq, al Tineh, Dukan, Jaada, Bir Hassou, and Sana.[xlvii] Turkish aircraft struck SDF positions, including tunnels, near the Qara Qozak Bridge.[xlviii] Turkey and the SNA have concentrated recent attacks on SDF positions east of the Qara Qozak Bridge, likely to isolate SDF units operating at the bridgehead west of the Qara Qozak Bridge.[xlix]

Turkey targeted the SDF along Peace Spring frontlines on February 19. Anti-SDF media reported that Turkish aircraft struck an SDF position near Tarwazia, north of Raqqa.[l] The Turkish strike comes amid a recent uptick in SDF-SNA shelling near Tarwazia in the past seven days.[li]

The SDF shot down an SNA drone near Deir Hafer on February 20.[lii]

The Turkish Defense Ministry announced on February 20 that it has killed 31 “PKK” fighters in northern Iraq and Syria in the past week.[liii] Turkey routinely conducts strikes targeting the "PKK” in northern Iraq and Syria, but it commonly conflates the PKK and the SDF. Not all SDF fighters are in the PKK, and not all PKK fighters are in the SDF. The Turkish Defense Ministry said that it has killed 408 PKK fighters since the beginning of 2025.[liv]

Syrian Interim Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) delegation on February 20.[lv] UNDOF oversees the disengagement zone between Syria and the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.[lvi] Qasra recently criticized the IDF’s presence in southern Syria in late January 2025 and said that ”intermediary” actors are working to pressure the Israeli government to withdraw from southern Syria.[lvii]

Republic of Cyprus Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos met with Syrian Interim President Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Affairs Minster Asaad al Shaibani in Damascus on February 20.[lviii] Cyprus, as part of the European Union, is important for the Syrian interim government‘s efforts to secure sanctions relief. Cyprus and Greece have reportedly opposed lifting sanctions on the Syrian interim government due to possible disputes over maritime borders and jurisdiction over natural resources in the Mediterranean Sea.  Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis told the interim government on February 9 that Greece expects Syria to respect the Law of the Sea.[lx]  EU foreign ministers are expected to discuss Syrian sanctions on February 24.[lxi]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent 

Iraqi media reported on February 20 that the Iraqi federal government will appoint members of Ammar al Hakim’s National Wisdom Movement to several senior government positions.[lxii] One of these positions is reportedly the Media and Communications Commission head. The Media and Communications Commission is an Iraqi government authority that regulates Iraqi media and communications.[lxiii] Iranian-backed groups co-opted the commission in 2022.[lxiv] These appointments come after Hakim recently boycotted several Shia Coordination Framework meetings and very likely represent an effort to ameliorate Hakim’s unspecified concerns. Unidentified sources told Iraqi media on February 6 that Shia Coordination Framework members discussed unifying Shia factions and resolving tensions with Hakim on February 5.[lxv] Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani reportedly convinced Hakim to resume his participation in Shia Coordination Framework meetings in response to the appointment of National Wisdom Movement members to government positions.

The Iraqi Administrative Court rejected former Baghdad Provincial Council Chairman Ammar al Qaisi’s lawsuit that challenged his recent dismissal from the chairman position.[lxvi] Members of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition and former Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi’s Sunni Progress Party in the Baghdad Provincial Council voted on February 6 to dismiss Qaisi.[lxvii]  The meeting reportedly occurred without the presence of the provincial council chairman or deputy chairman. Qaisi is a member of the Sunni Azm Aliance, whose leader is a longtime political rival of Halbousi and a competitor for political influence among Iraqi Sunnis.[lxviii]

Turkey struck Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) positions near Amedi District, Duhok Province, Iraqi Kurdistan, on February 20.[lxix]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Nothing significant to report.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Nothing significant to report.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Senior Iranian officials met with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziad al Nakhalah in Tehran on February 19 and 20. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian met separately with Nakhalah on February 19.[lxx] IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami separately met with Nakhalah on February 20.[lxxi]

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf discussed developing economic relations between Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia during a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart on the sidelines of the Asian Parliamentary Assembly in Baku, Azerbaijan, on February 20.[lxxii] Ghalibaf emphasized that Iran seeks to develop transportation routes, including the International North-South Transport Corridor, to increase regional trade.[lxxiii] Iran opposes Turkish and Azerbaijani efforts to construct the Zangezur corridor, which would connect Azerbaijan proper to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[lxxiv] Such a corridor would sever Iranian land access to Russia and Europe via Armenia. Ghalibaf also emphasized that Iran and Azerbaijan must prioritize diplomacy given “new conditions” in the South Caucasus.[lxxv]  It is possible that Ghalibaf was referring to the Armenian parliament’s recent adoption of a bill to initiate Armenia’s application to join the European Union.[lxxvi] Senior Iranian officials have previously expressed concern about growing NATO and Turkish influence in the Caucasus.[lxxvii]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.