Iran Update, February 21, 2023

February 21, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani and James Motamed

The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what pattern of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase. Protest activity has increased substantially in recent days, including at least 15 protests on February 16, 12 protests on February 19, 14 on February 20, and seven on February 21.[i] This increased turnout is the most that CTP has recorded since assessing that the Mahsa Amini movement culminated in January 2023. This renewed protest activity could indicate that the movement has regained momentum after what was in effect an operational pause. It is unclear if protest activity in this new phase will resemble the patterns that CTP first observed in the Mahsa Amini movement or what form acts of anti-regime defiance will take. It is also unclear how long this uptick in protest activity will last.

Western media outlets have reported lingering discontent throughout the Iranian population, corroborating CTP’s prior assessment that conditions remain present for the resumption of significant anti-regime activity.[ii] The Washington Post reported on February 19 that protesters in Saghez, Kurdistan Province—the birthplace of Mahsa Amini and site of significant anti-regime activity in recent months—are preparing for further unrest. Protesters reportedly stated that the regime has failed to address their grievances and that they have begun stockpiling materials to fight security forces, including Molotov cocktails. Protesters added: ”we’re ready for the next clash. All it needs is a spark.”[iii] The Associated Press separately reported enduring sociopolitical and economic grievances among several pro-regime individuals in the conservative city of Qom. One cleric told the outlet that he strongly disapproved of the regime’s brutal protest crackdown and felt increasingly strained by Iran’s deteriorating economic conditions.[iv]

Moderate and reformist politicians are urgently renewing their calls for the regime to address protester grievances. Former Rouhani administration First Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri insinuated that Iranian leadership had lost touch with its people and urged the regime to apologize for its shortcomings in an interview on February 21. Jahangiri stated that “Iran is in danger, and [the Mahsa Amini protests] were reaching a point where they could and still can endanger Iran.” Jahangiri called on regime loyalists and supporters to “show their credibility” and address protester grievances. Jahangiri additionally asserted that the regime suffered from fundamental and structural flaws, stating that “our structure is such that stable solutions do not come from it. . . we usually erase problems instead of solving them.”[v] Two former politicians affiliated with former reformist President Mohammad Khatami separately discussed the deepening divide between Iranian leadership and its population. Mohammad Ali Abtahi—a reformist politician and associate of Khatami—urged the regime to reframe its approach to Iranian youth participating in recent unrest on February 19.[vi] A former Khatami cabinet official also claimed that Iranian officials’ disinterest in communicating with the public would only increase anger with the regime on February 19. Khatami called for reforming various regime institutions, such as the Assembly of Experts and Guardian Council, but did not suggest a referendum on the Islamic Republic as did Mir Hossein Mousavi, on February 5.[vii]

Iran continues to face severe economic issues, which may fuel increased political attacks against President Ebrahim Raisi and his administration. The Iranian rial hit a new all-time low, valuing at around 500,000 for one US dollar on February 21.[viii] The regime responded by imposing new restrictions on how many Euros air passengers may withdraw in Iran, likely to prevent any significant reduction in the regime‘s foreign currency reserves.[ix] UK-based anti-regime outlet Iran International reported that regime officials are concerned about severe shortages in basic grocery items, although CTP cannot verify this reporting.[x] Numerous regime officials have expressed growing alarm over the economic situation in recent days as well. These officials include Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Raisi administration spokesperson Ali Bahadori Jahromi, and IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajji Zadeh.[xi]

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has long used the presidency as a relief valve for popular economic discontent and may similarly allow the regime to direct blame unto the Raisi administration. Raisi pledged to stabilize the national currency during a meeting with Khamenei and other Iranian leaders on February 18, affirming his responsibility for the matter.[xii] Parliamentarians, such as hardliner Javad Nik Beyn, have suggested summoning Raisi and his ministers to Parliament for questioning.[xiii] Such summonses are common in Iran but can conclude with Parliament impeaching the president or members of his cabinet if enough lawmakers approve (although no Iranian president has been removed from office by parliament). Nik Beyn previously attacked the Raisi administration for failing to designate a single individual to manage economic policy, as CTP previously reported.[xiv] There are numerous officials involved in shaping the Raisi administration’s economic policy. Many of these officials have ties to other regime power centers, such as the IRGC, judiciary, or various parastatal economic giants.[xv] These interpersonal connections will likely introduce an additional political dynamic to any parliamentary efforts to summon and/or remove officials from the Raisi administration. This parliamentary activity, which was the norm under previous presidents, shows that Raisi’s hardliner credentials and cabinet and rumors that Khamenei has selected him to be the next supreme leader are no longer shielding him personally or his cabinet from political attacks and possibly even impeachment proceedings. It is likely an indication that parliamentarians are very concerned about the threat the regime faces in the form of popular discontent.

The worsening economic conditions in Iran are facilitating solidarity and possibly cooperation between protest organizers and some domestic economic actors. Twenty Iranian civil society and economic organizations published a political manifesto on February 14, criticizing the regime protest crackdown and expressing support for the Mahsa Amini protests.[xvi] The signatories included organizations representing industrial and petrochemical workers, retirees, students, and various activist groups. Eighteen protest groups, including the United Youth of Iran, issued a joint statement expressing solidarity with the signatories on February 18.[xvii] Economically driven protests have become increasingly common in recent weeks, and CTP hypothesized that labor groups are coordinating some of this protest activity.[xviii] The civil society and economic organizations that signed the manifesto may have facilitated these recent demonstrations and strikes, although CTP cannot verify that hypothesis at this time.

Protest organizers may leverage popular economic frustrations to generate further political unrest against the regime. Making economic frustrations into a political issue would essentially invert the narrative that Iranian leaders have asserted in recent weeks. Many regime officials have focused on the role that poor economic conditions have played in driving the Mahsa Amini protests, as CTP previously reported, rather than addressing the core political and sociocultural factors that triggered the movement.[xix]

The efforts of regime officials and protest groups to associate the protest movement with economic issues will complicate any regime effort to de-escalate with the population. The regime cannot easily control macroeconomic trends in Iran but could have made meaningful concessions on the core political and sociocultural issues that sparked the Mahsa Amini movement. Iranian leaders have instead doubled down on their commitment to ideologizing the population and continuing to enforce the mandatory hijab law, while rhetorically tying the protests to the economy that they are struggling to improve.

Bloomberg reported on February 19 that International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) monitors had detected 84-percent-enriched uranium—the highest level of enrichment in Iran reported to date—at an unspecified nuclear facility, citing two senior diplomats.[xx] It is unclear how much uranium Iran has produced at this level of enrichment. Weapons-grade uranium purity is enriched to around 90 percent.[xxi] The IAEA had previously condemned Iran on February 1 for failing to inform it of ”substantial” changes and enriching uranium of up to 60 percent at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant.[xxii]

Key Takeaways

• The Mahsa Amini protest movement has likely entered a new phase, although it is unclear what the pattern and nature of anti-regime activity will characterize this new phase.
• Western media outlets have reported lingering discontent throughout the Iranian population, corroborating CTP’s prior assessment that conditions remain present for the resumption of significant anti-regime activity.
• Moderate and reformist politicians are urgently renewing their calls for the regime to address protester grievances.
• Iran continues to face severe economic issues, which may fuel increased political attacks against President Ebrahim Raisi and his administration.
• The worsening economic conditions in Iran are facilitating solidarity and possibly cooperation between protest organizers and some domestic economic actors.
• The efforts of regime officials and protest groups to associate the protest movement with economic issues will complicate any regime effort to de-escalate with the population.
• Bloomberg reported on February 19 that International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) monitors had detected 84-percent-enriched uranium—the highest level of enrichment in Iran reported to date—at an unspecified nuclear facility, citing two senior diplomats.
• At least 12 protests occurred in 10 cities across eight provinces on February 19, 14 protests occurred in 14 cities across 13 provinces on February 20, and seven protests occurred in six cities across five provinces on February 21. CTP did not record protest activity on February 18.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least 12 protests occurred in 10 cities across eight provinces on February 19. CTP assesses with moderate confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Shoushtar, Khuzestan Province[xxiii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxiv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Families of prisoners sentenced to death on drug-related charges.

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Bakers
• Notes: Bakers went on strike in response to reduced flour quotas and low bread prices.

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations on February 19:

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[xxvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Cultural actors

Yazd City, Yazd Province[xxvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Yazdbaf Factory workers on strike

Rasht, Gilan Province[xxviii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Kerman City, Kerman Province[xxix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[xxx]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xxxi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Kayson Company workers

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xxxii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Shoush, Khuzestan Province[xxxiii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Yasouj, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province[xxxiv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Municipal workers

At least 14 protests occurred in 14 cities across 13 provinces on February 20. CTP assesses with moderate confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[xxxv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xxxvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Khorramabad, Lorestan Province[xxxvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Saveh, Markazi Province[xxxviii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: National housing applicants

Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xxxix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Kanroud Sazeh Petrochemical Company workers

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xl]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations on February 20:

Asalouyeh, Bushehr Province[xli]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: South Pars Refinery contract workers

Yazd, Fars Province[xlii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Lead and Zinc Company workers on strike

Ilam City, Ilam Province[xliii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[xliv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Yasouj, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad Province[xlv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[xlvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Arak, Markazi Province[xlvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired telecommunications workers

Zanjan City, Zanjan Province[xlviii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Iran National Lead and Zinc Company workers on strike

At least seven protests occurred in six cities across five provinces on February 21. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Baneh, Kurdistan Province[xlix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Shopkeepers

Tehran City, Tehran Province[l]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retired university workers

Tehran City, Tehran Province[li]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Education workers

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province[lii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Green space contractors

Mashhad, Khorasan Razavi Province[liii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Welfare recipients

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[liv]

• Size: Smal
• Demographic: Municipal workers

Masjed Soleiman, Khuzestan Province[lv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Petrochemical workers

Protest coordinators and organizations called for anti-regime demonstrations on the following date:

February 22[lvi]

• Location: Bazaars throughout Iran

Prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid tweeted on February 19, condemning security officers who have raped arrested citizens.[lvii] Abdol Hamid was likely responding to the recent sentencing of a local LEC commander who raped a 15-year-old girl in Chabahar, Sistan and Baluchistan Province. An Iranian military court sentenced the commander to 15 months in prison for ”creating an atmosphere of skepticism toward the police,” rather than rape.[lviii]

An unidentified gunman shot and killed an LEC officer in Chahar Bagh, Alborz Province on February 20.[lix] Iranian state media described the gunman as a drug dealer.

The Central Bank of Iran (CBI) announced new measures aimed at controlling exchange rates on February 21. CBI Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin announced that the CBI had created a new currency and gold exchange center to “replace the free market” and stabilize foreign exchange rates.[lx] Iranian media separately reported that the CBI will no longer provide dollars to currency exchange bureaus for distribution.[lxi]

CNN worked with arrested protesters to locate a number of detention sites that the regime used to brutally torture anti-regime dissidents. CNN reported on February 21 that several of the sites were makeshift and cropped up near popular protest areas. Some of such sites were located in the Basij centers of local mosques. CNN confirmed the existence of three dozen detention facilities total, including six sites in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province; five in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province; and eight in Tehran City, Tehran Province. Arrested protesters stated that the regime had tortured medical professionals who had treated injured protesters, confirming prior reports of an anti-regime medical network established to allow protesters to circumvent hospital treatment.[lxii] CNN’s sources stated that the regime had been more willing to use brutal tactics against protesters participating in recent unrest compared to protesters from anti-regime demonstration waves, which they attributed to the regime’s fear of the Mahsa Amini movement. One source assessed that: ”the regime felt that it would be overthrown this time. They needed to stop the protests at any cost.”[lxiii]

The regime continues to crack down on businesses providing goods and services to women who do not full adhere to the mandatory hijab law. Iranian authorities closed a pharmacy in Tehran and a café in Shiraz on February 21 over their reported failures to enforce the hijab requirement.[lxiv] The regime has refocused on enforcing widespread adherence to the hijab law in recent weeks after briefly and informally relaxing such restrictions in late 2022, as CTP previously reported.[lxv]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev accused parts of the Iranian regime on February 18 of participating in the recent attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran.[lxvi] An armed individual shot and killed a security officer and injured two other guards at the embassy on January 27, as CTP previously reported.[lxvii] Baku recalled the embassy staff in the following days. Aliyev stated that ties between Azerbaijan and Iran will normalize once regime officials investigate the incident transparently and punish the perpetrators of the attack. Tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran have increased in recent months as Iranian officials regularly accuse Azerbaijan of hosting Israeli intelligence services.[lxviii]

President Ebrahim Raisi gave an interview with Chinese state-owned media outlet Xinwen Lianbo. China Central Television broadcasts Xinwen Lianbo, which is one of the oldest and most viewed television programs in mainland China.[lxix] Raisi emphasized Sino-Iranian strategic cooperation and framed his visit to Beijing as a turning point in relations between the two countries.[lxx] Raisi previously published an op-ed in the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s People’s Daily, which CTP assessed likely signals high-level Chinese support for increased Sino-Iranian cooperation.[lxxi]

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed that he will travel to Tehran in mid-March 2023 in a meeting with Iranian Ambassador to Belarus Saeed Yari on February 21. Yari stated that Belarus-Iran ties were at their peak and would continue to improve following Lukashenko’s Tehran visit.[lxxii]

External Security and Military Affairs

Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Shahram Erani paid an official visit to Oman on February 18 and met with Omani Navy Commander Seyf bin Nasser al Rahbi, among other Omani officials.[lxxiii] Iranian state media has not provided additional details on Erani’s visit.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes on multiple likely IRGC and Iranian-backed militia positions in Damascus Province, Syria on February 18.[lxxiv] An Israeli OSINT Twitter account claimed that the IDF struck an IRGC Quds Force facility in the Kfar Sousa suburb of Damascus.[lxxv] The account claimed the Quds Force facility is directly across the street from the local headquarters for the Quds Force’s Unit 840.[lxxvi] This unit is reportedly responsible for planning kidnappings, abductions, assassinations, and other external operations.[lxxvii]

The IDF separately targeted positions in Sayyida Zainab, Damascus Province, where the IRGC and Iranian-backed militias maintain a significant military presence.[lxxviii] The IDF also struck two likely Syrian Arab Army (SAA) air defense positions in Damascus and As Suwayda Provinces.[lxxix] Assad Regime-run SANA reported that the airstrikes killed five and wounded 15 people.[lxxx]  Damascus Police Command issued told reporters that SAA Brigadier General Amjad Ahmed Ali died during the airstrikes but did not identify any of the other casualties.[lxxxi] Independent analysts have suggested that Ali may have been involved in Iranian efforts to smuggle precision-guided munitions into Syria.[lxxxii]

Likely Iranian-backed militants launched two rockets at US-led International Coalition forces stationed at the Green Village base, Deir ez Zor Province, Syria on February 18.[lxxxiii] US Central Command announced that the attack did not harm any personnel or base property.[lxxxiv] The militants conducted the attack several hours prior to the February 18 Israeli airstrikes around Damascus.[lxxxv] US forces downed an Iranian-made intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) drone on February 16 approximately 30 kilometers north of the Green Village at the nearby Conoco Mission Support site, as CTP previously reported.[lxxxvi] The timing of the ISR flight suggests Iranian-backed militants likely intended to gather intelligence on US positions prior to the February 18 attack. Iranian-backed militants occasionally conduct low-intensity attacks—such as launching two unguided rockets—against US forces in eastern Syria to retaliate for regional developments that Iran perceives as hostile and perpetrated by the US. CTP previously reported the IDF conducted a series of airstrikes on January 29 and 30 against Iranian-backed militia convoys likely smuggling weaponry and materiel into eastern Syria through the al-Qaim Iraq-Syria border crossing.[lxxxvii] Iran may have ordered the attack in retaliation for the January 29 and 30 airstrikes. Iran also may have ordered the attack as part of its response to the January 28 kamikaze drone attack on an IRGC facility in Esfahan City, Esfahan Province, Iran.[lxxxviii]

Iranian-backed militants deployed additional units into Syria ostensibly to provide earthquake relief.[lxxxix] Asaib Ahl al Haq’s (AAH) 43rd brigade led a convoy into Syria as part of an operation AAH termed “People of Goodness.”[xc] Lebanese Hezbollah delivered a 20-truck convoy to Aleppo City on February 21, reportedly carrying 600 tons of food and medical supplies.[xci]  CTP previously reported that Iranian-backed proxies have used earthquake relief convoys to transport weaponry and materiel into Syria.[xcii]