Iran Update, February 23, 2023

February 23, 2023, 6:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Senior regime officials are increasingly acknowledging that the Islamic Republic risks permanently alienating itself from its people and that the problem is urgent, but have seemingly drawn different conclusions about how to mitigate this risk. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implicitly warned of increased rifts between Iranian leadership and its youth in a speech addressed to the Assembly of Experts on February 23. Khamenei described the assembly—a body of 88 clerics responsible for supervising, dismissing, and selecting Iran’s Supreme Leader—as a paragon of democracy. All elected assembly members must secure approval from a separate supervisory council, vetted by Khamenei, before running for office.[i] Khamenei stressed the importance of “preserving”-- possibly implying that the regime risks losing--the Islamic Republic’s social capital and called on the assembly to increase political participation among Iranian youth, echoing similar calls from actors across the Iranian political spectrum in recent weeks.[ii] Khamenei added that measures to increase social capital must occur within the ideological boundaries of the regime, and tasked the Assembly of Experts with “monitor(ing) and maintain(ing) the overall movement and important parts of the regime (so that) the revolution does not digress like other revolutions.” Khamenei also seemingly warned against public criticisms of the regime’s core ideology, stating: “no one should say online or elsewhere that the Islamic Republic has created an enemy for itself” and advised officials against “talking loosely and illogically.” Khamenei seemed to frame connecting with Iranian youth as an uphill battle and told his audience that “one should not be offended by doubt … one should be prepared to face doubt.” Khamenei additionally urged officials to “perform (their) duties seriously and without fatigue or weakness of action,” possibly an exhortation to President Ebrahim Raisi, who attended the meeting.[iii] It is noteworthy that Khamenei did not signal his desire to end calls for the impeachment of Raisi administration officials, which parliamentarians have made in recent days as Iran faces significant economic challenges.[iv] The Supreme Leader previously instructed parliament against impeaching former President Hassan Rouhani in 2020, making his silence in this context conspicuous.[v]

Khamenei’s comments are not necessarily anomalous; he has previously acknowledged the regime’s shortcomings following recent protests.[vi] Khamenei’s solution to these shortcomings is not new, either. The Supreme Leader instructed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to further ideologize Iranian youth instead of granting sociocultural concessions, asking the Guard to “redouble its efforts to attract, nurture, and train talented youth … to strengthen the Guards’ spiritual, revolutionary, and military foundations” in a statement celebrating a regime holiday on February 23.[vii] The frequency with which and context wherein Khamenei is discussing the deepening divide between the Islamic Republic and its youth, however, indicates that Khamenei feels and wishes to express an increased sense of urgency even as other regime officials express urgency and alarm more openly.

Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf separately made an urgent appeal for governmental change in a parliamentary meeting on February 23. Ghalibaf warned that the regime risked delegitimization if it failed to reform, stating “if we do not reform governance...the sacred institution of the Islamic Republic will be harmed.” Ghalibaf added that “the survival of the Islamic Revolution without the people is questionable.” CTP has previously assessed that Ghalibaf is a pragmatic hardliner and that such calls for reform are made with the aim of strengthening the Islamic Republic rather than altering it fundamentally, as Ghalibaf appears sincere in his devotion to the ideals and preservation of the revolution.[viii] Ghalibaf stated that Iranian officials “must make the governance of the regime efficient” and that “the people like the revolution but criticize officials,” signaling his support for the ideological core of the regime but recognizing that the regime must introduce meaningful governmental reforms in order to avoid losing the people’s trust.[ix]

Ghalibaf delivered his comments at a meeting about the function of the Article 90 Committee. Article 90 of the Iranian Constitution and the Article 90 Committee relate to complaints against parliament, the executive, and the judiciary.[x] Article 90 also specifies the procedures for interpellating, impeaching, and removing officials of those bodies, including ministers and the president. Ghalibaf may have made this speech in response to recent calls among parliamentarians for the impeachment of Raisi administration officials.[xi] Ghalibaf may be aiming to discourage a frenzy of impeachment proceedings, as such actions risk exacerbating Iran’s internal issues and distracting officials from rectifying the economy. There is currently no direct evidence to support this hypothesis, however.

Ghalibaf explicitly called for parastatal organizations to decrease their involvement in the Iranian economy.[xii] Ghalibaf stated that a significant part of Iran’s economy is “khasoulati,” a term of opprobrium referring to the disproportionate role played by government-controlled organizations in the economy.[xiii] Ghalibaf added that former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had warned the government against interfering in affairs that the Iranian people can handle themselves (although Khomeini himself established a number of such organizations). These statements follow Ghalibaf’s speech on February 22 in which he implied that the IRGC is an obstacle to allowing the Iranian economy to operate efficiently. Ghalibaf may be suggesting that Iran’s economic issues can only be addressed through fundamental change.[xiv] Ghalibaf’s observations are accurate that parastatal organizations including, but not limited to, the IRGC and those it controls badly distort Iran’s economy and have interfered with efforts to increase Iran’s economic health and efficiency for decades. His focus on criticizing such organizations in a speech ostensibly about the constitutional article related to impeachment supports the hypothesis that he seeks to redirect parliamentary focus away from fruitless impeachment proceedings that cannot lead to economic improvement and toward addressing some of the root causes of the Iranian economy’s struggles.

An Israeli OSINT Twitter account circulated uncorroborated claims that unknown actors targeted two IRGC-affiliated complexes in the vicinity of Karaj, Alborz Province on February 23, citing inside sources.[xv] Local residents reported hearing blasts and anti-aircraft activity roughly 13 miles away from Karaj, Alborz Province.[xvi] One resident observed that that anti-aircraft activity ”seemed like it was targeting a drone,” consistent with footage that allegedly captured the event.[xvii] The Israeli OSINT Twitter account stated that the purported attack resulted in one casualty.[xviii] CTP cannot independently verify this report. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency acknowledged reports of explosions in Karaj, but claimed that such blasts resulted from ”Basij training exercises.”[xix] The footage allegedly capturing the event features two explosions on or near ground level. Israel previously conducted a kamikaze drone attack on a military munitions factory near Esfahan City, Esfahan Province on January 28, as CTP previously reported.[xx]

Key Takeaways

• Senior regime officials are increasingly acknowledging that the Islamic Republic risks permanently alienating itself from its people and that the problem is urgent, but have seemingly drawn different conclusions about how to mitigate this risk.
• An Israeli OSINT Twitter account circulated uncorroborated claims that unknown actors targeted two IRGC-affiliated complexes in the vicinity of Karaj, Alborz Province, citing inside sources.
• At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces.
• Sports and Youth Minister Hamid Sajjadi has sustained serious injuries following a helicopter crash in Baft, Kerman Province.
• Iranian social media users continued to report symptoms of chemical poisoning among some high school students.
• An unnamed senior Iranian official told Al Monitor on February 23 that Iran would support reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or establishing a separate nuclear agreement with the United States.
• The Iranian rial continued to plummet on February 23, reaching approximately 526,500 rials to one US dollar.
• Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Tehran on February 21.
• Independent Iraqi political parties boycotted a session of Parliament.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces on February 23. CTP assesses with high confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[xxi]

• Size: Small
• Notes: Individuals gathered at the Behesht Mohammadi Cemetery in Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province. Some individuals chanted anti-regime slogans, although it is unclear whether most mourners participated in such chants.

CTP assesses with moderate confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Kerman City, Kerman Province[xxii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Esfandagheh Chromite Mine workers

Sports and Youth Minister Hamid Sajjadi has sustained serious injuries following a helicopter crash in Baft, Kerman Province on February 23. Iranian media reported that the crash killed Sajjadi’s advisor and injured two others, excluding Sajjadi.[xxiii] Sajjai suffered brain hemorrhaging and is currently in a local intensive care unit in Baft.[xxiv]

Iranian citizens reportedly received a text message from the Ministry of Intelligence and Security stating that the Mossad was exploiting their “lack of information and awareness” on February 22. The text claimed that the Mossad was offering citizens cash in exchange for parking a vehicle in a designated place.[xxv]

Iranian social media users continued to report symptoms of chemical poisoning among some high school students. Students in Boroujerd, Lorestan Province and Qom City, Qom Province allegedly experienced “poisoning” on February 22, resulting in the hospitalization of dozens of students.[xxvi] Affected students reported symptoms such as numbness, abdominal pain, headaches and shortness of breath.[xxvii]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

An unnamed senior Iranian official told Al Monitor on February 23 that Iran would support reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or establishing a separate nuclear agreement with the United States. The official stated that Iran would “prefer a normal relationship with the West—with the JCPOA” and claimed that the US and Iran were indirectly negotiating and prepared for a prisoner swap. The official stated that Iran would adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty even if the P5+1 and Iran failed to revitalize the JCPOA. Al Monitor added that the Iranian official viewed increased engagement with foreign actors as imperative to stabilizing Iran’s internal environment, stating that “protests have died down, but we have no choice but to pursue reforms. This is a domestic, not foreign, imperative … normalization with regional states is our priority.” The official added that Iran is seeking to prevent an escalation between the US and Iraq.[xxviii]

Supreme National Security Council-affiliated Nour News Agency denied reports that Iran had enriched uranium to 84 percent purity on February 23.[xxix] Bloomberg previously reported on February 19 that International Atomic Energy Organization (IAEA) monitors had detected 84-percent-enriched uranium—the highest level of enrichment in Iran reported to date—at an unspecified nuclear facility, citing two senior diplomats.[xxx]

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in Tehran on February 21.[xxxi] Kadhimi released a statement claiming that the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited him to Tehran reportedly to discuss regional and domestic Iraqi issues.[xxxii] Kadhimi also met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on February 22 and 23.[xxxiii] An unidentified source from the Iraqi Shia Coordination Framework reported that the Coordination Framework is attempting to deescalate tensions with the US.[xxxiv]

In December 2022, the US Federal Reserve restricted dollar transactions through five major Iraqi banks aimed at limiting transfers to Iranian institutions. The restrictions cut off Iraqi debt payments to Iran and has compounded the economic crisis in Iran. Mustafa al-Khadimi may be acting as an interlocutor between Iran and the United States to lift restrictions and allow Iraq to pay its debts. Alternatively, Kadhimi may be acting as a liaison between Iran and the US following renewed interest in reviving a nuclear deal.

Independent Iraqi political parties boycotted a session of Parliament on February 23.[xxxv] Iraq’s State of Law Coalition called for a snap vote in Parliament on a new election law on February 22. Parliament agendas are released 48 hours ahead of parliament sessions and the snap vote was a break from procedure. Iraq’s parliament rescheduled the vote for February 27.[xxxvi] The proposed election law is backed by the Coordination Framework and opposed by independent and minority political parties in Iraq.[xxxvii]

Economic Affairs

The Iranian rial continued to plummet on February 23, reaching approximately 526,500 rials to one US dollar.[xxxviii] The rial was valued at around 500,000 for one US dollar on February 21, a then all-time low.[xxxix] The regime must implement significant economic reforms in order to meaningfully address Iran’s economic conditions, although it is presently unclear if Iranian officials have articulated and cohered around such a solution.

President Ebrahim Raisi was notably absent from ongoing public discussions about deteriorating economic conditions on February 23. Information and Communications Technology Minister Issa Zahreh Pour stated that foreign actors had targeted the Iranian rial and claimed that the Raisi administration had plans to stimulate economic growth on February 23, although Zahreh Pour does not oversee the administration’s economic policies.[xl] An Iranian parliamentarian previously announced on February 22 that Raisi administration officials had been unable to attend a scheduled meeting on currency fluctuations, resulting in the meeting’s postponement until February 25.[xli]

External Security and Military Affairs

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Iraqi officials to discuss Iranian security concerns in Iraq on February 22 and 23. Amir Abdollahian argued that armed separatist groups operating in Iraqi Kurdistan present a threat to Iran’s national security and that their presence in Iraqi Kurdistan is unacceptable to the Iranian regime.[xlii] Amir Abdollahian and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fouad Hussein released a joint statement announcing that Iran and Iraq have established a joint counter-terrorism committee to counter Kurdish militias in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xliii] Amir Abdollahian also met with Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid and Popular Mobilization Forces head Faleh al-Fayyad to discuss counterterrorism operations in Iraq.[xliv]