Iran Update, February 4, 2024

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates on February 3 and 4, 2024. Detailed coverage will resume Monday, February 5, 2024.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Unspecified officials familiar with the hostage negotiations told the Wall Street Journal that divisions between Hamas’ leadership in the Gaza Strip and its exiled political leadership are impeding negotiations. The officials said that Hamas’ political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, is prepared to accept a six-week pause in fighting and hostage exchange, but that Hamas’ exiled political leadership is calling for more concessions and a permanent ceasefire.[i] Egyptian officials added that Hamas’ political leadership is also demanding the release of 3,000 Palestinian prisoners—including some who took part in the October 7, 2023 attacks—in return for 36 Israeli civilian hostages.[ii] Beirut-based senior Hamas official Osama Hamdan said on February 3 that Hamas and its allies rejected the six-week pause in fighting in a “united decision.”[iii] Hamdan added that Hamas and its allies are committed to a permanent ceasefire. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader demanded that any negotiations guarantee a “comprehensive ceasefire,” an Israeli withdrawal from and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, and a “clear political solution.”[iv]

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that approving a hostage release deal is “up to Hamas,” but that he is not able to give a precise timetable on a hostage release deal.[v] He added that a deal is not imminent. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that Israel will not release “thousands” of prisoners in a hostage deal and that a permanent ceasefire will not be part of any hostage release deal.[vi]

Sinwar may calculate that a six-week pause would slow Israel’s momentum sufficiently enough to permanently end fighting and secure Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. The Wall Street Journal reported on January 31 that US officials are seeking a six-week pause in fighting to “stall Israel’s military momentum and potentially set the stage for a more lasting truce.”[vii] US and Arab officials ”familiar with the negotiations” told the Wall Street Journal that Israel would find it ”difficult to resume the war at its current intensity.”[viii] An interim pause leading to less intense Israeli ground operations or an end to Israeli operations would likely ensure Hamas‘ survival as a governing authority in the Gaza Strip.

Sinwar also likely seeks a pause in fighting to secure short-term military advantage. A six-week pause would enable Sinwar to reorganize his military forces, accelerate their infiltration into areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, and continue the reconstitution of Hamas’ military organization in the northern Gaza Strip free from Israeli interference. An IDF military correspondent reported on February 4 that Hamas’ Gaza City Brigade commander is still alive and a “major factor in Hamas’ reconstitution efforts” in the northern Strip.[ix] This commander, free from the threat of Israeli strikes during a pause, could accelerate these efforts.

Key Takeaways:

• Negotiations: Unspecified officials familiar with the hostage negotiations told the Wall Street Journal that divisions between Hamas’ leadership in the Gaza Strip and its exiled political leadership are impeding negotiations.
• US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that approving a hostage release deal is “up to Hamas,” but that he is not able to give a precise timetable on a hostage release deal.[x] He added that a deal is not imminent.
• Sinwar may calculate that a six-week pause would slow Israel’s momentum sufficiently enough to permanently end fighting and secure Hamas’ rule in the Gaza Strip. An interim pause leading to less intense Israeli ground operations or an end to Israeli operations would likely ensure Hamas‘ survival as a governing authority in the Gaza Strip.
• Sinwar also likely seeks a pause in fighting to secure short-term military advantage. A six-week pause would enable Sinwar to reorganize his military forces, accelerate their infiltration into areas previously cleared by Israeli forces, and continue the reconstitution of Hamas’ military organization in the northern Gaza Strip free from Israeli interference.
• Northern Gaza Strip: Palestinian fighters continued their efforts aimed at disrupting Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip, primarily in the al Sinaa area of southwestern Gaza City, on February 4.
• Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces have “intensified” fighting in al Amal area of western Khan Younis in recent days.
• Yemen: The United States and the United Kingdom conducted strikes targeting 36 Houthi military positions and assets in 13 locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 3.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian fighters continued their efforts aimed at disrupting Israeli operations in the northern Gaza Strip, primarily in the al Sinaa area of southwestern Gaza City, on February 4.[xi] CTP-ISW assessed on February 3 that Palestinian fighters infiltrated southwestern Gaza City.[xii] Hamas and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a leftist militia aligned with Hamas in the current war, claimed four separate attacks targeting Israeli forces in al Sinaa on February 4.[xiii] Hamas fighters also targeted Israeli armor with rocket-propelled grenades in the al Sabra area, southwest of Gaza City.[xiv] The 401st Brigade (assigned to the 162nd Division) killed seven Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip.[xv]

Palestinian fighters targeted Israeli infantry and armor with small arms fire and RPGs in Khan Younis City on February 4.[xvi]

 Israeli forces have “intensified” fighting in al Amal area of western Khan Younis in recent days.[xvii] The IDF said al Amal neighborhood is a Hamas stronghold.[xviii]  The 35th Paratroopers Brigade (assigned to the 98th Division) raided Hamas military infrastructure in the neighborhood.[xix]

The Givati Brigade raided the main headquarters of Hamas’s Khan Younis Brigade in the southern Gaza Strip on February 4.[xx] The IDF said that Hamas used the facility to train fighters for the October 7 attacks and to military direct operations.[xxi] Mohammad Sinwar, the commander of the Khan Younis Brigade and brother of Hamas political leader in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar, had a main office in the compound.[xxii] Israeli forces also raided a ”combat management” building in western Khan Younis used by a senior Khan Younis commander on February 4.[xxiii] The forces killed Palestinian fighters and captured weapons warehouses and weapons manufacturing equipment in the raid.[xxiv]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces clashed with Palestinian militias eight times across the West Bank on February 4.[xxv]  Israeli forces detained four wanted individuals and confiscated weapons in overnight raids across the West Bank on February 4.[xxvi]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted at least eight attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on February 4.[xxvii]

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The United States and the United Kingdom conducted strikes targeting 36 Houthi military positions and assets in 13 locations across Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen on February 3.[xxviii] The targets included “multiple underground storage facilities, command and control, missile systems, UAV storage and operations sites, radars, and helicopters.”[xxix] US Central Command said that the strikes targeted facilities used by the Houthis to attack international shipping and US Navy ships in the region.[xxx]  Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that the United States and the United Kingdom conducted 48 strikes and warned that the strikes will not go “without response and punishment.”[xxxi]

US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted preemptive strikes targeting seven Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to launch toward ships in the Red Sea on February 3.[xxxii] CENTCOM determined in both instances that the cruise missile presented an “imminent threat” to commercial vessels and US Navy ships in the Red Sea.  

IRGC-controlled media claimed on February 3 that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian backed Iraqi militias—conducted two rocket attacks targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in northeastern Syria.[xxxiii] CTP-ISW cannot verify these claims. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq did not claim responsibility for either of the attacks on its Telegram account.