Iran Update, January 20, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. 

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 19.

Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.[i] Hamas released three female Israeli hostages on the first day of the ceasefire on January 19.[ii] Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank in exchange.[iii]

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) facilitated the entry of 630 humanitarian aid trucks into the Gaza Strip on January 19.[iv] Israel is required to support the entry of 600 aid trucks into the Gaza Strip daily during the first phase of the ceasefire with Hamas.[v]

The IDF fired warning shots at approaching Gazans in the Gaza Strip on January 20.[vi] Palestinian medical officials reported that IDF injured eight Gazans in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.[vii] A Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF also injured two individuals in the central Gaza Strip.[viii] The IDF warned Gazans on January 19 to avoid approaching Israeli forces in designated areas.[ix]

The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on January 19 that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.”[x] The IDF similarly stated on January 19 that it will deploy new forces to the West Bank amid Hamas’ efforts to stoke conflict there despite the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[xi] Israel is expected to release hundreds of Palestinian prisoners into the West Bank as part of the ceasefire-hostage deal, which informed the IDF decision to deploy new forces.[xii] The IDF Central Command will deploy elements from the 900th Infantry Brigade (99th Division) to conduct offensive operations in the West Bank.[xiii] The IDF 900th Infantry Brigade concluded its two-month deployment to the northern Gaza Strip on January 5.[xiv]

Likely Arab tribal forces have engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in several locations along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in SDF-controlled territory since January 19. Sheikh Ibrahim al Hafl issued a call to tribal fighters on January 19 to ”stand as a solid line” and ”liberate” SDF-held territory.[xv] Hafl is a tribal leader who previously incited an Arab uprising against the SDF in fall 2023 and later defected to regime-controlled territory.[xvi] Hafl most recently called for Arabs to defect from the SDF on December 9, 2024.[xvii] Local, anti-SDF media reported that local gunmen crossed the Euphrates River into SDF-controlled territory and attacked SDF checkpoints, headquarters, and other positions in at least six towns along the western bank of the river on January 19.[xviii]  Syrian media reported that the gunmen captured an SDF headquarters in Suwaidan Jazeera and Dhiban on January 20.[xix] At least five SDF personnel were killed in the attacks, according to local reports.[xx] The SDF reinforced positions along the western bank and issued curfews over several towns in its territory.[xxi]

The SDF accused former regime and National Defense Forces remnants of attacking SDF headquarters and capturing main roads in Kasra, Khasham, Dhiban, al Tayyana, and Gharanij.[xxii] The SDF has previously referred to Hafl’s forces in such terms, describing them as former regime affiliates.[xxiii]A Deir ez Zor-based source reported that most of the fighters who attacked SDF positions are affiliated with Hafl.[xxiv]

A Deir ez Zor-based source reported that the SDF responded to the tribal fighters’ attacks by firing at HTS-led forces positions across the Euphrates River.[xxv] The HTS-led Department of Military Operations currently operates from these positions, and numerous Syrian outlets reported that the SDF and HTS-led forces exchanged fire across the river.[xxvi] The SDF denied on January 20 that it engaged any HTS-affiliated fighters in Deir ez Zor and accused “Turkish-affiliated” outlets of spreading a false narrative.[xxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Hamas announced that the next round of hostage releases will occur on January 26.
• West Bank: The IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said that the IDF must be prepared for “significant operations” in the West Bank in the “coming days.”
• Northern Syria: Likely Arab tribal forces have engaged the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in several locations along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River in SDF-controlled territory.
• Northern Syria: Anti-SDF outlets have continued to circulate unconfirmed reports that the HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed forces to the SDF-SNA frontlines near Manbij. An HTS decision to send fighters to reinforce the SNA would represent a significant departure from current HTS efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm.

Syria

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to Lebanon
• Reestablish Iranian influence in Syria

Anti-SDF outlets have continued to report that the HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed forces to the SDF-SNA frontlines near Manbij since January 19.[xxviii] Several Syrian outlets reported on January 19 that the HTS-controlled Department of Military Operations, which is affiliated with the Syrian interim government, deployed forces to the frontlines.[xxix] An anti-SDF outlet circulated footage on January 19 of fighters traveling in a purportedly Department of Military Operations convoy to join the fighting at Tishreen Dam.[xxx] One of the fighters in the footage wore a patch that strongly resembles the ISIS flag, which probably indicates support for some ISIS views but not membership in the organization.[xxxi] CTP-ISW cannot confirm local reporting and has not observed credible indicators that the HTS-controlled Syrian Ministry of Defense has deployed or has committed to deploy forces to Aleppo Province. An HTS decision to send fighters to reinforce the SNA would represent a significant departure from current HTS efforts to coerce the SDF to disarm, which involves direct negotiations with the SDF and coordination with the SNA and Turkey.[xxxii] Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan suggested on January 10 that Turkey would give the Syrian interim government an opportunity to disarm and dissolve the SDF before Turkey takes military action, however.[xxxiii] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara may calculate that HTS military involvement would sufficiently encourage the SDF to disarm itself, which it has so far been unwilling to do through negotiations with HTS alone. CTP-ISW will continue to monitor reports about deployments to the frontlines.

The SNA and Turkey have continued to attack SDF positions along a key ground line of communication in northern Syria in order to isolate the SDF at Qara Qozak Bridge. Anti-SDF media reported that Turkey struck SDF positions in Sarrin on January 20, which is located along the M4 highway and is a critical logistical route for SDF defenses at Qara Qozak bridge.[xxxiv] The SNA shelled SDF positions near Sarrin and in the southeastern Kobani countryside on January 20.[xxxv]

The SNA continued trying to reduce the SDF bridgehead west of Tishreen Dam on January 20. The SDF stated that the SNA launched an attack in “large numbers” from Tal Syriatal, northwest of the dam.[xxxvi] The SDF added that it killed 21 SNA fighters in clashes in the area.[xxxvii] The SDF posted footage on January 19 and 20 of several drone strikes targeting SNA fighters, tanks, and armored vehicles.[xxxviii]  Suleiman Shah Brigade Commander Abu Amsha posted footage of the brigades’ forces operating in towns and terrain around Tishreen Dam.[xxxix] The Suleiman Shah Brigade is member of the SNA‘s Joint Force and is active near the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak bridgeheads.

The SNA also mortared and fired small arms targeting SDF positions near Deir Hafer city, south of Tishreen Dam.[xl] The SDF stated that it conducted two drone attacks targeting SNA vehicles in the area.[xli]

Turkish aircraft and drones reportedly struck two SDF positions in northern Hasakah Province on January 20. Local media reported that Turkey conducted two drone strikes targeting an SDF warehouse south of Darabasiya, near the Syria-Turkey border.[xlii] Turkish aircraft also struck an SDF position in Qahtaniyah, east of Qamishli.[xliii]

The SNA likely remains deployed near Tal Tamr along eastern SDF-SNA frontlines. Anti-SDF media posted footage of an SNA fighter firing small arms that reportedly targeted SDF positions near Tal Tamr on January 19.[xliv] The SNA has reportedly deployed forces to the line of control near Tal Tamr since January 8.[xlv]

The Turkish Consulate General in Aleppo reopened on January 20 after remaining closed for 12 years.[xlvi] Turkish Interim Charge D’Affaires to the Turkish Embassy in Damascus Burhan Koroglu and Turkish Consul General in Aleppo Hakan Cengiz attended the opening ceremony of the consulate general.[xlvii] Koroglu and Cengiz also met with Aleppo Governor Azzam al Gharib.[xlviii] Gharib is the commander-in-chief of al Jabhat al Shamiya, or the Levant Front, which controls Azaz in Aleppo Province.[xlix] Azaz is part of SNA-held territory.[l]

Syrian media reported that HTS-led forces clashed with former Assad regime members in Datour and Basnada, Latakia, on January 19.[li]

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi visited Israeli forces in Syria on January 20.[lii] Halevi told the forces that their presence in Syria has enabled the IDF to allocate resources and forces to other fronts and that the IDF will “now move forward on [those] other fronts.” The visit comes after Halevi met with the commanders of the IDF 210th Division, 98th Division, and Northern Command on January 19 to discuss the situation in Syria.[liii] The IDF continued operating in Quneitra Province, Syria, on January 20. Syrian media reported that Israeli forces entered al Baath in the Israel-Syria disengagement zone and withdrew after an hour.[liv] Syrian media also reported that Israeli forces advanced to Khan Arnabah, which is just outside the disengagement zone.[lv]

The Rif Dimashq Endowments Department reportedly sought to take control of the Shia Sayyidah Zeinab shrine. The Sayyidah Zainab Shrine Friday Prayer Leader, Sheikh Adham al Khatib, issued a statement on January 20 claiming that the Rif Dimashq Endowments Department “suspended” its decision to “seize” the shrine after he met with the Rif Dimashq endowments director.[lvi] Khatib claimed that he warned the director about the “negative repercussions” of “seizing” the shrine and emphasized the need to preserve “Islamic and national unity.”[lvii] The Syrian Popular Resistance, which is likely a pro-Assad group that espouses sectarian narratives, released a statement on January 20 praising Khatib for confronting the Rif Dimashq Endowments Department and describing Khatib as a “shepherd of the Shia sect.”[lviii]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

A Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) delegation traveled to Baghdad on January 19 to try to resolve an ongoing budget dispute with the Iraqi federal government.[lix] Shia political parties walked out of Parliament on January 19 in protest against an amendment to the Federal Budget Law that would increase compensation for oil production in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in return for the KRG resuming oil exports.[lx] The KRG ceased oil exports to Ceyhan Port in Turkey in March 2023 and has since then largely relied on the Iraqi federal government to pay public sector salaries.[lxi] The resumption of oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan would likely improve salary disbursements to public employees.

Sunni political parties have aligned with Kurdish parties on this issue. Azm Alliance leader Muthanna Samarrai called on January 20 for approving the budget amendment, saying that the halt in oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan has cost the Iraqi economy over 18 billion US dollars.[lxii] Prominent Sunni politician Khamis al Khanjar, who helped found the United Sunni Leadership Coalition, said after meeting KRG President Nechirvan Barzani on January 13 that the Iraqi federal government must provide salaries for public employees in Iraqi Kurdistan.[lxiii]

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi said on January 20 that Houthi operations targeting Israel are ”linked” to Israel implementing all phases of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement.[lxiv] Abdulmalik claimed that US airstrikes targeting Houthi military infrastructure and the increased US naval presence in the Red Sea have failed to deter the Houthis from attacking Israel. Houthi-affiliated, Sanaa-based Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) stated that the Houthis would stop attacking Israeli-linked ships ”upon the full implementation of all phases of the [Israel-Hamas ceasefire] agreement," in an email to shipping companies on January 19.[lxv] The HOCC confirmed that the Houthis will only re-trigger “sanctions”—referring to attacks on maritime traffic—on the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel if the Houthis are attacked.

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The Gaza Strip

The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli soldier in the northern Gaza Strip on January 19.[lxvi] Hamas took the Israeli soldier hostage during IDF operations in the Gaza Strip in 2014.[lxvii]

Lebanon

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) acting Commander Major General Hassan Awde inspected the 5th Infantry Brigade in Bayda, Tyre district in southwestern Lebanon on January 20.[lxviii] Awde met the 5th Infantry Brigade commander, who briefed Awde on the LAF deployments and IDF withdrawals in the South Litani sector. Awde inspected units deployed in Chama and al Sammiyah.

Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces operated near Wadi al Saluki on January 20. Lebanese media reported that Israeli military vehicles from Bani Hayyan advanced in the direction of Wadi al Saluki on January 20.[lxix] LAF personnel entering Talloussah, encountered Israeli armor at the Bani Hayyan junction in Wadi al Saluki, and postponed of the LAF unit’s mission as a result.[lxx] Three UNIFIL military vehicles reportedly withdrew from an unspecified forested area near Wadi al Saluki Road after witnessing Israeli forces reportedly bulldozing the site.[lxxi] Israeli forces later withdrew from Wadi al Saluki.[lxxii]

Israeli armor reportedly advanced towards the northern entrance of Maroun al Ras, southeastern Lebanon, and fired a shell at an unspecified target on January 20.[lxxiii]

Israeli forces reportedly fired artillery at an unspecified actor in Kfarchouba, Hasbaya District, Nabatieh Governorate on January 20.[lxxiv]

West Bank

Palestinian militias detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting an Israeli armored personnel carrier, killing one Israeli soldier from the IDF 421st Territorial Brigade (877th Division) in Tammun, Tubas, northern West Bank on January 20.[lxxv] The IED attack seriously injured one Israeli soldier and moderately injured three others.[lxxvi] No Palestinian militia has claimed responsibility for this attack at the time of this writing. Palestinian militias have killed at least four Israeli soldiers by detonating IEDs in the northern West Bank in the past year.[lxxvii]

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iran has continued to conduct military exercises to prepare to counter external and internal security threats. Iran has conducted a flurry of exercises across the country in recent weeks and will continue for the next several. The latest involved the Artesh Ground Forces 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade conducting a two-day counterterrorism exercise along the northeastern border with Afghanistan.[lxxviii] The Artesh Ground Forces artillery, armored, aviation, drone, electronic, and missile units and other supporting units supported the 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade in their heliborne operation to storm a hypothetical terrorist headquarters. The Tehran-based 65th Airborne Special Forces Brigade, also known as NOHED, consists of 5,000 personnel and is Iran’s most elite special forces unit, according to a US’s Defense Intelligence Agency report in 2019.[lxxix] NOHED is responsible for counterterrorism, hostage rescue, reconnaissance, espionage, telecommunications, among other irregular warfare operations.[lxxx] The Iranian regime sent out NOHED forces, alongside the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) personnel, to Syria in 2016 as advisors and to gain experience with Iranian proxies.[lxxxi] Iranian media reported NOHED personnel presence on the Iranian Afghan border in 2021.[lxxxii] NOHED also participated in the search and rescue operation for former President Ebrahim Raisi and former Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, after they died in a helicopter crash in May 2024.[lxxxiii]

Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri pad an official visit to Pakistan on January 20. Bagheri met separately with Pakistani Army Commander General Asim Munir, Air Force Commander Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Babar Sidhu, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, President Asif Ali Zardari, and Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif in Islamabad.[lxxxiv] Bagheri said that the most important discussion in these meetings was improving border security “in various dimensions.”[lxxxv] Bagheri announced that Iran will participate in the Aman-25 multinational exercise hosted by Pakistan’s Navy. Bagheri added that his delegation also discussed coordinating to address matters relevant to Afghanistan. Iranian Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi discussed border security with Munir in Islamabad in November 2024.[lxxxvi]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.