Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of the ongoing opposition offensive in Syria. These maps are updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.[i] The PIJ statement claimed the joint operations rooms would coordinate and develop ”field work” and ”joint action.” The joint operations rooms will be comprised of fighters from PIJ’s al Quds Brigades, Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades, and al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades’ ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch.[ii] The ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch, which is one of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades many branches based in various locations throughout the West Bank, was active in Tulkarm in summer 2024.[iii] It is unclear at this time where the joint operations rooms will be based, or which subgroup or groups of the ”Youth of Revenge and Liberation” branch will be involved. Hamas, the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and PIJ previously established a combined operations room known as ”the Hornets’ Nest” that was based in Jenin and active from 2022-2024. The Hornets’ Nest also included the military wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, among others.[iv] PIJ, Hamas, and the “Youth of Revenge and Liberation” claimed to fire small arms and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in a combined operation targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[v]

Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. A senior Iraqi diplomat claimed on January 22 that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will only integrate into the Iraqi army after US forces completely withdraw from Iraq.[vi]  The outgoing Biden administration reportedly pressured the Iraqi government to dissolve the Iranian-backed Iraq militias.[vii] The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups. Many of these groups have committed acts of sectarian cleansing dating back to the 2000s, which would destroy the national character of the Iraqi army if the government reflagged entire militia units as Iraqi army units.[viii] Multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, and the Badr Organization, swear allegiance to the Iranian supreme leader, not the Iraqi state.[ix] The state-recognized wings of these groups within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) already answer to militia chains of command—not the Iraqi prime minister—and there is no reason to believe that these groups would adhere to an Iraqi army chain of command if reflagged as Iraqi army units. The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that the remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[x] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani told Saudi outlet al Elaph in January 2025 that the Iraqi government is actively trying to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias within Iraq’s legal and institutional framework.[xi]

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba head Akram al Kaabi threatened to resume rocket and missile attacks targeting US forces in Iraq if the United States extends its presence past the September 2025 withdrawal date or makes “sudden moves.”[xii] Kaabi added that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias will increase the pace of attacks targeting US forces if the United States delays its withdrawal from Ain al Asad airbase.[xiii] It is notable that US-led international coalition forces will withdraw from some areas in Iraq, including the Ain al Asad airbase, by September 2025 but will not withdraw completely from Iraq until the end of 2026.[xiv]

Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks.[xv] The officials expect the vessels to arrive at Bandar-e Abbas port in southern Iran and deliver the material to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The ships are expected to carry more than 1,100 tons of sodium perchlorate, which can be converted to slightly over 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate, the main component for solid propellant for missiles. Ammonium perchlorate needs to be mixed with other components to create solid fuel propellant for missiles. The unspecified officials estimated that 1000 tons of ammonium perchlorate can—if converted to solid fuel propellant—fuel up to 260 mid-range Iranian ballistic missiles, including the Kheybar Shekan and Haj Qassem. Iran used Kheybar Shekan missiles in both April and October 2024 missile attacks on [xvi]

Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however. Unspecified Israeli sources reported that the IDF strikes hit 12 planetary mixers used to produce solid fuel for ballistic missiles.[xvii] Iran can reportedly not produce the mixers domestically and remanufacturing the mixers could take at least a year. Iran needs these mixers to combine various components, including ammonium perchlorate, and create solid propellant for missiles. It is not clear if Iran has mixing facilities at other locations but the loss of 12 mixers has likely significantly degraded Iran’s ability to produce missiles and mount a large-scale attack on Israel soon, regardless of Iran’s supply of ammonium perchlorate.

Iran has previously used ammonium perchlorate for internal missile production and exported it to members of the Axis of Resistance. Iran engaged in secret negotiations with China and Russia in April 2023 to acquire a Chinese supply of ammonium perchlorate for its solid-fueled missiles.[xviii] The US Navy also interdicted an IRGC shipment of 70 tons of ammonium perchlorate en route from Iran to the Houthis in November 2024. The Houthis could use ammonium perchlorate as a precursor for solid fuel propellant, but there is currently no evidence that the Houthis can manufacture solid fuel. The ammonium perchlorate can also be used to make explosives.

Key Takeaways:

• Gaza Strip: CTP-ISW did not record verifiable reports of kinetic activity in the Gaza Strip or reports of attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel since the last data cut off on January 21.
• West Bank: Palestinian Islamic Jihad announced the formation of joint operations rooms in the West Bank on January 22 with Hamas and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ fighters.
• Iraq: Iraq may attempt to integrate Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi army after the withdrawal of US forces, which would not satisfy US demands to dissolve the militias. The integration of the militias would instead increase their influence within the army, which is deeply problematic given the backgrounds and loyalties of many of these groups.
• Iran: Unspecified Western officials told The Financial Times on January 22 that two Iranian cargo vessels carrying a large amount of chemical precursor for solid missile propellant will travel from China to Iran over the next few weeks. Israeli damage estimates from the IDF strikes on Iran in October 2024 suggest that Iran’s missile production capabilities likely remain limited, however.

Syria

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Reestablish ground lines of communication through Syria to Lebanon
• Reestablish Iranian influence in Syria

Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) concentrated attacks around the Tishreen Dam against the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The US-sanctioned Suleiman Shah Brigade, which is an SNA formation, posted footage on January 21 in which its forces fired artillery and rockets at SDF positions around the Tishreen Dam.[xix] Anti-SDF media circulated footage from the SNA Dawn of Freedom Operations Room in which SNA fighters fired an anti-tank-guided munition at an SDF position near the Tishreen Dam.[xx]

Turkey and the SNA continued attacks on SDF positions along possible lines of advance. Anti-SDF media claimed that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting an SDF position near the Mabaqir base in Tal Tamr, Hasakah.[xxi] Anti-SDF media also claimed that Turkey conducted an airstrike on an SDF position in Bir Hasso, south of Kobani.[xxii] Turkish and SNA forces have deployed to the Turkey-Syria border at Kobani and along the line of control near Ain Issa and Tal Tamr, which CTP-ISW assessed may be in preparation for a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xxiii]

The HTS-led Department of Military Operations arrested at least 20 people in Lajat, Daraa Province, on January 20 for various reasons, including participation in drug trafficking, the former Assad regime, and Lebanese Hezbollah.[xxiv] Syrian media reported on January 20 that the Department of Military Operations and Southern Operations Room launched a large-scale security campaign in several villages in the Lajat region.[xxv] Security forces seized numerous weapons in the area and transferred the detainees to Damascus.[xxvi]

The IDF continued to operate in southern Syria near the Golan Heights on January 22. Syrian sources reported that Israeli forces destroyed former Assad regime positions in eastern and central Quneitra.[xxvii] IDF armor also reportedly entered and withdrew from a town in southern Quneitra.[xxviii]

Syria Interim Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani called for countries to lift sanctions on Syria at the Davos World Economic Forum in Switzerland on January 22.[xxix] The US Treasury Department issued a general license for energy sales and personal remittances to Syria on January 6.[xxx] The general license will last for six months and does not lift existing sanctions on Syria.[xxxi]

Iraq

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Strengthen Iranian and Axis of Resistance influence over the Iraqi state and society
• Harden the Iraqi government against internal dissent

The Iraqi Parliament Security and Defense Committee head told Iraqi media on January 22 that Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani withdrew a draft law on PMF military service and retirement submission for a vote due to Popular Mobilization Commission objections.[xxxii] Mashhadani and his two deputy speakers are responsible for “jointly” determining the parliamentary agenda.[xxxiii] The Popular Mobilization Commission oversees a range of administrative, planning, and training responsibilities for the PMF.[xxxiv] A Sadiqoun bloc parliamentarian called for Mashhadani to add the draft law to the parliamentary agenda on January 21.[xxxv] Sadiqoun represents Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq.[xxxvi] Multiple Asaib Ahl al Haq units are part of the PMF.

Arabian Peninsula

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Harden the Houthi regime against internal dissent in Houthi-controlled areas
• Destroy the anti-Houthi opposition in order to control all of Yemen
• Erode Israeli will to continue the war in the Gaza Strip

The Houthis released the 25-member crew of the British-owned and Japanese-operated Galaxy Leader to Oman on January 22. The Houthis had held the crew hostage since the group hijacked the ship in November 2023.[xxxvii] The Houthis said that they made the decision after a meeting with Hamas and with Omani assistance.[xxxviii] The Houthis noted that the release is a sign of support for the ceasefire agreement. Hamas Representative to Yemen Moaz Abu Shamala also confirmed the release of the hostages and thanked the Houthis for their support on January 22.[xxxix] Shamala met with the Houthi Foreign Affairs Minister Jamal Amer at the Houthi Defense Ministry in Sanaa on January 21.[xl]

The Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip
• Rebuild and reestablish Hezbollah in southern Lebanon
• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

The Gaza Strip

An IDF official assessed that the Israel-Egypt border will likely present a renewed but low-level security threat due to smuggling attempts.[xli] The IDF 512th Territorial Brigade (80th Division) Commander stated on January 22 that the IDF had intercepted several weapons and drug smuggling attempts from Egypt into Israel over the past year. Egyptian smugglers improved their smuggling capabilities by using quadcopter drones, adapting to the IDF’s use of lethal force along the Israel-Egypt border. The IDF intercepted two smuggling attempts using small quadcopters that carried small arms as the drones crossed into Israel from Egypt in late 2024.[xlii]

Lebanon

The IDF 810th Mountain Brigade (210th Division) recently destroyed Hezbollah weapons during a raid in the Mount Dov area, in southwestern Lebanon.[xliii] Israeli forces destroyed anti-tank launchers, rocket launchers, machine guns, and missiles aimed at Israeli territory.[xliv] Israeli forces have recently operated in Kfar Chouba, Hasbaya District, adjacent to Mount Dov.[xlv] The IDF 810th Mountain Brigade previously conducted a brigade-level operation in the Syrian Mount Hermon area in early January.[xlvi]

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and UNIFIL backfilled IDF positions in Kfar Chouba, Hasbayah District, on January 22.[xlvii] The LAF reported that it deployed to ”several points” in Kfar Chouba town. Lebanese media previously reported IDF artillery shelling in Kfar Chouba on January 20.[xlviii] The LAF and UNIFIL must backfill all IDF positions south of the Litani River by 4 am local time on January 26, according to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.[xlix] The IDF has withdrawn from six additional areas in southern Lebanon, including Khiam and most of its positions in southwestern Lebanon, as of January 22.[l] The LAF has redeployed to over 50 positions across Lebanon as of January 18 according to the UN.[li]

Lebanese and Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on January 22 that Israeli forces detonated explosives in seven villages along the Israel-Lebanon border.[lii] 

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on January 22 that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, via Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, submitted a request for the IDF to remain in several unspecified outposts in southern Lebanon to US President Donald Trump.[liii] Israeli officials have recently indicated that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met.[liv] According to the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement, the IDF must withdraw from areas south of the Litani River by January 26.[lv]  Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem previously stated on January 4 that Hezbollah will allow the Lebanese state to fulfill the ceasefire, but implied that Hezbollah’s patience” may run out.”[lvi] Hezbollah has not explicitly stated whether it will resume attacks on Israel or Israeli forces if the IDF remains in southern Lebanon after January 26.

West Bank

Israeli forces continued their counterterrorism “Operation Iron Wall” in Jenin city targeting militia fighters and infrastructure on January 22.[lvii] The IDF ”struck” more than ten fighters in Jenin since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on January 21. The IDF conducted airstrikes targeting militia infrastructure and destroyed improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted on the roads. The IDF instructed Palestinians to remain inside an unspecified hospital in Jenin while it cleared IEDs planted on the roads near the hospital but stated it did not enter the hospital.[lviii] Hamas released a statement condemning the Palestinian Authority security forces' alleged participation in the operation in Jenin.[lix] PA forces reportedly withdrew from the Jenin refugee camp area on January 21 before the IDF began its operation.[lx] Hamas called on all Palestinian militias and fighters to target the IDF across the West Bank. PIJ, Hamas, and al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting the IDF in Jenin on January 22.[lxi] The IDF previously assessed that Hamas will likely try to conduct attacks in the West Bank despite the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[lxii]

The IDF “neutralized” a drone rigged with a pipe bomb near Yitzhar settlement, south of Nablus, on January 22.[lxiii] No militia has claimed this improvised drone attack at the time of this writing.

Iranian Decision-Making, Internal Dynamics, and Foreign Policy

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s emphasis on leveraging BRICS financial mechanisms is part of an effort to reduce dependency on Western economies. Khamenei praised the progress of the Iranian private sector during a meeting with Iranian entrepreneurs, investors, and economic activists in Tehran on January 22.[lxiv] Khamenei urged government agencies to amend restrictive laws and change obstructive regulations for domestic investors. Khamenei claimed that Iran can achieve 8% economic growth without foreign investment and urged government officials not to argue that Iran needs foreign investment to achieve economic growth. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian previously stated in August 2024 that Iran must attract 200 to 250 billion US dollars of foreign investment to address energy, banking, and budget imbalances to reach the 8% growth target.[lxv] Khamenei also highlighted Iran's participation in BRICS, urged diplomatic efforts to maximize the benefits of BRICS, and described the BRICS financial system as a significant opportunity that enables trade in member states’ currencies.[lxvi] Khamenei may be trying to encourage preemptive measures to counter sanctions, in anticipation of a second Trump "maximum pressure“ campaign and potential E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) snapback sanctions.[lxvii]

Expediency Discernment Council member and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei stated that “Syrians will soon join the Axis of Resistance.”[lxviii] Rezaei emphasized "Iran’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty" and the need for "an inclusive government in Syria” during an interview with Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen on January 22. Rezaei’s remarks echo Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s calls for Syrian youth to mobilize against “foreign occupiers" in which Khamenei likened Syria’s present situation to Iraq in the 2000s, when Iran-backed militias secured Iran’s influence.[lxix] Khamenei and other Iranian officials have consistently framed the post-Assad Syrian landscape as an opportunity for Iran to shape events in Syria through grassroots mobilization.[lxx] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit such tension to rebuild the Axis of Resistance in Syria.

International Atomic Energy Agency Director Raphael Grossi stated on January 22 that Iran is currently producing at least 30 kg of uranium enriched up to 60% every month.[lxxi] Grossi previously stated in December 2024 that Iran's production of 60% enriched uranium would increase by  "seven, eight times more, maybe, or even more" than Iran’s production levels in December 2024, which were 5 to 7 kg of 60% enriched uranium a month.[lxxii]

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.