Iran Update, July 24, 2023

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

1. The buildup of Iranian-backed forces in eastern Syria is possibly causing local anti-Iran and anti-Shia discontent.
2. The Iranian state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) launched an Azeri language section on July 21, likely to shape domestic Azerbaijani public opinion as Iran grapples with its concerns about the Caucasus becoming an arena for foreign interference.
3. Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for greater cyber security cooperation among BRICS countries during a Friends of BRICS National Security Advisors meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 24. Iran may seek to bolster cyber security cooperation with BRICS countries to confront cyber-attacks and negative Western media narratives about Iran more effectively.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

The buildup of Iranian-backed forces in eastern Syria is possibly causing local anti-Iran and anti-Shia discontent. Iran surged forces into eastern Syria and increased militant salaries in July following rumored International Coalition attacks into Syrian regime-controlled territory, as CTP previously reported.[i] Local armed actors clashed with Iranian-backed militias several times since then, such as by attacking a military vehicle and engaging in a gunfight.[ii] Civilians attacked a bus carrying Shiite pilgrims in Albu Kamal on July 14.[iii] Kata’ib Hezbollah militants searched for the people who attacked the bus and threatened locals over the incident.[iv] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commanders held a meeting in Deir ez Zor City on July 24 to discuss repeated attacks on Iranian-backed militias and Shiite pilgrims.[v] Local anti-Syrian regime media Eye of Euphrates reported that the Iranians are afraid the situation in Deir ez Zor will get out of control following the attacks.[vi] Convoys of pilgrims and Iranian-backed militias disguised as pilgrims have entered Syria from the Albu Kamal border crossing without such incidents.[vii] That the attacks have occurred after the surge of Iranian-backed forces to eastern Syria suggests local dissatisfaction with the foreign fighters in eastern Syria.

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

The Iranian state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) launched an Azeri language section on July 21, likely to shape domestic Azerbaijani public opinion as Iran grapples with its concerns about the Caucasus becoming an arena for foreign interference.[viii] IRNA Chief Executive Ali Naderi met with his counterparts at the Azerbaijan State News Agency in Baku on July 21 to facilitate further cooperation between the two news agencies and launch IRNA’s Azeri section.[ix] Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Abbas Mousavi stated Iran’s hope that this move would improve relations between the two countries.[x] Iran has previously attempted to influence in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs, including but not limited to sponsoring Shia militant groups inside Azerbaijan.[xi] President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian separately met with the Armenian Foreign Affairs Minister Ararat Mirzoyan in Tehran on July 24.[xii] Raisi stated that foreign interference in the region complicates issues in the Caucasus, emphasizing that Iran will not accept any geopolitical changes in the region.[xiii] Mirzoyan responded that Armenia will “never become a platform for anti-Iranian actions.”

The launching of IRNA Azeri and Raisi’s emphasis on preventing foreign interference in the region is consistent with recent regime rhetoric and action with respect to its security concerns in Azerbaijan and the wider Caucasus region. Supreme Leader Military Affairs Advisor and former IRGC Commander Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi expressed concern on July 12 about Western attempts to sow discord in the Caucasus by making geopolitical changes in the region.[xiv] Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati similarly warned Russia on July 13 about possible NATO interference and aggression in the Caucasus.[xv] Israel-based i24News claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan, which if true would signal that Tehran is prepared to arm Azerbaijan’s adversaries if the former does not accede to Iran’s demands.[xvi] The IRGC Ground Forces conducted a military exercise near Iran’s border with Azerbaijan on July 19.[xvii] Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri stated on the sidelines of the exercise that Iran’s armed forces are prepared to take “powerful” actions if Azerbaijan does not address Iran’s security concerns.[xviii]

Iranian officials have articulated a series of demands against Azerbaijan, which largely focus on Baku halting its anti-Iran cooperation with Israel and Turkey. Regime officials have frequently accused Baku of allowing Israel to use Azerbaijani territory to launch operations against Iran.[xix] The regime additionally opposes Azerbaijan and Turkey’s efforts to establish a corridor between Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic in Armenia. Such a corridor would directly connect Azerbaijan to eastern Turkey and hamper Iranian economic access to European and Russian markets.[xx] Turkey and Azerbaijan have also stalled Iranian efforts to feed its gas into the existing pipelines built by the Azerbaijanis that travel through Turkish territory before arriving in Europe via the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC).[xxi] Iranian officials and media previously accused Israel of using Azerbaijan as an intelligence base to instigate protests during the Mahsa Amini movement.[xxii]

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian called for greater cyber security cooperation among BRICS countries during a Friends of BRICS National Security Advisors meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa on July 24.[xxiii] Iran may seek to bolster cyber security cooperation with BRICS countries to confront cyber-attacks and negative Western media narratives about Iran more effectively. Iran is not currently a member of BRICS, an economic and political organization composed of Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa.[xxiv] Iranian officials have repeatedly expressed their desire to join this multilateral organization, however.[xxv] Ahmadian’s comments about cyber security cooperation point to the kinds of benefits Iran seeks to acquire as a full member of BRICS. Ahmadian lamented that Iranian infrastructure has been the “victim” of numerous cyber-attacks.[xxvi] Israel has conducted multiple cyber-attacks against Iran in recent years, including against Iranian nuclear facilities.[xxvii] Ahmadian additionally accused the United States of using digital platforms to encourage Iranian citizens to take “actions against Iran’s national security.” Iranian officials accused Western media of stoking the Mahsa Amini protest movement between September 2022 and January 2023 as part of the West’s “soft war” against the regime.[xxviii] “Soft war” is an Iranian doctrinal term that refers to the enemy use of nonmilitary means, such as economic and psychological pressure and information operations, to erode regime legitimacy, cultivate domestic opposition, and propagate Western values in Iran.[xxix] 

Iran seeks to join the BRICS as part of its efforts to create a parallel world order with other revisionist states to confront Western “dominance.”[xxx] Ahmadian called on BRICS countries to use “non-American internet systems and platforms for financial, economic, and administrative exchanges.”[xxxi] Iran has sought an alternative financial messaging platform to Belgium-based SWIFT ever since SWIFT disconnected Iran from its platform in 2018.[xxxii] Regime-affiliated news outlets have additionally expressed support for linking Iran’s SEPAM financial messaging system with China, India, and Russia’s financial messaging systems in recent months.[xxxiii] Iran seeks to conduct economic exchanges in local currencies to preserve its dwindling foreign currency reserves.[xxxiv] President Ebrahim Raisi recently called on Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members to abandon the US dollar in financial transactions during his speech at the 23^rd SCO Summit on July 4.[xxxv]