Iran Update, June 6, 2024

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Iranian hardline officials are continuing to try to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 presidential election. These efforts probably seek to avoid infighting between Iranian hardliners that could provide an opening for a more moderate candidate to win the presidency. Former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei called for “synergy and unity” among hardliners in a Twitter (X) post on June 5.[i] Rezaei similarly called for a "consensus” among "revolutionary forces” during a meeting with Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Foundation President Amir Hossein Ghazi Zadeh Hashemi and Parliamentary Economic Committee Chairman Mohammad Reza Pour Ebrahimi on June 4.[ii] Hardline politician Gholam Ali Haddad Adel separately called on hardliners on June 6 to support a single candidate in the upcoming election.[iii] Haddad Adel warned that hardliners could suffer a “defeat” in the election if they support a “plurality of candidates.”[iv] Haddad Adel added that supporting a “plurality of candidates” could lead to a repeat of the 2013 presidential election in which a reformist candidate, Hassan Rouhani, won the presidency.[v]

Hamas reportedly said that it will reject the Israeli ceasefire proposal, arguing that the proposal does not ensure a permanent end to hostilities.[vi] Saudi-based media obtained a copy of a Hamas memo to other Palestinian militias in which Hamas explained that Hamas did not accept the proposal because it is  "fundamentally different" from the proposal that US President Joe Biden outlined on May 31.[vii] Hamas said that it is committed to the proposal it accepted on May 6. Egypt unilaterally modified the May 6 proposal to include a permanent end to hostilities.[viii] Hamas has previously said that it will not accept a ceasefire that does not ensure a permanent ceasefire after the completion of the initial phase of the proposal.[ix] Hamas does not view any ceasefire as permanent and believes that any truce that ends before Israel’s destruction is a temporary truce.[x] The United States said on June 6 that Hamas has not delivered an official response to the Israeli proposal.[xi]

Hamas’ reported rejection follows several reports that negotiations involving Israel, Hamas, and international mediators were showing no signs of a breakthrough.[xii] Unspecified Egyptian sources said the mediators were attempting to reassure Hamas that the proposal would lead to an end to the fighting and full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.[xiii]

Hamas will likely continue to reject ceasefire proposals if the proposal fails to secure Hamas’ maximalist objectives, which include a permanent ceasefire. Hamas remains confident that it can survive Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, and it can therefore pursue its maximalist demands without major concessions. Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, said in February that his military forces are in good condition and would survive a Rafah operation and he was in no rush to secure an agreement in early May.[xiv] CTP-ISW has previously noted that Hamas’ confidence in its survival increased and its ceasefire demands appear to have solidified as the IDF drew down its forces in the Gaza Strip beginning in late December 2023.[xv]

Hamas attempted to infiltrate Israel using a tunnel 200 meters from the Israel-Gaza Strip border in Rafah.[xvi] Four Palestinian fighters armed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) emerged from the tunnel under the cover of a thick fog.[xvii] Israeli forces engaged the Palestinian fighters in a fire fight and directed a drone and tank to engage the fighters.[xviii] The IDF killed three of the four Palestinian fighters 400 meters from the Israeli border in the Gaza Strip.[xix] The fourth Hamas fighter fled into Rafah.[xx] One Israeli soldier died during the incident.[xxi] Palestinian fighters have very rarely attempted to infiltrate Israeli territory since the October 7, 2023, attack.

Unspecified US and Israeli officials said in a June 6 Reuters report that Hamas has lost half of its forces and is currently using insurgent tactics.[xxii] Three senior US officials familiar with battlefield developments said that Hamas’ numbers have decreased from an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 before the conflict to 9,000 to 12,000 fighters at present.[xxiii] US intelligence previously estimated that Hamas has lost 30 to 35 percent of its fighters, and Israeli intelligence previously estimated that Hamas had as many as 30,000 to 40,000 fighters prior to the war.[xxiv] An IDF spokesperson acknowledged that destroying Hamas as a governing authority is “an achievable and attainable military objective,” instead of attempting to kill every Hamas fighter.[xxv] Israeli officials have previously said that Israel’s war objectives are to destroy Hamas as a military organization and governing authority.[xxvi]

One of the officials said that Hamas is avoiding direct battles with Israeli forces, preferring to ambush the IDF and using improvised explosive devices against Israeli forces.[xxvii] A Gazan resident noted that Hamas previously immediately engaged Israeli forces as they advanced, but now Hamas is waiting for the IDF to enter the IDF’s target area before attacking.[xxviii] An Israeli officer similarly noted that Hamas allows the IDF to advance into a target area before Hamas begins to engage the IDF.[xxix] Hamas fighters have previously employed similar ”insurgent” tactics, however. An Israeli Army Radio correspondent said that Israeli forces encountered significant militia ”resistance” in Zaytoun but not en route to Zaytoun in February 2024.[xxx] US officials estimate that Hamas can sustain such tactics “for months,” given Hamas’ ability to access weapons smuggled into the Strip via tunnels as well as additional weapons and ordinance captured from the IDF.[xxxi]

A US official told Reuters that the Palestinian militias are withdrawing rapidly after attacks, taking cover, regrouping, before appearing in areas where Israeli forces are absent.[xxxii] CTP-ISW has previously observed that Palestinian militias withdraw into areas where Israeli forces are absent to rest and reconstitute.[xxxiii] This complicates Israeli efforts to conduct repeated raids, as Palestinian fighters can withdraw from the areas that the IDF targets if the Palestinian fighters are at risk of being destroyed.

Unspecified Iranian-backed Iraqi militias issued a 40-day deadline for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani to set a date for a US troop withdrawal from Iraq according to an “informed [Iraqi] political source” cited by an Iraqi Kurdish news outlet on June 5.[xxxiv] The ultimatum warned that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would resume attacks targeting US forces if Sudani fails to meet the 40-day deadline. A Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated news outlet reported on May 25 that several Iranian-backed Iraqi militias believe the United States and Iraq were "procrastinating” a decision to remove US forces from Iraq and were considering resuming attacks on US forces.[xxxv] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Esmail Ghaani ordered Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to suspend attacks on US forces in January 2024.[xxxvi] Some militias, including Kataib Hezbollah, fiercely resisted the order. The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have not changed their long-standing objective to expel US forces from Iraq and Syria and retain the capabilities to resume their attack campaign at any time.[xxxvii] Kataib Hezbollah has been driving efforts to resume attacks on US forces since at least April 2024 after their resistance to Ghaani‘s original stand-down order in January.[xxxviii] Various Iranian-backed Iraqi actors, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, have also warned that Iranian-backed militias will resume attacks on US forces if the United States and Iraq fail to set a timely date for a US troop withdrawal.[xxxix]  This report in Iraqi media did not make clear whether individual Iranian-backed Iraqi militias or the Islamic Resistance in Iraq as a whole issued this ultimatum. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that conducted attacks targeting US forces between October 2023 and January 2024, but many of the coalition’s constituent militias have attacked US forces prior to the current war.

The Houthis claimed on June 6 that they conducted a combined operation targeting Israel with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as part of their effort to impose an unofficial blockade.[xl] The Houthis said that they conducted a combined operation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq targeting three ships near Haifa port, Israel, on June 6, including one ship that the Houthis said violated their unofficial blockade on Israel.[xli] The IDF has not acknowledged any such attacks and CTP-ISW cannot verify this claim at the time of this writing. Both the Houthis and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq have targeted shipping companies for transporting goods to Israel ports overland or by sea.[xlii] Iran and its Houthi partners have begun to articulate an aspiration to increase their ability to target Israel’s economy through military action, including by using drones and missiles to discourage shipping from traveling to Israeli ports.[xliii] Iran and its militia partners cannot likely impose a blockade using drone and missile attacks in the near term, given that the Houthis and other Iranian-backed groups have not yet proven that they can successfully fire missiles and drones into the Mediterranean Sea at a rate sufficient to impose costs on the Israeli economy.[xliv] But Iran and its so-called ”Axis of Resistance” likely believe that a severe economic disruption would compel Israeli leaders to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state.[xlv]

The combined attacks come shortly after a flurry of engagements across the Axis of Resistance to promote cooperation against Israel. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi called on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to join the Houthis in attacking international shipping in the Mediterranean Sea during a speech on May 16.[xlvi] The secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah held a phone call with Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi on May 24 to discuss the war, including coordination and force readiness.[xlvii] Such engagements demonstrate that members of the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance are continuing to coordinate their actions during the Israel-Hamas war.

The combined Houthi-Iraqi militia attack reflects the broader desire of the Axis of Resistance to operate and present itself as an interoperable coalition. The claimed attacks highlight how Iran and its Axis of Resistance seek to function as a coalition to achieve its goals against Israel.[xlviii] The Axis of Resistance has also seemingly attempted to present itself as an interoperable coalition at other junctures in the war. Houthi supreme leader Abdulmalik al Houthi said on October 10 that the Houthis were ”coordinating” with the Axis of Resistance to decide when and how to enter the war, and both the Houthis and Iraqi groups began their respective attack campaigns on October 18, one day after the al Ahli Hospital explosion.[xlix] This coordination is emblematic of Iran’s vision for the Axis of Resistance, which Iran sees as its unconventional alliance of like-minded actors united by anti-US and anti-Israeli ideologies.[l] This strategic alignment helps Iran and Iranian-backed groups accomplish their shared objectives, such as the destruction of Israel and the expulsion of US influence from the region.

The Houthis released a video on June 5 that shows the Houthis firing a likely Iranian-supplied missile that it used to target Eilat, southern Israel, on June 3.[li] The Houthis said that its Palestine missile is “locally made,” but the missile bears visual similarities to the Iranian Kheiber Shekan ballistic missile.[lii] Iran originally unveiled the Khiber Shekan in February 2022.[liii] Associated Press reported that the Palestine missile uses solid fuel as opposed to liquid fuel.[liv] The Kheiber Shekan is also a solid fuel missile.[lv] A Syrian Arab Army affiliated source also reported that the Palestine missile resembles the Kheiber Shekan missile.[lvi]

Palestinian fighters are likely maintaining at least one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) manufacturing cell northeast of Tubas. Unidentified Palestinian fighters detonated a VBIED approximately one kilometer from the IDF’s Tayasir checkpoint in Tubas on June 6.[lvii] The VBIED exploded in an open area and there were no casualties.[lviii] There are no obvious targets in the area where the Palestinian fighters detonated the VBIED, and the IDF is investigating whether this incident was a failed attempt to detonate the VBIED at the Tayasir checkpoint.[lix] No Palestinian militia has claimed the attack as of this writing. Palestinian fighters have deployed at least five VBIED attacks targeting Israeli forces in the northern West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023.[lx] Four of those attacks took place near Tubas.[lxi]

Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the significant amount of resources and expertise required to manufacture a VBIED. It is unclear how sophisticated or well-manufactured these VBIEDs are, especially because the VBIED used in this attack appears to have detonated before its operators intended. An Israeli military correspondent noted that IED attacks of an “unprecedented nature” have appeared in the West Bank in recent months.[lxii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian Presidential Elections: Iranian hardline officials are continuing to try to promote an electoral consensus among hardliners ahead of the June 28 presidential election as part of an effort to avoid infighting between hardliners that could provide an opening for a moderate victory.
• Ceasefire Negotiations: Hamas reportedly said that it will reject the Israeli ceasefire proposal, arguing that the proposal does not ensure a permanent end to hostilities. Hamas will continue to reject proposals until it secures a “permanent ceasefire.” Hamas does not acknowledge the legitimacy of any permanent ceasefire and has repeatedly said that any ceasefire is temporary until Hamas destroys Israel.
• Gaza Strip: An Israeli official said that Hamas is avoiding direct battles with Israeli forces, preferring to ambush the IDF and using improvised explosive devices against Israeli forces
• Yemen: The Houthis claimed on June 6 that they conducted a combined operation targeting Israel with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias as part of their effort to impose an unofficial blockade. This blockade is unlikely to be successful, given that the Houthis have so far been unable to successfully attack Israeli shipping in the Mediterranean at a sufficient rate to impact imports or exports from Mediterranean ports.
• Iraq: Iranian-backed Iraqi militias reportedly set a 40-day deadline for the Iraqi prime minister to expel US forces from Iraq.
• West Bank: Palestinian fighters are likely maintaining at least one vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) manufacturing cell northeast of Tubas. Palestinian militias in Tubas may be collaborating to assemble and deploy these VBIEDs, given the significant amount of resources and expertise required to manufacture a VBIED.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF Air Force struck a Hamas compound within a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) school in Nuseirat, central Gaza Strip, on June 6.[lxiii] The IDF said that it identified 20 to 30 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters in the compound. These fighters had been directing attacks targeting Israeli forces from the compound. The IDF said that some of the fighters participated in the October 7, 2023, attack into Israel.[lxiv] The compound also served as a civilian shelter for approximately 6,000 people.[lxv] The IDF said it took precautions to reduce the chance of harming uninvolved civilians.[lxvi] The IDF targeted the classrooms that the fighters were in which was separate from where civilians were sheltering.[lxvii] Local sources reported up to 33 people died in the strike, including women and children.[lxviii] An IDF spokesperson said he is not aware of any civilian casualties following the strike.[lxix] The IDF identified nine of the Palestinian fighters it was targeting in the school.[lxx] Hamas continues to use civilians as human shields to protect Hamas’ military infrastructure, weapons, and personnel. These tactics intentionally put civilians in harm’s way.

The IDF 98th Division continued re-clearing operations in eastern Bureij and eastern Deir al Balah on June 6.[lxxi] Israeli forces located tunnel shafts and engaged Palestinian fighters using tank fire and airstrikes.[lxxii] Palestinian militias claimed several attacks targeting Israeli forces in eastern Bureij and eastern Deir al Balah using mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG).[lxxiii]

The IDF Air Force struck a Palestinian cell on June 6 that fired rockets at Kissufim from the central Gaza Strip on June 5.[lxxiv] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack.[lxxv]

The IDF 162nd Division continued clearing operations in Rafah on June 6.[lxxvi] The IDF 89th Commando Brigade found many weapons, including IEDs and grenades. Hamas fighters detonated an explosively rigged tunnel targeting Israeli forces in western Rafah.[lxxvii] US and Israeli officials told Reuters that there are about 7,000 to 8,000 Hamas fighters sheltering in Rafah, including top Hamas leaders such as the leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar.[lxxviii]

The IDF 828th Bislamach Brigade completed its mission in Rafah and withdrew on June 6.[lxxix] The brigade initially entered Rafah on May 28.[lxxx] There are five IDF brigades currently operating in Rafah.[lxxxi]

The United States said that repairs of the temporary pier for facilitating aid transfer into the Gaza Strip is ongoing and that the pier could be operational in the coming days.[lxxxii] The United States suspended operations at its temporary pier in the Gaza Strip after the pier sustained damage at sea on May 25.[lxxxiii] The Pentagon said that the United States does not anticipate more delays once the pier is operational.[lxxxiv]

Israel will set up a permanent system to transfer wounded and sick people in and out of the Gaza Strip for treatment.[lxxxv] The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT)—a department within the Israeli Defense Ministry—said that the relevant authorities and unspecified countries are working together to prepare the system to transfer the relevant people. Human rights organizations estimate that there are 14,000 wounded and critically ill people who need such assistance.

Palestinian militias did not conduct any indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on June 6.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least three locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on June 5.[lxxxvi] Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces operating in Jenin camp with small arms and detonated IEDs on June 6.[lxxxvii] Israeli media reported an IDF helicopter opened fire on Palestinians in Jenin and injured eight people.[lxxxviii] The IDF confirmed that its units used a helicopter to assist them in detaining a Palestinian suspect in Jenin.[lxxxix]

The IDF conducted an overnight “counterterrorism” operation in the West Bank on June 5.[xc] The IDF detained 11 Palestinians affiliated with Hamas and questioned suspects in Qalqilya. The IDF also detained wanted Palestinians and confiscated weapons in villages near Nablus, Ramallah, and Hebron.  

The US State Department sanctioned the Lions’ Den, a Palestinian militia group based in Nablus, West Bank, on June 6.[xci] The US State Department sanctioned the group under Executive Order 14115, which places sanctions on targets that are responsible for or complicit in actions that ”threaten the peace, security, or stability of the West Bank.”[xcii] CTP-ISW last observed Lions’ Den activity on April 17, when Palestinian media claimed that Lions‘ Den fighters targeted an Israeli checkpoint in Nablus with small arms on April 17.[xciii]

An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported on June 6 that the Israeli defense establishment is concerned that the West Bank’s deteriorating economy will lead Palestinian residents to join militias and start a “third intifada.”[xciv] The correspondent reported that the Israeli defense establishment has been working on a “severe warning document” to send to Israeli politicians. The document warns that the lack of income for West Bank residents could translate into a growing security problem. The Israel-Hamas war has severely impacted the West Bank’s economy due to Palestinian laborers' inability to cross into Israel and the Palestinian Authority’s ongoing tax revenue disputes with Israel.[xcv] The Shin Bet and IDF assess that the current poor economic conditions may lead West Bank residents to join Palestinian militias at a time when Iran is smuggling funds into the West Bank to support Palestinian resistance efforts.[xcvi] The document warns that a third intifada could break out in the West Bank, transforming the West Bank from a “secondary arena” to a “central arena” for Israeli war efforts. The Israeli Army Radio correspondent suggested in May 2024 that Israeli forces have deprioritized the task of defending the West Bank borders due to Israeli deployments in the Gaza Strip and along the Israel-Lebanon border.[xcvii]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Deter Israel from conducting a ground operation into Lebanon
• Prepare for an expanded and protracted conflict with Israel in the near term
• Expel the United States from Syria

Iranian-backed militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah, have conducted at least eight attacks into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on June 5.[xcviii]

Biden administration officials have warned Israel against conducting a “limited war” in Lebanon in recent weeks, according to unspecified US and Israeli officials.[xcix] US and Israeli officials told Axios that the Biden administration cautioned that an Israeli offensive in Lebanon could push Iran to intervene and widen the conflict. A senior IDF source told Axios that the situation on the Israel-Lebanon border has been escalating since May due to an increase in Hezbollah drone attacks, which CTP-ISW has also recently observed.[c] The Axios report also detailed that the IDF has presented several options for expanding the fighting during a recent cabinet meeting, including a ground operation that would push the Hezbollah’s elite commando arm—the Radwan Force—away from the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah established the Radwan Force to conduct ground operations into Israel itself.[ci] The Radwan Force poses the one of the most significant threats to Israel from Hezbollah, given that it is designed to conduct October 7-style attacks.

IDF Northern Command Commander Maj. Gen. Ori Gordin said during a speech on June 6 that the IDF has completed preparations for a potential Israeli offensive in Lebanon .[cii] Gordin gave the speech to mark the 18-year anniversary of 2006 Lebanon War. Gordin added that the IDF will continue to fight until security is restored in northern Israel.

Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Iran held a farewell ceremony on June 6 in Qom, Iran, for an IRGC-backed Fatemiyoun Division fighter killed in the June 3 IDF airstrike in Aleppo, Syria.[ciii] Iranian media reported that the Fatemiyoun fighter died in the same Israeli airstrike in Aleppo that killed IRGC adviser Saeid Abyar. The Fatemiyoun Division is composed of Shia Afghan fighters who are refugees in Iran.[civ] The Division operates under the command of the IRGC. Nouri will be buried in Qom on June 7. The United States Treasury Department designated the Fatemiyoun Division as a terrorist organization in 2019.[cv]

Iranian Acting Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani discussed potential resolutions to the Israel-Hamas war in a phone call with Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister Sameh Shoukry on June 5.[cvi] Bagheri Kani and Shoukry discussed the current challenges surrounding any resolution to the Israel-Hamas war. The ministers agreed to ”pursue the process of developing” bilateral relations. Egypt and Iran do not currently have diplomatic relations.[cvii] Former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi previously met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi to discuss the restoration of ties in December 2023.[cviii]

The Iraqi government will host Syrian and Turkish officials in Baghdad “in the coming days” as part of ongoing efforts to restore relations between the two countries.[cix] Iraq has hosted multiple undisclosed meetings between Syrian and Turkish officials according to an “informed [Iraqi] government source” cited by Iraqi Kurdish news. Syria and Turkey have participated in reproachment talks since 2022 to resolve outstanding territorial and refugee issues.[cx] Syrian President Bashar al Assad spoke with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani on June 5 to discuss strengthening border security, combatting terrorism, enhancing economic cooperation, and unifying efforts to stop Israel’s actions against Palestinians.[cxi]

The Houthis claimed on June 5 that it conducted drone and missile attacks targeting three ships in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.[cxii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the attacks at this time. The Houthi movement said that it fired drones and missiles targeting the Liberian-flagged Roza and Liberian-flagged Vantage Dream ships in the Red Sea.[cxiii] The Houthi movement also claimed that it fired drones targeting the US-flagged Maersk Seletar in the eastern Arabian Sea. A Maersk spokesperson said that Maersk Seletar had not reported any incident.[cxiv] British security firm Ambrey also said on June 6 that the Houthis likely targeted a Greek-owned bulk carrier in the Red Sea.[cxv] The Houthis have not confirmed the June 6 attack at this time of writing.