Iran Update, March 14, 2023

Contributor: Ashka Jhaveri 

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Iranian government is prioritizing mandatory veiling amidst poor economic conditions, recent student poisonings, and heightened protest activity. President Ebrahim Raisi discussed protecting “the culture of chastity and hijab in society” during a speech commemorating Martyrs’ Day on March 14. Raisi reiterated that Iran’s external enemies are responsible for the recent student poisonings and claimed that Iran can overcome its problems by “relying on God.”[i] The Parliamentary Cultural Committee separately published a report on chastity and hijab on March 14 emphasizing using an “indirect and intelligent approach” to enforce veiling as opposed to “physical confrontation.”[ii] The Cultural Committee added that it held meetings with the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) to “review and follow up" on this organization’s “problems.”[iii] The government’s “intelligent” approach involves--among other measures--placing responsibility for hijab enforcement on individuals such as shopkeepers as well as using facial recognition technology to identify unveiled women.[iv] This approach—despite government claims—is, in fact, confrontational. While security forces may not physically confront unveiled women, using facial recognition technology violates their privacy, and the penalties the regime has discussed levying can prompt confrontations of various sorts. Iranian authorities have additionally shut down many stores, pharmacies, and restaurants where the owners of these spaces neglected to enforce veiling among female customers in recent months.[v] Recent reports by Bloomberg and NPR also suggest that a growing number of Iranian women in urban centers are defying the mandatory hijab law on a daily basis.[vi] If this trend continues, the regime may have to decide in the near future whether to confront this outwardly defiant segment of the population.

The government’s emphasis on mandatory veiling is striking given its relative inattention to issues such as the economy and recent student poisonings. Iranian social media users have recently circulated videos of desolate bazaars which would typically be packed with holiday shoppers before Nowrouz, the Iranian New Year.[vii] Social media users have also shared images of advertisements offering Iranians the option to pay for basic goods—such as chicken and meat—with monthly installments.[viii] Although the Iranian rial has appreciated in recent days, Iran’s inflation rate remains at around 50 percent, making many basic commodities unaffordable for the average Iranian.[ix] The government has also not identified the cause of recent student poisonings and continues to frame these incidents as attacks by Iran’s enemies on Iranian school children, as CTP previously reported.[x]

Protesters escalated against the regime on March 14. CTP recorded at least 20 protests in 14 cities across 8 provinces on March 14. Protest groups had called for protests for March 13-15 centered around the major national holidays, as CTP previously reported.[xi]  Iranians participated in the Chahar Shanbe Souri holiday on March 14.  Traditional celebrations involve the symbolic act of jumping over fires in celebration of the upcoming new year. Social media users circulated footage of protest activities across the country, most of which included setting fires and throwing firecrackers in city streets, activity that is consistent with the Chahar Shanbe Souri holiday and not inherently anti-regime.[xii] Protesters were also documented using homemade incendiary devices and chanting anti-regime slogans, however, behavior that is inconsistent with the Chahar Shanbe Souri holiday.[xiii] Some social media captured protesters describing the devices as "handheld grenades,” but it remains unclear what these devices are. Prominent anti-regime citizen journalist Twitter account 1500 Tasvir circulated images of similar objects yesterday, suggesting that they would be used in the protest activity today.[xiv] IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency also circulated images of the objects, stating that the use of these devices is intended to incite widespread violence.[xv] Some protesters targeted security personnel and property with these devices in several locations across the country, marking a significant increase in the use of these items in anti-regime protests.[xvi] CTP has previously observed protesters throwing other incendiary devices, such as Molotov cocktails and fireworks, throughout the Mahsa Amini protest movement.[xvii]

Social media users also reported an increasingly securitized environment across the country.[xviii] This is consistent with CTP’s previous assessments that the regime would heavily deploy its security services around the national holidays as part of an effort to deter and crack down on protests.[xix] Regime officials and regime-affiliated news agencies continued their efforts on March 14 to deter people from participating in the Chahar Shanbe Souri celebrations.[xx] Reports also indicate a major security crackdown on a medium sized protest in Rasht, Gilan Province, where regime security forces apparently fired at the protesters.[xxi] 

Key Takeaways

• The Iranian government is prioritizing mandatory veiling amidst poor economic conditions, recent student poisonings, and heightened protest activity.
• Protesters escalated against the regime on March 14.
• At least 20 protests occurred in 14 cities across eight provinces.
• Some regime officials are continuing to deny that the recent attacks on Iranian school girls were poisonings.
• Iran and Bahrain could be considering normalizing their relations following the Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement.
• Iranian proxy Badr-affiliated Iraqi officials rhetorically targeted Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani for his handling of security operations in Diyala, likely to deter him from interfering in Badr operations in Diyala.
• Iran deployed proxy forces along the Al Mayadin-Abu Kamal segment of the Route Four highway likely to improve local operational security conditions.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least 20 protests occurred in 14 cities across eight provinces on March 14. CTP assesses with high to moderate confidence that protests occurred in the following cities:

Karaj, Alborz Province[xxii]

• Size: Undetermined

Esfahan City, Esfahan Province[xxiii]

• Size: Small

Bandar-e Anzali, Gilan Province[xxiv]

• Size: Undetermined
• Protester Activity: Threw homemade incendiary devices

Rasht, Gilan Province[xxv]

• Size: Medium
• Regime Repression: Clashes between security personnel and protesters, sounds of gunfire audible in social media clips.

Divandarreh, Kurdistan Province[xxvi]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Threw homemade incendiary devices

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[xxvii]

• Size: Undetermined
• Regime Repression: Security personnel reportedly shot and arrested protester

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[xxviii]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Threw homemade incendiary devices, burned Iranian flag

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxix]

• Size: Small to medium
• Area: Ekbatan

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxx]

• Size: Small to medium
• Area: Nezam Abad

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxxi]

• Size: Small
• Area: Sattar Khan

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxxii]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Sang Mahsa Amini protest anthem, Baraaye
• Area: Unknown, but may be IVO Ekbatan.

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxxiii]

• Size: Small
• Area: Pirouzi Street

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxxiv]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Threw homemade incendiary devices at security personnel
• Area: Tehran Pars

Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province[xxxv]

• Size: Undetermined
• Regime Repression: Clashes between security personnel and protesters, sounds of gunfire audible in social media clips.

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following cities:

Eslamabad-e-Gharb, Kermanshah Province[xxxvi]

• Size: Undetermined
• Regime Repression: Security personnel reportedly shot at protesters
• Notes: There is no available footage of protests in this area, and it is unclear if this incident meets CTP’s threhold for protest activity.

Kermanshah City, Kermanshah Province[xxxvii]

• Size: Undetermined
• Protester Activity: Threw homemade incendiary devices
• Notes: It is unclear if this incident meets CTP’s threshold for protest activity

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xxxviii]

• Size: Undetermined
• Notes: It is unclear if this incident meets CTP’s threshold for protest activity

Izeh, Khuzestan Province[xxxix]

• Size: Undetermined
• Notes: It is unclear if this incident meets CTP’s threshold for protest activity

Haft Tappeh, Khuzestan Province[xl]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Haft Tappeh sugarcane workers
• Notes: Strike and protest

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xli]

• Size: Small
• Area: Esfandiari

IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency criticized former reformist President Mohammad Khatami’s March 14 statements suggesting that regime-affiliated actors were responsible for the recent poisoning attacks on schoolchildren.[xlii] Fars called Khatami’s insinuation “deplorable” and characterized him as one of the many “radical reformists” who advance the enemy’s “malice intentions.” Fars’ reporting validates CTP’s previous assessment that Khatami’s comments could solidify the suspicion that the regime was in some way responsible for the attacks.[xliii]

Some regime officials are continuing to deny that the recent attacks on Iranian school girls were poisonings. Judiciary Spokesperson Masoud Setayeshi described student reports of chemical poisonings  as a general “malaise” on March 14.”[xliv] Setayeshi added that specialized laboratories were investigating whether the recent school incidents were actual poisonings. The spokesperson emphasized that the regime would identify and prosecute the perpetrators “without mercy” and announced that security forces arrested eight individuals in connection with the attacks in Fars Province.

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Iranian Civil Aviation Organization (CAO) Spokesperson Jafar Yazerlou stated that the CAO is reviewing resuming flights between Iran and Saudi Arabia.[xlv] The two countries agreed to reestablish bilateral relations on March 10, as CTP previously reported.[xlvi]

Iran and Bahrain could be considering normalizing their relations following the Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement. UK-based outlet Amwaj Media reported that Iran and Bahrain recently held talks on “administrative and bureaucratic issues,” citing an informed source.[xlvii] The article added that the two countries could normalize their relations following “the reopening of embassies in Riyadh and Tehran.” Semi-official Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) separately recirculated a Sputnik News interview with Bahraini Parliamentarian Mamdouh al-Saleh, who stated that normalization negotiations between Iran and Bahrain are underway.[xlviii]

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian held a phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 13.[xlix] The two foreign ministers discussed the recent Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement, developments in the Ukraine war, and Iran’s inclusion in the talks to resolve tensions between Turkey and Syria. The Syrian regime likely postponed the Ankara-Damascus talks that were scheduled for later this week, as CTP previously reported.[l]

Economy

Guardian Council Spokesperson Hadi Tahan Nazif announced that the council finished its mandatory review of the budget bill for the next fiscal year and has forwarded the bill to parliament.[li] The Guardian Council is the governmental body responsible for reviewing and approving legislation passed by parliament, in addition to supervising elections and vetting candidates.

External Security and Military Affairs

Badr Organization-affiliated Iraqi officials rhetorically targeted Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani for his handling of security operations in Diyala, likely to deter him from interfering in Badr operations in Diyala. The Badr-affiliated Governor of Diyala Muthanna al Tamimi accused Iraqi Special Forces (ISOF) of falsely arresting a Badr Commander Sabah Zaini on March 10 and demanded the officers who arrested him be held accountable.[lii] Sabah Zaini was arrested on charges of murder and kidnapping by ISOF on March 10 during sweeping operations to arrest individuals tied to recent killings in Diyala province.[liii] Tamimi and several unnamed al-Fatah Coalition members of parliament demanded that Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi form a joint committee under the Human Rights and Security Committees to investigate Sabah Zaini’s arrest.[liv] Al Fatah Coalition is the Badr Organization’s political wing in Parliament. Statements from the al Fatah Coalition indicate Sudani is losing influence within the Coordination Framework.[lv]

Nouri al Maliki affiliated Deputy Commander of Joint Operations Lieutenant General Qais al Muhammadawi reported that unspecified security forces arrested 162 individuals on suspicion of involvement in recent killings in Diyala.[lvi] The Badr-affiliated 1^st Emergency Response Division and Iraqi Special Forces began separate sweeping operations in Diyala province on March 10.[lvii] CTP previously reported that Iranian-backed Shia militias likely took advantage of security deployments in Diyala to target opposition groups in the province.[lviii] Diyala province’s ethnic and sectarian diversity allowed al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian-backed Shia militants to establish strongholds and conduct targeted attacks between 2006-2007.[lix] Sectarian conflict and sectarian behavior on the part of security forces in Diyala province present an opportunity for ISIS to establish itself as a security guarantor for Sunnis in the province.

Iran deployed proxy forces along the Al Mayadin-Abu Kamal segment of the Route Four highway likely to improve local operational security conditions. Unspecified Iranian proxy forces replaced local Syrian fighters in Abu Kamal and Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor Province on March 14, according to Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.[lx] Iranian-backed militants also arrested 12 Syrian fighters for leaking information in Al Mayadin and Deir ez Zor cities on March 14.[lxi] The arrest and replacement of local militants with foreign proxies suggests that Iran intends to improve local security via proxy forces it has a direct and strong command-and-control relationship with—such as the Fatemiyoun, Iran’s Afghan Shia fighters. Iran has reinforced specifically this section of the Route 4 highway with its proxy militias since the February 6 earthquake, as CTP previously assessed.[lxii] Eye of Euphrates reported on March 2 that local IRGC and Iranian-affiliated militia leadership met in Al Mayadin to discuss methods to limit information leaks and improve operational security along the Al Mayadin-Abu Kamal Route Four segment.[lxiii] These solutions could have included replacing local militants with more dependable proxy forces.