Iran Update, March 20, 2023

March 20, 2023, 7:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Iranian security leaders have announced in recent days that they will resume enforcing the mandatory hijab law with a confrontational approach. The social deputy of the IRGC Qom Provincial Unit—Major Ali Mehdi Babaei—announced on March 18 the implementation of a new initiative—the “Let’s Enjoin Good in Our Neighborhood” plan—to enforce the hijab requirement and other regime behavioral expectations in public in Qom Province.[i] Babaei described the plan as “neighborhood-centric” and mosque-based, suggesting that the IRGC will use the Basij Organization to implement the initiative.  IRGC Operations Deputy Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan previously announced plans to establish “patrols for enjoining good and forbidding evil” in Qom between March 16 and Ramadan, as CTP reported.[ii] It is noteworthy that the IRGC and Basij—rather than the Law Enforcement Command (LEC)—appear to be trying to take lead on hijab enforcement. Law Enforcement Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Radan stated on March 19 that the LEC will increase neighborhood patrols during Nowrouz and confront women not properly adhering to the hijab law.[iii] Radan specified that “travelers in Mazandaran Province must observe the hijab law much more than before,” indicating that his target audience was tourists—many of whom are likely from Tehran—traveling to the Caspian Sea for the Nowrouz holiday.

The security leaders directing this more confrontational approach may have won the intra-regime debate against more moderate figures over how to enforce the hijab law. Many parliamentarians have expressed support for a “smart” and “indirect” approach to enforce veiling in recent months.[iv] The Parliamentary Cultural Committee proposed cutting phone and internet services to unveiled women in a report published on March 14, as CTP previously reported.[v] The Parliamentary Judicial and Legal Committee also announced plans to block the national identification cards of unveiled women and bar them from banking services on February 3.[vi] Iranian officials have discussed using surveillance cameras with facial recognition technologies to identify unveiled women as well.[vii] These measures would avoid physical confrontation with unveiled women and punish them indirectly.[viii] Many of these measures have been proposed by parliamentarians who do not have the authority to enact them, however. It appears that those who have the authority—namely the security services—have opted to ignore these calls for restraint in favor of a more confrontational—and potentially more forceful—approach.

The IRGC may have decided to first launch its morality patrol campaign in Qom for several reasons. Qom is the religious heartland of Iran, and security leaders may fear that the presence of unveiled women in this city will tarnish the image and undermine the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. Security leaders may also be securitizing Qom to deter potential dissent from some in the clerical establishment. Several senior clerics voiced criticism of the regime during the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Ayatollah Mostafa Mohaghegh Damad and Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani criticized state security services for the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022, as CTP previously reported.[ix] Ayatollah Hossein Nouri Hamedani separately called on the regime to listen to the people’s grievances in September 2022.[x] Security leaders could use these patrols to message to these clerics that the regime has no intention of backing down from its crackdown on Iranian women. Security leaders’ efforts to reconstitute morality patrols are particularly striking in light of UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Javaid Rehman’s announcement on March 20 that evidence confirms Mahsa Amini died on September 16, 2022 “as a result of beatings by the state morality police.”[xi]

Anti-regime outlets have published purported internal regime meeting notes detailing observations consistent with CTP’s previous assessments about intra-regime fractures and major problems within the security services during the Masha Amini protests.[xii] An anti-regime Telegram channel named “Freedom Time” published the document on March 18, claiming that it was the summary of a January 3, 2023, meeting between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and regime security leadership.[xiii] IranWire and Iran International then separately reported on the document on March 18 and 19, respectively. CTP cannot independently verify the authenticity of this document. If it is a forgery, it is a high-quality one whose makers have a nuanced understanding of internal Iranian security affairs. CTP does not regard the document as an independent confirmation of our previous assessments, but some key points in the document are consistent with our previous assessments and hypotheses.

High-ranking security officials, according to the document, reported in the meeting with Khamenei that many security personnel had abandoned their posts, refused to use violence against protesters, and in some cases even misled security leaders in order to help protesters. Some of the officials in the meeting stated that the above issues were due to younger security personnel’s empathy for their fellow youth. A provincial IRGC official identified the low salaries of security services as the root cause, citing an incident in which security forces looted a facility in Karaj, Alborz Province stocked with food. Others pointed to the diminishing ideological commitment within the ranks to the regime’s core values. CTP has previously assessed on multiple occasions that Iranian security services were struggling with bandwidth constraints, exhaustion, and low morale and that regime officials were alarmed by these developments.[xiv] CTP had specifically assessed that less ideologically committed security personnel might struggle to sustain the level of violence that regime officials were demanding, and that the latter were concerned about low salaries leading to defections and insubordination.[xv]

The discussions detailed in the document are furthermore consistent with CTP’s prior assessments about intra-regime fractures over the security response to the protests. Different regime officials had varying accounts of the root causes and extent of the security services’ inability to confront protesters and offered correspondingly different solutions. Those who identified low salary as the cause called for tax exemptions and increasing the government’s budget for the security services. Those who identified the security forces’ declining ideological attachment to the regime as the cause called for the relevant political and cultural institutions to increase their ideological efforts. Several officials stated that the above issues within the regime’s security and intelligence services were unprecedented in the history of the Islamic Republic. Others, including Khamenei, believed the reports were exaggerated and that regime officials should instead focus on the degree to which the services were both prepared and ideologically inclined to confront protesters. CTP previously assessed and reported on numerous occasions that the regime was internally split over the cause and extent of the security forces’ inability and unwillingness to crack down on protests.[xvi]

The document included some information that CTP has not previously observed in the open-source information space. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Gholam Ali Rashid reported that the security services had thwarted plans by rogue elements to shell the Supreme Leader’s office and personal residence. If true, this event would be far beyond any level of internal mutiny that CTP has previously assessed or reported.

Various regime actors continue to portray the economy differently. The Iranian rial depreciated nearly five percent from 471,000 rials to one US dollar on March 17 to 494,000 rials to one US dollar on March 20.[xvii] Parliamentarian Ahmad Alireza Beygi stated on March 18 that the Raisi administration “has lost its ability to control the market.”[xviii] Parliamentarian Morteza Mahmoudvand similarly stated on March 20 that “not only are the poor suffering from economic pressures today, but the middle class is also experiencing serious damage.”[xix]

President Ebrahim Raisi and his circle have contrastingly continued to tout their purported “economic achievements.” He stated during the opening ceremony of the second phase of an oil refinery in Abadan, Khuzestan Province on March 20 that Iran’s economy grew four percent in the past year.[xx] Raisi added that the second phase of the refinery has created between 7,000 and 15,000 jobs.[xxi] Oil Minister Javad Owji separately praised the administration for completing the Abadan Oil Refinery project—which he stated the Hassan Rouhani administration left “half-finished.”[xxii]

Key Takeaways

• Iranian security leaders have announced in recent days that they will resume enforcing the mandatory hijab law with a confrontational approach. The security leaders directing this more confrontational approach may have won the intra-regime debate against more moderate figures over how to enforce the hijab law.
• Anti-regime outlets have published purported internal regime meeting notes detailing observations consistent with CTP’s previous assessments about intra-regime fractures and major problems within the security services during the Masha Amini protests.
• Various regime actors continue to portray the economy differently.
• At least two protests occurred on March 18, three protests on March 19, and five protests on March 20.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces on March 18. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following cities:

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxiii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Individuals advocating for the disabled

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following cities:

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[xxiv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Taxi drivers on strike

At least three protests occurred in three cities across one province on March 19. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following cities:

Shoush, Khuzestan Province[xxv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xxvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Shoushtar, Khuzestan Province [xxvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

At least five protests occurred in five cities across two provinces on March 20. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following cities:

Sanandaj, Kurdistan Province[xxviii]

• Size: Small to medium
• Demographic: Individuals chanting anti-regime slogans during Nowrouz celebrations

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[xxix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Individuals chanting anti-regime slogans during Nowrouz celebrations

Marivan, Kurdistan Province[xxx]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Individuals chanting anti-regime slogans during Nowrouz celebrations

Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province[xxxi]

• Size: Small to medium
• Demographic: Individuals chanting anti-regime slogans during Nowrouz celebrations

Piranshahr, West Azerbaijan Province[xxxii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Individuals chanting anti-regime slogans during Nowrouz celebrations

The LEC discovered and neutralized a car bomb in Tehran Province on March 17.[xxxiii] The vehicle owner reportedly noticed an explosive underneath the car and called the police. Using an explosive in this manner is typically meant to kill a vehicle operator rather than nearby individuals. Iranian state media reported that the vehicle owner does not have “any important executive responsibilities in government agencies.”

President Ebrahim Raisi continued emphasizing the need to indoctrinate the population during a meeting with Rahian-e Nour tourists in Khuzestan Province on March 20.[xxxiv] The term Rahian-e Nour—meaning “Passengers of Light” in Persian—refers to regime-organized tours of Iran-Iraq War battlefields. Such tours are particularly common around Nowrouz. Raisi framed these tours and related services as critical to countering Western cultural influence. Raisi also called on artists and cinema workers to focus more on portraying “martyrs” from the Iran-Iraq War. These statements are related to the regime’s ”explanation jihad”—a term coined by regime officials that means using propaganda to ideologize the population and increase public support for the Islamic Republic.

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian engaged Turkey for a second time in recent weeks likely over Iranian security concerns in Azerbaijan. Abdollahian held a phone call with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu on March 17, during which the two discussed Iran-Azerbaijan relations.[xxxv] The two previously discussed Israeli involvement in the Caucasus in a meeting on March 8, as CTP previously reported.[xxxvi] Regime officials have repeatedly in recent months expressed concern about an alleged Israeli intelligence presence in Azerbaijan and called for Baku to reject cooperation with Israel.[xxxvii] Regime officials may seek to persuade Turkey to address their concerns vis-a-vis Azerbaijan after they have failed to resolve these issues with Baku directly. Abdollahian and Cavusoglu additionally discussed the normalization of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia during the March 17 phone call.

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani discussed security and economic cooperation during an official visit to Iraq on March 19. Shamkhani met Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji, among others.[xxxviii] Shamkhani and Araji signed an agreement to address Iranian security concerns in Iraqi Kurdistan.[xxxix] Regime officials have repeatedly accused anti-regime militant groups and Israel of using Iraqi Kurdistan to facilitate operations into Iran. Central Bank Governor Mohammad Reza Farzin accompanied Shamkhani and discussed financial cooperation and accelerating Iraq’s payments to Iran during the visit.[xl]

Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Affairs Mohammad Jamshidi tweeted on March 19 that President Ebrahim Raisi has accepted an invitation from Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz to pay an official visit to Riyadh.[xli] Jamshidi added that they would discuss increasing economic and regional cooperation during the visit.

Parliamentarian Elham Azad stated on March 19 that Iran and Bahrain are working to reopen embassies with one another.[xlii] Azad also stated that Bahrain will invite Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf for an official visit. Azad was part of an Iranian delegation that attended the 146^th Assembly of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Manama on March 11-15.

Senior officials from the Strategic Foreign Relations Council are conducting an official visit to Syria. Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi and Secretary Abbas Araghchi arrived in Damascus on March 19.[xliii] They plan to meet Syrian President Bashar al Assad, Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad, and Religious Endowments Minister Mohammad Abdul Sattar. The Strategic Foreign Relations Council serves as an advisory board to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Kharrazi has occasionally served as a personal envoy of Khamenei as well.

External Security and Military Affairs

IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani visited Aleppo and Latakia on March 17.[xliv] Iranian state media reported that Ghaani oversaw earthquake relief shipments. Iran has reportedly moved weapons shipments into Syria under the guise of humanitarian, as CTP previously reported.[xlv] Ghaani previously visited Aleppo and Latakia to meet with Syrian, Iraqi proxy, Lebanese Hezbollah, and possibly Russian officials in early February 2023.[xlvi]

Iraqi Interior Minister Abdul al Shammari chaired a meeting with security officials affiliated with Iranian proxies in Diyala province on March 20.[xlvii] The meeting included Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Diyala Operations Commander Talib al Musawi, PMF-affiliated Army Chief of Staff Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah, Asaib Ahl al Haq (AAH)-affiliated Diyala Police Chief Major General Alaa al Zubaidi, and Nouri al Maliki-affiliated Iraqi Joint Operations Deputy Commander Qais al Mohammadawi. The PMF deployed four additional Badr brigades to Diyala province on March 16 under the pretext of additional security for Nowrouz.[xlviii] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani deployed Iraqi Security Forces to Diyala province following a series of likely Badr Organization-affiliated killings. Iranian proxy-affiliated leadership has since worked to retain control of security operations and Diyala province under the PMF independent of Sudani.

The Iraqi parliament passed several amendments to electoral reform laws on March 20.[xlix] Parliament passed an amendment stipulating that individuals with prior misdemeanor or felony corruption convictions are barred from running for office.[l] The Parliamentary Integrity Committee under Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s administration has abused corruption charges to target and arrest former officials under the Mostafa al Kadhimi government and would likely use the amendment to further marginalize political opponents.[li] Parliament did not vote on amendments backed by former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and the Shia Coalition Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia political parties—that would reverse election reforms from 2019 during the March 20 session.[lii] These proposed amendments would marginalize independent and minority political parties in favor of Maliki‘s State of Law Coalition. Iraqi activist groups have called for protests in Iraq if Parliament passes Maliki's proposed election laws.[liii] Parliament is expected to vote on the remaining election laws on April 1.[liv]