Iran Update, March 27, 2023

March 27, 2023, 6:00 pm ET

Contributor: Andie Perry

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have messaged that the Iran-led Axis of Resistance is prepared to continue escalating against American forces in eastern Syria. Iran uses the term “Axis of Resistance” to refer to the regional state, semi-state, and non-state actors with which Tehran cooperates to pursue its strategic objectives, including the Bashar al Assad regime, Lebanese Hezbollah, and various Iraqi, Syrian, and other proxy groups. The Iranian Advisory Center in Syria—likely a front for the IRGC Quds Force—issued a statement on March 24 warning the US that the Axis of Resistance has “the upper hand” in Syria and can retaliate against any US attacks.[i] Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Spokesperson Keyvan Khosravi echoed these remarks on March 25.[ii] Iranian state media and Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated outlets have similarly emphasized in recent days that the Axis of Resistance is prepared to attack US forces in eastern Syria if the escalation cycle between them continues.[iii] The IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah are responding to the series of attacks between the US and Iranian-backed forces that erupted in Syria on March 23-24 after Iranian-backed militants conducted a kamikaze drone attack on US forces in northeastern Syria, killing one American.[iv]

The IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah are signaling their resolve against the US and readiness to absorb the military costs of further escalation in Syria. US and Israeli airstrikes have demonstrably failed to impose a high enough cost to persuade Iranian leaders to stop their efforts to entrench themselves militarily in Syria and push US forces out. The IRGC may calculate that it incurs a relatively low cost given that these airstrikes often destroy facilities that the IRGC can reconstruct and kill non-Iranian fighters whom the IRGC likely views as expendable. The failure of the US to deter Iran from attacking American positions is, in fact, the key reason that the US became entangled in this latest escalation cycle in the first place. CTP previously argued that Iran likely ordered the kamikaze drone attack that killed an American contractor in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian-backed targets in Syria because Tehran feared Israeli responses more than it feared American reactions.[v]

Israel has conducted a series of airstrikes against Iranian-backed forces in Syria in recent weeks in response to an uptick in Iranian military activity in Syria, especially around Aleppo.[vi] Iran has worked to exploit the earthquake in northern Syria to strengthen its military position there in recent weeks, as CTP previously reported.[vii] The IRGC is likely trying to bring advanced military capabilities and/or forces into Aleppo under the guise of humanitarian aid. It is unclear for what exactly Iran is preparing, but this activity has clearly crossed an Israeli red line.

An Iranian-backed group called the Al Ghaliboun Brigade issued a statement claiming responsibility for the kamikaze drone attack that killed an American contractor. Iranian state media described this militia as an Iraqi group, although other analysts have characterized it as a Syrian Shia militia.[viii] The group could alternatively be a front group for the IRGC Quds Force, which frequently claims attacks under false names.

Iran and its proxies may be trying to keep the escalation cycle confined to Syria. Iraqi Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Ali Al Askari issued a statement disclaiming his organization’s involvement in the attack and describing the perpetrators as the “Syrian popular resistance” when congratulating them for the attack.[ix] Iranian state media furthermore tweeted a map of US military bases in eastern Syria that the Axis of Resistance could strike.[x]

Iranian regime officials remain split over how to enforce the mandatory hijab law in the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini protest movement. Hardline parliamentarian Hossein Jalali presented a new plan to enforce the hijab law on March 27 which, if implemented, would fine unveiled women up to 30,000,000,000 rials (approximately $60,000).[xi] This extremely high fine would enable Iranian authorities to detain and arrest unveiled women who do not have the financial means to pay it. Jalali emphasized that the new plan is “completely ‘smart’ and there is no physical confrontation.”[xii] Regime officials use the term “smart”—houshmand in Persian—to refer to advanced technologies, such as facial-recognizing cameras, that can identify unveiled women without physically confronting them. Jalali previously espoused a “smart” approach in December 2022, stating that “the hijab law is in place, but physical confrontation will not take place, no one will be arrested, a verbal warning will not even be given.”[xiii] Hardline politician and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer Mohsen Rafigh Doust separately stated on March 25 that enforcing mandatory veiling with force “will generate a negative reaction.”[xiv] These individuals’ calls for enforcing the hijab law without physical confrontation may be a direct response to security leaders’ announcements in recent days that they plan to resume enforcing veiling with a confrontational approach, as CTP previously reported.[xv] IRGC Operations Deputy Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan announced plans to establish “patrols” in Qom Province between March 16 and the end of Ramadan to ensure compliance with the regime’s morality standards.[xvi] The social deputy of the IRGC Qom Provincial Unit—Major Ali Mehdi Babaei—similarly announced a new initiative—the “Let’s Enjoin Good in Our Neighborhood” plan—to enforce the hijab requirement in Qom Province on March 18.[xvii]

The confrontational and “smart” approaches to hijab enforcement are not mutually exclusive. Political actors who support enforcing mandatory veiling with a “smart” approach may oppose physical confrontation because of the risk that it could trigger demonstrations similar to those during the Mahsa Amini protests. Those who support physical confrontation—including some commanders in the IRGC, Basij, and Law Enforcement Command (LEC)—seem contrastingly to view “smart” measures such as surveillance and facial recognition technology as supplemental tools to enforce hijab compliance. The LEC previously resumed using surveillance cameras to identify unveiled women in cars in January 2023, for example.[xviii]

Regime officials—regardless of whether they espouse a confrontational or “smart” approach to hijab enforcement—continue to speak about the hijab in a tone-deaf manner. It is noteworthy that the intra-regime debate is about how to enforce mandatory veiling—not about whether the mandatory hijab law should exist. Both those who support a “smart” approach and those who prefer physical confrontation agree that they will not make sociocultural concessions to Iranian women and will instead pursue the hardline stance put forward by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[xix] Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami stated on March 27 that Iranian women should regard the hijab as a “blessing.”[xx] Assembly of Experts Member Ayatollah Mohsen Araki separately stated on March 26 that unveiling is the equivalent of a “spiritual and cultural Corona [virus]” that “destroys society.”[xxi] These statements may resonate with women who already fully abide by the hijab law. They will likely further alienate and fuel frustration among Iranians who oppose the regime’s hijab policies, however.

Key Takeaways

• Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have messaged that the Axis of Resistance is prepared to continue escalating against American forces in eastern Syria.
• An Iranian-backed group called the Al Ghaliboun Brigade issued a statement claiming responsibility for the kamikaze drone attack that killed an American contractor.
• Some Iranian proxies have tried to avoid becoming involved in the escalation cycle, possibly to keep it confined to Syria and/or prevent the US from retaliating against them.
• Iranian regime officials remain split over how to enforce the mandatory hijab law in the aftermath of the Mahsa Amini protest movement.
• Regime officials—regardless of whether they espouse a confrontational or “smart” approach to hijab enforcement—continue to speak about the hijab in a tone-deaf manner.
• At least one protest on March 25, four protests on March 26, and one protest on March 27.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on March 25. CTP assesses with moderate confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Haft Tappeh, Khuzestan Province[xxii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Haft Tappeh Sugarcane Factory workers

At least four protests occurred in four cities across three provinces on March 26. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Ahvaz, Khuzestan Province[xxiii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Shoush, Khuzestan Province[xxiv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Retirees

Saghez, Kurdistan Province[xxv]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Teachers protesting the arrest of teacher union activist Soleiman Abdi[xxvi]

Tehran City, Tehran Province[xxvii]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Individuals who lost money in the fake online trading platform “King Money”[xxviii]

At least one protest occurred in one city across one province on March 27. CTP assesses with low confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Baneh, Kurdistan Province[xxix]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Mechanics on strike

Law Enforcement Command (LEC) Special Units Commander Brigadier General Hassan Karimi announced plans on March 25 for the LEC Special Units deploy to 400 different locations across Iran in the new Persian calendar year in anticipation of protests.[xxx] Karimi also added that the LEC Special Units will have to double their capacity to effectively cover those locations, suggesting that they do not currently have the manpower necessary. The LEC Special Units are a highly trained, anti-riot force that the regime uses heavily in its protest crackdowns.[xxxi] The Special Units were already deployed across the country during the Nowrouz holiday to confront potential protests, as CTP previously reported.[xxxii]

Iranian social media users circulated alleged footage of security forces establishing checkpoints along major roads leading into and out of Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on March 26.[xxxiii] This securitization of Zahedan follows Zahedan Sunni cleric Abdol Hamid’s fiery sermon of March 24 directly targeting positions that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had taken a few days before.[xxxiv]

Economic Affairs

Raisi administration officials continued to echo Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s rhetoric on the economy and proposed ways to implement his economic vision in the new year. President Ebrahim Raisi reiterated his administration’s readiness to decrease inflation, increase production, and grow the private sector during several meetings with senior regime officials between March 25 to 27.[xxxv] First Vice President Mohmmad Mokhber likewise stated that the necessary conditions for curbing inflation are economic growth and the ”popularization of the economy.”[xxxvi] Mokhber may have been again referring to privatizing parastatal entities as he did in another speech on March 22, as CTP previously reported.[xxxvii] This rhetoric mirrors Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Nowrouz address on March 21, during which he directed the regime to pursue economic policies that would “control inflation and increase economic production” and called for privatization, stating that “the most important problem and weakness of the country is the governmental nature of the economy.”[xxxviii]

The Supreme Labor Council increased the minimum wage by 27 percent for the new Persian calendar year.[xxxix] This wage increase will likely not significantly improve workers’ economic welfare, however, as it is far below Iran‘s inflation rate which hovers between 40 to 50 percent, according to different reports.[xl] The Supreme Labor Council is composed of various Raisi administration executives.[xli]

The Iranian rial depreciated slightly from 494,000 rials to one US dollar on March 24 to 511,500 rials to one US dollar on March 27.[xlii]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani met with Qatari Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad bin Abdol Aziz Al Khalifa in Tehran on March 27.[xliii] Shamkhani emphasized that Iran has prioritized expanding cooperation with regional countries and that it places no restrictions on the expansion of regional relations. Al Khalifa expressed his satisfaction with the March 10 normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian similarly met with Al Khalifa on March 27.[xliv]

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian continued his increased rate of diplomatic engagements with regional officials on March 26 and 27. Amir Abdollahian held a phone call with Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal bin Farhad to discuss scheduling a meeting during the month of Ramadan—the second call between them since March 23.[xlv] Amir Abdollahian also held a phone call with Libyan Foreign Affairs Minister Najla El Mangoush to discuss reopening the Iranian embassy in Libya on March 26.[xlvi] Amir Abdollahian lastly held a phone call with Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Faisal Mekdad to discuss regional cooperation on March 26.[xlvii]

Strategic Foreign Relations Council Chairman Kamal Kharrazi denied rumors of divisions or tensions within the regime foreign policy apparatus on March 27.[xlviii]  Kharrazi stated that certain uninformed individuals were “misusing” Shamkhani’s and his own recent diplomatic engagements as signs of a growing rift between them and the Foreign Affairs Ministry. He stated that Iran’s foreign affairs and policy are well coordinated. Kharrazi visited Lebanon and Syria between March 19-22. SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani visited Iraq and the United Arab Emirates after having negotiated the rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, as CTP previously reported. Some news outlets and social media accounts have observed the conspicuous absence of Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian in the recent visits and negotiations, speculating that the Foreign Affairs Ministry has been sidelined by the Supreme Leader and the foreign policymaking organs under his direct supervision.[xlix] Amir Abdollahian also denied these speculations on March 17, as CTP previously reported.[l]

The Wall Street Journal reported on March 27 that Russia has supplied Iran with advanced surveillance software and cyberweapons in exchange for Tehran’s supply of drones for Russian use in Ukraine.[li] The article lists internet-censorship software and communication-surveillance capabilities that would allow the regime to monitor, degrade, and deny mobile communications. The regime will likely use these capabilities to target both political dissidents and foreign adversaries.

SNSC Secretary Ali Shamkhani held a phone call with Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval on March 27.[lii] They discussed the nuclear negotiations, regional cooperation, and the Iran-Saudi rapprochement.  

External Security and Military Affairs

At least two protests occurred in two cities across two provinces in Iraq on March 25. CTP assesses with high confidence that two protest occurred in the following location:

Baghdad, Baghdad Province[liii]

• Size: Medium
• Protester activity: Protesters gathered outside Parliament
• Protest Suppression: Riot police dispersed protesters from a park near Parliament

Nasariyah, Dhi Qar Province[liv]

• Size: Medium
• Protester Activity: Protesters blocked access to Zaytoon and Nasr bridges

At least six protests occurred in six cities across six provinces in Iraq on March 27. CTP assesses with moderate to high confidence that 6 protest occurred in the following location:

Al Shomali, Babil Province[lv]

• Size: Small to Medium
• Protester Activity: Protesters blocked access to the main highway traveling to southern provinces; Protesters burned tires in the street
• Protest Suppression: Security forces heard using live fire rounds; Protesters seen clashing with riot police; Unconfirmed reports claimed Iranian-backed militias participated in protest suppression
• Note: Protesters released a statement claiming that parliamentarians who voted in favor of the election laws would be blocked from entering the province

Baghdad, Baghdad Province[lvi]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Protesters gathered in Tahrir Square; Protesters released a statement rejecting the election laws and criticizing Sudani, Halbousi, and members of Parliament
• Protest Suppression: Unidentified security forces were deployed to Tahrir Square

Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar Province[lvii]

• Size: Small – Medium
• Protester Activity: Protesters blocked access to Al Halboubi Square with concrete barriers

Najaf, Najaf Province[lviii]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Protesters set fires in the road, blocking traffic

Diwaniyah, Al Qadisiyah Province[lix]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Protesters stormed a local government office and later set fire to it

Kut, Wasit Province[lx]

• Size: Small
• Protester Activity: Protesters set fire to tires in the street, blocking traffic
• Protest Suppression: Riot police were seen deployed in response to protests

The Iraqi parliament passed all 15 State of Law Coalition-backed election law amendments on March 26, which will likely empower former Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki.[lxi] The election law amendments will advantage large political parties, such as Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, at the expense of minority and independent political parties in future elections. These amendments reverse electoral reform laws passed in 2019 and 2020 in response to the Tishreen Movement—a youth-led protest movement that demanded election law and constitutional reforms to address deep-rooted corruption, economic issues, and poor government service provision. Parliament furthermore repealed on March 26 legislation from 2020 that established district-based constituencies, reverting legislative elections to multi-seat provincial elections. The district-based constituencies were meant to prevent major political blocs from overriding popular votes.  

Iraqi protest groups called for more anti-government demonstrations on March 26 in response to Parliament passing the election law amendments.[lxii] Protesters previously responded to calls for a sit-in outside Parliament from March 24 through March 25 to block Parliament from holding a voting session.[lxiii] Iraq’s parliament initially announced it would hold a vote on the proposed election laws on March 25, however, the vote was delayed until March 26.

Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated media published an article on March 26 describing how the Axis of Resistance and Russia are coordinating to expel US forces from Syria.[lxiv] The article stated that the Axis of Resistance and Russia play united but distinct roles in this effort. The article framed recent Russian air maneuvers over US positions in Syria as being connected to recent Iranian-backed militant attacks on US forces.