Iran Update, March 31, 2023

March 31, 2023, 5:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

Contributors: Anya Caraiani

Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes in Damascus, Syria on March 30 that resulted in the death of senior IRGC official Milad Heydari, which likely will prompt Iranian-backed militants to attack US forces stationed in eastern Syria in the coming days. Recent Iranian attacks on US forces in response to IDF airstrikes suggests a pattern in which Iran retaliates for instances in which IRGC personnel are killed. Local Syrian media reported that an IDF drone killed an IRGC official and a Lebanese Hezbollah official on March 23 near Abu Kamal, Deir ez Zor province.[i] The IDF drone strike occurred approximately 12-18 hours prior to the attack on US forces in Hasakah province, suggesting that Iran ordered the attack in response to the IDF drone strike and not the airstrike on Aleppo International Airport on March 22, which did not kill any IRGC personnel. CTP has observed several other Iranian-backed attacks on US forces that support this pattern, which are outlined in the timeline graphic below. 

Iranian regime rhetoric suggests that Iran is preparing to respond with force. Iranian state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) described Heydari as an officer in the IRGC’s Cyber Command.[ii] IRNA also described Heydari as “one of the military advisers” in Syria to Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Command.[iii] Media outlets affiliated with the Iranian regime have uncharacteristically publicized Heydari’s death and echoed threats of retaliation made by senior Iranian officials.[iv] This unusual emphasis on his death and the related threats suggests the regime is setting rhetorical conditions to respond by attacking US forces in Syria.

The Times of Israel reported that the target of the March 30 IDF airstrike was an Iranian asset related microchips used in missile guidance systems and not Heydari.[v] Iranian convoys smuggling precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and warehouses in Syria that store the PGMs are commonly targeted during Israeli airstrikes, suggesting Heydari may be involved in the Iranian effort to produce and smuggle missiles and other precision-guided munitions into Syria.

Heightened Quds Force activity in eastern Syria is consistent with coordination or attack planning with local militias. Deir Ezzor 24 reported that an IRGC Quds Force delegation arrived from Tehran to hold meetings in Al Mayadin, Deir ez Zor province with local Iranian-backed militias on either March 29 or 30.[vi] The arrival of the IRGC Quds Force is consistent with the spike in IRGC Quds Force activity in Deir ez Zor province since March 25, which CTP additionally previously reported.[vii] The Quds Force held these meetings potentially to survey damage, improve morale amongst local forces after recent US airstrikes, or to plan additional attacks on US forces.

CTP is not prepared to assess the location wherein such a strike would originate nor which US positions in eastern Syria the attack would target. Iranian-backed forces have targeted US positions across Hasakah, Deir ez Zor, and Homs provinces from positions in both Iraq and Syria.[viii] The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported on March 30 that unspecified Iranian-backed militants deployed to positions to Al Ulayyaniyah, approximately 30 kilometers from the Al Tanf Deconfliction Zone that surrounds the US garrison at Al Tanf in Homs Province.[ix] CTP cannot verify the accuracy of this report, but Al Ulanyyaniyah’s proximity to the T3 pumping station and multiple Iranian-backed militia positions in Palmyra—locations where Iranian-backed militants are known to store ISR and possibly kamikaze drones—suggest such a deployment may be in preparation to strike US forces at Al Tanf with a kamikaze drone.

Iranian-backed militants conducting a retaliatory strike against US forces in Syria could renew the tit-for-tat escalation cycle that occurred March 23-25, which would in turn risk additional attacks against US forces. As CTP previously reported, media outlets associated with the Iranian regime and Lebanese Hezbollah likely executed a coordinated messaging campaign to communicate that the Axis of Resistance is prepared to further escalate against US forces in the event of additional airstrikes.[x] US forces did not respond to a rocket attack in eastern Syria perpetrated by Iranian-backed militants on March 25. Iran may interpret the US response to another potential attack on US positions in eastern Syria as a continuation of the March 23-25 escalation cycle.

The Iranian regime signaled its agreement to uncompromisingly enforce the mandatory hijab law on March 30. The Interior Ministry issued a statement about the hijab on March 30 in which it wrote that “there has not been and will not be any retreat and leniency in religious principles and rulings and traditional values.”[xi] The Supreme Cultural Revolution Council previously issued a statement about the hijab on January 8, as CTP previously reported.[xii] The council’s statement emphasized the necessity of veiling but added that “the weakness of some women’s hijab should not be taken as a sign of their disbelief in religious principles,” evincing a degree of tolerance that is not detectable in the Interior Ministry’s March 30 statement.[xiii] Iran’s morality police operated—and may still operate—under the Law Enforcement Command (LEC) and Interior Ministry, further suggesting that the Interior Ministry’s statement may be an indication that the regime has decided that it might adopt a confrontational approach to enforcing the hijab law. Social media users have circulated a greater number of videos showing individuals who appear to be shop owners and local officials confronting unveiled women in recent days.[xiv] It is unclear whether this uptick in social media reports is due to regime officials cracking down on unveiled Nowrouz travelers or whether these reports are indicative of a broader regime campaign to enforce mandatory veiling through confrontation.

The regime likely considers coopting pro-regime loyalists to enforce the hijab law as a safer approach to confrontation because it places blame for hijab enforcement on pro-regime citizens as opposed to the regime itself. Several Friday prayer leaders seemingly referenced this strategy in their Friday sermons on March 31. Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda called on the LEC and "airport and terminal officials” to issue warnings to unveiled women.[xv] Karaj Friday Prayer Leader Mohammad Mehdi Hosseini Hamedani separately called on “pious and veiled women” to attend Karaj’s tulip festival and help officials enforce mandatory veiling.[xvi] This strategy may have long-term negative impacts on Iranian society, however. Placing responsibility for hijab enforcement on pious citizens may exacerbate the schism between regime supporters and dissidents. Iranian authorities arrested several “improperly dressed” girls who insulted and beat a veiled woman in Qom on March 27, for example.[xvii] This incident highlights that regime dissidents may increasingly equate pious citizens with the regime itself if the regime continues to call on these citizens to enforce mandatory veiling. The individuals who embrace the regime’s call to enforce veiling may additionally disregard regime officials’ warnings to avoid physical and violent confrontation with unveiled women. Iranian social media users widely circulated a video on March 31 of a man pouring yoghurt on two unveiled women in a grocery store in Khorasan Razavi Province.[xviii] Such incidents place the regime in a bind. It must either ignore acts of violence and assault against unveiled women and risk fueling greater public anger toward the regime or condemn such incidents and alienate the individuals whom it is attempting to coopt to enforce the hijab law.

Continued conversations on mandatory veiling are particularly noteworthy amidst the regime's relative silence on how to address Iran's deteriorating economic conditions. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei implied that the primary topic of intra-regime debate should be the economy during his Nowrouz address on March 21, as CTP previously reported.[xix] The majority of Friday prayer leaders discussed veiling more passionately and comprehensively than the economy in their sermons on March 31, however. Their focus on mandatory veiling--as opposed to the economy—highlights that the regime likely believes it can confront hijab violations more easily than it can Iran’s economic challenges. The regime is additionally unwilling to implement fundamental reforms that would cause short-term economic disruptions but ultimately improve Iran’s economic health, as CTP previously reported.[xx]

The Iranian regime’s threats to securitize Zahedan have been ineffectual in deterring prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid from criticizing the regime in his weekly sermons.[xxi] Abdol Hamid indirectly endorsed a referendum against the regime, echoing his call for foundational change on February 17, as CTP previously reported.[xxii] He commented that when a political system falls apart, a referendum is “a great thing,” and attributed the regime’s crisis of legitimacy to its narrow-minded and sectarian worldview. Abdol Hamid noted that post-revolutionary Iran was not inclusive of different ethnicities, religious sects, genders, and diverse belief systems, and stated that the Islamic Republic does not represent the people and is neither “Islamic” nor a “Republic.” Abdol Hamid’s comments specifically referenced Islamic Republic Day, a public holiday in Iran celebrating the March 1979 referendum that established the regime.

Abdol Hamid continued to sustain his highly critical rhetoric despite the regime’s threats to securitize his hometown of Zahedan. IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Pakpour set the rhetorical conditions on March 28 to degrade Abdol Hamid’s anti-regime following in Zahedan, as CTP previously assessed.[xxiii] The regime has thus far allowed Abdol Hamid to occupy a permanent political space, making it increasingly difficult for the regime to suppress him and his movement as time goes on. Abdol Hamid will likely maintain his anti-regime posture without escalating to an overtly revolutionary position. The latter would likely instigate a violent regime crackdown in response, jeopardizing Abdol Hamid’s ability to sustain his criticism of the regime without posing any danger to himself or his following.

Key Takeaways

• Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes in Damascus, Syria on March 30 that resulted in the death of senior IRGC official Milad Heydari, which likely will prompt Iranian-backed militants to attack US forces stationed in eastern Syria in the coming days.
• Recent Iranian attacks on US forces in response to IDF airstrikes suggests a pattern in which Iran retaliates for instances in which IRGC personnel are killed.
• The Iranian regime signaled its agreement to uncompromisingly enforce the mandatory hijab law on March 30.
• The Iranian regime’s threats to securitize Zahedan have been ineffectual in deterring prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid from criticizing the regime in his weekly sermons.
• At least three protests occurred in three cities across three provinces.
• The Iranian rial slightly depreciated from 549,000 rials to one US dollar on March 30 to 549,500 rials to one US dollar on March 30.
• Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani strongly condemned Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Eli Cohen’s March 29 discussion on Iran with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov.
• An unidentified Iraqi political source claimed that IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani discussed the recent escalation in Syria with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) leadership in Baghdad.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least three protests occurred in three cities across three provinces on March 31. CTP assesses with high confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[xxiv]

• Size: Small to medium
• Demographic: Zahedan residents protesting after prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon
• Notes: Protesters held a silent demonstration this week, reportedly because of Ramadan

CTP assesses with low confidence that protests occurred in the following locations:

Galikash, Golestan Province[xxv]

• Size: Small

Boukan, West Azerbaijan Province[xxvi]

• Size: Small
• Demographic: Taxi drivers on strike

Economic Affairs

The Iranian rial slightly depreciated from 549,000 rials to one US dollar on March 30 to 549,500 rials to one US dollar on March 30.[xxvii] The rial’s continued depreciation marks an 18.5 percent decrease in value on March 31 compared to March 16, when it valued at 463,500 rials to one US dollar.[xxviii]

Foreign Policy and Diplomacy

Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani strongly condemned Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Eli Cohen’s March 29 discussion on Iran with his Azerbaijani counterpart Jeyhun Bayramov. Cohen reportedly stressed that Israel and Azerbaijan “share the same perception of the Iranian threats” in his discussion.[xxix] Kanani warned that Azerbaijan was “expected to avoid the trap of enemy relations” and added that Iran would be unable to remain indifferent to improved Israeli-Azerbaijani ties.[xxx]

Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed strengthening Iranian-Omani bilateral relations in a phone call with his Omani counterpart Badr Al-Busaidi on March 31. Abdollahin described Iran as a “neighbor and reliable friend for Iran.”[xxxi]

External Security and Military Affairs

An unidentified Iraqi political source claimed that IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani discussed the recent escalation in Syria with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) leadership in Baghdad.[xxxii] The PMF is an umbrella organization of Iranian-backed militias. Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on March 30 following the March 29 IDF airstrike targeting a ”pro-Iranian” foreigner in Syria.[xxxiii] The IDF conducted a second airstrike on the outskirts of Damascus on March 30 shortly after Ghaani arrived in Baghdad. The timing of Ghaani’s arrival suggests he and PMF leadership discussed means of retaliating against US forces in Syria for Israeli airstrikes on March 29 and 30, one of which killed a senior IRGC official.

[i] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/03/31/8108

[ii] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85070468/%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF; www.irna dot ir/news/85070628

[iii] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85070468/%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF

[iv] https://twitter.com/NagiNajjar/status/1641823442759737347; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/01/11/2873755/شهادت-یکی-از-مستشاران-نظامی-سپاه-در-حمله-رژیم-صهیونیستی-به-سوریه

[v] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/iran-says-revolutionary-guards-officer-killed-in-alleged-israeli-strike-on-damascus/

[vi] https://deirezzor24 dot net/en/an-iranian-delegation-arrives-in-deir-ezzor-from-tehran/

[vii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-29-2023

[viii] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20211026-syria-iran-behind-the-attack-on-al-tanf-base-says-us/; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/15/syria-tanf-drone-strike-us-base/

[ix] https://www.syriahr dot com/en/294051/

[x] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-30-2023; https://www.alalam dot ir/news/6575788; https://www.alahednews dot com.lb/article.php?id=52286&cid=113; https://moqawama dot org/essaydetails.php?eid=36515&cid=330

[xi] https://www dot farsnews dot ir/news/14020110000602/%D8%A8%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AA-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%B9%D9%82%D8%A8%E2%80%8C%D9%86%D8%B4%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%B4%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AA-%D9%86%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF

[xii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-crisis-update-january-8-2023

[xiii] http://entekhab dot ir/002ygl

[xiv] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641759431204503556?cxt=HHwWiIC8-aLg2cgtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1641815880014221314?cxt=HHwWhMC-rYO288gtAAAA

[xv] https://t dot co/TZhtGkc7tv

[xvi] https://www dot irna dot ir/news/85070491/%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%87-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%AC%D8%B1%DA%AF%D9%87-%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%87

[xvii] https://www dot entekhab dot ir/fa/news/720341/%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DB%8C%DA%A9%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86%E2%80%8C%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%82%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF

[xviii] https://twitter.com/IranIntl_En/status/1641805731832778752?s=20

[xix] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-21-2023

[xx] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-23-2023

[xxi] https://youtu.be/eptHuPErwU8 ; https://abdolhamid.net/persian/2023/04/01/13604/

[xxii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-17-2023

[xxiii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-28-2023

[xxiv] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641774547937513472?cxt=HHwWgMC-sZfQ4MgtAAAA ;

https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641774149503680512?cxt=HHwWgICw6f644MgtAAAA

[xxv] https://twitter.com/hra_news/status/1641811391936856066?cxt=HHwWhICwyeSw8cgtAAAA

[xxvi] https://twitter.com/iranworkers/status/1641726905484181505?cxt=HHwWgoCwuYP7ysgtAAAA

[xxvii] Bonbast dot com

[xxviii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-16-2023

[xxix] https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-735852

[xxx] https://mfa dot ir/portal/NewsView/715811

[xxxi] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85070134/%D9%88%D8%B2%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AC%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%87-%D9%88-%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[xxxii] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A2%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B5%D9%84-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9

[xxxiii] https://t.me/sabreenS1/72894; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-30-2023