Iran Update, May 15, 2023

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here. 

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian leaders are stoking conflict between Israel and Palestinian militias, likely to enable the IRGC to transfer military equipment into Syria with a lower risk of Israeli interdiction. Iranian weapon shipments into Syria could trigger a new escalation cycle with Israel that risks entangling US and Coalition forces.
2. Ultra-hardline political factions are mounting a political campaign against pragmatic hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, likely to restrain him from pursuing major political reforms. Ghalibaf has been calling for major political and economic reforms for several months.
3. The Iranian regime is portraying clerics as allies of the Iranian people likely to prevent further acts of violence against them. Unspecified individuals attacked clerics on five separate occasions in April and May 2023, marking a five-fold increase in attacks against religious figures compared to the first three months of 2023.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant and especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iranian leaders are stoking conflict between Israel and Palestinian militias, likely to enable the IRGC to transfer military equipment into Syria with a lower risk of Israeli interdiction. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) coordinated to fire over 600 rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip on May 11 in retaliation for an Israeli airstrike on senior PIJ leadership.[i] Iranian leaders have encouraged this conflict since then. IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani released a statement on May 14 pledging Iranian support for the Palestinian militias fighting Israel.[ii] Israeli media additionally reported that Iranian officials agreed to pay PIJ $5 million for each day that they continue to attack Israel.[iii] These actions in combination indicate a coordinated Iranian effort to stoke fighting and message to Israel that Iran is coordinating with the Palestinian militias. Iran is continuing to transfer military weapons into Syria while Israel is focused on the Palestinian militias. Two Iranian-backed militia convoys arrived in Deir ez Zor City on May 14, carrying artillery, rockets, and military advisers and fighters.[iv] Israel has long sought to prevent the Iranian transfer of personnel and weapons into Syria. Israel Defense Forces temporarily paused airstrikes targeting Iranian-backed militia convoys traveling into eastern Syrian from Iraq after tensions rose between Israel and Palestinian militias in early April 2023.[v] CTP previously assessed that Iran may use such operational pauses to increase weapons convoys into Syria.[vi]

Iranian weapon shipments into Syria could trigger a new escalation cycle with Israel that risks entangling US and Coalition forces. Iran previously sought to consolidate its military position in Syria in February and March 2023, using aid sent after the February 6 earthquake as cover, as CTP previously reported.[vii] Israel responded with an airstrike campaign to disrupt Iranian arms transfers into Syria.[viii] Iranian-backed militants conducted a kamikaze drone attack on US forces in northeast Syria, killing one American, following an Israeli airstrike targeting an Iranian or proxy officer on March 30.[ix]  

Iranian Domestic Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Regime Dynamics

Ultra-hardline political factions are mounting a political campaign against pragmatic hardline Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, likely to restrain him from pursuing major political and economic reforms. Iranian media reported that Ghalibaf will run unopposed in the May 23 speaker election. Islamic Revolution Stability Front parliamentarians are now considering nominating their party Secretary General, Morteza Agha Tehrani, to run against Ghalibaf in the upcoming parliament speaker election on May 23.[x] Iranian media reported that Tehrani does not seek to win but only to damage Ghalibaf’s political support within Parliament, citing the Stability Front’s concern over Ghalibaf’s April 18 meeting with moderate regime powerbrokers.[xi] CTP previously assessed that Ghalibaf may seek to form a political coalition with these moderate figures to advance his pragmatic hardliner agenda.[xii] Ghalibaf has been calling for major political and economic reforms for several months.[xiii]

Tehrani is a cleric with longstanding ties to the extreme hardline political and clerical establishment. Tehrani and the Stability Front are ardent supporters of former Supreme National Security Council secretary and former presidential candidate Saeed Jalili. Ghalibaf clashed with Jalili and Stability Front parliamentarians over the regime’s response to the recent Mahsa Amini protests, as CTP previously reported.[xiv] Tehrani challenged Ghalibaf for the speakership in 2020 and 2022 and lost on both occasions.[xv]

Regime Stability

The Iranian regime is portraying clerics as allies of the Iranian people likely to prevent further acts of violence against them. Unspecified individuals attacked clerics on five separate occasions in April and May 2023, marking a five-fold increase in attacks against religious figures compared to the first three months of 2023.[xvi] Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Hajj Ali Akbari called on Friday prayer leaders and government officials to avoid “marginalizing” unspecified segments of society in his Friday sermon on May 12.[xvii] This suggests Akbari was calling on regime officials to engage with disaffected citizens rather than isolate them. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency subsequently published a video on May 15 depicting Hashtgerd, Alborz Province Friday Prayer Leader Ruhollah Mokhtari as a likable and relatable figure who plays soccer and enjoys comedy shows.[xviii]

These measures follow statements from regime officials that have stressed the need to protect clerics since the assassination of Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Abbas Ali Soleimani in Babolsar, Mazandaran Province on April 26. Former Intelligence and Security Minister and Shia cleric Ali Fallahian called on Friday prayer leaders to learn self-defense during an interview with reformist news outlet Entekhab on May 2.[xix] The Islamic Propaganda Coordination Council separately called on law enforcement and security services to confront “thugs” on May 2 in response to Soleimani’s assassination, as CTP previously reported.[xx][xxi]