Iran Update, May 5, 2023

May 5, 2023, 4:00 pm ET

The Iran Updates are produced by the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.  

Contributors: Anya Caraiani

Attacks on Iranian clerics increased during the past month, which may reflect broader public antipathy to the regime's sociocultural and economic policies. Unidentified individuals have attacked clerics in four separate incidents in April, marking a four-fold increase in violence against religious figures compared to January, February, and March 2023. The recent attacks coincide with the implementation of a new veiling enforcement plan on April 15, which uses advanced surveillance technology to identify unveiled women and punishes the owners of public spaces who fail to enforce veiling.[i] Some Iranian social media users have framed the plan as a symbol of regime oppression, which signals public frustration with repressive sociopolitical policies. An individual who seemingly attempted to run over a cleric in Tehran City, Tehran Province on April 27 expressed frustration with being unable to find work, which indicates the economic problems the regime has failed to fix are motivating violence.[ii]  

These attacks could create fissures between the clerical establishment and the regime. Some clerics--such as Ayatollah Mustafa Mohaghegh Damad and Ayatollah Asadollah Bayat Zanjani--have previously criticized the regime’s violence against citizens.[iii]

Key Takeaways

• Attacks on Iranian clerics increased during the past month, which may reflect broader public antipathy to the regime's sociocultural and economic policies.
• At least one protest occurred on May 5.
• The Iranian regime has increased the pace of state executions, which could reinvigorate anti-regime sentiments in Sistan and Baluchistan Province
• Iranian leadership is signaling greater cohesion among Palestinian resistance factions, likely to support their integration into the Axis of Resistance.
• Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani may replace Popular Mobilization Authority Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh according to Iranian-backed Telegram channel
• IRGC Quds Force Commander of Eastern Syria Hajj Mahdi and IRGC Quds Force Commander of the Albu Kamal rail crossing Hajj Hussein met with a Russian delegation in Albu Kamal City on May 3.

Internal Security and Protest Activity

At least one protest occurred on May 5. CTP assesses with high confidence that one protest occurred in the following location:

Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province[iv]

• Size: Medium
• Demographic: Zahedan residents protesting after prominent Sunni cleric Moulana Abdol Hamid’s Friday sermon

CTP did not record any student poisoning incidents on May 5.

The Iranian regime has increased the pace of state executions, which could reinvigorate anti-regime sentiments in Sistan and Baluchistan Province.[v] Iranian authorities executed at least 42 citizens within the past week including 19 Iranian-Balochs, an ethnic group that predominantly lives in Sistan and Baluchistan Province. The regime's discrimination of Iranian-Balochs has historically sparked anti-regime sentiments and activity within the province.

External Security and Military Affairs

Cohesion between Palestinian resistance factions could enable Iran to share resources and capabilities from the Axis of Resistance with the factions more easily. Hamas-affiliated newspaper Felesteen boasted about cooperation between Palestinian resistance factions following a rocket attack into Israel on May 2.[vi] Felesteen claimed ”all the Palestinian military factions” coordinated in a Gaza-based joint operations room for the attack.[vii] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi stressed the need for unity and cohesion of resistance forces during a meeting with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah, Hamas political bureau member Khalil al Hayya, and other senior Palestinian officials during his state visit to Damascus on May 4. The meeting likely signaled the integration of Palestinian resistance factions into the Axis of Resistance, as CTP previously assessed.[viii] Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani referenced orders from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2014 that directed the IRGC Quds Force to arm militias in the West Bank during a meeting with Ayatollah Mohammed Saeedi on May 4.[ix]

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani may replace Popular Mobilization Authority Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh according to Iranian-backed Telegram channel Sabreen.[x] An anti-Shia Coordination Framework Telegram account claimed that Sudani plans to appoint Commander of Iraqi Joint Operations Command Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah as the new Popular Mobilization Authority Chairman after Yarallah.[xi] An unidentified source cited by Iraqi news agency Al Rabiaa denied reports that Yarallah will be appointed.[xii] CTP cannot independently verify these claims.

IRGC Quds Force Commander of Eastern Syria Hajj Mahdi and IRGC Quds Force Commander of the Albu Kamal rail crossing Hajj Hussein met with a Russian delegation in Albu Kamal City on May 3.[xiii] The Russian delegation demanded Iranian-backed militias allow Russian forces to establish headquarters in Al Baghouz, situated on the Iran-Iraq border, and in Albu Kamal City. The delegation also demanded that Russian forces repair the Albu Kamal bridge crossing the river into Syrian Democratic Forces territory. Mahdi and Hussein rejected the Russian demands.