Iran Update, November 14, 2023

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Hamas is conducting a delaying operation against the advancing Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip to achieve strategic and operational effects. Hamas’ delay mission generates strategic effects by helping it rally support for Hamas among its partners, within the region, and internationally. Hamas’ delay effort also supports Hamas’ operational objectives within the Gaza Strip, which include preserving essential capabilities and key leaders and setting conditions to conduct an insurgency against Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip if necessary.
2. Israeli forces continued their advance toward al Shifa Hospital from the north and south. Israeli forces continued clearing operations north of Gaza City. Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks on Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip. The IDF opened two humanitarian corridors leading to Salah al Din Street for civilians to evacuate the northern Gaza Strip.
3. Palestinian militias continued their usual rate of indirect fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel.
4. Palestinian fighters clashed with and conducted IED attacks against Israeli forces in Tulkarm. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine called for Palestinians to attack Israeli soldiers and civilians in the West Bank.
5. Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted 18 cross-border attacks into northern Israel.
6. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi proxies—claimed three attacks on US bases in Syria. The al Dhaferin Group of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq threatened to escalate attacks against the United States in the region.
7. The Houthi movement Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi threatened to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea, specifically around the Bab al Mandeb, echoing a long-repeated threat. Israel intercepted a missile over the Red Sea targeting Eilat in southern Israel.
8. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian held a telephone call with his Qatari counterpart Mohammad bin Abdolrahman al Thani.

Hamas is conducting a delaying operation against the advancing Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip to achieve strategic and operational effects. This assessment is a change to CTP-ISW's previous assessment that Hamas fighters in the northern Gaza Strip were screening a main defensive effort in Gaza City.[i] According to US military doctrine, a delay mission is when a force “trades space for time by slowing” an enemy and “inflicting maximum damage. . . without. . . becoming decisively engaged.”[ii] A delay mission also seeks to “wear down the enemy so that friendly forces can regain the initiative through offensive action [or] establish an effective defense.”[iii] The IDF captured a Hamas battle plan on November 4 that suggested that Hamas had not heavily committed its forces to the defense of the northern Gaza Strip, which is consistent with a delay mission.[iv] A Gaza Strip-focused X (Twitter) account reported on November 10 that senior Hamas fighters fled al Shifa Hospital, where Hamas maintains key military and tunnel infrastructure.[v] The delaying operation would have enabled these fighters to escape, and their escape lets Hamas preserve some of its core leadership. Reuters reported on November 3 that Hamas believes it can “frustrate” Israeli forces through “urban guerrilla tactics.”[vi]

Hamas’ delay mission generates strategic effects by helping it rally support for Hamas among its partners, within the region, and internationally. Hamas officials have repeatedly outlined their strategic objectives in the war against Israel since October 7. These objectives include generating renewed support for the Palestinian cause internationally and regionally.[vii] A delay mission supports Hamas’ strategic objectives by protracting the fighting and avoiding a decisive Hamas defeat. Reuters reported on November 3 that Hamas is prepared for a long war that it hopes will force Israel to agree to a ceasefire.[viii] Top Hamas official Khalid al Hayya said on November 8 that the October 7 attack and the war “succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back on the table” and that Hamas knew the October 7 attack would spur a “big reaction.”[ix] Hayya added that Hamas sought to “change the entire equation,” a reference to the ongoing normalization negotiations and agreements between Israel and major Arab states.[x] This statement of objectives is consistent with Hamas’ 1988 charter, which called for generating support from ”the Palestinian circle, the Arab circle, and the Islamic circle.”[xi] Hamas officials have called consistently for greater support from Arab states against Israel since the beginning of the war.[xii]

Hamas’ delay effort also supports Hamas’ operational objectives within the Gaza Strip, which include preserving essential capabilities and key leaders and setting conditions to conduct an insurgency against Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip if necessary. Israeli reports suggesting that Hamas fighters have fled south along with the fact that Hamas has not reportedly used some of the higher-end capabilities it is assessed to have suggest that its leaders seek to preserve combat power rather than become decisively engaged.[xiii] An insurgency and prolonged conflict in the Gaza Strip could also reinforce Hamas’ strategic objectives. Hamas leaders could find a prolonged war desirable because they believe that it would degrade international and regional support for Israel. Hamas’ ability to retain more advanced capabilities and senior leaders by delaying Israeli forces will allow it to coordinate and execute an insurgency or to rapidly reconstitute its military capabilities after a ceasefire.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces continued their advance toward al Shifa Hospital from the north and south on November 14. The IDF reported on November 14 that it expects two of its divisions to link up at al Shifa Hospital “soon,” adding that one of the divisions was 300 meters from the hospital.[xiv] The Hamas-controlled Gazan Health Ministry also reported that IDF vehicles had reached the southeastern gate of the hospital on the evening of November 13.[xv] A surgeon at the hospital told the Wall Street Journal that unspecified forces fired on civilians attempting to leave the hospital on November 13.[xvi] Israeli officers said that their forces had informed hospital staff of ”safe corridors” for civilians to evacuate the hospital and that Hamas was therefore firing on civilians along those corridors.[xvii]

Israeli forces also continued operations in al Shati refugee camp on November 13. Geolocated footage showed Israeli forces using a large-caliber weapon to target a building along the Gaza City coast in al Shati camp on November 13.[xviii] The IDF spokesperson reported that IDF infantry and armor continued operations in al Shati camp.[xix]

Israeli forces continued their eastward advance from the Square of the Unknown Soldiers on November 14, operating in the vicinity of Isra Towers and Sayyara Square.[xx]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations north of Gaza City on November 14. The al Quds Brigades mortared IDF positions in al Nasser neighborhood, northern Gaza City, on November 13.[xxi] Other al Quds Brigades fighters engaged IDF forces in small arms clashes near Sulatayn road, west of Beit Lahia.[xxii] The al Qassem Brigades also mortared and clashed with IDF forces in two separate engagements in Beit Hanoun, northeastern Gaza Strip, on November 14.[xxiii]

Palestinian militias conducted two indirect fire attacks on Israeli forces in the central Gaza Strip on November 14.[xxiv] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed a mortar attack on a concentration of Israeli forces located in Juhor ad Dik.[xxv] The al Quds Brigades claimed that it successfully destroyed Israeli forces in the attack.[xxvi] CTP-ISW has not observed any confirmation of this claim. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed that it conducted an attack on Israeli forces east of Juhor ad Dik with the 144mm Rajum rocket system.[xxvii] The al Qassem Brigades did not report any damage to Israeli forces from the attack.

The IDF opened two humanitarian corridors leading to Salah al Din Street for civilians to evacuate the northern Gaza Strip on November 14.[xxviii] IDF spokesperson Avichay Adraee released an official statement announcing open evacuation corridors from the Gaza Strip coast and from the al Daraj and al Tuffah neighborhoods.[xxix] The statement also provided two different resources for civilians to report any Hamas attempts to block civilians from evacuating.[xxx]

• The IDF opened a humanitarian evacuation corridor leading away from the Gaza Strip coast to move civilians away from active fighting areas.[xxxi] Civilians were instructed to evacuate via Youssef al Azma Street to Salah al Din Street between 1000 to 1600 local time on November 14.[xxxii]
• The IDF announced that it suspended military operations in al Daraj and al Tuffah neighborhoods between 1300 and 1400 local time for civilians to evacuate.[xxxiii] Civilians were encouraged to leave the area and evacuate south via Salah al Din Street.[xxxiv]

Palestinian militias continued their usual rate of indirect fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel. CTP-ISW recorded ten indirect fire attacks on November 14.[xxxv] The al Quds Brigades claimed eight indirect fire attacks, five of which targeted Israeli military facilities surrounding the Gaza Strip.[xxxvi] The al Qassem Brigades claimed two indirect fire attacks into Israel, targeting Tel Aviv and Israeli military forces stationed in southern Israel.[xxxvii]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with and conducted IED attacks against Israeli forces in Tulkarm on November 14. The IDF said that Israeli forces captured dozens of IEDs and raided a workshop that produced them.[xxxviii] The IDF stated that Shin Bet arrested an unspecified senior Palestinian militia commander who tried to escape the city in an ambulance.[xxxix] Several Palestinian militias operate in Tulkarm through affiliated battalions, including the al Quds Brigades and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.[xl] The al Qassem Brigades and the Tulkarm Rapid Response Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade each claimed at least one IED attack while fighting Israeli forces in Tulkarm. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade Tulkarm Battalion acknowledged seven of its fighters died on November 14.[xli]  

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) called for Palestinians to attack Israeli soldiers and civilians in the West Bank on November 14.[xlii] The PFLP explicitly framed this violence as meant to reduce Israeli military pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip by exhausting Israeli forces in the West Bank. The PFLP previously praised shooting attacks on Israeli settlements in the West Bank and called for additional attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians on November 9.[xliii] These statements indicate that the PFLP seeks to support Hamas’ efforts to draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there.

 This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 18 cross-border attacks into northern Israel on November 14.[xliv] The IDF said that unspecified fighters fired mortars and anti-tank guided missiles targeting IDF positions in five locations.[xlv] LH claimed to target three IDF military sites.[xlvi] LH specified that it conducted a rocket attack and used other unspecified means to conduct the attacks without providing further details.[xlvii] LH also claimed that it fired rockets targeting an “Israeli logistical force” in Har Dov in northern Israel.[xlviii] IDF air defenses separately intercepted a “suspicious target” near the coast of Acre but did not provide details on the origin or nature of the threat.[xlix] The al Qassem Brigades previously claimed to have fired rockets targeting an area near Acre on November 6.[l]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi proxies—claimed three attacks on US bases in Syria. The coalition targeted US forces along the Euphrates River in Deir ez Zor Province, where US forces operate under Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR). US forces are deployed with CJTF-OIR to fight ISIS.[li] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and its affiliated groups have claimed 77 attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East since the Israel-Hamas war began.

• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two separate one-way drone attacks targeting US forces at Green Village and the nearby al Omar oil field in northeastern Syria on November 13.[lii]
• The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed to launch a rocket salvo at the US base Conoco Mission Support Site in northeastern Syria on November 14.[liii]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq unveiled a surface-to-surface missile on November 14, which bares visual similarities to the Iranian-made Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile.[liv] The Fateh-110 is a ”short-range, road-mobile, solid-propellant ballistic missile” with a range of 200-300 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms.[lv] Iran has used the Fateh-110 missile on several occasions to attack US and Iraqi Kurdish militant positions in Iraq in recent years.[lvi] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claims to currently use the al Aqsa-1 missile, which bears visual similarities to the Iranian-made Fateh-313 which the Iranians used  to target US positions in Iraq in January 2020.[lvii]

The al Dhaferin Group of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq threatened on November 14 to escalate attacks against the United States in the region. The group promised in a message posted to its Telegram that the coming weeks “will be hotter.”[lviii] The group has claimed two attacks on US bases in Iraq since the Israel-Hamas war began. The group claimed mortar attacks targeting US forces at the Ain Asad Airbase in Anbar, Iraq, on November 6 and the al Harir Air Base in Erbil, Iraq, on November 8.[lix] Mortars have significantly shorter ranges than most other munitions that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq uses, suggesting that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq cell that conducted the attack was operating in the general vicinity of al Harir airbase.

Israel intercepted a missile over the Red Sea targeting Eilat in southern Israel on November 14.[lx] The IDF confirmed that its Arrow long-range air defense system intercepted the missile before it entered Israeli airspace.[lxi] The Houthi movement has launched missiles and drones over the Red Sea targeting Israel several times during the Israel-Hamas war. The Houthi movement leader said on November 14 that the Houthis will continue attacks on Israel and in the region.[lxii]

The Houthi movement Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi threatened to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea, specifically around the Bab al Mandeb, echoing a long-repeated threat.[lxiii] The Houthis have repeatedly threatened maritime traffic around the Red Sea in recent years but do not always act on these threats. The Houthis do have the capability to conduct such attacks, however, as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force has provided the means to do so.[lxiv] The Houthis have conducted several attacks on commercial ships in the Red Sea with waterborne IEDs and have deployed naval mines off Yemen’s Red Sea coast.[lxv]

Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian held a telephone call with his Qatari counterpart Mohammad bin Abdolrahman al Thani on November 14.[lxvi] Iranian state media reported that the two discussed efforts to halt Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and the provision of humanitarian aid. The two officials could have also discussed a range of other topics, including Iranian access to its frozen financial assets inside Qatari banks.

Iranian state media recirculated Western reports on November 14 that the Joe Biden administration could approve a sanctions waiver that would enable Iran to access $10 billion worth of frozen Iranian financial assets in Iraq.[lxvii] The Washington Free Beacon speculated on November 13 that the Biden administration could do so, noting that the sanctions waiver would be an extension of the 120-day waiver US Secretary of State Antony Blinken signed in July 2023 to allow Iraq to pay Iran for electricity via non-Iraqi banks.[lxviii] Ebrahim Raisi administration-affiliated outlet IRNA and Iranian Supreme National Security Council-affiliated outlet Nour News Agency recirculated the claim. These outlets additionally argued that the Biden administration should not prevent Iran from accessing its frozen assets in Iraq since Iran played no role in Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel.