Iran Update, November 20, 2024

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem announced in a November 20 speech that Hezbollah would require a permanent ceasefire and the preservation of Lebanese sovereignty in any agreement with Israel.[i] Qassem clarified that maintaining Lebanese sovereignty requires preventing Israel from operating in Lebanon “whenever [Israel] wants” and refuted that Israel could “impose its conditions” on Hezbollah.[ii] Qassem is referring to the current US-proposed ceasefire agreement that would allow Israel to continue to attack Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) fail to enforce the ceasefire.[iii] The draft agreement includes a clause that states that Israel retains its right to self-defense, and the United States sent to Israel a side letter that stipulates US support for the Israeli right to respond with force to Hezbollah threats.[iv] Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar and Defense Minister Israel Katz reiterated on November 20 that Israel requires that it retain its ability to “act and defend Israeli citizens from Hezbollah” in any agreement.[v]

Removing these clauses from the ceasefire agreement would likely enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench itself in southern Lebanon. The current ceasefire agreement provides no other sufficient mechanisms to ensure that Hezbollah remains disarmed in southern Lebanon.[vi] UNIFIL and the LAF would be the only other parties responsible for observing and enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon. CTP-ISW continues to assess that it is extremely unlikely that UNIFIL or the LAF would be willing or able to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament given their previous failures to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006. The LAF, which would be responsible for dismantling Hezbollah infrastructure and enforcing disarmament, is particularly unlikely to directly confront Hezbollah.[vii]

US special envoy Amos Hochstein met with Lebanese Parliament speaker Nabih Berri for a second day in Beirut to discuss the Hezbollah response to the US-proposed agreement.[viii] Hochstein returned to Israel and will meet with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for further consultations on November 21.[ix]

Qassem, in his speech, continued trying to project Hezbollah strength and resilience against Israeli operations in Lebanon.[x] Qassem promised to attack “the center of Tel Aviv” in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes in northern and central Beirut.[xi] Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah is not a regular standing army and that the group will rapidly attack and ambush Israeli forces as they enter Lebanon.[xii] Qassem also continued to grossly exaggerate the success of Hezbollah operations in Israel and the number of IDF casualties and material damage.[xiii] Qassem asserted that Hezbollah would survive politically after the war and work with the LAF and people to rebuild Lebanon.[xiv]

Iranian officials are continuing to broadcast their enduring support for Hezbollah. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a message of support to the Lebanese people on November 19.[xv] Separately, Khamenei’s senior security adviser, Ali Larijani during his trip to Beirut on November 15 reportedly promised continued Iranian support and a commitment to help the Hezbollah rebuild its forces as they recover from the war.[xvi]

Documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hezbollah and Hamas. An Israeli think tank close to the Israeli defense establishment released a report on November 18 detailing the Iranian role in establishing the "Palestinian project" in Lebanon, citing documents that the IDF seized from the Gaza Strip.[xvii]  Senior Hamas official Khaled Meshaal met with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force officer responsible for Palestine in May 2022, during which they agreed to begin working to establish a Hamas presence in Lebanon. Two thousand Hamas fighters, according to the plan, would have integrated into Hamas special operations forces (SOF) units that would have participated in any Hezbollah ground assault into Israel. The IRGC and Hamas ultimately sought to expand the number to ten thousand Hamas fighters integrated into Hezbollah SOF. Hamas would be tasked with recruiting fighters from the Sunni population in Lebanon, according to the documents.[xviii] Iran would be primarily responsible for funding Hamas activities in Lebanon, including armament and training.[xix] CTP-ISW cannot confirm whether the 2,000 Hamas fighters ever deployed to Lebanon, but Hamas does have a limited presence in southern Lebanon. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—has claimed at least 20 attacks into Israel from Lebanon since October 2023.[xx]

Hamas still retains small forces outside the Gaza Strip that its external leaders can use as a cadre to rebuild Hamas militarily. Hamas' severely degraded position in the Gaza Strip and the failure of its war against Israel suggest that both Iran and Hamas may recognize that accomplishing their objective of destroying Israel is not feasible from the Gaza Strip.[xxi] Hamas will want to rebuild after the October 7 war, and it has several potential avenues for doing so. The Iran-Hamas project outlined in the letter indicates that both parties could view Lebanon as a viable option for Hamas’ reconstitution.[xxii] Iran’s financial support for Hamas in Lebanon and its strong ties with Hezbollah would give Iran significant influence over Hamas’ military wing there. Promoting cohesion between Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon are part of broader Iranian efforts to increase interoperability across the Axis of Resistance.

The United States and E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on November 19 in response to Iran not fully cooperating with the IAEA.[xxiii] The IAEA Board of Governors is expected to vote on the resolution on November 21.[xxiv] The proposed censure resolution comes after the IAEA issued a report on November 19 showing that Iran has increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium since August 2024.[xxv] The IAEA reported that Iran possessed 182.3 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent as of late October 2024.[xxvi] This amount marks a 17.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent since August 2024.[xxvii] The IAEA added that Iran possessed a total of 6,604.4 kilograms of enriched uranium, which marks an 852.6 kilogram increase in the Iranian total enriched uranium stockpile since August 2024.[xxviii] A US weapons expert reported on November 19 that Iran’s breakout timelines have thus reduced significantly since August 2024.[xxix] The expert stated that Iran can make enough weapons grade uranium, which is uranium that is enriched to 90-percent purity, to produce almost 10 nuclear weapons in a month, 13 in two months, 14 in three months, 15 in four months, and 16 in five months.[xxx]

Iran is trying to prevent the IAEA Board of Governors from approving the censure resolution by offering to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent and threatening unspecified consequences if the IAEA censures Iran. Iran offered to cap its stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60 percent at 185 kilograms in exchange for the IAEA rejecting the censure resolution.[xxxi] Iran notably did not offer to reduce the amount of 60 percent enriched uranium that it currently possesses but instead only offered to not further increase its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile. 185 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium is enough uranium, if enriched further, to produce four nuclear weapons.[xxxii] Senior Iranian officials, including Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi, have warned that Iran will respond “appropriately and proportionately” if the IAEA censures Iran.[xxxiii] An Iranian outlet claimed on November 19 that Iran could retaliate by activating a “significant number” of advanced centrifuges.[xxxiv] The outlet may have been referring to the IR-6 centrifuges that Iran has installed at Fordow in recent months.[xxxv] The IAEA confirmed in August 2024 that Iran installed eight cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at Fordow but that the centrifuges were not yet operational.[xxxvi] Iran previously installed new centrifuges at its nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow in response to an IAEA censure resolution in June 2024.[xxxvii]

The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent additional Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Israel in order to avoid Israeli strikes on Iraq. Saudi media reported on November 20 that an Israeli attack targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militias is “imminent” unless the Iraqi federal government prevents further militia attacks on Israel, citing unspecified sources.[xxxviii] Saudi media added that the United States informed the Iraqi federal government that it has “exhausted all levers of pressure” to try to prevent Israel from striking Iraq.[xxxix] This report comes after Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Gideon Saar wrote a letter to the president of the UN Security Council on November 18 in which he emphasized the Israeli right to defend itself against Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks.[xl] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani chaired an emergency National Security Ministerial Council meeting on November 19 during which he ordered Iraqi security forces to “prevent and pursue any military activity outside the control of the state.”[xli] Iraqi security forces reportedly secured sites used by Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to launch drones and missiles at Israel following the meeting.[xlii] It is unclear whether the Sudani administration can prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel given that it has thus far failed to reign in these militias. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, increased its rate of attacks by nearly 150 percent between September and October 2024 and has claimed 59 attacks in November 2024 thus far.[xliii]  

Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip in the wake of increased looting of humanitarian aid trucks by armed groups. Axios reported on November 20 that a US-based national security consulting company, Orbis, has proposed a plan to Israel to securely deliver humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[xliv] Orbis outlined a pilot project that includes establishing a humanitarian aid hub in an area cleared of Hamas.[xlv] The aid hub will be established by a private aid organization, according to Orbis. The project would also involve a third-party private contractor securing the aid hub in coordination with the IDF.[xlvi] The proposed p project is likely aimed at establishing the humanitarian aid hub in Jabalia, in the northern Gaza Strip, where the IDF has been conducting clearing operations since October 6.[xlvii] An Israeli Army Radio correspondent reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz reviewed the proposed plan.[xlviii] The establishment of the aid hub will require additional IDF operations in Jabalia that could take three months to fully clear the area of Hamas and secure the area.[xlix] Israel is exploring methods to distribute aid in the northern Gaza Strip following a rise in armed groups looting humanitarian aid trucks in the strip in the recent days.[l] The IDF has taken several steps in the recent days to increase the flow of aid in the Gaza Strip following pressure from the United States, including plans to reopen the Kissufim border crossing to facilitate the transfer of aid trucks into the northern Gaza Strip.[li]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the Netzarim Corridor to conduct a situational assessment on November 20 and announced a reward of five million US dollars and safe passage out the Gaza Strip to any individual who frees an Israeli hostage.[lii] Netanyahu, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, and IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi met with the commanders of the IDF 99th Division IDF Southern Command in the corridor to review IDF operations in the Gaza Strip.[liii]

Key Takeaways:

• Lebanon: Lebanese Hezbollah is trying to remove a clause in a US-proposed ceasefire agreement that allows Israel to strike Hezbollah targets if Hezbollah violates the ceasefire. Removing these clauses would enable Hezbollah to gradually re-arm and re-entrench in southern Lebanon.
• Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
• Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran refusing to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
• Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
• Gaza Strip: Israel is exploring options to improve the distribution of humanitarian aid in the Gaza Strip. These considerations come amid an uptick in armed Palestinian gangs interdicting aid convoys and looting them.

Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division likely conducted clearing operations in Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip on November 20. Palestinian militias claimed two attacks targeting the IDF there.[liv] The IDF reported on November 20 that a soldier from the 900th Infantry Brigade died during clashes with Palestinian militias around Jabalia and another soldier was injured in the northern Gaza Strip.[lv]

Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees mortared the IDF around the Netzarim Corridor on November 20.[lvi]

The Jordanian Air Force delivered seven tons of humanitarian aid into the southern Gaza Strip on November 20.[lvii] Eight Jordanian helicopters delivered the aid packages to al Qarara, which is four kilometers north of Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip. The aid packages will be transferred to the World Food Program for further distribution, according to the Jordanian military.[lviii]

The United States sanctioned on November 19 six senior Hamas officials involved in fundraising and weapons smuggling into Gaza Strip.[lix] The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Hamas leaders abroad, including a senior member of the Hamas military wing, three Turkey-based financiers, and others involved in fundraising and weapons smuggling.[lx] Several of the officials have directly facilitated previous Hamas attacks. This is OFAC’s ninth round of sanctions against Hamas and its supporters since October 2023.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

Israeli forces continued counterterrorism operations in Jenin Governorate in the northern West Bank on November 20.[lxi] Israeli forces killed two Palestinian fighters and seized weapons.[lxii] The IDF also destroyed two improvised explosive device (IED) factories on November 20.[lxiii] Palestinian fighters attacked an IDF Air Force aircraft near Jenin during the Israeli operations.[lxiv] The aircraft returned fire on the fighters.[lxv] Palestinian militias, including Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, have detonated IEDs and fired small arms targeting Israeli forces in at least four locations in Jenin Governorate since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on November 19.[lxvi]

Israeli forces arrested a wanted individual and seized fives lathes for arms production in Urif, Nablus Governorate, on November 20.[lxvii]

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist claimed that the IDF began advancing near Kfar Shebaa, southeast Lebanon on November 19.[lxviii] Local sources reported air and artillery strikes and ground engagements in the general vicinity.[lxix] Hezbollah did claimed no attacks targeting the IDF in this area on November 19 or 20, however. Geolocated footage posted on November 9 showed that the IDF operated southwest of Shebaa.[lxx] The IDF 210th Division has operated in the Golan Heights and Kfar Shebaa area since the IDF began ground operations in Lebanon in early October 2024.[lxxi]

The IDF reportedly advanced further into Khiam on November 20. A Hezbollah-affiliated journalist reported that Israeli armor advanced into Khiam from the northeast and shelled the outskirts of Ebel as Saqi, north of Khiam.[lxxii] Local sources reported Israeli artillery fire targeting Ebel as Saqi as well.[lxxiii] The IDF previously approached Khiam from the south and east during its last advance in late October 2024.[lxxiv] Official Hezbollah attacks are somewhat inconsistent with the Hezbollah-affiliated journalist’s claims about the IDF direction of advance. Hezbollah claimed six rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel south of Khiam.[lxxv] Hezbollah also attacked Israeli forces with one-way attack drones south of Khiam.[lxxvi] The IDF 98th Division is conducting clearing operations in Khiam to degrade the Hezbollah ability to attack northern Israel.[lxxvii] Geolocated footage posted by the IDF on November 19 showed the IDF operating on Khiam’s southern outskirts.[lxxviii]

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi visited the IDF 98th Division around Khiam on November 20.[lxxix] The commanders of the IDF Northern Command and 98th Division participated in the situational assessment. Halevi reiterated that Israeli forces are operating in Lebanon with a “very clear mission to return the residents of the north to their homes safely.” Halevi noted that the Hezbollah presence near Khiam threatens residents in Kiryat Shmona, Metula, Misgav Am, and Kfar Yuval.[lxxx]

Hezbollah claimed anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks targeting three IDF infantry units near Markaba, southeast Lebanon.[lxxxi] Hezbollah claimed that the ATGM attacks killed and wounded Israeli soldiers.[lxxxii] Hezbollah did provided no evidence to substantiate these claims and has repeatedly lied about the success of its forces in recent weeks.

The IDF 36th Division continued clearing operations near Chama, southwest Lebanon, on November 20. Hezbollah claimed to attack the IDF with artillery shells in the southern of outskirts of Chama.[lxxxiii] Hezbollah engaged Israeli infantry with small arms fire and attacked an Israeli tank in Tayr Harfa, south of Chama.[lxxxiv]

Hezbollah fired a rocket barrage toward Israel and hit a UNIFIL site in Chama on November 19.[lxxxv] UNIFIL stated that five rockets caused “heavy damage” but did not injure peacekeepers.[lxxxvi] The IDF stated that Hezbollah fired the rocket from north of Chama. This is the second time that the UNIFIL base in Chama has been struck. An Israeli 155mm artillery shell struck the base on November 15.[lxxxvii]

The IDF has continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure in southern Lebanon since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 19. The IDF has conducted at least 100 airstrikes over the past day across Lebanon.[lxxxviii]

The IDF Air Force struck and killed two Hezbollah officers on November 17.[lxxxix] The strikes targeted an operations commander and the head of the Hezbollah coastal unit anti-tank missile force.[xc] The anti-tank munitions officer targeted Israeli forces and civilians in the Western Galilee.[xci] The IDF Northern Command Commander Major General Ori Gordin reiterated that the IDF has degraded Hezbollah’s indirect fire capabilities.[xcii] The IDF said in late October that it had destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah drones and 80 percent of Hezbollah rockets through its ground and air campaign.[xciii]

The IDF likely conducted several airstrikes on Iranian-backed militia targets in Palmyra, central Syria, on November 20. Local sources reported that Israeli strikes targeted an ammunition depot, a site near the Syrian Military Intelligence Branch, and a position tied to the Iranian-backed Afghan Fatemiyoun Division.[xciv]  The IDF stated in early November that its airstrikes in Syria damage Hezbollah’s weapons transfer networks and particularly Hezbollah Unit 4400, which oversees Iranian support to Hezbollah.[xcv]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 19 to 2:00pm ET on November 20. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least 13 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 19.[xcvi] All 13 reported Hezbollah attacks targeted IDF sites, IDF soldiers, or towns in northern Israel.[xcvii] Hezbollah conducted three attacks targeting an IDF 1st Infantry Brigade administration base north of Acre.[xcviii] Israeli media reported that a Hezbollah rocket impacted a kindergarten in Acre.[xcix] The kindergarten was empty at the time, and there were no casualties.[c] Hezbollah claimed two one-way drone attacks targeting the IDF 146th Division logistical base in Sheikh Danun, northwestern Israel, and the IDF 91st Division headquarters in Ayelet HaShahar, northeastern Israel.[ci] Hezbollah conducted at least six rocket attacks targeting IDF personnel along the Israel-Lebanon border.[cii] A rocket directly impacted a house in Kiryat Shmona.[ciii] Hezbollah fighters also launched rockets targeting Israeli forces in Avivim across the border from where Israeli forces are conducting clearing operations in Maroun al Ras, southwestern Lebanon.[civ] Hezbollah also fired rockets targeting civilians in Safed.[cv]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed a drone attack targeting a “military target” in northern Israel on November 19.[cvi] The IDF intercepted a drone launched ”from the east” before it entered Israeli airspace on November 19.[cvii]

Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Special Representative to the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov met with Iranian and Yemeni officials on November 19. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Bogdanov in Tehran on November 19.[cviii] The officials discussed regional issues and Iranian-Russian economic cooperation. Bogdanov’s visit to Tehran follows his meeting with former Yemeni Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and son of Yemeni former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, according to the Russian Embassy in Yemen.[cix] The officials discussed Yemen’s ”military-political” and humanitarian situation. Bogdanov underlined the importance of establishing a lasting dialogue among Yemenis through the United Nations.[cx] The United States and United Kingdom sanctioned Saleh in 2015 for his role in expanding Houthi control in Yemen.[cxi] Bogdanov may have discussed Russia’s support for the Axis of Resistance in both meetings.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi attended the second tripartite meeting with Saudi Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Waleed el Khereiji and Chinese Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Deng Li in Riyadh on November 19.[cxii] The officials reiterated their governments' commitment to the normalization of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia.[cxiii] The three also applauded the first Iranian-Saudi media committee meeting and a memorandum of understanding between the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry's Political and International Studies and Amir Saud al Faisal Diplomatic Studies Institute.

Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref met Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev in Tehran on November 20.[cxiv] Aref emphasized Iran's commitment to long-term, comprehensive collaboration with Russia and expanding bilateral economic relations alongside the implementation of existing agreements to boost trade.[cxv] Iran continues to cooperate with Russia in the energy sector. Russian Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Iranian Gas Company for Russia to supply pipeline gas to Iran in June.[cxvi] Iran has world’s second largest gas reserve after Russia, but Iran has high domestic gas demands and lacks the technology to increase gas production.[cxvii] Russian gas exports have decreased since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, so both states are collaborating in this sector to circumvent international sanctions on their economies.[cxviii] Iran also faces gas shortages for this upcoming winter and Masoud Pezeshkian’s government has received backlash domestically in their handling of gas shortages, including nationwide electricity blackouts.[cxix]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian discussed regional developments with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Tehran on November 20.[cxx] Thani separately met with Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi.[cxxi] Qatar confirmed on November 19 that Hamas officials responsible for ceasefire-hostage deal negotiations are no longer in Doha following the ongoing impasse in Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks.[cxxii] Qatar ended its role as negotiation mediator in early November.[cxxiii]

Iranian Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Aziz Nasir Zadeh traveled to Venezuela on November 19 to participate in the 10th Iran-Venezuela Joint Economic Commission.[cxxiv] Nasir Zadeh trip will conclude with a meeting with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.[cxxv]

The Iranian “Enjoining the Good and Forbidding the Evil” Headquarters opened the “Clinic for Quitting Hijab Removal” in Tehran on November 14, targeting women who refuse to comply with the mandatory hijab law and labeling them as mentally ill.[cxxvi] The Pezeshkian administration has tried to distance itself from the initiative.[cxxvii] Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Zahra Behrouz Azar said that “this issue has no connection to [the administration], and its establishment was not approved by the administration.”[cxxviii]

The IRGC Ground Forces killed three likely Jaish al Adl fighters, arrested six, and secured the surrender of five others in Sistan and Baluchestan Province on November 20.[cxxix] Jaish al Adl is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi group in southeastern Iran near the border with Pakistan. Iranian Deputy Parliament Speaker Ali Nikzad condemned a recent Jaish al Adl attack in Saravan, Sistan and Baluchestan Province, which killed two Basij members and injured another.[cxxx] Nikzad vowed a harsh response. The IRGC Ground Forces killed and arrested the fighters as part of the "Martyrs of Security" exercise, which began on October 31 in response to Jaish al Adl killing of ten Law Enforcement Command officers in Taftan, Sistan and Baluchestan Province, on October 26.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.