Iran Update, November 24, 2024

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

A top adviser to the Iranian supreme leader discussed Lebanon and ceasefire negotiations, nuclear policy, and a potential Iranian response to Israel’s October 25 strike. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor, Ali Larijani, specifically discussed Iran’s role in Lebanon. The interview was published in Iranian media on November 24.[i] Larijani confirmed Iran’s support for all Lebanese people, alongside Hezbollah, throughout Lebanon’s ceasefire negotiations with Israel. Larijani also reaffirmed support for Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s path of diplomacy. Larijani underlined, however, that Hezbollah must be part of Lebanon’s post-war decision-making process. Larijani’s statements underscore the importance that Iran assigns to Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon.[ii]  

Larijani stated that Iran will not “take any steps” to address the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) concerns about Iran’s nuclear program in the recent IAEA censure resolution if there is no compromise with the IAEA.[iii] The resolution censured Iran for failing to cooperate with the IAEA and comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.[iv] Iran will meet with the E3 countries, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, for nuclear negotiations in Geneva on November 29.[v] Iranian media reported on November 23 that Iran is activating 5,000 centrifuges in response to the censure resolution, and Iran‘s parliamentary speaker confirmed that Iran activated the centrifuges on November 24.[vi]  Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI) Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi told Iranian media on November 23 that the AEOI will activate thousands of centrifuges that will increase Iran’s uranium enrichment rate over the next four to six months.[vii]

Larijani said that Iran would respond to Israel’s October 25 attack on Iran, but did not confirm any details. Larijani added that the ”relevant officials will make the right decision.”[viii] Larijani agreed that Iran’s response’s goal is to deter Israel from attacking Iran again.[ix]

An unknown gunman fired on a Jordanian police patrol near the Israeli embassy in Amman, Jordan, on November 23.[x] The gunman injured three Jordanian police officers in the attack. An unspecified security source stated that Jordanian security forces shot and killed the attacker after pursuing him on foot for at least an hour.[xi] Jordanian Communications Minister Mohammad Momani called the attack a ”terrorist attack” targeting Jordanian security forces.[xii] The Israeli ambassador to Jordan left Jordan shortly after the October 7, 2023, attacks.[xiii]

Jordanian forces disrupted a drug smuggling attempt from Syria, underscoring the risk that Iranian-backed militias could use these smuggling networks to further their efforts to destabilize Jordan. Jordanian security forces killed one drug smuggler and arrested six others who were attempting to cross the Syrian-Jordanian border into Jordan on November 24.[xiv] Jordanian officials stated there has been an increased effort by drugs and arms smugglers linked to Iranian-backed militias based in southern Syria to cross the border into Jordan over the past few weeks. Iranian-backed militias, which support drug smuggling into Jordan, can also use those routes to smuggle arms from Syria into Jordan.[xv] Iran has increasingly prioritized building its militia networks in the West Bank in recent years. Iranian leaders could conclude that they need to invest further in building their networks in Jordan to develop their militia infrastructure in the West Bank more effectively. The Jordanian armed forces have conducted multiple airstrikes into Syria targeting Iranian-affiliated smuggling networks since the October 7 war began, suggesting either a change in Iranian-backed smuggling patterns and/or a change in Jordanian tolerance of them.[xvi] Both Israeli and Jordanian police have thwarted numerous attempts over the past year by Iran and its partners to transport small arms, explosives, mines, and rockets across the Jordan-West Bank border.[xvii]

Several Israeli settlers attempted to attack a senior IDF commander in Hebron, in the West Bank, on November 22.[xviii] Dozens of Israeli settlers attempted to attack IDF Central Command Commander Major General Avi Bluth during a religious pilgrimage to Hebron. The IDF Central Command is responsible for the West Bank, and its relationship with the Israeli settler community in the West Bank is usually strained because Israeli settlers oppose IDF authority in the area.[xix] Israeli security forces arrested five individuals who attempted to attack Bluth.[xx] At least one attacker was previously held in administrative detention before being released in July 2024.[xxi] Defense Minister Israel Katz announced the end to administrative detention for settlers in the West Bank on November 22.[xxii] This decision would result in Israeli security forces only issuing administrative detention orders for Palestinians accused of terrorism in the West Bank.[xxiii] Administrative detention is the controversial policy of holding suspects without charge in the West Bank.[xxiv] The United States warned Israel on November 23 that its decision to stop issuing administrative detention orders against West Bank settlers could increase violence in the West Bank.[xxv]

Israeli media reported on November 24 that the Israeli government is planning to extend reserve duty for 320,000 IDF reservists until March 2025.[xxvi] An Israeli opposition leader criticized this move by citing the burden on IDF reservists and called for broader recruitment, including recruiting ultra-Orthodox Israelis.[xxvii]

The UAE Interior Ministry arrested three unspecified individuals for the murder of Israeli-Moldovan Rabbi Zvi Kogan in the UAE.[xxviii] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel will use ”all means necessary...to the fullest extent of the law" to deal with the individuals, and those who dispatched them, involved with the murder of Kogan.[xxix] Emirati forces found Kogan's body in al Ain, near the Emirati-Omani border, on November 24 after he had been reported missing for several days.[xxx] Kogan worked in Dubai on behalf of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish organization.[xxxi] An unspecified person familiar with the investigation stated that Israel suspects that Uzbek nationals with ties to Iran were involved with the murder.[xxxii] Israel did not directly accuse Iran of involvement. Iran has previously used foreign nationals to conduct attacks and kidnappings targeting Israeli, Jewish, and dissident Iranian targets outside of Israel.[xxxiii]

Lebanese Hezbollah is likely firing large numbers of rockets at Israel to pressure the Israeli government during ongoing ceasefire negotiations. Hezbollah fired about 250 rockets at civilian and military targets in Israel over seven hours on November 24, according to IDF reports.[xxxiv]  Some of the rocket fire targeted central Israel, but the majority of Hezbollah’s attacks on November 24 targeted northern Israeli towns.[xxxv] Hezbollah is likely attempting to demonstrate to the Israeli government and people that continuing the IDF’s military operations will not create entirely safe conditions to return northern Israelis to their homes and that a ceasefire deal is the only viable way to accomplish Israeli war aims. One of Israel’s stated war aims is to return Israeli civilians to their homes in the north.

Hezbollah conducted three rocket attacks targeting IDF bases and targets in Tel Aviv, Yavne, and Ashdod that it claimed were in retaliation for recent Israeli airstrikes on northern and central Beirut.[xxxvi] Israeli Army Radio reported that Hezbollah fired four barrages of 17 launches into central Israel.[xxxvii] These attacks follow Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s promise in a November 20 speech that Hezbollah would attack “the center of Tel Aviv” in response to the Israeli airstrikes.[xxxviii] Hezbollah claimed that ”Beirut law applies to Tel Aviv” in a graphic published shortly after the attacks.[xxxix]

Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement. Financial Times (FT) reported on November 24 that Houthi-affiliated intermediaries recruited "hundreds" of Yemeni men since as early as July 2024 to travel to Russia after promising them lucrative jobs in the "security" and "engineering" fields and eventual Russian citizenship.[xl] Russian authorities reportedly instead forcibly conscripted the largely inexperienced recruits into the Russian army and sent them to fight in the war upon their arrival in Russia. FT also highlighted growing ties between the Kremlin and the Houthis, citing US Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking, who confirmed that Russia is actively engaging with the Houthis and discussing weapons transfers. CTP-ISW has assessed that the Kremlin has in part sought to offset heavy battlefield losses and personnel shortages by enlisting migrants and foreign nationals while avoiding another partial involuntary reserve callup in Russia.[xli] CTP-ISW also observed growing engagement between Kremlin officials and Houthis amid enhanced Russia-Iran cooperation and Iranian support for the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iran: A top adviser to the Iranian supreme leader discussed Lebanon and ceasefire negotiations, nuclear policy, and a potential Iranian response to Israel’s October 25 strike. Larijani stated that Iran will not “take any steps” to address the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) concerns about Iran’s nuclear program in the recent IAEA censure resolution if there is no compromise with the IAEA.
• Jordan: An unknown gunman fired on a Jordanian police patrol near the Israeli embassy in Amman, Jordan, on November 23.
• West Bank: Several Israeli settlers attempted to attack a senior IDF commander in Hebron, in the West Bank, on November 22.
• Israeli Reservists: Israeli media reported on November 24 that the Israeli government is planning to extend reserve duty for 320,000 IDF reservists until March 2025.
• Israeli Murdered in the UAE: The UAE Interior Ministry arrested three unspecified individuals for the murder of Israeli-Moldovan Rabbi Zvi Kogan in the UAE. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that Israel will use ”all means necessary...to the fullest extent of the law" to deal with the individuals responsible for Kogan’s murder.
• Hezbollah Operations: Lebanese Hezbollah likely fired large numbers of rockets at Israel to pressure the Israeli government during ongoing ceasefire negotiations. Hezbollah fired about 250 rockets at civilian and military targets in Israel in seven hours on November 24, according to IDF reports. Hezbollah is likely attempting to demonstrate to the Israeli government and people that continuing the IDF’s military operations will not create entirely safe conditions to return northern Israelis to their homes and that a ceasefire deal is the only viable way to accomplish Israeli war aims. One of Israel’s stated war aims is to return Israeli civilians to their homes in the north.
• Houthi-Russia Cooperation: Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement.

Gaza Strip:

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF 162nd Division likely continued clearing operations around the Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip on November 24. A Palestinian journalist reported IDF gunfire in the northern part of Jabalia refugee camp.[xliii] The Popular Resistance Committees mortared Israeli forces in Jabalia on November 24.[xliv]

Israeli forces continued operating in the central Gaza Strip on November 24. A local Palestinian journalist reported that the IDF conducted a controlled demolition of civilian infrastructure in Bureij and Nuseirat refugee camps.[xlv] The journalist also reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles there.[xlvi]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip on November 24. A local Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles in eastern Khan Younis.[xlvii]

Palestinian militias conducted at least two attacks targeting Israeli forces in the southern Gaza Strip on November 24.[xlviii] Hamas fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) targeting an IDF bulldozer north of Rafah City.[xlix] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) fired rockets targeting Israeli forces along the Philadelphi Corridor in the southern Gaza Strip.[l]

PIJ and Palestinian Mujahideen Movement fired rockets targeting an IDF base in southern Israel on November 24.[li]  

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

See the topline section.

Northern Israel and Lebanon

Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

The IDF 98th Division continued to operate in Khiam. Geolocated footage posted on November 23 showed the IDF conducting controlled demolitions of buildings in southern Khiam.[lii] Israeli forces have reportedly been operating on Khiam’s southern and eastern outskirts since advancing into the area on November 16.[liii] A Hezbollah-affiliated correspondent reported engagements between Israeli forces and Hezbollah fighters in Khiam‘s northern neighborhoods accompanied by artillery shelling over the area.[liv]

Hezbollah continued to claim attacks targeting Israeli forces near Deir Mimas, southeastern Lebanon, since CTP-ISW's last data cut off on November 23. Hezbollah fired rockets and mortars targeting Israeli forces near Deir Mimas.[lv]  Hezbollah fired anti-tank guided missiles targeting an Israeli tank on a hill on Deir Mimas’ western outskirts.[lvi] Hezbollah-affiliated outlet al Akhbar reported on November 22 that IDF armor was seen advancing toward the western outskirts of Deir Mimas.[lvii]

The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation orders for four towns west of Deir Mimas, southeastern Lebanon on November 23.[lviii] The IDF has previously ordered residents of these four towns to evacuate north of the Awali River.[lix] The IDF stated that it would operate against Hezbollah in evacuated areas.[lx]

The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southwestern Lebanon on November 24.[lxi] The 36th Division has raided over 150 targets in recent ground operations.[lxii] The IDF 1st Infantry Brigade, the 188th Armored Brigade, the 282nd Artillery Brigade, and Yahalom combat engineers have located weapons, rocket launchers, compounds, and other Hezbollah infrastructure.[lxiii]

Lebanese sources reported on November 22 that the IDF advanced over al Bayyada Hill, which is on the Lebanese coast north of Naqoura.[lxiv] A Lebanese journalist posted videos of purported anti-tank guided missiles launched at Israeli tanks positioned on al Bayyada Hill overlooking the Lebanese coast.[lxv] Geolocated imagery has suggested Israeli forces have been advancing towards the hill in recent days.[lxvi] Al Bayyada Hill overlooks UNIFIL Position 1-26 and a nearby Hezbollah military site. The hill also provides Israeli forces with an advantageous position to monitor Hezbollah activity along the coast.[lxvii] Hezbollah-affiliated media reported that Hezbollah fired numerous anti-tank missiles targeting Israeli tanks near al Bayyada town’s eastern outskirts.[lxviii] Hezbollah also claimed to engage Israeli forces with small arms and rockets on al Bayyada town’s northeastern outskirts.[lxix] Lebanese sources reported Israeli artillery shelling in the area.[lxx]

The IDF acknowledged and expressed regret for an IDF strike that inadvertently hit a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) post in southern Lebanon on November 24.[lxxi] The Israeli strike impacted a LAF checkpoint in al Amiriya, on the Tyre-al Qalila road.[lxxii] The LAF said the strike killed a soldier, injured 18 others, and caused damage to the post.[lxxiii] The IDF said it regretted the incident and clarified that it is not targeting the LAF.[lxxiv] The IDF said the incident took place in areas ”where fighting is ongoing” against Hezbollah.[lxxv]

Hezbollah claimed that it fired an anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli armor near a school in Jebbayn, southwestern Lebanon, on November 23.[lxxvi] The IDF has been operating in Jebbayn since at least November 15.[lxxvii]

The IDF conducted several airstrikes targeting Hezbollah command-and-control sites in Beirut’s southern suburbs on November 24.[lxxviii] The IDF struck two sites in Hadath and Haret Hreik, according to geolocated footage posted by Lebanese social media users.[lxxix] The IDF warned citizens to evacuate away from the buildings before the strikes.[lxxx]

The IDF Air Force (IAF) conducted an airstrike targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure on the Jusiyah border crossing on the Lebanon-Syria border overnight from November 23 to 24.[lxxxi] The IDF reported that Hezbollah uses civilian border crossings, including the Jusiyah crossing, to smuggle Iranian weapons into Lebanon via Syria.[lxxxii] The weapons are transferred by Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, which is involved in arms smuggling. An Israeli military correspondent reported that the IDF struck the Jusiyah crossing once previously in October 2024.[lxxxiii]

An unspecified senior US defense official stated that the IDF conducted an airstrike that killed Hezbollah Golan Heights commander Ali Mussa Daqduq.[lxxxiv] Several social media users previously suggested that the IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike targeting Daqduq outside Damascus on November 10.[lxxxv] Daquq directed attacks against hundreds of US servicemembers in Iraq in the 2000s.[lxxxvi] The IDF nor Hezbollah have confirmed the target of the airstrike.

Israeli Army Radio reported that US Special Envoy to Lebanon Amos Hochstein gave Israeli officials an ultimatum to reach a ceasefire deal in the next few days or Hochstein will stop acting as a mediator.[lxxxvii] An unspecified Israeli official claimed that there have been some hindrances to the negotiations recently. An Israeli journalist reported that Lebanon insists that France be involved in the monitoring committee to implement the ceasefire agreement.[lxxxviii] Israeli officials opposed French involvement due to France’s perceived ”anti-Israel stance.”[lxxxix]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Nothing Significant to Report.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.