Iran Update, November 6, 2024

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6.[i] Qassem said that Hezbollah was “ready” for a war of attrition and that Israel would “not win, even if it takes a long time.”[ii] The speech marked the 40-day death anniversary of former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and was Qassem’s second public statement since taking over as head of Hezbollah.[iii]

Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.[iv] Qassem said that Israel would have to end operations in Lebanon before Hezbollah would agree to indirect ceasefire talks through Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabhi Berri, who is a Hezbollah ally.[v] Qassem said that the ”ceiling” for negotiation would be the ”full protection of Lebanese sovereignty without any reduction,” suggesting that Hezbollah will not permit foreign forces to operate in southern Lebanon in any way that is beyond UNIFIL’s current mandate.[vi]

Qassem implicitly threatened the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).[vii] Qassem implied that LAF allowed an Israeli naval raid into Batroun, north of Beirut by saying that “today I will not accuse” but ”demand” an answer.[viii] Qassem further demanded that the LAF protect Lebanese maritime borders.[ix] Qassem appears to be implying that Hezbollah would not sit idle while the LAF coordinates with the IDF and could set the tone for LAF activities in southern Lebanon after the end of the Israeli ground operation. Israeli Army Radio reported that senior Hezbollah naval official Imad Amhaz surrendered without resistance to Israeli naval special operations forces in Batroun on November 1.[x] Qassem’s comments are notable given that the LAF is the security force responsible for enforcing Hezbollah’s withdrawal and disarmament in southern Lebanon, according to leaked copies of a late October ceasefire proposal.[xi] The leaked text stipulates that LAF would deploy 10,000 troops to southern Lebanon, monitor the Israel-Lebanon border and all land, sea, and air crossings, and dismantle all non-state military infrastructure while confiscating arms.[xii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the success of this proposal depends fully on Hezbollah’s agreement and cooperation with the LAF, making Qassem’s threats notable.[xiii]

Qassem grossly exaggerated the number of IDF injuries, deaths, and material damage caused by Hezbollah.[xiv] He falsely claimed that Hezbollah has killed and wounded over a thousand Israeli soldiers over the last 40 days.[xv] The IDF has announced that it has suffered 38 soldiers killed in action in southern Lebanon and northern Israel since the start of the ground operation.[xvi]

Qassem continued to extol Hezbollah’s strength after Israeli operations without providing any evidence. Qassem said that Hezbollah’s weapons stockpiles are not low.[xvii] The IDF has seized tens of thousands of anti-tank guided munitions from Hezbollah warehouses near the Israel-Lebanon border.[xviii] The IDF said that it had destroyed 70 percent of Hezbollah drones and 80 percent of Hezbollah rockets through its ground and air campaign.[xix] Qassem also claimed that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of fighters in reserve who are ready to engage the IDF.[xx] The IDF assessed that it has killed at least 3,000 Hezbollah fighters since October 7, 2023.[xxi] Israeli operations, including the pager and radio attacks, have injured thousands of additional Hezbollah fighters.[xxii] Western estimates of Hezbollah’s fighting force range from 20,000 to 50,000 fighters.[xxiii]  

IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.[xxiv] Halevi said that the IDF will develop plans to “expand and deepen” ground operations and activate those plans as needed.[xxv] Halevi noted that these plans will be formulated alongside efforts to pursue a diplomatic agreement in Lebanon.[xxvi] 

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to pressure the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Political Council leader Sheikh Ali al Asadi threatened that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—would target US bases in Iraq and Syria if the Iraqi government discovered that Israel used Iraqi airspace to attack Iran on October 25.[xxvii] The IDF struck several locations in Iraq and Syria on October 25 before launching strikes into Iran.[xxviii] The Iranian-backed Iraqi militias falsely believe that the United States can control Israeli actions and have often attacked US bases in Iraq and Syria as a retaliation against Israeli action. Both Israel and the United States have reportedly warned Iraq that Israel may strike targets in Iraq if Iranian-backed Iraqi groups target Israel from Iraqi territory.[xxix] These Israeli threats may have led Iraqi militias to attempt to deter Israel, including by pressuring the United States under the false assumption that the United States can prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq.

The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory. The US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told the Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani that Israel will almost certainly strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory, according to Axios.[xxx] Sullivan and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also pressured Sudani to limit Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks targeting Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria, something Sudani has so far failed to prevent.[xxxi]  Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Ansar Allah al Awfiya leader Ali al Fatlawi also told Lebanese outlet al Akhbar on November 5 that the Iraqi militias have the right to support the Iranian response against Israel, further underscoring Sudani’s failure to prevent militia attacks.[xxxii]

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory. Two unspecified Israeli sources told Axios on October 1 that Iraqi militias may soon attack Israel using ballistic missiles and drones.[xxxiii] The IRGC has probably shipped some of these missiles and drones in components to Iraqi militias, allowing the groups to assemble the systems themselves possibly with Houthi support, as CTP-ISW suggested on November 5. This collaboration could have also extended into rudimentary drone production.

Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.[xxxiv] Jaish al Adl acknowledged that two high-ranking commanders and 12 fighters were killed in what it said was a joint Iranian-Pakistani airstrike.[xxxv] The Pakistani officials have not confirmed the joint military action with Iran, however. The IRGC conducted drone and missile strikes in January 2024 on two Jaish al Adl headquarters in Koh Sabz, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan, on January 16 without Pakistan's permission. Pakistan responded by launching combination of drones, rockets, and air-launched standoff munitions targeting Baloch separatists in three locations near Saravan, Iran, on January 17.[xxxvi] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Pakistan on November 4 to meet with high-ranking Pakistani officials. Araghchi's trip likely aimed, in part, to express Iran's concerns regarding border security.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Iranian-backed Iraqi Militias: Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba threatened to target US bases in Iraq and Syria on November 4, likely to compel the US to prevent potential Israeli strikes in Iraq. The Biden Administration has conveyed to the Iraqi government that the United States will not be able to prevent an Israeli strike in Iraq if Iran attacks Israel from Iraqi territory.
• Iran in Iraq: The IRGC is reportedly transferring ballistic missiles and drones and planning a joint attack with Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against Israel, further suggesting Iran will retaliate for Israel’s October 25 strikes in Iran from Iraqi territory.
• Hezbollah: Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem claimed that Hezbollah would outlast Israel in a “war of attrition” in a speech on November 6. Qassem did not tie a Lebanon ceasefire to Israeli actions in the Gaza Strip, a notable shift from Nasrallah’s position before the ground operation.
• Israeli Ground Operations in Lebanon: IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi said on November 6 that the IDF will prepare plans to expand military operations in Lebanon.
• Anti-Regime Militancy in Iran: Iranian media claimed that Iran and Pakistan conducted a joint airstrike attack against Jaish al Adl, a Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militia on November 5.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to sustain clearing operations in the Gaza Strip
• Reestablish Hamas as the governing authority in the Gaza Strip

The IDF expanded clearing operations west of Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip on November 6. Commercially available satellite imagery published on November 6 indicates that the IDF conducted clearing operations in al Salateen neighborhood, which is located along the coastline west of Beit Lahiya. The IDF reportedly ordered Gazans to evacuate Beit Lahiya amid ongoing Israeli clearing operations in the area.[xxxviii] A Palestinian journalist reported that an IDF airstrike in Beit Lahiya on November 6 killed 15 Palestinian civilians.[xxxix] Palestinian militias conducted at least three attacks targeting Israeli forces west of the Jabalia refugee camp on November 6.[xl]

The IDF redeployed the IDF 99th Division to the Netzarim Corridor on November 6.[xli] The IDF 99th Division replaced the IDF 252nd Division that has been in the Netzarim Corridor since late July 2024.[xlii] The IDF 252nd Division killed hundreds of Palestinian fighters and demolished ten kilometers of Hamas tunnel systems during its three-month-long deployment.[xliii] The IDF 252nd Division conducted clearing operations during its deployment that marginally expanded the IDF’s presence north and south of the Netzarim Corridor.

The IDF continued destroying Palestinian militia infrastructure in the central Gaza Strip on November 6. A Palestinian journalist reported gunfire from Israeli vehicles around Nuseirat and Bureij refugee camps.[xliv] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) fired rockets targeting an IDF position in the central Gaza Strip.[xlv]

Gazans continued to protest price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in the central Gaza Strip for the third consecutive day on November 6.[xlvi] The protests expanded into the Maghazi and Nuseirat refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip, according to a Palestinian journalist. Local shop owners in Nuseirat called on local businesses to go on strike on November 7 to protest the price gouging.[xlvii] A Palestinian journalist posted a video showing several dozens of Gazans protesting the price gouging of humanitarian aid and goods in the central Gaza Strip.[xlviii]  These protests suggest that some Gazans are no longer afraid of Hamas’ internal security apparatus and are willing to break previous taboos by protesting, given that these protests are taking place in areas that the IDF has never fully cleared of Hamas in the central Gaza Strip where Hamas remains active.[xlix]

The World Health Organization (WHO) concluded the final phase of the polio vaccination campaign in the Gaza Strip on November 6.[l] The WHO confirmed that international aid organizations administered the second round of polio vaccines to approximately 94 percent of the target population across the Gaza Strip. Aid organizations resumed the third and final phase of administering polio vaccinations on November 1 after a one-week delay due to the ongoing Israeli clearing operations in the northern Gaza Strip.[li] The polio vaccination campaign began in September 2024 following the implementation of a temporary humanitarian pause in the Gaza Strip.[lii]

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant delivered a final address to Israeli citizens several hours after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed him from his position on November 5.[liii] Gallant outlined the “disagreements” that he had with Netanyahu that led to his dismissal, including his belief that Israel has a “moral obligation and responsibility” to return the Israeli hostages held by Hamas “as quickly as possible.”[liv] Gallant said that freeing the hostages is “achievable” but will require “painful compromises that Israel can bear and the IDF can deal with.”[lv] Gallant also noted that Netanyahu dismissed him due to his view that all Israelis of conscription age must serve in the IDF.[lvi] Gallant had approved plans prior to his dismissal on November 5 to issue draft orders to 7,000 members of Israel’s ultra-Orthodox community.[lvii] Ultra-orthodox Israelis have historically been exempted from mandatory IDF service, though this cut-out has come under fire in recent years.[lviii] Gallant took responsibility for the Israeli security establishment's “successes and failures” over the past two years and said that Israel’s security remains the “mission of [his] life.”[lix]

West Bank

Axis of Resistance objectives:

• Establish the West Bank as a viable front against Israel

A Palestinian man attempted to conduct a car ramming and stabbing attack at a bus stop near the Israeli settlement of Shilo in the West Bank on November 6.[lx] The man injured two Israeli civilians at the bus stop before the IDF shot him.[lxi] No militia has claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of this writing.

Israeli forces continued large-scale counterterrorism operations in the northern West Bank on November 6.[lxii] The IDF killed at least two Palestinian fighters in an airstrike in an unspecified area in the West Bank.[lxiii] The IDF arrested an unspecified number of individuals and destroyed an explosives laboratory in the northern West Bank. The IDF killed two fighters in Qabatiya, Jenin Governorate, who attempted to conduct a car ramming attack targeting IDF soldiers.[lxiv] Several Palestinian militias, including PIJ, Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Mujahideen Brigades, fired small arms and detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) targeting Israeli forces operating in Jenin Governorate on November 6.[lxv] The northern West Bank has long been a hotspot for Palestinian militancy, and Israeli forces focused counterterrorism efforts in the northern West Bank in late Summer and Fall 2024.

The Wall Street Journal reported on November 5 that the West Bank is on the “edge of economic collapse.”[lxvi] The Wall Street Journal reported that unemployment in the West Bank was around 31 percent between April and June 2024. The report noted that Israel has canceled over 100,000 work permits for Palestinians to work in Israel since October 2023. The Wall Street Journal, citing Palestinian officials and economic analyses, reported that every major economic sector in the West Bank has shrunk since the start of the October 7 War. The report added that the Palestinian Authority is expected to face a nearly $2 billion budget deficit in 2024. This report follows an Israeli government decision on October 31 to extend a cooperation waiver between Israeli and Palestinian banks in the West Bank until November 30.[lxvii] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned on October 31 that failing to extend the waiver for longer than a month-by-month basis creates a “looming crisis” in the West Bank.[lxviii]

Northern Israel and Lebanon
Lebanese Hezbollah objectives:

• End Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip
• Survive the October 7 War as a capable political and military organization with control over Lebanon

The IDF Air Force recently killed the commander of a Hezbollah battalion in Khiam.[lxix] The IDF said that the commander, Hussein Abdel Halim Harb, was responsible for launching several attacks on northern Israeli towns, including Metula.[lxx] Geolocated footage posted on November 6 showed the IDF 8th Armored Brigade (res.) (91st Division) operating in Khiam in recent days.[lxxi] The IDF said that the 8th Armored Brigade (res.) directed several airstrikes targeting other Hezbollah leaders and raided the “central headquarters” for Hezbollah fighters in the area.[lxxii] Israeli forces also destroyed firing points aimed toward northern Israeli towns and located and destroyed weapons, including Kornet missiles, grenades, and explosives.[lxxiii] Hezbollah-affiliated media reported on November 4 that the IDF had withdrawn from Khiam.[lxxiv]

Hezbollah fired rockets targeting Israeli forces between Kfar Kila, Lebanon, and Metula, Israel, on November 6.[lxxv] Lebanese media reported that Israeli forces conducted clearing operations in Kfar Kila on November 5 amid “heavy” artillery shelling in the area.[lxxvi]

The IDF 36th Division continued operations in southeastern Lebanon. Geolocated footage posted on November 5 showed the IDF 36th Division operating in western Houla.[lxxvii] Israeli forces directed several airstrikes targeting Hezbollah fighters, including a cell of fighters that fired rockets toward northern Israel on November 5.[lxxviii]

Hezbollah fired rockets and drones at Israeli forces on the eastern outskirts of Maroun al Ras on November 5 and 6.[lxxix]

Israeli forces continued operations in southwestern Lebanon near Alma al Shaab. Geolocated footage posted on November 5 showed Israeli forces clearing a building southwest of Alma al Shaab.[lxxx] Lebanese sources reported artillery shelling and bursts of small arms fire on the eastern outskirts of Alma al Shaab on November 6.[lxxxi]

The IDF continued its air campaign targeting Hezbollah capabilities and infrastructure on November 6. The IDF Air Force struck dozens of Hezbollah targets across Lebanon in the past day, including weapons depots, launch pads, fighters, military buildings, and other infrastructure.[lxxxii]

The IDF struck Hezbollah headquarters, weapons warehouses, and military infrastructure in Beirut’s southern suburbs for the first time since November 1.[lxxxiii] The Hezbollah Beirut regional command is responsible for this area. The airstrikes in Beirut’s southern suburbs are part of the IDF’s ongoing effort to damage Hezbollah infrastructure in the Beirut area.[lxxxiv] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation notices to the residents of Laylaki, Haret Hreik, and Burj al Barajneh in Beirut’s southern suburbs before conducting airstrikes in the area.[lxxxv]

The IDF Air Force conducted numerous strikes targeting Hezbollah sites north of the Litani River. The IDF struck numerous towns in the Baalbek region, eastern Lebanon.[lxxxvi] The Baalbek-Hermel governor reported that six airstrikes killed at least 38 people.[lxxxvii] Lebanon’s Civil Defense Service stated that search efforts for survivors and the deceased are ongoing.[lxxxviii] The IDF also struck several towns near Nabatieh, southern Lebanon.[lxxxix] The IDF Arabic-language spokesperson issued evacuation notices to residents in the Nabatieh area to evacuate away from four identified buildings before conducting airstrikes there.[xc]

This map illustrates individual Israeli air and artillery strikes based on local Lebanese reporting. This map depicts strikes reported from 2:00pm ET on November 5 to 2:00pm ET on November 6. This map is not exhaustive. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the locations of Israeli strikes.

Hezbollah has conducted at least 24 attacks into Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 5.[xci] The IDF said that Hezbollah fired at least 120 rockets into Israel from Lebanon on November 6.[xcii] A Hezbollah rocket struck an open area at Ben Gurion Airport.[xciii] Hezbollah said that it was targeting an IDF base near the airport.[xciv] Hezbollah rockets also struck a parked car in Ra'anana, central Israel.[xcv] Hezbollah continued to target Israeli military-industrial sites north of Haifa.[xcvi] Hezbollah also targeted the IDF 91st Division and 188th Armored Brigade headquarters with one-way attack drones and rocket fire.[xcvii] The 91st Division is currently operating in southeastern Lebanon. These attacks are likely part of a broader Hezbollah campaign to target IDF rear positions in northern Israel and “support lines” as part of its defense against Israel’s ground operation in southern Lebanon, though this effort has proved unsuccessful so far[xcviii][xcix] Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem said on November 6 that Hezbollah would escalate attacks on Israeli forces in the coming days to cause “pain” in Israel.[c]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has claimed five attacks targeting Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on November 5. The claims include the following:

• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Eilat.[ci] The IDF intercepted a drone over Arava, southern Israel, that crossed into Israeli territory from the east.[cii] The IDF separately intercepted a drone approaching Israel from the east before it crossed into Israeli territory.[ciii] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify which IDF interception corresponds to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s claim.
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in Haifa.[civ]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified “vital target” in southern Israel.[cv]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in southern Israel.[cvi] The IDF intercepted a drone approaching Israel from the east before it crossed into Israeli territory.[cvii]
• A drone attack targeting an unspecified military target in Golan Heights.[cviii]

The Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister’s Special Envoy to West Asia, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, met with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati in Beirut on November 5.[cix] Sheibani emphasized the importance of national unity and internal cohesion in Lebanon while reiterating Iran's readiness to send humanitarian aid to Lebanon.[cx] Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi appointed Sheibani as his special envoy to West Asia on October 1, the same day that the IDF launched its ground campaign into Lebanon.[cxi]

Iran and Belarus are expanding defense and military cooperation.  The Head of the Belarusian Defense Ministry’s Department of International Military Cooperation, Major General Valery Revenko, led a Belarusian Army delegation to the Iranian Artesh Command and General Staff University in Tehran on November 6.[cxii]  This visit is part of ongoing cooperation between Belarus and the Artesh. The Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Force commander recently met with the commanders of the Artesh, Artesh Air Force, and Artesh Air Defense Force in Tehran in August 2024.[cxiii] Russian state media also announced in August 2024 that Iran and Belarus will hold a combined military exercise, but did not specify when the exercise will take place.[cxiv]

The Iranian Judiciary sentenced three "Israeli spies" in West Azerbaijan Province, Iran, to death on November 5 due to their alleged involvement in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020.[cxv] The Judiciary accused the individuals of transporting unspecified equipment into Iran that Israel used to kill Fakhrizadeh.

The value of the Iranian rial reached a near record-low level on November 5 amid indications that former US President Donald Trump was slated to win the 2024 US presidential election.[cxvi] The value of the Iranian rial dropped to 703,000 rials to one US dollar, nearing its record-low value of 705,000 rials to one US dollar in April 2024. Trump previously imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran between 2018 and 2021, which significantly hurt the Iranian economy.[cxvii] The value of the rial likely dropped on November 5 in anticipation that Trump might impose harsher sanctions on Iran in his second term. The Iranian economy continues to face numerous challenges, including high inflation and rising unemployment.

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events.

CTP-ISW defines the “Axis of Resistance” as the unconventional alliance that Iran has cultivated in the Middle East since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979. This transnational coalition is comprised of state, semi-state, and non-state actors that cooperate to secure their collective interests. Tehran considers itself to be both part of the alliance and its leader. Iran furnishes these groups with varying levels of financial, military, and political support in exchange for some degree of influence or control over their actions. Some are traditional proxies that are highly responsive to Iranian direction, while others are partners over which Iran exerts more limited influence. Members of the Axis of Resistance are united by their grand strategic objectives, which include eroding and eventually expelling American influence from the Middle East, destroying the Israeli state, or both. Pursuing these objectives and supporting the Axis of Resistance to those ends have become cornerstones of Iranian regional strategy.