Iran Update, September 11, 2023

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched an interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

1. Iranian officials met with Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government officials to discuss disarming Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
2. Iranian forces deployed to Kurdish areas in western Iran, possibly to deter protests on the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death.
3. Iran is attempting to mitigate tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This follows reports of a military buildup on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border with both sides engaging in threatening rhetoric over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in recent days.

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iranian officials met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials to discuss disarming Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). This suggests that Iran is prioritizing gaining Kurdish support to implement the security agreement over conducting attacks against Iranian opposition groups in the IKR in the near term. Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Mohammad Kazem Al-e Sadegh met with KRG Prime Minister Masoud Barzani and KRG President Nechevin Barzani on September 11 to discuss bilateral relations. Their discussions included the Iran-Iraq security agreement that he Iranian and Iraqi governments signed in March 2023 that stipulated the Iraqi government will disarm and remove Iranian Kurdish opposition groups from the IKR by August 23.[i] Iranian leadership moved the deadline back to September 19. Iranian officials have warned that security forces would act if the Iraqi government did not fulfill the agreement, however.[ii] Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani stated that the Iraqi Army had deployed over 3,000 troops to the Iraqi Kurdistan-Iran border during a press conference, according to Iranian state-owned media outlet Tasnim.[iii] CTP, however, has not recorded any instances of Iraqi forces reinforcing the IKR-Iranian border.

Iranian forces deployed to Kurdish areas in western Iran, possibly to deter protests on the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death. Iran deployed military personnel and weaponry to Boukan and Mahabad, West Azerbaijan Province and Marivan and Saghez, Kurdistan Province on the Iran-Iraqi Kurdistan border between August 18 and September 11.[iv] These primarily Kurdish towns were major hotspots during the height of the Masha Amini protest wave and suffered some of the harshest protest suppression from Iranian security forces, as CTP previously reported.[v] Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani praised the Iraqi government in a statement on September 11 for taking “good measures” to implement the security agreement following these deployments.[vi]

The deployments to western Iran could support Iranian attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan after the anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death. Iran has given the Iraqi government a deadline of September 19 to disarm Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the IKR. Iran gave a similar ultimatum to the Iraqi government in November 2022, claiming that Kurdish opposition groups were arming and fueling the Masha Amini protest movement, particularly in western Iran.[vii] Iranian forces launched attacks into the IKR targeting the Kurdish opposition groups when the Iraqi government did not comply.[viii]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iran is attempting to mitigate tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani stated on September 11 that Iran is diplomatically engaged with Armenia and Azerbaijan to ensure peace and security in the Caucasus.[ix] A high-level Iranian military delegation met with Azerbaijani Defense Ministry officials in Baku on September 9 to discuss enhancing Azerbaijani-Iranian military cooperation and ensuring stability on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.[x] President Ebrahim Raisi called for dialogue to resolve regional tensions during a phone call with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on September 9.[xi] This follows reports of a military buildup on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border with both sides engaging in threatening rhetoric over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in recent days.[xii]

Raisi also stressed that Iran is prepared to assume an “effective role” as a “powerful neighbor” to prevent geopolitical changes in the Caucasus during his phone call with Pashinyan. Raisi’s statement is noteworthy given the regime’s recently expressed concerns about geopolitical trends in the region. Senior Iranian officials, including Raisi, emphasized Iran’s strong opposition to foreign interference and geopolitical changes in the Caucasus during their meetings with Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Tehran on September 3.[xiii] Supreme Leader Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati warned on July 13 that Turkish and NATO interference in the Caucasus will raise the risk of conflict in the region which Iran’s adversaries -- specifically the United States and Israel -- will exploit to “undermine the security of the entire region.”[xiv]

Israel-based i24News and Kuwaiti newspaper Al Jarida claimed on September 11 that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has authorized Iranian military intervention in the Caucasus. The outlets also claimed that India, Iran, and Russia have supplied Armenia with a substantial amount of military equipment over the past month.[xv] i24News similarly claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan.[xvi] CTP cannot independently verify any of the above claims. The claim that Iran has supplied drones and military equipment to Armenia is consistent with Supreme Leader Military Affairs Adviser and former IRGC Commander Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi’s assertion in October 2022 that 22 countries, including Armenia, sought to buy Iranian drones.[xvii] The claim also follows reports of recrudescent tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in recent days and Iranian attempts to mitigate the tensions.[xviii] Senior Iranian officials have, furthermore, expressed Iran’s vehement opposition to and willingness to prevent geopolitical changes in the Caucasus in recent months.[xix] Iran’s provision of drones to Armenia would also be part of the regime’s larger effort to leverage arms sales to generate revenue for the Iranian economy, as CTP previously assessed.[xx]

Flightradar24 incorrectly reported that a Pouya Air aircraft flew to Russian-occupied Crimea on September 7.[xxi] This announcement changes CTP’s assessment that the aircraft was possibly transferring military materials and/or personnel to Russian positions in Crimea. Iran continues to supply Russia with military equipment via other routes, such as the Caspian Sea route, however.[xxii]