September 14, 2023

Iran Update, September 14, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani and Nicholas Carl

The Iran Update aims to inform national security policy by providing timely, relevant, and independent open-source analysis of developments pertaining to Iran and its Axis of Resistance. This update covers political, military, and economic events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. It also provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute with support from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates Monday through Friday. To receive Iran Updates via email, please subscribe here.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched an interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions.

Key Takeaways

  1. The IRGC Quds Force and LH are trying to significantly increase their military infrastructure in Mayadin in eastern Syria. The expanding presence there in part supports the Iranian campaign to expel US forces from Syria.
  2. Iranian-backed political actors in Iraq are preparing to coopt legal procedures and requirements to disqualify opponents in the upcoming Iraqi provincial elections in December 2023.
  3. Iranian leaders are using a combination of military threats and foreign diplomacy to resolve three simultaneous security challenges around northwestern Iran.

Iranian Activities in the Levant

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout the Levant especially in Syria. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) are trying to significantly increase their military infrastructure in Mayadin in eastern Syria. The IRGC Quds Force plans to build up its nearby Soleimani base into the largest Iranian military base abroad, according to local reports on September 13.[i] This plan involves transferring unspecified weapons from the Imam Ali base on the Iraq-Syria border to the Soleimani base. The Imam Ali base is the largest Iranian military base abroad, which the IRGC uses to house drones, missiles, and fighters.[ii] CTP previously reported that the IRGC Quds force and LH established a joint headquarters in Mayadin in June 2023 and prepared a runway to support drone operations near Mayadin in August 2023.[iii]

This expanding presence in Mayadin in part supports the Iranian campaign to expel US forces from Syria. CTP has reported extensively on how Iran has sought to create an increasingly hostile operating environment for US forces in Syria to this end. The buildup of military infrastructure in Mayadin is consistent with fostering this kind of environment. Mayadin is an especially noteworthy location given that it is across the river from US positions in eastern Syria.

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

Iranian-backed political actors in Iraq are preparing to coopt legal procedures and requirements to disqualify opponents in the upcoming Iraqi provincial elections in December 2023. Judge Haydar Hanoun—the head of the Federal Integrity Commission and affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization—announced on September 14 that his commission will audit candidates, their families, and their affiliates for corruption ahead of the elections.[iv] This announcement comes after the Shia Coordination Framework—a loose coalition of Iranian-backed political parties—approved in March 2023 legal amendments that prohibit individuals charged with corruption from running for office.[v] CTP assessed at the time that the Federal Integrity Commission could use these amendments to marginalize political opponents by charging them with corruption.[vi]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Iranian leaders are using a combination of military threats and foreign diplomacy to resolve three simultaneous security challenges around northwestern Iran.

  • Regime security forces have deployed units to northwestern Iran in recent weeks to deter and prevent the eruption of anti-regime protests.[vii] Iranian leaders have expressed concerns that protests could ignite, especially in Kurdish-majority areas in the northwest, to commemorate the one-year anniversary of Mahsa Amini’s death on September 16.[viii] CTP previously assessed that the regime may violently suppress demonstrations that erupt in northwestern Iran in the coming days.[ix]
  • Iranian leaders are negotiating with Iraqi authorities to disarm and relocate anti-Iranian regime Kurdish militias operating in Iraqi Kurdistan.[x] Iranian leaders frequently accuse these militias of fueling unrest in Iran and have warned that they would conduct attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan if Iraqi authorities do not disarm and relocate the groups by September 19.[xi] Senior Iranian officials have indicated that the Iraqi central government will meet their demands, making a potential Iranian attack into Iraqi Kurdistan unlikely in the coming days.[xii]
  • Iranian leaders have engaged Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish officials in recent weeks to discuss rising tensions in the Caucasus.[xiii] Iranian leaders have repeatedly expressed concerns that Azerbaijan seeks to establish a land corridor that connects Azerbaijan proper, through Armenia, to its Nakhchivan enclave.[xiv] Such a corridor would directly connect Azerbaijan to Turkey and hamper Iranian economic access to European and Russian markets. The repeated engagements in recent days underscores Iranian leaders’ desire to diffuse tensions through diplomatic means.

[i] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/09/13/9670

[ii] https://www.jpost dot com/Middle-East/Iran-is-building-tunnels-in-Syria-near-Iraq-border-for-weapons-610501; https://twitter.com/Step_Agency/status/1171818667182645248; http://syria.tv/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%AF%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1; https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/03/20/8018 ; https://israel-alma dot org/2023/03/23/the-imam-ali-base-in-albukamal-a-central-military-anchor-in-the-iranian-corridor-to-syria-and-lebanon/

[iii] https://eyeofeuphrates dot com/ar/news/2023/06/29/8987; https://www.syriahr.com/en/306240/

[iv] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%87%D9%8A-%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B7%D9%84%D9%82-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%83-%D9%87%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B4%D8%AD%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3-%D9%88%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B8%D9%81%D9%8A%D9%86

[v] https://iq.parliament dot iq/blog/2023/03/20/%d9%85%d8%ac%d9%84%d8%b3-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%86%d9%88%d8%a7%d8%a8-%d9%8a%d8%a8%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b5%d9%88%d9%8a%d8%aa-%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%89-%d9%82%d8%a7%d9%86%d9%88%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%86/

[vi] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-20-2023

[vii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-11-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-18-2023 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1692466035981455534 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1694692803798794393 ; https://twitter.com/HengawO/status/1694605358411509896 ; https://x.com/HengawO/status/1701283662644338998?s=20 ; https://x.com/HengawO/status/1701171074824565020?s=20  

[viii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-12-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-11-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-6-2023  ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-18-2023

[ix] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-12-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-11-2023

[x] https://www.irna com ir/news/85227830/ ; https://www.tasnimnews com com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7 ; https://www.ina dot iq/193443.html ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/20/2954568 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85227830

[xi] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/20/2924321/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640 ; https://amwaj dot media/media-monitor/iraqi-pm-on-iran-charm-offensive-as-deadline-to-disarm-kurdish-groups-looms

; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2022/11/21/iran-attacks-positions-in-nort... ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-29 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-28 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-2 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-4 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-5 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-16 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-11 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-22 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-20 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-14

[xii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-13-2023 ; https://www dot irna.ir/news/85227830/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www dot shafaq.com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA-%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%B6%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7 ; https://www.ina dot iq/193443.html ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/20/2954568 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85227830

[xiii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/08/23/2945498 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/03/2951466 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/04/2951633 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/04/2951654 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/11/2954635 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/20/2954568 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/14/2956294 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85228379 ; https://www.farsnews dot ir/en/news/14020623000340

[xiv] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-24-2023 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-21-2023