September 11, 2023

Iran Update, September 18, 2023

Johanna Moore and Amin Soltani

Key Takeaways

  1. The IRGC deployed forces to the Iran-Iraq border, likely to coerce the Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government to stop threats from anti-Iran opposition groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.
  2. Iran could also use the recent deployments to conduct attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan should coercion fail.
  3. Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani threatened on September 16 to retaliate against the United States for its decision to unload seized Iranian oil from the Suez Rajan

Iranian Activities in Iraq

This section covers Iranian efforts to consolidate and expand Tehran’s economic, military, and political influence throughout Iraq. This section examines some of the many campaigns that Iran is pursuing to achieve this strategic objective. CTP will update and refine our assessments of these campaigns over time and in future updates.

The IRGC deployed forces to the Iran-Iraq border, likely to coerce the Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to stop threats from anti-Iran opposition groups in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). The Iranian and Iraqi governments signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in March 2023 stipulating that the Iraqi government is responsible for disarming and removing Kurdish opposition groups from the IKR.[i] Iranian officials threatened last week to conduct attacks into the IKR if Iraqi authorities do not fully implement the security agreement by September 19. Iranian officials have more recently acknowledged that the Iraqi government is meeting most of the stipulations in the MOU.[ii] Protests around Mahsa Amini’s death anniversary on September 16 did not materialize to the extent that regime officials and Western media expected. This provides the regime with an opportunity to use the northwest deployments to instead degrade Kurdish militants in the IKR without facing bandwidth constraints from suppressing protests, as CTP previously assessed.[iii]

  • The IRGC Ground Force deployed tanks, artillery, and multiple launch rocket (MLRS) systems to unspecified locations on Iran’s northwestern borders on September 13.[iv] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency claimed on September 13 that the deployments were meant to maintain border security.[v] Iran has previously used artillery and MLRS, in addition to missiles and drones, to target anti-regime groups in the IKR.[vi]
  • IRGC Operations Deputy Brigadier General Abbas Nilforoushan stated that if the Kurdish opposition groups are not completely disarmed and their headquarters are not properly dismantled, Iran will “protect the security of the country.”[vii] Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Nasser Kanani stated on September 18 that the Iraqi government had met many of the stipulations under the security agreement but was still in the process of fulfilling outstanding components.[viii]
  • Iranian security forces interdicted two separate Kurdish separatist groups in Kurdistan Province and Ilam Province between September 15 and 17 attempting to smuggle weapons into Iran from the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) to arm protesters and conduct attacks.[ix] Iranian officials, however, did not suggest that these arrests posed an increased risk to Iranian security and maintained that the Iraqi government was still working to fully implement their security agreement.

Iran could also use the recent deployments to conduct attacks against Iraqi Kurdistan should coercion fail. These deployments are suitable for both securing the border against armed militants and conducting attacks into Iraqi Kurdistan region (IKR). Iranian officials and media continue to highlight the threat Kurdish militants in the IKR pose to Iranian security.[x] Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Mohammad Reza Ashtiani stated on September 18 that Iran will consider taking military action after the September 19 deadline, consider with regime rhetoric in recent weeks.[xi] Protests around Mahsa Amini’s death anniversary on September 16 did not materialize to the extent that regime officials and Western media expected. This provides the regime with an opportunity to use the northwest deployments to instead degrade Kurdish militants in the IKR without facing bandwidth constraints from suppressing protests, as CTP previously assessed.[xii]

Iranian Domestic and Political Affairs

This section covers factors and trends affecting regime decision-making and stability. CTP will cover domestic politics, significant protest activity, and related issues here.

Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani threatened on September 16 to retaliate against the United States for its decision to unload seized Iranian oil from the Suez Rajan tanker. Ashtiani further warned that Iran can disrupt maritime energy trade in the Persian Gulf.[xiii] The United States unloaded Iranian oil on August 20 off of the Suez Rajan tanker it seized in late April.[xiv] IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri similarly threatened on July 20 that Iran will hold the United States and US companies responsible for confiscating and unloading Iranian oil.[xv] CTP previously assessed that Iran will likely retaliate by harassing or seize US commercial and military vessels and personnel in the Gulf.[xvi]

[i] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/04/world/middleeast/iran-kurds-iraq.html ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/21/iran-attacks-positions-in-northern-iraq-targeting-kurdish-groupso ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/13/missiles-hit-iraqs-kurdish-capital-no-casualties-officials

[ii] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/27/2957734/%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-5-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[iii] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-september-14-2023

[iv] https://www dot tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www dot tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640

[v] https://www dot tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640

[vi] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/rocket-attack-near-iraqs-erbil-kills-one-wounds-10-mayor-2022-11-14/ ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-guards-launch-artillery-attack-militants-iraqi-kurdistan-2022-09-24/ ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/21/iran-attacks-positions-in-northern-iraq-targeting-kurdish-groupso ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-29 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-september-28 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-2 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-4 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-5 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-16 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-11 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-22 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-20 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-november-14

[vii] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B2%D8%B1%D9%87%DB%8C-%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C-%D8%B2%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%A7%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%B2%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%B6%DB%8C%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AA%DA%A9%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%84%DB%8C ; https://www dot iranintl.com/en/202309136356

[viii] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/27/2957734/%DA%A9%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-5-%D8%B4%D9%87%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B2-%D8%A2%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B6%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%AE%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B9-%D8%AF%D9%88-%DA%A9%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA

[ix] https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2956898/%D8%AE%D9%86%D8%AB%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%DB%8C-%D8%AD%D9%85%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%BA%DB%8C%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%B3%D9%82%D8%B2-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2957052/%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AA%DB%8C%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D9%88-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1 ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956696/%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B2%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA-%DA%86%D9%86%D8%AF-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86 ; https://www dot irna.ir/news/85229413/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B6%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%DA%A9%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF%D9%86%D8%AF ; https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956701/%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1-%DA%AF%D8%B1%D9%88%D9%87%DA%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%88%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85

[x] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956696 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/24/2956701 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85229413 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2956966 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/25/2956898 ;  

[xi] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/26/2957190 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/09/17/2957363 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955761 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/06/22/2955640 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/21/2924658; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/20/2924321

[xii]

[xiii] https://x.com/IranNuances/status/1703036380350238820?s=20   

[xiv] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/iranian-oil-cargo-seized-by-us-begins-unloading-after-long-delay-2023-08-20/ ; https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2023/08/us-finally-unloads-iranian-oil-seized-tanker ; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/us/politics/iran-oil-sanctions-violations.html  

 

[xv] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/04/29/2928597 ; https://www.irna dot ir/news/85175663

[xvi] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-20-2023-64b9d7ab38bc6 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-august-4-2023  

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